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I. ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
1. Expectation of privacy
A person is protected by the fourth amendment when his legiti-
mate expectation of privacy has been violated by an unlawful search or
seizure.' For purposes of the fourth amendment, standing is equivalent
to an expectation of privacy; one does not have standing unless one's
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated by a search or
seizure.' An expectation of privacy consists of a person's subjective ex-
pectation tempered by society's objective consideration that the expec-
I. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 (1980) (defendants Salvucci and Zackular
failed to show an expectation of privacy in an apartment, rented by Zackular's mother,
where stolen mail was found); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (automobile passengers
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in car's glove compartment nor under car's
seat). The Court in Rakas stated: "[Capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person
who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place." 439 U.S. at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)); see
infra note 3 and accompanying text.
2. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 93. The SalvucciCourt rephrased the standing
issue by stating that the question is "not merely whether the defendant had a possessory
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tation is reasonable. 3
a. containers
In Illinois v. Andreas,4 the Supreme Court decided that a warrant-
less reopening of a sealed container, in which drugs had been found
during an earlier border search, did not violate the fourth amendment.
When a large, locked metal container arrived at O'Hare International
Airport from Calcutta, a customs officer opened it and found a table in
which marijuana was concealed. The customs officer informed a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent who later confirmed that the
substance was marijuana. The container was then resealed with the
table inside. The next day, the DEA agent and a Chicago police officer
posed as delivery men and delivered the container to the defendant,
leaving it outside his door. While the police officer went to obtain a
search warrant, the DEA agent kept the apartment under surveillance
and observed the defendant take the package inside. Between thirty
and forty-five minutes after the delivery, but before the officer returned
with a warrant, the defendant left the apartment with the container and
was immediately arrested by the agent. At the police station, the of-
ficers opened the container, without a warrant, and seized the mari-
juana inside the table.
interest in the items seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area
searched." Id.
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, FBI agents' illegal wiretapping
and recording of a bookmaker's conversations in a public phone booth violated the defend-
ant's expectations of privacy in the conversations, because the defendant relied upon the
privacy of the booth. The Court held that the test to determine whether a person had a
reasonable expectation of privacy is that the person "exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy, and,. . . that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable."' Id. at 361 (Harland, J., concurring).
Relying on Rakas and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the Fifth Circuit has
stated that factors to consider when analyzing one's expectation of privacy include: whether
one has a "possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched, whether [one] has the
right to exclude others from that place, whether [one] has exhibited a subjective expectation
that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether [one] took normal precau-
tions to maintain his privacy and whether [one] was legitimately on the premises." United
States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981) (court held that defendant had an
expectation of privacy in gambling records hidden in his parents' house under their bed)
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
4. 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion in which Justices
O'Connor, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion.
5. Id. at 3325.
6. Andreas was charged with two counts of possessing a controlled substance. Id. at
3322.
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The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the ma-
rijuana found inside the table.7 The appellate court affirmed and held
that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the ship-
ping container.8 The court reasoned that since the police had failed to
make a "controlled delivery," they needed a warrant to validly reopen
and search the container.9
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the ap-
pellate court. First, the Court recognized that the initial border search
and the "controlled delivery"" were legal law enforcement tech-
niques.' Second, Andreas' expectation of privacy in the contents of
the container was extinguished when the officers legally opened it and
discovered illicit drugs.13 Upon resealing the container to make a con-
trolled delivery, the defendant's expectation of privacy was not re-
vived. 4 The Court analogized its holding to the reasoning underlying
the plain view doctrine. 5 Under the plain view doctrine, one does not
retain a privacy interest in an item that falls within the plain view of an
officer who has a legal right to be in the position to observe the object.' 6
Therefore, once the police discovered that the container concealed ma-
7. Id
8. Id. See People v. Andreas, 100 IM. App. 3d 396, 426 N.E.2d 1078 (1981).
9. 103 S. Ct. at 3322. Controlled deliveries occur in the following situations:
when a carrier discovers contraband while inspecting luggage to learn the identity
of the owner, when the drugs fall out of a broken piece of luggage; or when the
carrier exercises his privilege to inspect packages upon justified suspicion. The
contraband is restored to its container and then the carrier or police will deliver the
resealed container to its owner. Once the owner accepts the delivery, he is arrested
and the container is seized and searched a second time for the contraband that was
earlier seen inside.
Id at 3323 (citing United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472,476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
843 (1980)).
In Bulgier, an airport employee discovered cocaine in the defendant's suitcase and noti-
fied DEA agents, who identified the contraband. The court held that the initial seizure
followed by a controlled delivery, in which the agent kept the suitcase under constant sur-
veillance, created a constructive seizure which validated the second search of the suitcase
after the defendant's arrest. United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472, 476 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980).
10. 103 S. Ct. at 3322, 3325.
11. See supra note 9.
12. 103 S. Ct. at 3322-23.
13. Id. at 3323.
14. Id. at 3323-24.
15. Id at 3324. Under the plain view doctrine, police can make a warrantless seizure of
evidence that is within their plain view. If the discovery is inadvertent, and if the object is in
a public place, and the officer las a legal right to be in the position to observe the item, then
the officer's observation does not violate the fourth amendment. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971). The rationale behind the doctrine is that one does
not have a privacy interest in something that can be seen by the public.
16. 103 S. Ct. at 3324.
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rijuana, the contraband was like an object within the officer's plain
view.t" Thus, the defendant's privacy interest in the illicit drugs was
lost. 8
In reversing the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court stated
that a perfect controlled delivery was nearly impossible to attain in a
criminal investigation.' 9 The chances that the container will be put to
other uses or that contraband may be removed during a break in sur-
veillance depends upon various factors: the length of the break; the
nature and uses of the container; and "the setting in which the events
occur."2 Even though police cannot be absolutely certain that the con-
tents of the container are the same, this fact is insufficient to restore or
create a reasonable expectation of privacy in the container. 2'
Having held that a gap in surveillance does not automatically re-
store a privacy interest, the Court recognized the need for a standard to
determine when an individual's expectation of privacy in a container is
17. Id.
18. Id The Court stated that the owner may retain his title and possessory interest, but
not his privacy. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that this statement was
"out of touch with the genius of the American system of liberties." Id at 3327 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Brennan was astounded by the implications of the Court's decision. He essen-
tially saw the majority as saying that a person loses his privacy interest in an item that has
been seen in plain view whether the item is in the home or in public. Id at 3327-28 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Justice Brennan claimed that the plain view doctrine "hurts rather than
helps the Court's case." Id at 3327 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plain view doctrine neces-
sarily implies that a fourth amendment search is involved but that an exception to the war-
rant requirement applies. Here, the majority should not have used the rationale of the plain
view doctrine when it held that the fourth amendment did not apply because there was no
fourth amendment search. He stated that the fact that a person displays incriminating evi-
dence in plain view is not alone sufficient to authorize a search or seizure of the item. There
must be an independent reason for intruding upon an individual's right to repose and secur-
ity in his possessions. Usually, the plain view doctrine only justifies a search or seizure of an
item if the authorities have probable cause to suspect the item is connected with criminal
activity; the majority admitted this point. There would be no need for probable cause or for
a discussion of probable cause, however, if there was no fourth amendment search. Id. at
3328 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was making a semantic argument-the ma-
jority cannot analogize exceptions to the warrant requirement when it concludes that the
fourth amendment was not triggered.
19. Id. at 3324. The Court recognized the police's problem of maintaining surveillance
of the container they are trailing without being detected in their surveillance activities. .d.
20. Id.
21. Ird (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979)). In Sanders, the
Court suggested that although police may not be certain of the contents of containers taken
from automobiles, this lack of certainty does not prevent police searches of such containers.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979).
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reinstated after an interruption in control or surveillance by police.22
The Court stated that a standard which would limit "the risk of intru-
sion on legitimate privacy interests is whether there is a substantial
likelihood that the contents of the container have been changed during
the gap in surveillance. 23
If there is not a substantial likelihood that the contents have been
changed, there is not a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents
of a container which has been previously opened under lawful author-
ity.24 The Court concluded that because of the size of the container, its
specialized purpose, and the short break in surveillance, there was not a
substantial likelihood that the contents of the container had changed
while it was in the apartment.' Hence, the defendant had no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the container, and the reopening did not
constitute a search within the scope of the fourth amendment.26
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan objected to the Court's
labeling of the second search as a "reopening" rather than a search.27
He stated that Andreas had a protected privacy interest in the contents
of the container once it was delivered,2 and that the majority had re-
duced the right of privacy to dependence upon secrecy. 29 Once the
legal border search revealed the contraband, Andreas' reasonable ex-
pectation that the contraband would remain secret was lost and could
not be restored. 30  Andreas' right to maintain the integrity of his
container, however, was only temporarily waived when the box passed
through customs. His privacy interest was not extinguished by the bor-
der search; it was merely suspended.3' Justice Brennan stated that the
22. 103 S. Ct. at 3324.
23. Id. at 3324-25. The majority stated that in fashioning this test, it considered three
fourth amendment principles: (1) the standard must be workable for application by rank and
file police officers; (2) it must be reasonable, which means it would be absurd to recognize an
expectation of privacy where there is only a minimal probability that the contents of a
container have been changed; and (3) the test should be objective and not dependent upon
an individual officer's belief. Id at 3324.
24. Id. at 3325.
25. Id. The container was out of the officer's sight for approximately thirty to forty-five
minutes. After this time period, the defendant emerged from his apartment and was
arrested.
26. Id. at 3324-25.
27. Id at 3325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 3326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the fourth amendment does
not "protect only information." It also protects the "right to be let alone." Id (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 3326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 3326-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978),
1985]
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initial search does not validate the subsequent warrantless search or
render it a non-search.
32
Justice Brennan also objected to the Court's "substantial likeli-
hood" test.3 3 He indicated that if a person has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in a container whose contents are legally known, then a
person's expectation of privacy should be restored if he has unobserved
access to the container and any opportunity to change its contents.3 4
Because the container was within Andreas' possession, unobserved, for
thirty to forty-five minutes, there was not a substantial likelihood that
the container still contained contraband.35 Justice Brennan stated that
the Court's vague standard makes possible serious intrusions into a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
36
Finally, Justice Brennan believed that the case did not fall within
an exception to the warrant requirement.3 7 The case did not present
any of the conditions necessary to justify an exception, such as the need
to preserve the safety of officers,38 to prevent loss or destruction of evi-
dence,3 9 or to protect a compelling government interest.40  When a
legal search notifies suspects that they are objects of official interest, the
exigent circumstances doctrine recognizes that any delay in obtaining a
warrant may risk the destruction of evidence or the security of of-
ficers.4 ' In Andreas, the police officers who had searched the container
were in the process of obtaining a search warrant but instead decided to
conduct a warrantless search.42 There was no indication that the
the Court held that although a building fire and its immediate consequences are exigent
circumstances which justify a warrantless search, any further investigations which occur af-
ter the exigent circumstances cease require a warrant. The fire merely suspends the privacy
right; it does not extinguish it. 103 S. Ct. at 3326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 3327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 3329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 3328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. .d (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (war-
rantless search incident to arrest is legal if confined to the area within defendant's immediate
control, which means the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destruc-
tible evidence).
39. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (to preserve evidence in a car the automo-
bile exception allows officers to conduct a warrantless search of a car incident to a lawful
arrest or if there is probable cause).
40. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (dicta stating that officers may conduct
warrantless vehicle and baggage searches at border to prevent entrance of illegal aliens or
illegal goods).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 3328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id at 3329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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agents' safety was jeopardized or that the evidence was going to be de-
stroyed. In this situation, Justice Brennan did not see what interest the
Court was vindicating by its decision.43
In United States v. Knotts, 4 the Supreme Court held that use of
beeper signals, which enabled police to trace a car to the defendant's
cabin, did not violate the defendant's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.45 Police suspected co-defendant Armstrong of purchasing chlo-
roform to manufacture illicit drugs. Visual surveillance of Armstrong
revealed that after he bought the chemical he delivered it to co-defend-
ant Petschen. Prior to Armstrong's purchase, police had arranged with
a chemical company to install a beeper in a five-gallon drum of chloro-
form that was sold to Armstrong. Armstrong transferred the drum to
Petschen's car, which the officers began to follow by both visual and
electronic means. After losing visual surveillance, the officers were
forced to rely solely on the beeper signals, and traced the car to defend-
ant Knotts' cabin in Wisconsin. After three days of visual surveillance
of the cabin, the officers obtained a search warrant. In the cabin they
found a clandestine drug laboratory which included chemicals, equip-
ment and formulas for the production of amphetamines.
The trial court denied Knotts' motion to suppress the evidence
based on the warrantless monitoring of the beeper.46 Knotts was con-
victed of conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in violation
of 21 U.S.C. section 846. 47 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and held that monitoring the beeper signals violated Knotts'
reasonable expectation of privacy.48 The court reasoned that the search
moved from the public to the private sphere when the car left the high-
way and entered Knotts' property.49
43. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens appeared to
agree with Chief Justice Burger that "absolute certainty" is not required by the fourth
amendment. He seemed unwilling to say, however, that thirty to forty-five minutes was
sufficient to reestablish a privacy interest. This determination involves a question of fact
and hence he would remand to the trial court. Id. at 3329-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice Brennan filed
a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Jus-
tice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
45. 460 U.S. at 285.
46. Id. at 279.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both. .. ."
48. 460 U.S. at 282. See United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1981), for
opinion of lower court.
49. 460 U.S. at 284; 662 F.2d at 518.
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Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court held that the
police did not violate Knotts' expectation of privacy by monitoring the
beeper signals after the car left the highway.50 The Court indicated
that the beeper surveillance was equivalent to following a car on public
streets and highways." Although Knotts had the traditional expecta-
tion of privacy within his cabin, that expectation did not extend to the
visual surveillance of Petschen's car "arriving on his premises . . . nor
to the movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the
cabin in 'open fields.' ",52 The fact that the police used beeper signals in
addition to visual surveillance did not prohibit the police from enhanc-
ing their senses with science and technology. 3 The Court's decision
essentially approved using electronic devices to aid in detecting
crime.54
The Court disagreed with the defendant's claim that the search
entered the private sphere. It noted that the government limited its use
of the signals. 5  The signals were not used after the car ended its jour-
ney, nor were they used to obtain information as to the movement of
the drum within the cabin, or any other type of information that would
not have been visible to the naked eye.56 Because the warrantless mon-
itoring of the beeper signals did not invade Knotts' legitimate expecta-
50. 460 U.S. at 285. Knotts did not challenge the warrantless installation of the beeper
in the chloroform container. Id. at 1084. He did not think he had standing with respect to
this issue; hence the Court did not consider whether the installation of the beeper violated
his expectation of privacy.
51. Id at 281-82. It has been established that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in a
car than in a home. A person who travels on the public highway is within plain view and
thus has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his travels from one place to another. See
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (A car "travels on public thoroughfares where
both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.").
52. 460 U.S. at 282 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (open fields, even
though private property, are not protected by the fourth amendment)).
53. Id. at 285. Due to the driver's evasive driving tactics, police relied solely on beeper
signals to locate the car which had arrived at Knotts' cabin.
54. Id The Court stated that if the defendant's complaint was that scientific devices
allow police to be more efficient in detecting crime, it had no "constitutional foundation."
Id at 282. Knotts also expressed his fear that the government might be able to conduct
twenty-four hour surveillance without judicial supervision as a result of the Court's holding.
Id The Court stated that if police abuse such law enforcement techniques, then the Court
will determine whether constitutional principles apply. Id at 285.
55. Id
56. Id See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The Court suggested that the police
did not discover any more information than they could have found by relying on visual
surveillance. The facts, however, indicate that both visual surveillance and beeper monitor-
ing were necessary to discover the location of the car and container. Petschen's evasive
driving maneuvers made visual surveillance difficult. At times, the officers relied solely
upon the beeper signals to ascertain the location of the container. Id at 282.
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tion of privacy, there was neither a search nor a seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.57
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined in a concur-
ring opinion, stated that the case would have been more difficult had
Knotts challenged the installation of the beeper in the container. 58 Jus-
tice Brennan stated that he was not sure whether there was a constitu-
tionally significant difference between planting a beeper inside an
object owned by a criminal suspect and in arranging for the object con-
taining a beeper to be sold to the suspect. 59 Justice Brennan reempha-
sized the principle that the fourth amendment protects against
invasions of a person's legitimate expectation of privacy even if the in-
vasion is not accompanied by a physical intrusion.60 If the govern-
ment does physically intrude upon a constitutionally protected area,
then this intrusion may constitute a violation of the fourth amendment
even if the same information could have been obtained by other, less
intrusive means.6' By raising these principles, Justice Brennan suggests
that the installation of the beeper may constitute a physical intrusion.
Although the police in Knots might have used visual surveillance,
57. Id at 285.
58. Id at 285-86 (Brennan, J., concurring). The police had arranged for a beeper to be
placed in a container and for the chemical company to ensure that Armstrong receive that
container. Id. at 278.
Justice Brennan stated that if Knotts was right in claiming that he lacked standing to
challenge the installation of the beeper, then it only confirmed the "formalism and confusion
in this Court's recent attempts to redefine Fourth Amendment standing." Id at 287 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
Apparently Justice Brennan believed that Knotts would lack standing to challenge the
original installation only because the drum was not sold to him, but to Armstrong. If Arm-
strong were the only party who had standing, then the Court would seem to base standing
upon one's possessory or property interest in an item, rather than their expectation of pri-
vacy in the item. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court has consistently recognized that
a possessory interest in an item is not determinative of an expectation of privacy. See Rawl-
ings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149-50 (1978).
59. 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was not satisfied with the
Eighth Circuit's disposal of the installation issue. The appellate court had held that the
chemical company's consent to the installation of the beeper met fourth amendment require-
ments even though the company intended to sell the bugged container to an unsuspecting
customer. The Eighth Circuit stated that "the consent of the owner (of the chloroform
container) at the time of installation meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
even if the consenting owner intends to soon sell the 'bugged' property to an unsuspecting
buyer." United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981). In response, Justice
Brennan stated, with some sarcasm, that the government is not defending a claim for dam-
ages in an action for breach of warranty, but is attempting to justify the legality of a search
conducted in the course of a criminal investigation. 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
60. 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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rather than electronic devices, to discover the location of the container,
they may still have violated the fourth amendment by installing the
beeper into a constitutionally protected area.
62
Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens, in separate concurring
opinions, objected to the Court's use of the "open fields" doctrine be-
cause the case did not concern an "open fields" issue.63 Justice Stevens
also emphasized that the use of electrical devices implicates sensitive
concerns, although he did not find the electronic detection techniques
used in this case to be objectionable. 64
In United States v. Place,65 the Supreme Court held that the inves-
tigative procedure of subjecting luggage to a sniff test by a trained nar-
cotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.66 Law enforcement officers became suspicious
of Place's behavior while he was waiting in line at Miami International
Airport to purchase a ticket to New York's LaGuardia Airport. As
Place went to the gate for his flight, the officers approached him and
requested and received some identification. Place consented to a
search of his luggage, but the agents decided against searching the bags
because the plane was about to depart. The officers inspected the ad-
dress tags on both his bags and noticed discrepancies in the two ad-
dresses. They later discovered that neither address existed.67
Because of their encounter with Place, the Miami agents called
62. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Knotts would have to show that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the container.
63. Id. at 287 (Blackmun, J., concurring); ld at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although
both Justices Blackmun and Stevens believed that references to the open fields doctrine were
dicta, neither one explained why the doctrine was not applicable. It may be that the
container was not on public display due to the secluded location of the cabin. Id at 287
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring). In addition, the facts do not
indicate the length of time that the container was outside the cabin, which may show that the
drum was not located in an open field. As Justice Stevens noted, the record did not support
a finding that the container was in an open field. Id at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. Id (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that the Court's suggestion that
the police may augment their senses with science and technology was "unnecessarily broad
dicta" because there may be situations in which the use of such devices violates the fourth
amendment. Id (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967));
see supra note 3.
65. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun filed separate concurring opinions, in which Justice Marshall
joined.
66. Id. at 2644-45.
67. The bags were taken late on Friday afternoon. Thus, the agents retained the luggage




DEA agents in New York to inform them of him. When Place arrived
at LaGuardia Airport, his behavior aroused the suspicion of the New
York DEA agents. The agents approached Place and told him that
they believed he might be carrying narcotics. After Place refused to
consent to a search of his luggage, one agent said that they would take
his luggage to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant and that Place
was welcome to join them. The agents then took the luggage to Ken-
nedy Airport where it was subjected to a sniff test by a trained narcotics
detection dog. The dog reacted positively to the smaller bag, but am-
biguously to the larger bag. At this time, ninety minutes had passed
since the initial seizure of the luggage. Keeping the luggage, the agents
obtained a search warrant a few days later.68 Upon searching the bags,
the agents discovered 1125 grams of cocaine. Place was indicted for
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
section 841(a)(1).
69
Place argued that the government's seizure of his luggage violated
the fourth amendment unless it was based upon probable cause.70 The
government contended that a brief detention of luggage for purposes of
further limited investigation was justifiable if based upon reasonable
suspicion.7  The Supreme Court agreed, and held that a brief deten-
tion of luggage for exposure to a narcotics detection dog did not violate
the fourth amendment, as long as it was based on reasonable
72suspicion.
The officers' purpose in detaining the luggage was to subject it to a
dog sniff test.73 The Court stated that if the sniff test constituted a
search requiring probable cause, then the initial seizure would require
68. Id.
69. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally . . .(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent . . . to distribute . . . a controlled substance."
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2642-43.
71. Id at 2641-42. Whereas probable cause would require a police officer to believe that
there is a substantial probability that the luggage contains contraband or other evidence of a
crime, reasonable suspicion merely requires a police officer to have reasonable articulable
suspicion, derived from objective facts, that the property contains contraband or evidence of
the crime. Id at 2642.
72. Id at 2639. In determining whether the detention was justifiable, the Court bal-
anced the extent and nature of the intrusion upon Place's fourth amendment rights against
the government's interest in temporarily seizing the luggage for purposes of a dog sniff
search. The brief intrusion upon an individual's possessory interest caused by the seizure is
minimal in comparison to the strong countervailing government interest in preventing drug-
trafficking. Id at 2642.
73. Id at 2644.
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probable cause."4 The Court concluded, however, that the dog sniff did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
75
The Court reaffirmed the principle that a person possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage.7 6 A dog sniff does
not require opening of luggage, nor does it expose noncontraband
items that would be exposed if an officer rummaged through the con-
tents of the luggage.77 Hence, this investigative procedure is much
more limited, and much less intrusive than a typical search. 78 More-
over, the Court stressed that the information obtained from a canine
sniff is limited; it merely reveals the presence or absence of contra-
band.7 9 Subjection of luggage to a dog sniff test does not subject a
property owner to the embarrassment or inconvenience involved in
more intrusive investigative procedures. 8° Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the exposure of Place's luggage, in a public place, to a
trained narcotics dog did not constitute a fourth amendment search.8t
Despite its holding that the initial detention of Place's luggage was
permissible, the Court excluded the evidence obtained from the subse-
quent search of his luggage.8 z The Court emphasized that the brevity
of the intrusion upon fourth amendment rights is important in deter-
mining whether the seizure was so minimally intrusive as to be justifi-
able upon reasonable suspicion. 83 The length of the detention rendered
the seizure unreasonable in the absence of probable cause. The ninety
minute detention of Place's luggage exceeded the limited authority of




75. Id. at 2644-45.
76. Id. at 2644 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)). In Chadwick, the
warrantless search of a footlocker which was within the exclusive control of federal agents
violated the defendants' expectation of privacy in the contents of the footlocker. The Court
noted that the defendants' privacy interest in the footlocker was not in the container itself,
which was exposed to public view, but rather in the contents of the container. United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14 n.8 (1977).




81. Id. at 2644-45.
82. Id at 2646.
83. Id. at 2645.
84. Id In addition, the violation of Place's fourth amendment rights was increased by
the agents' failure to inform him of the place -to which they were transporting his luggage,
the length of time they might retain his luggage, and the arrangements that might be made
to return the luggage if no drugs were found. Id at 2646.
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In separate concurring opinions, Justice Brennan and Justice
Blackmun both stated that the Court should not have addressed the
issue of whether a canine sniff constituted a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. 85 Both Justices noted that the validity of the
canine sniff was not contested in the district court, nor was the issue
raised in the court of appeals. 6
Relying on United States v. Knotts,87 Justice Brennan contrasted
the investigative use of electronic devices and canine sniffs.8 In Knotts,
the Court stated that the use of electronic techniques merely enhances
the police's own sensory perception.89 Unlike an electronic beeper, a
dog does not merely enable a policeman to more efficiently discover
information that he might obtain using his own senses.9" A dog does
not enhance the sensory perception, but rather adds a new dimension
to human perception. 9' Justice Brennan concluded, therefore, that the
use of a narcotics detection dog represents a greater intrusion upon an
individual's privacy than the use of electronic devices.92
Justice Blackmun offered a different analysis of the dog sniff issue.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring), 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall joined in both concurring opinions. In his dissenting opinion from a denial of
certiorari in Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981), Justice Brennan expressed his belief that
dog sniffs of people constitute a search. Id. at 1025-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However,
Doe involved dog sniffs of people while Place involved dog sniffs of luggage. Justice Bren-
nan failed to stress this distinction as he had in Doe. Id. at 1026 n.4.
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring), 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun noted that neither party had an opportunity to brief or express any opinion on the
issue of canine sniffs. He stated that in grasping for "the appropriate analysis of the prob-
lem," the Court could not consider all the ramifications of such an important issue. Id at
2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In addition, Justice Blackmun stated that the Court should have waited until faced with
a case directly presenting the issue on whether a canine sniff constituted a search. Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring). He noted that certiorari was currently pending on two such
cases. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
88. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
90. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Id (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that the use of a dog sniff
search implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as those implicated by the use of
certain electronic techniques. Id at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring). This language was de-
rived from Knolls, in which Justice Stevens stated that the use of electronic devices "impli-
cate[s] especially sensitive concerns." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 288 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). In Knots and in Place, the concurrences cited Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). The Court in Katz held that the presence or absence of a physical intrusion or
trespass upon an area is not determinative of a fourth amendment search. Id at 353.
Hence, although a dog sniff does not amount to a physical intrusion, it still might violate a
protected privacy interest.
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He suggested that the sniff may be a minimally intrusive search that
could be justified in certain situations upon mere reasonable
suspicion.93
These three Supreme Court cases show the Court's tendency to
disfavor the application of the exclusionary rule. While the Court ex-
pands the government's freedom within such investigative techniques
as controlled deliveries, electronic devices, and dog sniffs, it may also
be restricting the areas in which a legitimate expectation of privacy ex-
ists. The Court extends the police's authority to search and intrude
upon an individual's privacy by holding that the police's use of such
investigative techniques does not constitute a search within the scope of
the fourth amendment.
b. safes
In United States v. Issacs,94 the Ninth Circuit held that the defend-
ant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a safe from which his
journals were seized by government agents.95 Secret Service agents ob-
tained a warrant to search Issacs' apartment for rent receipts and coun-
terfeit Federal Reserve Notes. During their search of the apartment,
the agents discovered a gun, a shoulder holster, ammunition, drug par-
aphernalia, and considerable amounts of methaqualone and cocaine in
Issacs' bedroom closet.96 Inside the closet, the agents noticed a safe
which they opened after receiving the combination from Issacs. The
safe contained six journals. One agent flipped through them to see if
they contained any receipts or counterfeit notes. While leafing through
one journal, the agent saw some notations which appeared to record
drug transactions. Although the agent did not notice similar notations
in the remaining five journals, he seized all six. 7
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2652-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. 708 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 165 (1983).
95. Id. at 1368.
96. Id. at 1366. There was no dispute over whether these items were within plain view.
Id
97. Id. A grand jury indicted Isaacs on six counts. The first and second counts charged
him with passing counterfeit notes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976); the third and fifth
counts charged him with possession with intent to distribute methaqualone and cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). The fourth and sixth counts charged him with use
of a gun to commit the crimes charged in the third and fifth counts in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (1976). At the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, the court admitted the journal
read by the agent and excluded the remaining five journals. At the second trial, the court
admitted the five journals for purposes of impeachment and admitted evidence of possession
of firearms. The jury found Issacs guilty on both counts of possession with intent to dis-
tribute. The court also granted the government's request to dismiss the counterfeit note
counts. 708 F.2d at 1366.
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On appeal from convictions of possession with intent to distribute
methaqualone and cocaine,9 8 Issacs argued that the evidence in the one
journal was not in plain view because the agents needed to read the
contents to discover the incriminating notations.99 The government
contended that Issacs lacked standing to object to the search because he
denied ownership and possession of the journals at trial. 00
The Ninth Circuit held that the search exceeded the scope of the
fourth amendment because Issacs had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the safe in which the journals were found. 10' The court first
acknowledged that a prosecutor may simultaneously claim, without
legal contradiction, that a defendant charged with possession of contra-
band possessed the seized good yet was not subjected to a fourth
amendment violation. 10 2 This rule, however, does not allow a prosecu-
tor to charge possession and dispute expectation of privacy in every
case.' 0 3 The government's argument failed in this case because the
facts rendered its positions necessarily inconsistent."o The court stated
that the government could not rely upon Issacs' denial of ownership to
defeat his right to challenge the legality of the search and then intro-
duce the journals as evidence of his guilt. 0 5 Issacs' denial of ownership
should not defeat his expectation of privacy in the safe nor his right to
object to the search given that the government will ask the jury to reject
that denial as it introduces the journals to prove Issacs' guilt. 10 6 More-
98. For text of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I) (1976), see supra note 69.
99. 708 F.2d at 1366-67.
100. Id. at 1367. The government also claimed the journals were within plain view. Id.
101. Id. at 1368.
102. Id. at 1367 (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90 (1980)). In Salvucci the
Court overruled the automatic standing rule established in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960). Under the automatic standing rule, a defendant had automatic standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a seizure if possession of the items seized was an essential
element of the offense charged. Id at 263. The rule was created for two reasons: First, in
order to show standing a defendant would need to allege facts at a suppression hearing
which might be sufficient to convict him. Second, the rule was to prevent the government
gaining the advantage of contradictory positions. Id at 262-63. The Court in Salvuccireal-
ized that subsequent cases abolished the need for automatic standing. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1980). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the
Court held that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing cannot be used as evidence
of his guilt at trial. Id. at 394. The Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), estab-
lished that the prosecution can with legal consistency argue that a defendant charged with
possession owned the seized item but did not suffer a fourth amendment violation. Id at
141-44. This would be true because possession of an item was no longer dispositive of a
privacy interest in the item. Id. at 143-44 n.12. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
103. 708 F.2d at 1367.
104. Id. at 1367-68.
105. Id. at 1368.
106. Id. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc),
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over, the government did not and could not dispute Issacs' expectation
of privacy in the safe.'0 7 Prosecutorial self-contradiction would not
have existed, however, if the government had argued that the defend-
ant possessed the seized good, but lacked an expectation of privacy in
the area searched. 108 Here, the Court rejected the government's dis-
tinction between an expectation of privacy in the invaded area and in
the items seized.'09 The government's admission that Issacs had a pri-
vacy interest in the safe precluded its claim that he had none in the
journals found inside."' Therefore, the court concluded that Issacs
had a legitimate expectation in the safe which conferred standing to
challenge the validity of the seizure of the journals. I '
c. business premises and administrative searches
The fourth amendment protects a businessman's legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in his private commercial property."
12
wherein the court rejected the "Government's position that [defendant's] trial tactic, denying
knowledge of the [contraband-filled] bag, strips him of Fourth Amendment protection,"
rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
107. 708 F.2d at 1368. The court stated that there was no question of abandonment of the
items found in Issac's personal safe. Id.
108. Id In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the government successfully and
properly argued that the defendant owned the drugs which he placed inside his friend's
purse, in which he lacked an expectation of privacy. Id at 104-06. In Salvucc4 the govern-
ment argued that the defendant owned stolen checks found inside another person's apart-
ment, in which he had no expectation of privacy. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 85, 95
(1980). The government may argue that a defendant who once possessed an item but subse-
quently abandoned it, also abandoned any expectation of privacy in the item. United States
v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant's denial of ownership of a
wallet constituted abandonment of property, leaving him without a legitimate expectation of
privacy and unable to challenge the search). The First Circuit has held that the government
may seek to introduce evidence seized from a room in which the defendant had no privacy
interest beyond mere presence in the room. United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554, 556 (1st
Cir. 1982).
Except for the abandonment cases, these cases reveal that a defendant who owns a
seized good but lacks an expectation of privacy in the "area searched," may not successfully
challenge the search on fourth amendment grounds. Salyuccl, 448 U.S. at 93. A defendant's
ownership of a seized item will not automatically confer standing. The Supreme Court in
Rakas and in Rawlings emphasized that ownership of seized items is merely one factor to be
considered in determining whether a person's fourth amendment rights have been violated.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105.
109. 708 F.2d at 1368. The cases on which the government relied involved seizures of
items from places outside of defendant's control. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
85-86 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1980). In Issacs, the safe was
arguably within Issacs' control because he possessed its combination and gave it to the
agents.
110. 708 F.2d at 1368.
111. Id
112. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (inspection of a warehouse for possi-
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In United States v. Nadler,II3 the Ninth Circuit held that defend-
ants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a print shop. 14
Executing a search warrant, Secret Service agents raided Victory Print-
ing, which was owned by two of the Nadlers' co-defendants. When the
agents entered the premises, the Nadlers were not present, but the co-
defendants were engaged in counterfeiting. The agents seized offset
printing and photographic equipment, counterfeit plates and negatives,
and approximately $600,000 in counterfeit currency." 5 At trial, co-de-
fendant Munt testified as to the present and previous counterfeiting op-
erations with defendants Dorian and Roni Nadler.
On appeal from convictions for conspiracy to print, possess and
transfer counterfeit money,1 6 the Nadlers argued that Munt's testi-
mony should be excluded as the "tainted fruit" of an illegal search." 7
The court did not address this issue, however, because the Nadlers had
failed to carry their burden of proving that they had a legitimate expec-
ble violation of municipal fire code required warrant). The Supreme Court in See stated
that the "businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial prop-
erty." Id.
113. 698 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1983).
114. Id. at 999-1000. The Nadlers were appealing the denial of their motion to suppress
co-defendant Munt's testimony which implicated them in the present counterfeiting crimes.
Id. at 1000.
The court equated the defendants' lack of an expectation of privacy with their lack of
standing. Id The court did not emphasize the fact that the search occurred on commercial
premises, nor did it find that the Nadlers' expectation of privacy was any less on commercial
premises than it would have been on residential premises.
115. Id. at 997. The agents had a search warrant but the district court had established
that the affidavits in support of the warrant did not meet the requirements of Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 698 F.2d at 997. Accordingly, none of the physical evidence
seized was offered as evidence against the Nadlers.
116. The Nadlers were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 471, 474 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both . ...
18 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) provides:
Whoever, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or alters any
obligation or other security of the United States shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 474 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever has in his control, custody, or possession any plate, stone, or other thing
with intent to use such plate, stone or other thing. . . in forging or counter-
feiting. . . [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
fifteen years . . ..
117. 698 F.2d at 997.
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tation of privacy in Victory Printing and therefore had no standing to
object to the search."
18
The Ninth Circuit held that the Nadlers' subjective expectation of
privacy in the premises was not objectively reasonable." 9 The court
noted that the defendants did not have any ownership or possessory
interest in the Victory Printing business or in the building itself.2 °
Moreover, the Nadlers did not have any right, license or privilege to
exclude any person from entering the shop.' 2 ' Although the defend-
ants argued that they exercised control over the shop because the en-
trance door was locked and there was a "closed" sign outside the shop,
the court stated that Victory Printing was a public business and had a
large glass window which allowed the agents to see into the room
where people were in the process of counterfeiting. 122 Hence, anyone
passing by could enter the shop during business hours, or see into the
shop at any time through the glass window. 23 Because there was no
evidence to support the Nadlers' claim of an expectation of privacy, the
judgment of the district court was affirmed.
Administrative searches of businesses that have been pervasively
or traditionally regulated are an exception to the warrant require-
118. Id. at 998. The issue of whether the Nadlers had a legitimate expectation of privacy
was not raised by any party in the district court. Id. The Ninth Circuit raised the issue sua
sponte.
119. 698 F.2d at 999-1000. The court applied the two-prong test from Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
120. 698 F.2d at 999. The court recognized that although the defendants' possessory in-
terest in the premises searched or items seized is relevant, it is not dispositive of their legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the print shop. Id.
The court followed and reemphasized the holding in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980), that 'arcane' concepts of property law [do not] control the ability to claim the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 105. In Rawlings, the Court held that the de-
fendant did not have an expectation of privacy in a friend's purse even though he owned the
drugs the police found inside the purse.
Although the court reemphasizes this principle from Rawlings, its holding stresses the
fact that the defendants did not have a possessory interest in the premises searched. The
court twice noted that the items that the Nadlers owned were suppressed. 698 F.2d at 998-
99.
121. 698 F.2d at 999.
122. Id.
123. Id Although the court did not discuss the plain view doctrine, its holding suggests
that the defendants' activity and the interior of the shop were within the officers' plain view.
Hence, the defendants lacked an expectation of privacy in items, activity, and premises
within the plain view of the public and the officers.
The district court and the Ninth Circuit did, however, suppress the printing press and
plate-maker in which the defendants had a possessory interest. The Ninth Circuit assumed
that the Nadlers had "standing" as to the printing press and plate-maker purchased by Do-
ran Nadler and Munt. Id at 998.
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ment. 124 In these circumstances, the person operating the business is
aware of and expects government supervision and regulation and thus
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy." 5 The Ninth Circuit
recently decided a case which addressed this exception.
In United States v. Kanot Maru No. 53,126 the Ninth Circuit held
that a warrantless search authorized by the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA) did not violate the fourth amendment. 2 7
The Coast Guard sighted the Kaiyo Maru fishing, by permit, in the
124. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless inspection of weapon
dealer's premises upheld because his business was heavily regulated by the government);
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless inspection of
alcoholic beverage industry held constitutional because the industry is subject to close gov-
ernment inspection). The pervasively regulated industry exception established in Colonnade
and Biswellwas most recently applied in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (warrant-
less search of an underground surface mine held constitutional due to strong federal interest
in improving safety conditions in mines, and further, mines have been pervasively regulated,
and the pertinent statute provided a sufficient substitute for a warrant). The exception pro-
vides that "warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily
violate the Fourth Amendment." Donovan, 452 U.S. at 598.
125. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981) (warrant may not be required where
Congress has "reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a
regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and de-
fined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will
be subject to periodic inspections"). The Supreme Court also recognized and reaffirmed this
exception to the warrant requirement in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
In Marshall, however, the Court did not apply the pervasively regulated industry exception
because the pertinent OSHA statute was not a sufficient substitute for a warrant. The statute
was not limited with respect to the number of businesses it applied to nor were the number
or frequency of searches limited. Id at 323.
The cases which involve administrative searches suggest that an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy on commercial premises is not as strong as one's privacy interest in a private
residence. The Donovan Court stated that "[t]he greater latitude to conduct warrantless
inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the
owner of commercial property enjoys. . . differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an
individual's home." 452 U.S. at 598-99.
126. 699 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 995. The FCMA provides in pertinent part:
(b) (1) Any officer who is authorized (by the Secretary, the Secretary of the
Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or the head of any Federal
or State agency which has entered into an agreement with such Secretaries
under subsection (a) of this section) to enforce the provisions of this chapter
may- (A) with or without a warrant or other process-
(ii) board, and search or inspect, any fishing vessel which is subject to the
provisions of this chapter, (iii) seize any fishing vessel. . . used or employed
in, or with respect to which it reasonably appears that such vessel was used or
employed in, the violation of any provision of this chapter; (iv) seize any fish
.. . taken or retained in violation of any provision of this chapter, and
(v) seize any other evidence related to any violation of any provision of this
chapter. ...
16 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (1982).
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Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) off Alaska. 128  Coast Guard officers
decided to make a routine boarding to inspect the Kaiyo Maru's docu-
ments and catch.' 29 Without a warrant or probable cause, the officers
boarded and searched the ship. On board, the officers discovered seri-
ous violations of the FCMA.1
30
The court held that the warrantless search did not violate the
crew's fourth amendment rights.13 ' The court noted that fishing is a
highly regulated enterprise and that the inspections were not infre-
quent. Therefore, the vessel owner expected that his property would be
periodically inspected.' 32 The court noted, however, that the inspec-
tions were limited to areas of the boat which were necessary to enforce
the FCMA.133 The crew's living quarters and personal property were
excluded from the search because there was a greater expectation of
privacy in these areas.' 34 In further support of its position, the court
stressed both the federal interest in protecting natural resources in the
FCZ, and that the statute authorized such searches. 
135
128. The FCZ is a 197 mile wide band of ocean beyond the territorial waters of the states
which is governed by the FCMA regulations. 699 F.2d at 992.
129. The Coast Guard requested information regarding the Kaiyo from its Juneau offices.
The Coast Guard officers were misinformed that the Kaiyo had failed to communicate to the
Coast Guard that it had switched fishing areas, as required by 50 C.F.R. § 611.4(a)(4)
(1979). 699 F.2d at 992.
130. The violations of the FCMA included underreporting of the catch and catching hali-
but, a prohibited species to all foreign fishermen. Id.
131. Id. at 995, 997.
132. Id at 997.
133. Id. at 997 n.23. This limitation of the search is consistent with United States v.
Raub, 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980). In Raub, the court stated
that the search was restricted to the areas of the ship which must be inspected to enforce the
fishing regulations. Id. at 1210. The court indicated that this restriction of the search in turn
restricted the possibility of abuse by officers. Id The limited possibility of abuse was just
one factor in favor of upholding a warrantless search of a salmon fishing vessel in Raub. Id.
134. The court relied upon United States v. Tsadu Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Ala.
1979) (warrantless search under FCMA of Japanese vessel in the Fishery Conservation Zone
fell within the pervasively regulated industry exception). 699 F.2d at 997 n.23. In Tsadu
Maru, the court excluded the crew's living quarters and personal property from the search
because of the greater expectations of privacy in these areas. Tsadu, 470 F. Supp. at 1229.
135. 699 F.2d at 995-96. The Supreme Court in Donovan stated that Congress may deter-
mine when a warrantless search is necessary to further a regulatory scheme in areas where
legitimate federal government interests exist. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599-600
(1981).
The court in Kaivo Maru also indicated that the statute and the enforcement policy of
the Coast Guard sufficiently limited the discretion of the inspecting officers in the field to
render the warrantless searches "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. 699 F.2d at 996.
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d vehicle searches
The courts have established that a person enjoys a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy in a car than in a home.' 36 Hence, warrantless searches
of automobiles do not necessarily violate the fourth amendment. The
reason behind this rule is that a car travels public roads, where its con-
tents and occupants are within plain view. 137 The fact that a car is
involved in the search does not necessarily mean that the person has
waived fourth amendment rights or expectations of privacy.13 The fol-
lowing Ninth Circuit cases address the issue of when a defendant main-
tains a sufficient and recognizable privacy interest in a vehicle.
In United States v. Perez,139 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's finding that defendants had no expectation of privacy in the gas
tank of a truck they had hired. 4 ° Perez and De La Garza were sus-
pected of smuggling drugs into the United States from Mexico. A four-
some, consisting of Perez, De La Garza, Sanchez, and Marquez, drove
north from the border while customs officers kept them under continu-
ous air and ground surveillance. Perez rode in the truck with Sanchez,
while the other defendants followed them in a car. When the men
stopped to eat, the officers approached them with weapons drawn.
Sanchez, the driver and owner, consented to a search of the truck. A
narcotics detecting dog sniffed at the gas tank. Searching the tank, the
136. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (recognizing diminished expecta-
tions of privacy in automobiles as compared to other property interests); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); see infra text accompanying note 137. The factors which reduce
one's privacy interest in an automobile are essentially twofold: first, the inherent mobility of
a car makes it impractical to obtain a warrant; and second, the use and regulation of an
automobile reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with other property
interests. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (Court refused to extend auto-
mobile exception to warrantless search of personal luggage even though it was located in an
automobile lawfully stopped by the police).
137. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
138. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,461-62 (1971) ("The word 'automobile' is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.").
139. 689 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). This was the second appeal in this case.
In its prior decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the case did not fit within the extended
border searches or consent exceptions to the warrant requirement. The court remanded the
case to determine whether the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the gas
tank of their truck. United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981).
On remand, the district court held that Sanchez, as owner and driver of the truck,
would have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the truck. Sanchez, however, died before
trial. 689 F.2d at 1337. The district court also held that all the defendants lacked an expec-
tation of privacy in the truck because they had merely rented it and did not drive it. Id
140. Id. at 1338-39. The defendants hired the truck's owner, Sanchez, to transport the
drugs across the border. Id. at 1337.
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officers found four pounds of heroin. 4'
On appeal from convictions for drug offenses, Perez argued that
his arrangements to hire the truck, his placement of heroin inside the
truck, and his role as escort demonstrated a propriety interest in the
contents of the truck, as well as a reasonable expectation of privacy. 42
The government contended that appellants lacked a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, and failed to show their right to exclude others from
the truck.
143
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the government, holding that the
defendants had an expectation of privacy in the gas tank, which was
violated by the warrantless search. 144 The defendants' close surveil-
lance of the truck, their arrangement with and payment to Sanchez to
transport the heroin, and their joint control over the truck showed that
they did not want any interference with their plan to transport and de-
liver the drugs. 14 The court also reasoned that a closed compartment
created a greater expectation of privacy than areas or objects that are
exposed.
46
In response to the government's claim that defendants did not
have a right to exclude others from the truck, the court emphasized that
the right to exclude others is only one factor in the fourth amendment
analysis.' 47 Moreover, a person can have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a place or object he does not own. 48 Hence, the officers'
search violated the defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy.
In United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 14 the Ninth Circuit
held that the claimant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
141. Id
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1337-38.
144. Id. at 1338-39.
145. Id. at 1338.
146. Id The court distinguished United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) and United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th
Cir. 1972). Both cases involved containers in open areas, which anyone might discover,
which suggests a lesser expectation of privacy than in a gas tank of a private car. 689 F.2d at
1338.
147. 689 F.2d at 1338.
148. Id (citing United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 1979). In Reyes, how-
ever, the defendants failed to establish that their own constitutional rights were violated or
that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a place. They did not assert an owner-
ship interest in the items seized from the plane, but merely claimed to be passengers trans-
ported to the United States. In addition, the court stated that one's expectation of privacy is
less in a plane than in a home. United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1979).
149. 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 981 (1984).
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in her car during the time she lent it to a third party.1 50  Officers
stopped the Mercedes when they saw that it lacked license plates.
Upon request, Reese, who was driving the car at the time, produced his
driver's license but could not find the vehicle registration. When Reese
got out of the car, one of the officers observed a package lying on the
passenger seat, which they believed contained narcotics. 5 It was later
determined that the package contained cocaine. Webb, the owner of
the car, arrived at the scene and told the officers that Reese had her
permission to use the car but that she knew nothing about narcotics
being in the car. The police seized the car the following day pursuant
to a warrant.1
52
The Ninth Circuit held that Webb could not challenge the legality
of the search of her car because she had relinquished her expectation of
privacy when she lent the car to Reese.-53 The court first reemphasized
the principle that one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than
in other areas.' 54 Hence, Webb began with a reduced expectation of
privacy. Although ownership is one factor which courts consider in
determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in an
object or place, it is not determinative.'55 Here, Webb did not take any
precautions to exclude others from her car, which is one means of in-
creasing one's legitimate expectation of privacy.'56 Further, the pack-
age, which was arguably in plain view, was seized from the passenger
150. Id. at 449. The court noted that the question in the case was not whether Webb, the
owner of the car, had standing to challenge the legality of the search of her car, but whether
the alleged illegal search violated any of Webb's fourth amendment rights. The court stated
that the question of standing was subsumed within the substantive fourth amendment claim;
for example, does the party have an expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id. at 448
n.3.
151. The officer claimed that the package was in "plain sight." There was a dispute,
however, as to whether the contents of the package were visible to the officers. Id. at 446.
152. For a discussion of the legality of the seizure and the forfeiture action, see Part I,
§ D. Warrantless Arrests this survey.
153. 708 F.2d at 449-50. The question of whether an owner of a vehicle can object to a
search that was conducted while the vehicle was in the possession of a third party was one of
first impression in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 448.
154. Id. The court noted that because of the extensive regulation of cars, drivers, and
traffic, cars often come into contact with the police. Therefore, police can often make intru-
sions without invading individual privacy interests in cars. Id
155. Id. at 449. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149-50 (1978) (" 'arcane' concepts of
property law ought not to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment"). In Rakas, the Court noted that the right to exclude others may create an expectation
of privacy and this right may or may not arise from a property interest. Id. at 143-44 n. 12.
Accord Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
156. 708 F.2d at 449. See United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1982), in
which the court stated that the right to exclude others is but one factor in the fourth amend-
ment analysis.
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side where Reese could have invited any stranger. 157 Therefore, by
voluntarily lending possession of the car to Reese for his exclusive use,
Webb extinguished her already diminished expectation of privacy in
her car.1
58
These cases stress that a defendant does not automatically lose his
privacy interest because a vehicle is involved in a police search. A
party may lack an expectation of privacy by loaning a car to a third
party,'5 9 but retain a privacy interest by hiring a third party to trans-
port items. 160 Therefore, it is important to examine the facts of the case
to determine whether the party challenging the search took precautions
to maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.
e. abandoned property
A warrantless search or seizure of property which has been volun-
tarily abandoned does not offend any fourth amendment rights.'I' The
test for "abandonment" is whether the person reasonably intends to
retain an expectation of privacy in the items claimed to be aban-
doned. 162 The courts use an objective test, 63 examining the party's
"words, acts, and other objective facts."'"
In United States v. Burnette, 65 the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's findings that the defendant had abandoned her privacy in-
157. 708 F.2d at 449.
158. Id The First and Fifth Circuits have held that when a vehicle owner lends his car to
a third party, any expectation of privacy is relinquished while it is in the third party's posses-
sion. Hence, the vehicle owner cannot challenge the legality of a search conducted while the
car was lent to another person. See United States v. Dall, 608 F.2d 910 (lst Cir. 1979)
(vehicle owner who lent truck to friends relinquished his expectation of privacy in a locked
camper on top of truck because he disclaimed knowledge of its contents), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendants who had
leasehold interest in plane relinquished their privacy interest by giving possession temporar-
ily to pilot), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978).
159. See United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
160. United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
161. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (Court held that defendant had aban-
doned items found in trash cans of hotel rooms he had just vacated).
162. United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant abandoned
motel room because he owed back rent; motel terminated his tenancy when it received key
to room in mail, and defendant never tried to retrieve items from room).
163. United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant had aban-
doned suitcase in which he was transporting cocaine when he denied ownership of bag and
had non-matching claims check), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
164. The Ninth Circuit established these criteria in United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d
407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant who dropped suitcase and walked away when police
approached did not show intent to abandon property).
165. 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1983).
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terest in her purse.'66 On appeal from a conviction for aiding and
abetting armed robbery, 167 Burnette argued that she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her purse which was violated by a search con-
ducted by the police.'68
The police spotted the defendant next to her car which fit the de-
scription of a get-away car used in a bank robbery. The defendant was
attempting to leave the area when officers stopped her. As an officer
approached her, she spontaneously told him that she had just found the
purse she was holding. When asked for identification, the defendant
took a traffic court summons from the purse she had supposedly just
found. The police then asked for photo identification and she re-
sponded that it was in her wallet in her purse. Afraid that the defend-
ant might run, the officer ordered her to sit on the curb and placed her
under arrest. While the defendant was looking in her purse, the officer
noticed that it was full of money. 169 He seized the purse, put her in
handcuffs, and gave the purse to another officer. At the police station,
the police continued their search of the purse and found $5,048 in cash,
as well as bait bills belonging to the bank that had been robbed.
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the de-
fendant's conduct proved that she had tried to and did retain a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the purse.' 70  Although she initially
denied ownership, her behavior during the encounter with the officers
demonstrated a lack of abandonment.' 7 ' The court based its decision
upon the following behavior: the defendant called the purse "my
purse"; she turned away from the officer to conceal the contents of the
purse when searching for her wallet; she did not open the purse com-
pletely but rather stuck her hand into it to get the wallet; and she did
not relinquish possession of the purse but held on to it until the officer
removed it from her.' 71 Although the court found the defendant had
166. The court applied the clearly erroneous standard of review in reaching its decision.
Id. at 1048.
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets . . . or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."
168. 698 F.2d at 1046-47.
169. Id. at 1043. Burnette's furtive conduct aroused the officer's suspicion, so he moved
around her to see what she was doing. Id at 1043-44.
170. Id. at 1048.
171. Id.
172. Id The court stressed the importance of retaining physical possession of the purse.
It noted that the previous cases in which courts have found abandonment usually involved
denial of ownership and physical relinquishment of property. Id at 1048 n.19. See supra
notes 163 & 164 for a discussion of United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) and United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976).
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not abandoned her purse, it admitted the evidence because the purse
was seized and searched incident to a lawful arrest.
73
2. State action
The actions of a private party who conducts an unreasonable
search or seizure do not implicate fourth amendment rights.'74 If the
private party acted on behalf of the police, or if the police requested,
suggested or ordered the person to act, however, then fourth amend-
ment issues are implicated.
75
The Ninth Circuit has established two factors to determine
whether a person has acted as an " 'instrument' or agent"' 76 of the gov-
ernment: (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the
search, and (2) whether the party intended to aid the government or to
further his own ends.'
77
In United States v. Miller,78 the Ninth Circuit held that a private
173. 698 F.2d at 1048-50. The court held that once an item has been lawfully seized and
searched, a subsequent warrantless search of that item is permitted as long as the item re-
mains in the uninterrupted possession of the police. Therefore, the warrantless search at the
police station was valid and did not violate Burnette's expectation of privacy. The court
limited its holding to initial searches that were legal and did not address the situation where
an item is returned to the owner. Id. at 1049 n.3.
The court suggested that if the police had not searched the bag immediately after the
arrest, Burnette would have retained her privacy interest in the purse. Id. at 1050. The
police would then have needed a warrant to conduct a subsequent search at the station. Id.
at 1049-50.
The court distinguished United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).
In Monclavo-Cruz, the defendant's purse was not searched at the time of arrest; hence, she
retained her privacy interest in the purse. As a result, the subsequent warrantless search at
the police station in Monclavo-Cruz violated the defendant's expectation of privacy. 698
F.2d at 1050.
174. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980). In Walter, the FBI's warrantless
screening of obscene films violated the defendant's expectation of privacy despite the fact
that a private party had previously opened the package containing the films after receiving
them mistakenly in the mail. The Court held that the private party was not acting on behalf
of the FBI when it opened a package containing obscene films and that the government
significantly expanded the search that had been conducted by the private party and required
a warrant.
175. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,487-88 (1971) (wife of defendant was not
acting as government agent when she offered to give police her husband's clothes and guns,
because her motive was to clear her husband and the police did not coerce or force her to
give them the items); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (airplane
employee was acting as government agent when he searched package because DEA agents
encouraged and paid for previous searches and he expected pay for his service).
176. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Supreme Court established
that the test to determine if there has been state action is whether the party "acted as an
'instrument' or agent of the state." Id at 487.
177. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981).
178. 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
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party's contacts with government officers were not sufficient to consti-
tute state action. 179 Szombathy had received a tip that his stolen trailer
was in Superior, Montana. The police invited him to Superior to ex-
amine certain trailers on defendant Miller's property that may have
belonged to Szombathy.8 0 Upon arriving in Superior, Szombathy met
with the officers and proposed that he go to Miller's posing as a pro-
spective buyer of mining equipment so that he could closely observe
the trailers. The officers did not object and agreed to meet Szombathy
later. When he arrived at Miller's property, Szombathy met Miller's
son who invited him into the shop area. In this area, Szombathy recog-
nized his trailer, and later saw conveyor belts that had been stolen with
the trailer. After reporting his findings to the police, Szombathy, ac-
companied by an agent, returned to Miller's property to take photo-
graphs of his stolen equipment. 181 By the time the officers obtained a
search warrant, the equipment was no longer at Miller's, but was later
discovered on a third party's property.
On appeal from convictions for knowingly receiving and conceal-
ing a stolen trailer in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2315,182 Miller ar-
gued that Szombathy was acting as a government agent when he
entered and inspected Miller's property.18 3 He based his argument on
such private citizen-police contacts as the invitation to come to Supe-
rior, the approval of Szombathy's plan to pose as a potential buyer to
gain access to Miller's property, and the agent's accompaniment of
Szombathy on his return visit to Miller's property.'
8 4
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that
Szombathy had acted in a private capacity and that Miller's fourth
amendment rights were therefore not violated.'8 5 To reach its conclu-
sion, the court analyzed the three interactions which Miller claimed to
have constituted state action. First, the police invited Szombathy to
179. Id. at 656.
180. The trailers were in public view, parked between the frontage road that led to
Miller's property and the highway. They were approximately 100-150 yards from the high-
way. Id at 655.
181. Id. at 656. The agent followed Szombathy for protective purposes and did not enter
Miller's property. Id
182. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever receives, conceals,
stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, . . . of the value of
$5,000 or more. . . knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken
• . . [sihall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
183. 688 F.2d at 656.
184. Id
185. Id. at 657.
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Superior so that he could identify his stolen items. 8 6 The court found
that the invitation did not allow the police to indirectly intrude upon
Miller's property or privacy interests through Szombathy. Second,
Szombathy, and not the police, suggested the idea of posing as a pro-
spective buyer.'87 Also, the officers did not encourage, force, or request
Szombathy to conduct a search on their behalf.'88 Finally, the agent
who followed Szombathy when he returned to Miller's property did so
for safety reasons only.'8 9 The officer stayed off the property and
watched Szombathy through binoculars. 90 The court stated that the
officer's attempt to stay hidden cancelled any trace of "police aura
around Szombathy."' 191 Moreover, the officers showed a desire to
avoid offending Miller's fourth amendment rights.19 2 Therefore, the
court concluded that Szombathy acted as a private individual rather
than as a government agent. Considering the government's knowledge
and approval of Szombathy's search, the court seemed to have based its
decision on Szombathy's intent, which was "to recover his stolen prop-
erty," and not to aid the government.
193
3. Standing
Fourth amendment rights are personal, and therefore must be as-
serted by the person whose constitutional rights and interests were vio-
186. Id
187. Id The court stated that police are allowed to ask theft victims to identify certain
items which were stolen from them. Because the trailers were parked on the highway,
within public view, the police and Szombathy did not intrude upon Miller's privacy interests
with their methods of investigation. Id at 658.
188. Id at 657. The court emphasized the fact that Szombathy's proposed actions were
not illegal and hence the officers had no reason to discourage him from visiting Miller's
property. Id
189. Id at 658.
190. Id See infra note 191.
191. Id The court made a minor distinction between the agent remaining off the prop-
erty and entering the property. If he had accompanied Szombathy onto the property, then
he might have cast a "police aura" around Szombathy. Id The agent, however, could still
see Szombathy's activities on the property with binoculars and, in effect, he was searching
the property through his use of binoculars.
192. Id By remaining off the property, the agents showed their concern about offending
Miller's fourth amendment rights. Id
193. Id The court went on to hold that, even if he had acted as a government agent,
Szombathy's warrantless search did not violate Miller's expectation of privacy. Szombathy
had entered the property with the consent of Miller's son, and the trailers he observed were
all within his plain view. The court stated that Miller could not claim an expectation of
privacy in items within the plain view of one who was invited onto his property. The court
stated that Miller assumed the risk that someone could be invited onto his property by his
son and would then observe the stolen trailers. Id at 658-59.
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lated by the search or seizure.1 94
In United States v. Chase,19 5 the Ninth Circuit held that the de-
fendant did not have standing to challenge the legality of a warrantless
detention of a third party. 196 Eisenberg, who was arrested for drug
offenses, having decided to cooperate with Narcotics Task Force (NTF)
agents arranged for a cocaine purchase from Chase. After observing
Eisenberg enter and leave Chase's house, one agent left to obtain a
search warrant. A half hour later, the other agents saw a woman leave
Chase's house and drive away. She was stopped on the false pretext of
a stolen auto investigation. 197 The woman, Houston, was detained for
fifteen to thirty minutes. During the detention, Houston's attorney ar-
rived and was reassured that everything was all right. Afraid that
someone at Chase's house would learn of Houston's detention, the po-
lice radioed the agents stationed at Chase's residence. The officers then
entered and secured Chase's house until the NTF agent returned with a
search warrant. Inside the house, the agents found 1,120 grams of co-
caine and a .38 caliber gun.19
8
Chase moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of
his house, arguing that the officers' detention of Houston created the
exigent circumstances which justified their entry into his home.' 99
The court held that Chase did not have standing to challenge the
legality of Houston's detention because his fourth amendment rights
were not violated.2 00 The court reasoned that Chase could not claim
194. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), see supra note 1; Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1969) (Supreme Court held that evidence obtained from illegal elec-
tronic surveillance of a co-defendant's or co-conspirator's phone conversation would be ad-
missible against defendant since his own constitutional rights were not violated by the
surveillance).
Whereas courts in the past separated the issues of standing and expectation of privacy,
now, after Rakas, the courts equate standing with an expectation of privacy. A defendant
has standing to invoke the exclusionary rule if his expectation of privacy has been violated.
See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 (1980), supra note 2; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-
48.
195. 692 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1982).
196. Id. at 70.
197. The deputies knew that they had stopped Houston on a false pretext. Id. They
searched Houston's car and found no incriminating evidence. Id.
198. Id Chase was convicted for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). See supra
note 69 for the statutory language. Chase was also convicted of illegal use of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1976), which provides in part: "Whoever ... (2) carries
a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted
... shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than one year nor more than ten years."
199. 692 F.2d at 70.
200. Id
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that the search of his house was illegal without vicariously asserting
Houston's constitutional rights.20 ' The court applied, by analogy, the
rule that a defendant cannot challenge the legality of a search warrant
because the information establishing probable cause was a result of an
illegal search or seizure of a third person.20 2 Thus, Chase could not
challenge the legality of the search on the ground that the evidence
establishing exigent circumstances was obtained as a result of an illegal
detention of Houston.2 °3
In United States v. Gallop,2  the Ninth Circuit remanded the case
to determine whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy in
his friend's purse in which incriminating evidence had been found.20 5
While conducting a valid inventory search of his friend Connors' purse,
police found syringes, pills, and prescription bottles with Gallop's
name on them. The officers arrested Gallop and Connors and contin-
ued to search the purse. Inside Connors' purse and Gallop's wallet,
they found money orders that had been stolen from the mail.20 6
In remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit stated that the search of
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1385-87 (10th Cir.) (defendant
could not challenge the legality of an X-ray search conducted on a suitcase belonging to co-
defendant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978)).
In Chase and Shovea, the defendants objected to evidence obtained as a result of a
search or seizure "directed at someone else." 692 F.2d at 70 (citing Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (although defendant was arrested in his absent friend's apartment,
where narcotics were found, the Court held that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the apartment because he had the owner's permission to stay there, he had a key to the
apartment, and his suit and shirt were there)).
203. 692 F.2d at 70. The court went on to hold that the district court's finding of exigent
circumstances was not "clearly erroneous." Id at 71. In this situation, the agents had rea-
son to believe that Chase would be "alerted to their presence." Id
204. 694 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1982).
205. Id at 207. The case demonstrates the interrelationship between standing and expec-
tation of privacy. The defendant was said to have standing only if he had a privacy interest
in his friend's purse. The case can be analyzed under either topic. Although the court did
not state its decision in terms of standing nor state that the defendant cannot vicariously
assert the rights of Connors, this is what the court was suggesting.
206. The police believed that the defendant and his friend were intoxicated and detained
them until they were taken to a "detoxification facility." See United States v. Gallop, 606
F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1979). The inventory search was conducted at this facility.
Gallop was convicted of possessing money orders stolen from the mail in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1708 (1976), which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever steals, takes, . . . or by fraud or deception obtains, or attempts so to
obtain, from out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box, mail recepta-
cle, or any mail route, or other authorized depository. . . any letter, postal card,
package, bag, or mail. . . or removes from any such. . . mail, any article or thing
contained therein . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
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Gallop's wallet incident to the arrest was legal unless he had. an expec-
tation of privacy in the purse.2"7 As in Rawlings v. Kentucky,20 8 the
police in Gallop arrested the defendant based on the evidence found in
a friend's purse. Following Rawlings, the court stated that the defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights were violated only if he had an expecta-
tion of privacy in Connors' purse.20 9
Both Chase and Gallop reemphasized the principle that a defend-
ant must have a personal privacy interest in the item or area searched
or seized in order to have standing to challenge the government's
action.
4. Applicability of the exclusionary rule
The exclusionary rule serves two purposes. By excluding evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the courts try to deter
future unlawful invasion by the police.2"0 Secondly, the courts want to
preserve judicial integrity by not encouraging or implicity approving
violations of the Constitution.211 The second purpose is actually con-
tained within the first, since its thrust is to deter fourth amendment
207. 694 F.2d at 207. The court held that under United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537
(1982), Rawlings must be applied retroactively. 694 F.2d at 207. In Johnson, the Court held
that fourth amendment decisions should be applied retroactively to "cases still pending on
direct appeal unless they represent a clear break with the past." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549.
Because Rawlings follows Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the case does not "represent
such a break." 694 F.2d at 207.
208. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). The court observed that the facts in Gallop resemble those in
Rawlings. 694 F.2d at 207. In Rawlings, the police searched the defendant and others while
they were at a friend's house. When police searched Cox's purse, they found LSD and other
drugs belonging to the defendant. The Court held that the defendant's fourth amendment
rights were not violated unless he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox's purse.
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
209. 694 F.2d at 206. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 720 (1984), presented a similar issue within a different fact situation than that in
Gallop. In Lomas, government agents offered evidence that was obtained in an illegal search
of co-defendant Margolis' hotel room. Lomas challenged the admissibility of the illegally
obtained evidence. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to determine whether Lomas had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room registered in Margolis' name. Id. at
894-95. The court reemphasized the principle that fourth amendment rights are personal.
Hence, Lomas would have the burden of proving that his own fourth amendment rights
were violated by the search. Id. at 895. While the defendant in Gallop had to prove he had
an expectation of privacy in his friend's purse, Lomas must prove he had a privacy interest
in his friend's hotel room.
210. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applicable
in grand jury proceeding because police would not be substantially deterred).
211. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59 n.35 (1976) ("The primary meaning of
'judicial integrity' . . . is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the
Constitution.").
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violations.212
In United States v. Garcia-Nunez,1 3 the Ninth Circuit held that the
government could not circumvent the exclusionary rule by admitting
evidence that supported a co-conspirator's conviction but was obtained
in violation of the co-defendant's fourth amendment rights. 214 Alerted
by a citizen's report, police officers went to a house, owned by Benson,
which they suspected was being used in smuggling illegal aliens. The
police followed some men who left the house and drove away in a car.
After stopping the car, which defendant Garcia-Nunez was driving,
they asked the passengers about their citizenship. The passengers ad-
mitted that they were illegal aliens. The officers later searched co-de-
fendant Benson's house and discovered undocumented aliens,
including Medina. Benson was charged with conspiring to conceal and
transport undocumented aliens,2 15 of harboring an undocumented
alien, Medina, and of aiding and abetting defendant Garcia-Nunez in
transporting Medina. Medina's testimony was used to convict Garcia-
Nunez of transporting illegal aliens. The district court, however, con-
sidered Medina's testimony the fruit of an illegal search and hence
inadmissible against Benson.21 6 Benson was acquitted of harboring but
found guilty of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting Garcia-Nunez in
transporting illegal aliens.217
212. Id
213. 709 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1983).
214. Id. at 562.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976) provides:
(a) Any person. . . who-
(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation
or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in
the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise;
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, . . . or at-
tempts to transport or move, within the United States by means of transportation
or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law;
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, .. in
any place, including any building or any means of transportation; or
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or
induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of-
any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration of-
ficer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States. . . shall be
guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years . . ..
216. 709 F.2d at 561.
217. Id.
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On appeal, Benson argued that there was insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for aiding and abetting the transporting of illegal
aliens because Medina's testimony was the fruit of an illegal search of
his house. 8 The Ninth Circuit agreed and excluded the evidence,
even though it supported a co-conspirator's conviction, because it was
obtained in violation of Benson's constitutional rights.2 19 The case
presented a novel situation: the government was trying to make co-
defendant Benson vicariously liable for the acts of Garcia-Nunez even
though the only evidence which was used to convict Garcia-Nunez was
obtained in violation of Benson's fourth amendment rights.22 0 The
court concluded that co-conspirator liability was inappropriate here
due to the application of the exclusionary rule.2 ' In deciding whether
to apply the exclusionary rule to the case, the court weighed the bene-
fits of deterrence against the social costs of excluding the evidence. 222
As a general rule, the act of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the
conspiracy can be attributed to all conspirators. 23 The court did not
decide whether this rule applied but held that exclusion of the evidence
as to Benson was necessary to maintain deterrence. 224 To impute Gar-
cia-Nunez's guilt to Benson would eliminate all deterrent effect and
circumvent the exclusionary rule because it would allow the govern-
ment to indirectly use evidence obtained in violation of Benson's fourth
amendment rights.225 Although the evidence was admissible against
Garcia-Nunez because he lacked standing to challenge the search, it
should not be admitted against Benson who had standing and whose
rights were violated. 2 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the govern-
ment could not attribute Garcia-Nunez's guilt to Benson and thereby
indirectly use evidence against Benson which was the fruit of an illegal
search.227
218. Id at 562.
219. Id. Garcia-Nunez's conviction was procured only through the use of evidence ob-
tained in violation of Benson's fourth amendment rights. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule was held
not applicable to civil tax proceeding because there was not a sufficient deterrent benefit)).
223. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1945) (a party to a conspiracy may be
liable for substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspir-
acy even if he does not participate in the offense or have knowledge of it).
224. 709 F.2d at 562.
225. Id
226. Id. The court does not explain why Garcia-Nunez lacked standing. Garcia-Nunez
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B. Search Warrants
The fourth amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and
seizures," and provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ' 228
The constitutional requirements for a search have been the subject of
unending controversy. During the past year, the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit have decided several cases attempting to deal with a
range of issues arising out of a warrant search.
1. Probable cause
In a major redefinition of the requirements for a finding of prob-
able cause based on information obtained from an informant, the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates229 rejected the "two-pronged" test
first articulated in Aguilar v. Texas23 ° and refined in Spinelli v. United
States.23' Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the magistrate was required
228. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
229. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
230. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar, a search warrant was issued on the basis of an
affidavit stating that "[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbituates and other narcotics and narcotic para-
phernalia are being kept at the above described premises." Id. at 109. The Court held that
this affidavit was insufficient because its conclusionary nature denied the magistrate the facts
necessary to make an independent determination of probable cause. The Court noted that
the affidavit contained no affirmation that the afflant or his unidentified source spoke with
personal knowledge of the assertions made. d. at 113. For a warrant issued on the basis of
hearsay statements, the Court required that "the magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that [evidence was where the
affiant claimed it was] and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" (d. at 114.
231. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The search warrant in Spinelliwas based upon an informant's
tip that "William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating
wagering information by means of the telephone[,]" and upon corroborative information
gathered by investigating the suspect's movements, phone numbers, and reputation. Id. at
413-14.
The Supreme Court held that the information in the affidavit failed to satisfy the re-
quirements in Aguilar, particularly the basis of knowledge aspect. Id. at 416. Using the facts
in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), see infra notes 248-50 and accompanying
text, the Court further held that facts corroborating the informant's tip were insufficient to
establish probable cause. 393 U.S. at 418. "A magistrate cannot be said to have properly
discharged his constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's tip which-even when par-
tially corroborated-is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilat's requirements when
standing alone." 393 U.S. at 415-16.
The majority in Gates cited criticism of the Spinelli decision and, although refusing to
overrule it, the Court rejected "the rigid categorization suggested by some of its language."
103 S. Ct. at 2332 n.11 (citing Unites States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 586 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) ("I continue to feel today that Spinelli. . .was wrongly decided."); 8 B. J.
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to be informed of facts from which he might determine the basis of the
informant's knowledge regarding the existence and location of evi-
dence, and facts from which he might evaluate the informant's
veracity.232
In Gates, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police received an
anonymous letter accusing the defendants of dealing in drugs and de-
tailed plans for an upcoming trip during which defendants were to
purchase and transport drugs from Florida. According to the letter,
Mrs. Gates would drive to Florida and meet Mr. Gates, who would fly
down and drive the car and drugs back to Illinois.2 33 Mader confirmed
the defendants' identity and verified that Mr. Gates had made a reser-
vation on a flight to West Palm Beach as predicted. He was later in-
formed that Mr. Gates had arrived in Florida, had stayed in a room
MOORE & M. WAXNER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.04 (1984) ("The Aguilar-Spineii
formulation has provoked much litigation .... ").
232. 378 U.S. at 114-15. Drawing from the language of Aguilar, many courts have bifur-
cated the "veracity prong" into "credibility" and "reliability" spurs. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2327 n.4; see, e.g., Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 525, 313 A.2d 847, 859 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1974) ("veracity prong" may be satisfied either by showing the informant to be credible
or his information reliable).
Furthermore, the "veracity" prong of the test may be satisfied absent knowledge of an
informant's credibility when the information was supplied against the informant's penal in-
terest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
An informant's failure to supply underlying facts showing his basis of knowledge may
be remedied by the "self-verifying detail" of the tip. See, e.g., Spinell4 393 U.S. at 416
(citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)).
Finally, where information supplied by an informant is partially corroborated by the
investigating officer, some courts have upheld affidavits that otherwise would not have met
the requirements of the two-prong test. Authority is split, however, as to whether this self-
verifying detail is usable to remedy defects only in the "veracity" prong. See 1 LA FAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3 (1978); Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974); People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 754-55, 403 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1980).
233. 103 S. Ct. at 2325. The letter read as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make
their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Green-
way, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in
Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded
up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she
drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will
be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back
he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over
$100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living
as pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are
friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums
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registered to "Susan Gates," and had driven north with an unidentified
woman the next morning in a car bearing Illinois license plates. Mader
then obtained a warrant to search the Gates' house and car. Upon exe-
cuting the warrant, agents found three hundred and fifty-two pounds of
marijuana in the Gates' car, and marijuana, weapons, and other con-
traband inside their home. 3
Affirming the trial court's suppression of the evidence obtained in
the search, the Illinois Supreme Court rigorously applied the Aguilar-
Spinelli test, and held that the affidavit failed both the reliability and
basis of knowledge prongs.235 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed." 6 Wbile the Court acknowledged that "'veracity,' 'reliability'
and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant" in the determination
of probable cause, it held that these elements should not be regarded as
"independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case
. "237 Instead, the Court substituted a "totality of the circum-
stances analysis" under which a reviewing court must simply ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that
probable cause existed.
238
234. Id at 2325-26.
235. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 891 (1981). The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that the informant's letter failed the "basis of knowledge prong" be-
cause it contained no indication that the writer had personal knowledge of the activities
described therein. Id at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 891. Finally, the court held that the corroborat-
ing statements by Mader in the affidavit were insufficient to satisfy either prong of the test.
Id. at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
236. 103 S. Ct. at 2336.
237. Id at 2327-28. The Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hear-
say information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.
Id. at 2322.
238. Id (quoting Jones v. Unites States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). In formulating its
"totality of the circumstances analysis," the Court drew upon three cases representing an
analytical thread which it argued were never completely harmonized with the Aguilar-
Spine/li line of cases.
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948), the Court rejected the notion that
probable cause must be proven by admissible evidence. Id at 172-75. The defendant had a
reputation for hauling illegal liquor, had been arrested before by the agents for illegally
transporting liquor, had been seen loading contraband into his car two times in the past six
months, and was driving a car appearing to be "heavily loaded." Id at 162. In upholding a
warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, the Court noted the distinction between the
evidence required to prove guilt and to show probable cause.
Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evi-
dence [admissible under the Constitution and rules of evidence].
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal
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Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that the sub-
stantial basis approach was more consistent with the Court's prior
treatment of probable cause than the more elaborate Aguilar-Spinelli
test.239 "Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the
probable cause standard is that it is a practical, nontechnical concep-
tion. '2 40 The Court reasoned that since many warrants are drafted by
"nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation[, the]
'built-in subleties' of the 'two pronged test' are particularly unlikely to
assist magistrates in determining probable cause."24
Rehnquist stated that courts of appeal should give great deference
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical con-
siderations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal tech-
nicians, act.
Id. at 174-75.
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), members of the District of Columbia
Narcotics Squad searched the defendant's apartment pursuant to a warrant which stated
that the officers had been informed by an informant that he had personally purchased heroin
from the defendants inside their apartment on many occasions. This same information had
been given to other officers through other sources of information, and the informant had
given reliable information to the officers "on previous occasion [sic]." Id. at 267-68 n.2. The
Court held that hearsay may support a search warrant "as long as a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay is presented." Id. at 269.
A search warrant based on allegations that an officer had observed activities suggestive
of the manufacture of illegal whiskey was upheld in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102
(1965). The Ventresca Court cautioned against "interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechni-
cal, rather than a commonsense, manner." Id. at 109.
The Court in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (5-4 decision), used a "sub-
stantial basis" approach to uphold a warrant where no underlying facts showing the inform-
ant's credibility were provided in the affidavit. The warrant was based upon an officer's
knowledge of the suspect's reputation and the assertion that his informant was "a prudent
person." Id. at 575. The Court stated that "Aguilar cannot be read as questioning the 'sub-
stantial basis' approach of Jones," and held that the information proffered in the affidavit
was sufficient, in total, to establish the veracity of the informant. Id. at 581.
In his comprehensive and colorful analysis of the Aguilar-Spinellitest, Judge Moylan of
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals had rejected the existence of a "substantial basis"
alternative. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 522, 313 A.2d 847, 852-57 (1974). Judge
Moylan argued that Jones and Draper, decided before Aguilar, would have been decided the
same way under Aguilar-Spinellt 19 Md. App. at 516-17, 313 A.2d at 853-54. Likewise,
Judge Moylan noted that the Court in Ventresca itself demonstrated that the facts alleged in
that case were sufficient underAguilar. 19 Md. App. at 518, 313 A.2d at 854. Judge Moylan
characterized the plurality's holding in Harris as a mere "peripheral collision" with Aguilar-
Spinelli regarding statements against penal interest. 19 Md. App. at 520-21, 313 A.2d at 855.
"The cases themselves are reconciled and rumours of their estrangement, ill-founded. There
is simply no 'substantial-basis-for-crediting' or 'totality-of-circumstances' alternative test.
Those who posit a looser approach offer not an alternative analysis but only a ffight from
analysis." 19 Md. App. at 522, 313 A.2d at 856.
239. 103 S. Ct. at 2328. See supra note 238.
240. 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
241. Id. at 2331 (quoting Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847, 860 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974)).
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to a magistrate's determination.2 42 To hold otherwise, he argued,
would engender uncertainty regarding the magistrate's determinations,
encouraging law enforcement officers to forego obtaining a warrant.
243
Furthermore, the Court stated that the complex and hypertechnical for-
mulation of probable cause under the Aguilar-Spinelli test interferes
with law enforcement and impedes its ability to provide security for the
public.244
The Court reasoned that the rigid guidelines of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test are antithetical to the diverse factual situations requiring a prob-
able cause determination. 45 Under the majority's approach, a defi-
ciency in an informant's basis of knowledge might be overlooked if that
informant was of unusual credibility. Conversely, an affidavit lacking
sufficient indication of the informant's veracity might be remedied by
an unusually detailed description of facts observed first-hand. 46
Applying this more flexible standard, the Court held that the in-
formant's detailed letter, independently corroborated by Mader, to-
gether with the nature of the suspect's activity, was sufficient for a
magistrate to find that there was a "fair probability" that the author of
the anonymous letter had reliable knowledge of the Gates' illegal
activities.2 47
In upholding the magistrate's determination, the Court compared
the facts in Gates with those in Draper v. United States,2 4  a case fre-
quently used as a benchmark for the determination of probable cause.
In Draper, a police officer received a tip that defendant was a narcotics
dealer, and would be returning by train from a trip with three ounces of
heroin. The informant described the suspect's appearance and dress,
and stated that he would be carrying a tan zipper bag and "'walked
real fast.' "249 The defendant was arrested at the train station after of-
ficers observed that he matched the description given by the informant.
The Draper Court held that the detailed nature of the tip, together with
the officer's corroboration of the information was sufficient to establish
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2331-32.
245. Id at 2328-29.
246. Id at 2329.
247. Id at 2334-35. The Court stated that the information obtained by Mader and the
DEA agents alone suggested the Gates were involved in drug dealing. The Court pointed
out that Florida is a known source of drugs, Lance Gates' actions were suggestive of a drug
run, the information in the letter was corroborated by Mader, and the letter was very de-
tailed. Id. at 2334.
248. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
249. Id. at 309.
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probable cause. 5 0 The majority in Gates likewise found that the anon-
ymous letter and the Gates' actions corroborating it were as suggestive
of criminal activity as the informant's corroborated tip in Draper."'
In his concurring opinion, Justice White argued that the warrant
should be upheld, but under the Aguilar-Spinelli formulation.2 52 White
believed that, while the anonymous tip was itself insufficient to furnish
probable cause, the officers' corroboration provided sufficient addi-
tional facts from which a magistrate could infer both that the informant
was credible and his information reliable. Justice White argued that
the Court was avoiding its responsibility to provide guidance to lower
courts by replacing the Aguilar-Spinelli test with a less precise probable
cause standard. 253 Although Justice White agreed that some lower
courts had applied the two-pronged test in an overly inflexible manner,
he advocated clarifying the rule concerning corroborating information
rather than abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test.254 Justice White
pointed out that, under the majority's standard, an unquestionably reli-
able informant's tip might be accepted without an adequate showing of
his basis of information, when such information given by a police of-
ficer has traditionally been held insufficient to show probable cause. 5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the result
reached by the majority would erode the role of the magistrate by al-
lowing him to accept judgments made by affiants without providing
facts sufficient for the magistrate to make an independent determina-
tion.256 Justice Brennan argued that without the structure provided by
the Aguilar-Spinelli test it was more probable that a magistrate could
issue a warrant without reliable information from a credible person.
Such a possibility, argued Justice Brennan, would "'obliterate one of
the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government,
where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the
law.' "257
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, argued that the facts alleged
250. Id. at 314.
251. 103 S. Ct. at 2334. The majority observed that the tip in Draper may not have satis-
fied the Aguilar-Spinelli test because the tip contained scant information concerning the in-
formant's reliability and his source of information. Id at 2334 n.12.
252. Id. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 2351 (White, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65
(1959); Jones v. Unites States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960); and Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933)).
256. 103 S. Ct. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in the affidavit were insufficient to allow a finding of probable cause."'
Justice Stevens also contended that greater deference should have been
given to the three state courts that reviewed and rejected the magis-
trate's finding of probable cause.259
In its concern over avoiding "seriously impeding the task of law
enforcement," 260 the majority in Gates has significantly eroded the con-
stitutional protection against an unreasonable search that has been de-
veloped by the Court over the past nineteen years. As both Justices
Brennan and White point out in their dissenting and concurring opin-
ions, the conclusory allegations of even a presumptively reliable police
officer have been held insufficient to establish probable cause without
providing a magistrate with facts which allow him to make an in-
dependent judgment as to the affiant's basis of knowledge.26' To the
extent that the relaxation of this requirement allows a magistrate to
accept the conclusions of the "usually reliable" informant without an
independent evaluation of the underlying circumstances from which
the informant came to that conclusion, the requirement that probable
cause will be determined only by a neutral and detached magistrate is
undermined.262
Moreover, while it is arguable that the two-prong test has been
applied by some courts in an unnecessarily technical fashion,263 it is not
necessary to abandon the principles of Aguilar-Spinelli in order for
magistrates to make probable cause determinations in a "practical,
nontechnical" manner. Indeed, as Justice White demonstrated in his
258. Id. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out that instead of re-
turning immediately after leaving the car in Florida and returning alone as the informant
had predicted, Mrs. Gates stayed and returned with her husband. Justice Stevens contended
that this discrepancy undermined the credibility of the informant's tip.
259. Id at 2361-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id at 2331.
261. See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (statement by affiant that "he
has cause to suspect and does believe" that illegal liquor on premises insufficient for prob-
able cause); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (warrant insufficient where no
allegation that affiant spoke with personal knowledge, no indication of source of belief, or
any other sufficient basis for probable cause).
262. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 588 (1971) in which Justice Harlan states:
[O]ur cases have established that where the affiant relies upon the assertions of
confidants to establish probable cause, the affidavit must set forth facts which en-
able the magistrate to judge for himself both the probable credibility of the inform-
ant and the reliability of his information, for only if this condition is met can a
reviewing court be satisified that the magistrate has fulfilled his constitutional duty
to render an independent determination that probable cause exists.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
263. See Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); People v. Palanza, 55
Ill. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (Il1. App. 1978); People v. Brethauer, 482 P.2d 369 (Colo.
1971).
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concurrence, it was possible to uphold the search in Gates under Agui-
iar-Spinelli.264
The affidavit used to establish probable cause for a search of the
defendants' homes was held sufficient in United States v. Foster.6 5 The
affiant, an experienced agent, declared that defendant Foster headed a
major heroin distribution ring and that Gibson was his lieutenant;266
that narcotics had been seen in Foster's home and that Foster had ad-
mitted maintaining false records to deceive the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice;267 and that Gibson had participated in drug sales and rented a
beeper like those used in Foster's organization.268 In the affiant's opin-
ion, drugs and drug paraphernalia would likely be found in the sus-
pects' residences.269
Appellants contended that there was no probable cause to suspect
that evidence would be found in the appellants' homes. 270  While the
Ninth Circuit agreed that probable cause to search does not follow
from probable cause to arrest,27' it nevertheless found that the informa-
tion in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause to search
the residences. 2  Appellants also claimed that, since the information
264. 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
265. 711 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1983). Defendants were convicted of possession of heroin
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) which states in pertinent
part: "[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally. . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Defendants were also convicted of conspir-
acy to possess heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), which
states: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this sub-
chapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both. . ....
266. 711 F.2d at 878-79.
267. Id The affidavit alleged that narcotics had been seen at Foster's home on several
occasions. The allegation concerning Foster's statement was obtained through an inform-
ant. Id
268. Id The affidavit's allegation concerning the beeper was based upon business
records. Id.
269. Id at 878. All the warrants used to search the defendant's residences were supported
by this single affidavit. The affidavit stated that based on agent Williams' eleven years
experience as a narcotics agent he thought drug-related evidence would be found at both
residences. Id
270. Id at 878-79.
271. Id at 878 (citing United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.) (dictum)
(search of residence invalid where officers only had probable cause to arrest defendant), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979)). The court noted that a valid search warrant must be based on
facts showing probable cause to believe the evidence is currently located at the place de-
scribed. Id. at 878.
272. Id. at 878-79. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the practical nature of the
determination of probable cause, requiring that the affidavit be given a "common sense and
realistic interpretation." Id at 878 (citing United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th
Cir. 1982)). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (observation of
large amounts of sugar and gasoline cans and smell of fermenting mash enough to support
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in the affidavit concerning observations of drugs and drug sales was
several months old, it was too "stale" to support a finding of probable
cause.273 The court disagreed, holding that the passage of time did not
preclude a magistrate's determination that probable cause existed
where the defendants' actions indicated a continuing pattern of crimi-
nal activity.
274
The court disposed of Foster's contention that the affiant's failure
to include exculpatory statements made by Foster275 entitled him to a
hearing under Franks v. Delaware.276 Since a magistrate could reason-
ably have found probable cause even if the statements had been dis-
closed, the court concluded that the officer's failure to make that
disclosure was not prejudicial to the defendant.
277
The Ninth Circuit also rejected defendant Gibson's claim that
nothing in the affidavit connected him with the residences searched. 278
The court stated that the gas company records listing his wife as a resi-
dent of the house supplied sufficient facts from which a magistrate
could infer that Gibson also resided there.
2 79
In United States v. Mehrmanesh,28 ° the Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendant's contention that the warrant issued for the search of his
home was overbroad and not supported by probable cause.28 t In
Mehrmanesh, a Chicago airport immigration inspector became suspi-
inference of illegal distillery). In this context, the Ninth Circuit stated that agent Williams'
opinion based upon eleven years of experience was an important factor for consideration in
determining the existence of probable cause. 711 F.2d at 878-79.
273. 711 F.2d at 878-79.
274. Id In making this determination, the court cited United States v. Reid, 634 F.2d
469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980) (magistrate correctly found probable cause to search in affidavit
containing year-old information concerning an ongoing business in their manufacture), cert,
denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981); and United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 1980)
(month-old observation held not "stale" where continuing counterfeiting operation indi-
cated), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 975 (1981). The most recent observation listed in the Foster
affidavit had been only three months old when the warrant was executed, and Gibson's last
payment on his beeper had been made only two months before the search. 711 F.2d at 878-
79.
275. 711 F.2d at 879. Foster was referring to three tape-recorded conversations indicating
that Foster was no longer selling drugs. Id
276. See infra note 347.
277. 711 F.2d at 879. The court found that only one of Foster's statements could have
affected the magistrate's finding. Id Since there was evidence in the affidavit linking him to
a subsequent drug sale, the court found that failure to consider Foster's earlier statement did
not prejudice him. Id
278. Id
279. Id The court noted that "It]he magistrate need not be convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the facts in the affidavit [were] true" to find probable cause. Id
280. 689 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1982).
281. Id at 834-35.
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cious when he found two waybills in hand-luggage belonging to Ali
Pirani, an Iranian citizen. The waybills disclosed that Pirani had
shipped two packages of personal effects normally carried by passen-
gers to ensure that they arrive safely. One of the waybills was ad-
dressed to an East Vista, Arizona residence rented by appellant
Mehrmanesh. 2 A Chicago customs agent intercepted one of the pack-
ages, a suitcase, and discovered heroin inside the lining. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) agents were notified and the package sent
on to its destination.283
When appellant's brother and nephew retrieved the package from
the airline in Phoenix and brought it to the appellant's home, DEA
agents followed. The suspects stopped en route to place a phone call at
about the same time a call was received at the Mehrmanesh residence.
Shortly after the suspects arrived at the residence, another man
emerged, drove away, and was arrested near the home for possession of
heroin and cocaine.284
Relying on this information and on an informant's tip that
Mehrmanesh was involved in heroin importation, DEA agents ob-
tained a warrant to search the East Vista residence. The suitcase, vari-
ous drug and drug paraphernalia, and documents linking the appellant
with the residence were found inside the residence and hidden within
its walls.2 85 Mehrmanesh was convicted of importing heroin and at-
tempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute it.
286
282. Id. at 826.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 826-27.
286. Defendant was convicted and sentenced pursuant to the following statutes: 21
U.S.C. § 841 (1976), which provides:
(a)... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-
(I) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or
dispense, a controlled substance.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 845 of this title, any person who
violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows . . . to a
term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years, a fine of not more than
$25,000, or both;
21 U.S.C. § 845 (1976), which provides in part: "Any person at least eighteen years of age
who violates section 841(a)(1) of this title by distributing a controlled substance to a person
under twenty-one years of age is. . .punishable by. . .a term of imprisonment, or a fine
• ..up to twice that authorized by section 841"; 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976), which states in
part: "It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States from any
place outside thereof. . . any controlled substance . . ."; 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1976),
which provides in part: "Any person who. . . knowingly or intentionally imports or exports
a controlled substance. . . shall be punished.. ."; 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), which provides:
1985]
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The Ninth Circuit rejected Mehrmanesh's challenge of the war-
rant's validity.2 87 The court reasoned that in light of the defendant's
activities, the character of the missing items, the opportunity for con-
cealment, together with inferences concerning likely hiding places, a
magistrate could reasonably conclude that the officers were likely to
find incriminating evidence at the location searched.
288
2. Border searches
Although probable cause is not a requirement for a border
search,289 all searches are subject to the fourth amendment prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 290  Body searches have
been classified into three "levels of intrusion," each requiring a distinct
level of suspicion before the search may be considered reasonable. Of-
ficers need only minimal suspicion to conduct a pat-down search.29'
The standard for a strip search is higher, requiring "real suspicion. ' 2 92
The most stringent showing is necessary before conducting a body cav-
ity search, where officers must have a "clear indication" that contra-
band is being concealed.2 93 The Ninth Circuit has recently held that,
because of the potential adverse effects of x-rays, an x-ray search is
subject to the "clear indication" standard.294
In United States v. Couch,2 95 the Ninth Circuit held that a detailed
tip reciting the defendant's plan to smuggle cocaine into the United
States by concealing it in his body satisfied the "clear indication" stan-
"[T]he person committing such violation shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or
fined not more than $25,000, or both"; and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), which provides: "Whoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." Mehrmanesh was sentenced to fif-
teen years' imprisonment and fined $25,000 on each count.
287. 689 F.2d at 834.
288. Id The court cited United States v. Spearman, 532 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1976) as sup-
port for this proposition. In Spearman, the Ninth Circuit held that it was permissible for a
magistrate to infer from evidence of a suspect's drug selling activities that it was probable
that evidence of drug dealing would be found in his car. Id. at 133.
289. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 611-14 (1977).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
291. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (search of suspect's mail by
customs officer allowed upon "reasonable cause to suspect"); United States v. Perez, 644
F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1981) (cars entering country subject to search without probable
cause).
292. United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1979) (strip search allowed
upon showing of "real suspicion").
293. United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980) (x-ray search upheld
upon showing of "real suspicion" and "clear indication").
294. United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982).
295. 688 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982).
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dard.29 6 DEA agents received the information from a confidential in-
formant.297 According to the informant, Couch and another suspect
were to take drugs to inhibit and clean out their digestive systems, and
then swallow several capsules of cocaine. Agents were also given de-
tails of the suspects' travel plans and were informed that Couch had
avoided x-ray detection in the past by claiming he had recently been
overexposed to them and feared further exposure would damage his
health. Upon reentering the country, the defendants were detained
while a warrant for an x-ray search was issued. Included in the affiant
agent's application were his observations corroborating some of the in-
formant's statements.298
Based in part on the insufficiency of the affidavit, the district court
granted Couch's motion to suppress evidence including the x-rays and
cocaine capsules excreted by Couch.29 9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the suppression order.3"° Applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test,
the court found that the informant was credible because he had fur-
nished reliable information on five occasions in the past."' In addi-
tion, the degree of detail in the tip together with the facts corroborated
by the customs agent satisfied the test's "basis of knowledge" prong.3 °2
The court also noted that, although each corroborated fact in the tip
was innocent in itself, it was highly unlikely that the suspect's actions,
particularly using the same excuse to avoid x-rays, were mere
coincidences. 0 3
296. Id. at 606.
297. Id at 600.
298. Id. at 600-01. The affidavit also stated that the defendants arrived from Peru, that a
prior search revealed no contraband, that Couch refused to be x-rayed for health reasons,
and that Couch had neither eaten nor excreted for seven hours. Id
299. Id. at 602. Defendant was convicted of importing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 952(a) and § 960(a)(1). 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) states in pertinent part: "It shall be
unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States. . . any controlled sub-
stance ... " 21 U.S.C. § 960 (1976) prohibits "import[ing] or export[ing] a controlled sub-
stance .... "Defendant was also convicted of possession of a controlled substance in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
300. 688 F.2d at 607.
301. LId at 605. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
302. Id
303. Id at 606-07. The court also noted that the agents had followed the procedure rec-
ommended in United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980) and United States
v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1976), by obtaining a court order before subject-
ing a defendant to an x-ray search. 688 F.2d at 604-05 n.9.
In this pre-Gates case, the court ruled that the informant's tip passed the Aguilar-Spinelli
test because the informer's detailed description of the defendant's plan cured an inadequate
disclosure of the informant's basis of information. The court emphasized that the details of
that description dealt with both innocent and criminal activities. 688 F.2d at 605-06. Corn-
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The court recently applied the "clear indication" standard in
United States v. Quintero-Castro" and United States v. Mendez-
Jimenez.3" 5 In Mendez-Jimenez, a warrant for an x-ray search was up-
held where the affidavit contained the following information: the de-
fendant (1) had arrived from Colombia, a known drug source country;
(2) was in possession of anti-diarrhea medication; (3) had not con-
sumed food or beverages since leaving Colombia; (4) was confused and
uncertain about his travel plans; (5) was carrying only limited identifi-
cation, a large amount of cash and a passport which looked as if it had
been tampered with; (6) appeared very nervous; (7) had paid cash for
his airline ticket; and (8) claimed to be vacationing in the United States
although he spoke no English and knew no one in the country. 30 6
In Quintero-Castro, however, the issuance of a warrant for an x-
ray search was overturned. As in Mendez-Jimenez, the affidavit stated
that the suspect had come from a known drug exporting country, said
he was on a short vacation without his family, and planned to stay at a
hotel even though he had relatives in the area. The affidavit further
stated that Quintero-Castro had paid for his airline ticket in cash, had a
large amount of cash in his possession and had given conflicting an-
swers in response to questioning. Unlike the affidavit in Mendez-
Jimenez, however, there was no allegation that a substance was found
that was associated with body-cavity smuggling, no allegation that de-
fendant had refrained from eating or drinking in the recent past, and
no evidence of passport tampering. Furthermore, the suspect in Quin-
tero-Castro had relatives in the United States. Because it found "fewer
factors to support a finding of probable cause," the Ninth Circuit held
that the affidavit failed to provide the clear indication of body cavity
smuggling necessary for an x-ray search.3" 7
pare United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1974) (corroboration of informant's
description of car and license not sufficient to establish probable cause) with United States v.
Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981) (corroboration of informant's description "inher-
ently suspicious" where suspect abandoned car and hitchhiked away). This holding reflects
the general trend toward flexibility in approach to the determination of probable cause
based on an informer's tip. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
304. 705 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
305. 709 F.2d 1300 (1983). The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), see supra note 286.
306. 709 F.2d at 1304. The defendant had been stopped by a customs inspector at Los
Angeles International Airport. When Mendez-Jimenez refused to consent to an x-ray
search, he was detained until the court order could be obtained. Id. at 1302. The court
found that this detention was not unreasonably intrusive. Id. at 1304.
307. 705 F.2d at 1101. In reaching its holding, the court reviewed several cases in which
x-ray searches had been upheld. See United States v. Couch, 668 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982)
(informant's tip corroborated by observations of customs officials); United States v. Ek, 676
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3. Seizures pursuant to a warrant
Private property used to import controlled substances may be
seized when the government shows probable cause to believe that the
seized property was used in the crime. 0 8 The requisite showing of
probable cause to seize property is similar to the standard required for
a search warrant. °9
In United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna,31 the ap-
pellant had purchased a yacht which was subsequently seized by the
government because its prior owner had allegedly used the vessel to
smuggle drugs. In the affidavit supporting the seizure warrant, a DEA
agent relied upon statements and diary entries by crew members of an-
F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982) (informant's tip corroborated by suspect's refusal to take food or
water during detention); United States v. Purvis, 632 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1980) (detailed obser-
vations of suspect's movements and possessions indicating drug smuggling); United States v.
Aman, 624 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1980) (restricted body movements, marijuana and drug smug-
gling paraphernalia discovered); United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980) (re-
stricted body movements, suspicious items, arrival from known smuggling source country).
The defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976), see supra note 286.
308. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances or their raw
materials].
Under 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1976) "it shall be unlawful (1) to transport, carry, or convey any
contraband article in, upon, or by any means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft." Section 782
of that title provides for the forfeiture of conveyances so used. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976).
309. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. One Twin Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). The burden of proof in such actions is governed by 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1976) which
provides:
In all suits or actions ... brought for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle,
merchandise, or baggage seized ... where the property is claimed by any person,
the burden shall lie upon such claimant ... provided, that probable cause shall be
first shown for the institution of such a suit or action, to be judged of by the court
The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 16 U.S.C. § 1615 in United States v.
One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1970). In that case the court held that the
forfeiture statutes did not violate the claimant's due process rights because the statutes are
"not criminal enough to prevent Congress from imposing the burden of proof on the claim-
ant." Id. at 66. But see United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721
(1971) (dictum) ("[T]his Court in the past has recognized the difficulty of reconciling the
broad scope of traditional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment
[sic]."); Devito v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (mem.) (owner of
seized property alleging no knowledge of illegal use has right to review claim to property
under fifth amendment).
310. 702 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983).
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other vessel indicating that the Tahuna was being used to smuggle ma-
rijuana, statements of agents regarding the yacht's movements, and the
discovery of unidentified seeds in the boat which were suspected to be
marijuana.3 1'
On appeal from a summary judgment entered against him,31 2 the
purchaser argued that the government must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that probable cause existed to believe that the property
seized was used to transport contraband.313 The Ninth Circuit rejected
that contention, holding that the various burdens of proof were not ap-
plicable to a showing of probable cause.3 14 The court stated that, since
the necessary showing concerns only probabilities, the application of an
evidentiary standard would be inappropriate. 1 Consequently, the
government was required only to establish reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the ship was used to transport narcotics. 316 Appellant also
contended that, because the statements in the affidavit were inadmissi-
ble as evidence, they could not be used to support the seizure.317 In
dismissing this contention, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that forcing the
government to prove by competent evidence that the vessel had been
used in smuggling would undermine the congressional intent to shift
the burden of proof to the claimant.31 8
4. Dog searches
In United States v. Setz,319 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
responses from two detector dogs provided the probable cause neces-
311. Id. at 1280. Russell, the mate aboard another vessel, had stated that his boat had
transferred 7,000 pounds of marijuana from Thailand to the Tahuna 250 miles west of San
Francisco. The cook on Russell's boat also kept diary entries indicating that the "cargo"
from the yacht was transferred to the Tahuna. DEA agent Petrotta later boarded the
Tahuna by identifying himself as a potential buyer. Petrotta found the seeds in the cargo
hold of the vessel. Id at 1279-80.
312. Id at 1280-83. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the government had
filed the same affidavit relied upon by the magistrate issuing the seizure warrant. Id. Four
months later, the district court entered a judgment of forfeiture against the Tahuna. Id.
313. Id. at 1281. Appellant contended that the government was required to "prove prob-
able cause by at least a preponderance of the evidence if not by clear and convincing evi-




317. Id. at 1282-83. The appellants contended that the statements used to obtain the war-
rant were either inadmissible hearsay or not sufficiently authenticated. Id. at 1284.
318. Id at 1283. The court also held that the information obtained through the infor-
mants was sufficient under the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id at 1283-87.
319. 721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983).
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sary to obtain a search warrant.32° In Spetz, members of the United
States Customs Special Contraband and Narcotics Interdiction Team
had brought the dogs into a customs area where cargo from two ships
was being unloaded. The dogs "mildly alerted" 321 on two large con-
tainers. 22 The officers returned with the dogs two days later after one
container had been unpacked in a freight terminal. Both dogs individ-
ually alerted on a package from the container. The agents subse-
quently determined that the addressee on the package had previously
been convicted of marijuana smuggling. Based on this information,
DEA agent Loveless prepared an affidavit upon which a warrant was
obtained and the package was opened, revealing 1440 pounds of
323marijuana.
Agents set up surveillance and followed two suspects who re-
trieved the package. The defendants were subsequently arrested at a
secluded residence when a sensing device planted in the marijuana in-
dicated that the package was being opened. Agents immediately ar-
rested several other suspects and executed a warrantless search of the
residence. Based partially on information obtained in this warrantless
search, DEA agents obtained and executed a warrant for a second
search of the house.324 Large amounts of marijuana, narcotics, and
narcotics paraphernalia found in and about the house were introduced
into evidence at the defendants' trial.
32 5
Relying on United States v. Beale,326 the Ninth Circuit rejected the
320. Id. at 1463.
321. A "'mild alert' . consists of lightly biting and scratching the object sniffed ...
[T]he stronger the scent, the more forcefully the dog will attack the object." Id. at 1461 n.2.
322. Id. at 1461.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1462.
325. Id at 1462-63. All three defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess and
distribute marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), see supra
note 286; Kalik and Spetz were convicted of aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1976) which states in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a princi-
pal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
Gulino and Spetz were also convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), see supra note 286; Spetz was further
convicted for possession of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1976), which provides
in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a con-
trolled substance .. "
326. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit in Beale held that the use of dogs
to detect the presence of contraband is a fourth amendment intrusion, "albeit a limited one,"
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defendants' contention that the dog sniff at the freight terminal failed
to supply probable cause to search the container.327 The court empha-
sized that the second dog's alert had independently corroborated the
indication given by the first dog.
328
Defendants further contended that the warrant was defective be-
cause the supporting affidavit contained erroneous information regard-
ing the past reliability of the dogs.329  The court rejected this
contention, reasoning that the relatively minor misstatement would not
have influenced the magistrate's judgment of the first dog's reliability,
especially in view of the independent corroboration by the second
dog.
330
Finally, the court ruled that the agents' search of the defendants'
house pursuant to the warrant was not unlawful, although the warrant
was partially based on information obtained in the earlier illegal war-
rantless search.33 ' The Ninth Circuit found that the substantial quan-
tity of marijuana discovered by the customs agents and the nature of
the defendants' activity were sufficient to justify the issuance of the
warrant even without the information gathered in the earlier search.1
32
5. Wiretaps
The fourth amendment right of privacy has long been held to ex-
tend to phone conversations in which a participant has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.333 To protect citizens from the unlawful inter-
ception of such conversations, Congress has passed legislation designed
and requires a "founded" or "articulable" suspicion that contraband is contained in the area
searched. Id at 1335.
327. 721 F.2d at 1463-64. The court upheld the first dog sniff at the terminal because it
was conducted in a customs area where goods were being unloaded from foreign ports. Id.
at 1463. In a footnote, the court noted that" 'mere entry alone into the United States from a
foreign country is a sufficient reason' for a search." Id. at 1463-64 n.13 (quoting Klein v.
United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973)).
328. 721 F.2d at 1464.
329. Id. The affidavit stated that one of the dogs had previously alerted correctly on sixty
of sixty-six occasions and the other had previously alerted correctly on two of two occasions.
In fact, the first dog had been correct on fifty-six ofsixty-one occasions and the other on only
two of six. Id
330. Id The court observed that, since the omission of this information was neither
harmful to the defendants nor "deliberate or in reckless disregard for the truth," the warrant
could not be overturned under the standard stated in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). Id at 1464-65.
331. 721 F.2d at 1468. The court found that the warrantless search was unlawful because
the facts failed to sufficiently indicate that suspects inside the house were armed and danger-
ous. Id. at 1467.
332. Id at 1468.
333. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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to prohibit electronic surveillance except upon compliance with speci-
fied stringent conditions.
3 34
In United States v. Brooklier,335 the district court summarily de-
nied Brooklier's motion to suppress his tape-recorded conversation
with "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno, an FBI informant, concerning an
extortion plan.3 36 On appeal, Brooklier contended that the affidavit
supporting the surveillance authorization failed to comply with the fed-
eral wiretap statute,337 which requires a "full and complete statement"
as to why other methods of investigation had or would have failed. 38
Brooklier contended that the electronic surveillance was unnecessary
because Fratianno could have infiltrated the group under investigation.
He further contended that the tapes should have been excluded because
the affiant officer had failed to inform the magistrate that Fratianno
was cooperating with the government.339
While agreeing that the government should have included the
facts concerning Fratianno, 34 ° the Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that
the district court's failure to hold a hearing and its admission of the
taped conversation was not error.34' The court relied on Franks v. Del-
aware,342 which requires an evidentiary hearing when the defendant
establishes that an affiant has deliberately included a false statement in
334. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
335. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
336. Brooklier and his co-defendants were accused of extorting money from
pornographers and bookmakers. After a seven-week trial, Brooklier was convicted of con-
spiracy and racketeering in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976), which provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for
any person who has received any income derived. . . from a pattern of racketeering activity
. . . to use or invest. . . any part of such income. . . in acquisition of any interest in...
any enterprise which is engaged in. . . interstate commerce." Brooklier was also convicted
of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), which provides in part: "Whoever in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce. . . or commits or threatens physi-
cal violence to any person or property. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than twenty years or both."
337. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a
wire or oral communication under this chapter . . . shall include the following
information:
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be un-
likely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. . ..
338. 685 F.2d at 1221.
339. Id.
340. The government argued that it need not have recited the facts concerning Fratianno
because he was not a fully cooperative informant when the recordings were made. Id
341. Id. at 1222.
342. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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the warrant affidavit. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, although the
government may have negligently prepared the affidavit, the exclusion
of the tapes was not required because there was no evidence of deliber-
ate omission of material information s43
The Ninth Circuit's use of the Franks test to dispose of this issue is
analytically unconvincing. The federal wiretap statute is designed to
protect the privacy of wire and oral communications and to provide
uniform criteria under which electronic surveillance may be ob-
tained.3" It imposes an affirmative duty on officers to show the lack of
probable success of other investigative methods before a wiretape can
be permitted and provides for the exclusion of evidence in violation of
these requirements.345 The rule in Franks was adopted to apply to false
statements made in support of an application for a search warrant. Ap-
plication of the Franks test in these circumstances operates to circum-
vent the clear purpose of the statute by exempting negligent
noncompliance.346
6. Warrants obtained by false statements
When a defendant shows that a warrant was obtained through the
use of reckless or deliberate false statements in the underlying affidavit,
and the affidavit would be insufficient to establish probable cause with-
out these statements, the defendant is entitled to a hearing to determine
343. 685 F.2d at 1222. The court stated that the defendant has the burden of showing
that an omission was made deliberately or in bad faith. 1d at 1221. Mere negligence is
insufficient to justify suppressing the evidence. Id
344. In Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), the Supreme Court interpreted the
intent of Congress in enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1976), by quoting from the Senate committee report that accompanied the
Act: "Title III has its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communica-
tions, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which
the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized." The Court then
noted the congressional intent to exclude evidence obtained by illegal electronic surveil-
lance: "The perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and crimi-
nal proceedings." Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 48, 50.
345. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1981). See supra note 344.
346. Section 2518 contains its own exclusionary clause, which the court did not address in
its opinion:
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial . . . may move to suppress the
contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or
evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully interpreted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is
insufficient on its face . . ..
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1981). In view of the clear congressional intent to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of the wiretap statute, the court's decision to engraft the requirements
under Franks is especially questionable.
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whether the warrant should be invalidated.347
In United States v. Davis,348 the Ninth Circuit reversed the defend-
ant's conviction for importation of hashish oil and remanded the case
for retrial.34 9 During an investigation of the murder of the defendant's
business associate, police applied for two search warrants to search
both the defendant's business (PDI offices) and a residence known as
71 Blue Lagoon.35° In the warrant application for the Blue Lagoon
property, the officer in charge of the investigation stated that he had
personally spoken with three confidential informants. In fact, that of-
ficer had not personally interviewed these informants, but had gathered
most of the information in the affidavit from subordinate officers.
35'
Although he became aware of the inaccuracy after the affidavit had
been typed, the officer failed to correct it.
352
In an earlier appeal challenging the validity of both warrants, the
Ninth Circuit had found that the defendant was entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware53 to determine whether the of-
ficer had deliberately or recklessly misstated the truth in the warrant
application.354 On remand, the district court found that the officer had
not deliberately or recklessly falsified the affidavit because the police
officer believed all the underlying information in the affidavit was
true.355
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's conclusion was
clearly erroneous because it overlooked the officer's statements claim-
347. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks, affiant officers had stated in
their application for a search warrant that they had interviewed the suspect's employers,
who had informed the officers that the suspect normally wore clothes similar to those de-
scribed by a rape victim. The defendant claimed that no such interview had taken place,
and sought an evidentiary hearing on the ground that the warrant was procured by false
statements. The Supreme Court ruled that when a defendant makes an initial showing that
a warrant was procured by deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, and the
warrant without the disputed statements would be insufficient to establish probable cause,
the defendant is entitled to a hearing to determine the validity of the affidavit. Id at 171.
348. 714 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1983).
349. .,d. at 901.
350. Id at 897. The search of the residence resulted in the discovery of a notebook subse-
quently introduced at trial. Id
351. Id. at 897-98.
352. Id
353. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). See supra note 347.
354. United States v. Davis, 663 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1981). In the first Davis appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that, although the affidavits stated sufficient facts for the magistrate to
infer probable cause, an evidentiary hearing was required because the defendant had made
the showing required under Franks. Id at 830.
355. 714 F.2d at 897.
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ing his personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the affidavit.3"6 The
court observed that, while the affiant could have relied upon the state-
ments of the junior officer, his failure to properly identify the sources of
his information made it impossible for the magistrate to make an in-
dependent determination of probable cause.357
The court also rejected the government's contention that the mis-
statements in the affidavit were harmless because the magistrate who
read it was aware of the true facts, having also read the affidavit under-
lying the warrant for the PDI offices. The court responded that the
government's use of such an affidavit "runs the risk" that an appellate
court might find such misstatements material.
318
The district court offered two alternative bases for validating the
search: (1) the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause even
without the disputed portions; or (2) admission of the evidence ob-
tained during the search, a notebook, was harmless error.359 The Ninth
Circuit summarily rejected both contentions, holding that these issues
were foreclosed by the court's holding in the prior appeal.
360
356. Id. at 898. The court stated that although probable cause did exist, that fact alone
could not remedy the defect in the affidavit. Id. at 899.
357. Id at 900. The Ninth Circuit distinguished cases where one police officer's knowl-
edge was imputed to another for the purpose of the determination of probable cause because
a magistrate is not allowed to rely upon the judgments of others in determining probable
cause. Id See United States v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir.) (officer entitled to rely
on information from fellow officer to establish probable cause), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078
(1972); United States v. Bernard, 607 F.2d 1257, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1979) (collective knowl-
edge of all agents involved in investigation sufficient for all probable cause).
358. 714 F.2d at 900. In support of this position, the court cited Keeble v. Sulmeyer, 290
F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1961), where a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy was revoked because he
made a false oath during a creditor's meeting. Id at 129. The court found these false state-
ments to be material, notwithstanding the fact that the trustee was aware of the existence of
the property about which the debtor lied. Id at 131. "A 'false oath cannot be justified on
the ground that the person to whom it is made knows or should know the truth despite the
falsehood."' Id
359. 714 F.2d at 900.
360. Id at 900-01. The government relied upon United States v. Fogarty, 663 F.2d 928,
930 (9th Cir. 1982), which was decided after the first Davis appeal, but before the second. In
Fogarty, the Ninth Circuit held that two related affidavits presented to the magistrate simul-
taneously were individually sufficient for him to determine probable cause. That court also
indicated that there is "no restriction which limits a magistrate to the four corners of a single
affidavit when facts are presented simultaneously in two related affidavits seeking two war-
rants." Id at 930. The Davis court refused to read Fogarty as allowing a magistrate to
determine probable cause by reference to a second affidavit. 714 F.2d at 900 (citing United
States v. Dudek, 560 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (6th Cir. 1977) (facts in two affidavits filed simulta-
neously usable to determine probable cause), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978)).
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7. Scope of the search
The fourth amendment requirement that a search warrant must
particularly describe the places to be searched and things to be
seized36' is designed to discourage general searches by preventing "the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another." '362 Minimal
discretion is left to the executing officer to determine the warrant's
scope.363
In United States v. Williams, 364 the Ninth Circuit held that a war-
rant describing an isolated rural area according to its geographical lo-
cation was sufficient to enable the executing officers to reasonably
identify the place to be searched.
365
While conducting an aerial search, officers of the Josephine
County Sheriffs Department observed marijuana plants growing on re-
mote mining claim sites. The officers prepared an affidavit for a search
warrant, describing the area to be searched according to mining claim
numbers, township, range, section, and meridian. The affidavit also
included descriptions of three buildings located on the property. A
warrant was issued authorizing a search of the "premises" described in
the affidavit, but omitting explicit reference to the buildings thereon.
The officers were authorized to search for "'evidence of active cultiva-
tion of marijuana, and evidence of its cultivator.' "366
When the officers executed the warrant, they discovered several
plots of marijuana plants on the grounds. Inside one of the buildings,
deputies found a lunch box labeled "L.K. Williams" which contained
homemade explosive devices. Williams was subsequently arrested and
convicted of firearms violations.367
In upholding the validity of the warrant, the Ninth Circuit stated
that "practical accuracy rather than . . . technical precision" should
govern whether a warrant sufficiently describes the place to be
361. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
362. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927). The prohibition in the Constitu-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures reflects the intention of its authors to pre-
vent the practice, prevalent in the colonies, of using "writs of assistance," in which revenue
officers were empowered to search at their discretion for smuggled goods. Id at 195.
363. Id. at 196.
364. 687 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1982).
365. Id. at 291-92.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 292. Williams was convicted of possession of homemade mines in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1976) which provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person...
(c) to receive or possess a firearm made in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or. ..
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him. . . or. . . (f) to make a
firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter. . ....
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searched.3 68 The court also noted that the requisite degree of specificity
will vary from an urban to a rural setting.369
The Ninth Circuit further held that neither the search of the build-
ings nor the search of the lunch box exceeded the scope of the war-
rant.370 The court defined the word "premises" to include the "'land
and the tenements or appurtenances thereto.' """ Consequently, the
court found that the magistrate intended to authorize a search of the
buildings. Having discovered the marijuana fields near the buildings,
the officers could reasonably believe that evidence of marijuana culti-
vation would be found inside the buildings. 2 With respect to the
lunch box, the court stated that it was reasonable to infer that evidence
of marijuana cultivation would be found inside. The court reasoned
that a suspect should not be able to frustrate a lawful search by merely
concealing the contraband inside a closed container. Once the box was
opened, the court held, the explosives were seizable under the plain
view doctrine.373
Although it disapproved of the government's wholesale seizure of
documents not mentioned in the warrant, the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Tamura,374 held that those documents obtained in the search
which were described in the warrant were properly admitted into
evidence.
375
Defendants Marubeni America Corporation (Marubeni) and its
employee Tamura were suspected of obtaining supply contracts with an
Alaskan telephone utility through a bribery scheme.376  In June of
1978, FBI agents searched Marubeni's Los Angeles office pursuant to a
368. 687 F.2d at 292 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)); see
supra note 238.
369. 687 F.2d at 293.
370. Id.
371. Id (quoting United States v. Meyer, 417 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1969)). In Meyer,
the Eighth Circuit upheld a search of buildings at a specified location described as "80 acres
in the name of Otto Lewis Meyer and Margie M. Meyer." For the word "premises," the
court used the definition from BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1344 (4th ed. 1957) which pro-
vides: "Lands and tenements; and estate; land and buildings thereon .
372. 687 F.2d at 293.
373. Id (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).
374. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
375. Id. at 597.
376. Id Marubeni would bribe employees of the Anchorage Telephone Utility (ATU) in
order to obtain inside information which would enable Marubeni to obtain supply contracts
with ATU at artifically high prices. For his part in the scheme, Tamura was convicted on




warrant.377 However, agents were unable to find the documents indi-
cated in the warrant from the corporation's voluminous files. When
employees refused to help with the search, the agents removed all ac-
counting records for the years in question.378 The government kept
these records until shortly before trial, refusing to return them unless
the defendants would stipulate to their authenticity.3 79
Tamura contended that the trial court had erred in admitting
seized documents described in the warrant because the FBI's wholesale
seizure of Marubeni's records exceeded the scope of the warrant.380
The Ninth Circuit held that the FBI's seizure of the company's ac-
counting records was unreasonable.3 8' It further characterized the gov-
ernment's retention of the records in order to coerce the defendants as
"highly improper" and "'the kind of investigatory dragnet that the
fourth amendment was designed to prevent.' "5382
377. The warrant authorized officers to search for records of contracts for the sale of
cable, records of bribe payments, and travel records. Id at 594.
378. Id. at 595. The accounting records for the years in question included eleven card-
board boxes of computer printouts, thirty-four file drawers of vouchers, and seventeen draw-
ers of cancelled checks. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id Tamura did not challenge the validity of the warrant nor the scope of the search
at the Marubeni offices, but merely the scope of the seizure. Id.
381. Id. at 596. The government contended that the seizure was not unreasonable be-
cause of the difficulty of separating the documents sought from the company's general
records. The court disagreed, noting the general rule that only items specifically identified
in the warrant may be seized. Id. (citing United States v. Honore, 450 F.2d 31, 33 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1048 (1972)). Further, the court suggested that the proper pro-
cedure when faced with voluminous records as in this case was to seal and hold the docu-
ments pending a magistrate's approval of a further search. Id at 595-96. See MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.5 (1975).
382. 694 F.2d at 595-97 (quoting United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 543 (Ist Cir.
1980)). In Abrams, officers seized all of the Medicare and Medicaid records of doctors sus-
pected of Medicare fraud, conspiracy and mail fraud. The warrant specified "certain prop-
erty, namely evidence of a crime, to wit, certain business and billing and medical records of
patients of Doctors. . .which show actual medical services performed and fraudulent serv-
ices claimed to have been performed in a scheme to defraud the United States ...." 615
F.2d at 542. The court in Abrams discussed the origin of the particularity requirement,
noting that "[t]he general warrant and the unrestricted search that follows have been con-
demned by Americans since Colonial days." Id. at 543 (citing Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 195 (1927)).
An expression of the Supreme Court's concern over the danger of general warrants in
the context of a business records search is shown in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976) where the Court stated:
In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be ex-
amined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among
those papers authorized to be seized . . . .[R]esponsible officials, including judi-
cial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that
minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.
Id. at 482 n. 11.
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Nevertheless, the court upheld the admission of the documents
seized.383 In support of this seemingly anomalous decision,38 4 the court
determined that the improper seizure was motivated by practical con-
siderations rather than "a desire to engage in indiscriminate 'fish-
ing.' 385 The court also rejected the contention that the officers'
behavior was so unconscionable as to constitute a due process
violation.386
In United States v. Issaes,387 the Ninth Circuit upheld the seizure
of a journal containing records of drug transactions while executing a
search warrant pertaining only to rent receipts and counterfeit Federal
Reserve notes.388 While executing the warrant, Secret Service agents
discovered a locked safe in the defendant's closet. Issacs gave them the
combination, and the agents opened the safe, discovering six journals.
While leafing through one of the journals to see if it contained receipts
or notes, an agent noticed notations appearing to record drug transac-
tions. Although he found no such notations in the other journals, the
383. 694 F.2d at 597. The Ninth Circuit relied on the general rule that the seizure of
evidence not described in the warrant along with evidence which is described in the warrant
does not require suppression of the latter. .d. (citing United States v. Daniels, 549 F.2d 665,
668 (9th Cir. 1977)).
384. Id. (citing United States v. Daniels, 549 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court in
Daniels admitted into evidence drugs seized in the search of a home, but excluded letters
also found in the search because they were outside the scope of the warrant. The court held
that the letters were not "'products' of illegal seizures." United States v. Daniels, 549 F.2d
665, 668 (9th Cir. 1977). This reasoning is an application of the "fruits of the poisonous
tree" doctrine. In Tamura, it seems that the records used against the defendant were "prod-
ucts" of the illegal wholesale seizure of the company's records. Therefore, the Tamura
court's use of Daniels is highly questionable in this factual context.
385. 694 F.2d at 597. To illustrate the circumstance in which a warrant would be over-
turned as a general warrant, the court cited two cases for comparison. In United States v.
Rettig, 589 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1978), officers had used a warrant authorizing a search for
marijuana and related materials, to conduct an extensive search for evidence of a cocaine
importing conspiracy. The court found that the officers had "substantially exceeded any
reasonable interpretation of [the warrant's] provisions." Id. at 423.
In United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982), FBI agents conducted a massive search of defendant's offices pursuant to a warrant
with a lengthy affidavit containing 162 descriptions of property subject to seizure. The court
upheld the search even though some items incidently seized were outside the scope of the
warrant. Id at 1259-60.
386. 694 F.2d at 597. The Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained by police
conduct which is "shocking to the universal sense of justice" must be suppressed under the
"fundamental fairness component" of the fifth amendment. See Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (evidence obtained by forcible use of stomach pump excluded); United
States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (offer of five dollars to suspect's five-year-old son
to discover location of heroin held not to violate due process).
387. 708 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 165 (1983).
388. Id. at 1336. While searching Issacs' apartment pursuant to the warrant, agents dis-
covered drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons and ammunition.
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agent confiscated all six. At trial, the court admitted the journal con-
taining records of drug transactions, but suppressed the other five
journals.389
On appeal, Issacs claimed that the plain view doctrine did not ap-
ply to the seizure of the journal because the agent had to read the con-
tents in order to understand that the journal was incriminating.39 ° The
Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that the seizure of the journal was
permissible under the plain view exception to the warrant require-
ment.39' In searching this holding, the court followed Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,392 in which the Supreme Court held that officers may seize
evidence, not described in the warrant but found in plain view during a
legal search if: (1) the discovery was inadvertent; and (2) it was imme-
diately apparent to the officer that the object was evidence of a
crime.
393
The Issacs court held that the agent's discovery of the notations in
the journal had met the criteria established in Coolidge and thus, the
journal had properly been introduced into evidence. 394 The Ninth Cir-
cuit distinguished its holding in United States v. Wright,395 because the
agent in Issacs, unlike the agent in Wright, had discovered the incrimi-
nating notations during his initial perusal of the journal.39 6
The seizure of evidence of a crime, as distinguished from its fruits
or instrumentalities, or of contraband, requires an additional showing
389. At the defendant's first trial, which ended in a mistrial, five of the journals were
excluded. At the second trial, all six journals were admitted for impeachment purposes. Id.
Issacs was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methaqualone in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
390. 708 F.2d at 1368.
391. d. at 1369.
392. 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
393. 708 F.2d at 1368. Although the Ninth Circuit used the rule in Coolidge to resolve
this case, it noted that, in fact, the requirements of the Coolidge rule had been redefined in
Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). In Brown, the Court's plurality opinion questioned
both the "inadvertance" and "immediately apparent" requirements stated in Coolidge.
"'Plain view' is perhaps better understood, therefore, not as an independent 'exception' to
the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an
officer's 'access to an object' may be." 103 S. Ct. at 1540-41.
394. 708 F.2d at 1370.
395. 667 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1982). In Wright, an officer had discovered a ledger
during a search pursuant to a warrant authorizing seizure of a California driver's license.
After leafing through the ledger and discovering nothing incriminating inside, the officer
brought it to another investigator who discovered that narcotics transactions had been re-
corded in the ledger. Id at 795. The Ninth Circuit found that the incriminating nature of
the ledger was not "immediately apparent," and held that its seizure and perusal was illegal.
Id.
396. 708 F.2d at 1369-70.
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by the warrant applicant that a "nexus" exists between the evidence
and the criminal behavior.397
In United States v. Rubio,391 the defendants contended that the
seizure from their homes of indicia of membership in an alleged Rack-
eteer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) was done without prob-
able cause.3 99 Subsequent to the indictment of six members of the
Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club for racketeering, federal law enforce-
ment agents obtained warrants to search each member's home.4"' In
each supporting affidavit, the agents described in detail the types of
indicia of membership customarily kept by members of the Hell's An-
gels, enumerated facts indicating that the defendants were members,
and stated that each defendant had been indicted by a federal grand
jury for membership in a RICO enterprise.40 '
In holding that the evidence seized should have been suppressed,
the Ninth Circuit first recalled the Supreme Court's rejection of the
"mere evidence rule" in Warden v. Hayden.4 °2 Under Hayden, evi-
dence of a crime is seizable if there is probable cause to believe that the
items to be seized will aid in a particular criminal investigation.0 3 In
397. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In Hayden, the Supreme Court rejected
the "mere evidence rule" under which evidence of a crime not subject to government seizure
was not subject to a search warrant. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (no-
tion that the fourth amendment protection against search and seizure protected only prop-
erty interests has been gradually replaced with the idea that the amendment exists primarily
to protect privacy); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963) (intangible
property protected under fourth amendment); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266
(1960) (subtle distinctions under property law not determinative of whether party is "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103-04
(1959) (stolen goods in which defendant has no property right protected under fourth
amendment). The Court in Hayden held that, in order for "mere evidence" to be subject to
seizure, "[there must be. . . a 'nexus'--automatically provided in the case of fruits, instru-
mentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." 387 U.S.
at 306-07.
398. 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983).
399. Id. at 791.
400. Id at 790.
401. Id at 794. Defendants were subsequently convicted under the RICO statute which
makes it unlawful for "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). During the
execution of the warrants, agents recovered substantial additional evidence of criminal ac-
tivity not described in the warrant but found in plain view. Although the warrant was based
upon the alleged RICO offenses, all defendants except Rubio were convicted only of those
additional charges added as a result of this evidence obtained under the plain view excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. 727 F.2d at 791.
402. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
403. Id at 307.
CRIMINAL L4W SURVEY
Rubio, nearly all of the objects described in the warrant were "mere
evidence." 4"
The crime for which the defendants were under investigation pro-
hibits participation in a corrupt organization "through a pattern of
racketeering activity." 5  Therefore, in order to establish probable
cause, the affiants must establish a nexus between the indicia of mem-
bership in the club and the club's illegal activities. Otherwise, reasoned
the court, members innocently associated with such an organization
would be subject to search simply because other members were en-
gaged in illegal activity.4°6 The Ninth Circuit held that no such nexus
existed in this case because there were no facts alleged in the affidavits
showing that the suspects had engaged in racketeering activities
through their connection with the Hell's Angels.40 7 Further, the mere
assertion that the suspects had been indicted under the RICO statute
was held insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.4 °8
Although an indictment from a properly constituted grand jury conclu-
sively establishes probable cause for an arrest, such an indictment does
not establish probable cause for a search without an independent judi-
cial determination." 9
C. Warrantless Searches
Generally, warrantless searches are unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. Although a search pursuant to a warrant is preferred, the
courts have recognized various exceptions to the warrant requirement.
This section sets forth those exceptions.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. 703 F.2d at 1129. The court concurred with the Second Circuit's conclusion in
United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), which held that a violation of the
RICO statute occurs when (I) the defendant is only able to commit the predicate criminal
offense through involvement in the organization; or (2) where the predicate offense is "re-
lated to activities of that enterprise." Id at 54. Simply committing the predicated offense
would not be sufficient to violate the RICO statute. Id Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned, mere association with the allegedly corrupt enterprise would not be enough to sup-
port a warrant without a further showing that the evidence to be seized was related in some
way to that organization's criminal activities. 703 F.2d at 1130.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1130-31. The court cited United States v. Cheshire, 678 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.
1982), a case stemming from the same indictment as Rubio. In Cheshire, the Ninth Circuit
found that a six-year-old affidavit substantially identical to the ones in Rubio alleged insuffi-
cient facts to show probable cause to believe that the defendant was presently a member of
the Hel's Angels.
409. 703 F.2d at 1130-31 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1973)).
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1. Exigent circumstances
An exception to the search warrant requirement may result from
the presence of exigent circumstances.4 ° A warrantless search pursu-
ant to the exigent circumstances exception is justified by a reasonable
belief that evidence would be destroyed or removed while a warrant
was being sought.41'
In United States v. Martin,4" 2 the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant
was necessary to examine a sealed bag. The court ruled that no exigent
circumstances existed because the bag was in exclusive police cus-
tody.413 Martin had invited Garcia, an undercover Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent, to purchase cocaine at Martin's house.
Garcia saw Martin place the cocaine into a locked bank bag and put it
in a desk drawer in Martin's bedroom. Garcia subsequently went
outside to meet another agent on the pretext of meeting her friend with
the money. When she returned, Garcia arrested Martin in the hallway.
Garcia went into the bedroom, opened the desk drawer, and removed
the locked bag. The key was obtained from Martin and used to open
and search the bag.
4 14
The court determined that no exigent circumstances existed be-
cause the bag was in police custody, and its contents were not subject to
removal or destruction by Martin.41' Because the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a valid search of the bag's contents required a warrant, it did not
reach the issue of whether the seizure of the bag itself was legal.
41 6
Finally, the court distinguished the cases upon which the govern-
ment relied as not addressing the warrantless search of a closed
container in police custody.417 In fact, the cases relied upon by the
410. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215-16 (1981) (warrantless search
without exigent circumstances violated fourth amendment).
411. United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1975) (entry into resi-
dence to protect contraband from destruction).
412. 693 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1602 (1984).
413. Id. at 78.
414. Id. at 77-78. Officer Garcia admitted that nothing had prevented the police from
obtaining the required warrant. Id. at 78.
415. Id. at 78 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)). In Chadwick, the
Court ruled that a search warrant was required before federal agents could open a locked
footlocker, even though it was properly in their possession and they had probable cause to
believe it contained contraband. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 11 (1977). The
Court reasoned that there was no exigency because the agents had exclusive control of the
footlocker following its seizure. There was no danger that the footlocker could be removed
before a warrant was secured. Therefore, a search warrant was required. Id. at 13.
416. 693 F.2d at 78.
417. Id The cases cited by the government were United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977), and United States v. Ortiz, 603 F.2d 76 (9th
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government involved interpretation of the plain view doctrine.
In a dissent, Judge Goodwin argued that Martin packed the bag in
front of Garcia, and therefore could have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in its contents, at least as to Garcia.418 Although the dissent
recognized the argument that a ten to twenty minute lapse could extin-
guish "plain view," and thereby restore Martin's expectation of pri-
vacy, it concluded that the passage of time in the present case was not
significant enough to create a new expectation of privacy.4 19
In United States v. Chase,420 the Ninth Circuit upheld a warrant-
less search based upon exigent circumstances where the defendant
could have been warned of police presence due to the allegedly illegal
detention of a third party.42' Narcotics Task Force (NTF) agents set
up a sale of cocaine from Chase. After the transaction occurred, a
search warrant was sought. In the meantime, a woman leaving Chase's
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980). In Johnson, several officers observed narcotics
being prepared for distribution, but did not immediately arrest or search the defendants.
Instead, the officers returned to the police station for reinforcements and to determine
whether a search warrant was required. Although the officers did not continue their surveil-
lance during this half-hour delay, the court upheld the subsequent warrantless search based
upon exigent circumstances. The court determined that the delay did not destroy the exist-
ence of probable cause any more than if there had been a longer wait for a warrant. 561
F.2d at 842. The court stated that when the police observe a crime in progress with contra-
band in plain view, they are fully authorized both to make arrests and to seek out the contra-
band. Id. at 844-45.
In Ortiz, a police officer observed the defendants sitting at a table inside a service sta-
tion. A jar containing folded papers was on the table. The officer, convinced that a drug
transaction was taking place, approached the defendants and identified himself. Defendant
Canales grabbed the jar and hid it while the officer chased another defendant. Canales was
subsequently arrested by the officer. During a warrantless search of the service station, the
officer discovered the jar containing heroin under a couch in the back room. The court
upheld this search since the officer had legally observed the heroin. The plain view excep-
tion was not destroyed when Canales grabbed the jar containing the heroin and ran from the
front part of the service station. 603 F.2d at 79.
418. 693 F.2d at 78 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the facts in this
case were distinguishable from those in Chadwick. In Chadwick, the defendant's privacy
was invaded when the luggage he had packed in privacy was searched without a warrant.
The Court found that by placing personal effects inside a locked footlocker, the defendant
manifested an expectation that the contents would be free from public examination. United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). In the present case, Martin openly allowed Gar-
cia to observe him pack the cocaine in the bag and place it into the drawer. 693 F.2d at 78
(Goodwin, J., dissenting).
419. 693 F.2d at 78 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that this was "essen-
tially a unitary transaction. . . . The officer came, she saw, she went out to get 'the money'
which turned out to be reinforcements, and she returned and retrieved what she had just
seen . . . . This transaction invaded no privacy that Martin had not voluntarily relin-
quished when he dealt with Garcia." Id. (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
420. 692 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
421. 1d. at 71.
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residence was detained on the pretext of a stolen automobile investiga-
tion. A search during this detention revealed no cocaine or weapons.
The woman's attorney stopped at the detention site, then left. The
NTF agents, fearful that Chase would soon learn of the detention, en-
tered and secured the residence until the search warrant was ob-
tained.4 22 Chase moved to suppress the evidence obtained from this
search, including cocaine and a pistol, on the theory that, through the
illegal detention of the woman, the agents created the exigency that
justified the entry into his home.423
Because the district court's finding of exigent circumstances was
not clearly erroneous, the judgment was affirmed.424 The court ruled
that the woman's attorney's knowledge of the detention was sufficient
to support a reasonable belief by the NTF agents that Chase would be
alerted to their presence.425
In United States v. Lomas,4 26 the Ninth Circuit held that in the
absence of exigent circumstances, the warrantless entry of a hotel room
to determine whether it was occupied was illegal. 427 During a DEA
undercover operation, a search of defendant Margolis revealed a re-
ceipt for a local hotel room where earlier narcotics-related activities
had taken place. A DEA agent and a local deputy entered the room to
check for occupants. The procedure took thirty seconds and they did
not notice any incriminating evidence. The room was then secured to
prevent the destruction of evidence while awaiting a search warrant.42
The court held that the warrantless entry to conduct "even the most
cursory search" was illegal in the absence of exigent circumstances.429
422. Id. at 70.
423. Id. Chase based his argument on United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.
1980). However, the court distinguished Allard, reasoning that the exigent circumstances in
Allardwere created by conduct that violated the defendant's own constitutional rights, and
not those of a third party. 692 F.2d at 70.
424. 692 F.2d at 71 (citing United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), overruled on other grounds, United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1984)).
425. Id
426. 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984). The defendants were
convicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976). 706 F.2d at 888.
427. 706 F.2d at 893.
428. Id. at 888-90.
429. Id at 893. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). In Vale, after officers deter-
mined that they had observed a narcotics sale, they arrested the defendant on the front steps
of his house. One officer made a cursory inspection of the entire house to determine whether
anyone else was present. The Court held the search invalid because of the lack of exigent
circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 34-35.
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Nonetheless, Margolis' conviction was affirmed because the court de-
termined that the other evidence against him rendered the "admission
of this evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."43
In United States v. Spetz,4 3 1 the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant-
less protective search of a house for additional suspects following the
arrest of five suspects in the driveway was illegal.432 DEA agents had
followed the delivery of 1440 pounds of marijuana to a private resi-
dence. During the protective sweep subsequent to the arrest of five sus-
pects, the agents discovered a set of scales, approximately $10,000 in
currency, narcotics, and drug paraphernalia. These observations were
included in an affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant for
the residence.433
The Ninth Circuit observed that the exigent circumstances excep-
tion may justify a protective search when officers conduct an arrest in
or near a residence, and the officers reasonably believe that there might
be other persons on the premises who could be dangerous to them.434
The district court concluded that there were exigent circumstances
which justified the warrantless protective search.435 In reviewing the
district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that in order to justify
a warrantless search, the government must "'"point to specific and ar-
430. 706 F.2d at 894. Lomas' conviction was reversed and the case was remanded to
allow the district court to determine whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the hotel room. The court stated that if such an expectation is found to have existed, the
trial court must then decide whether the evidence could have been obtained through some
independent source. Id at 894-95. The court did not decide whether there was sufficient
evidence to find Lomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the items seized in the hotel
room were not admitted. .d. at 895.
431. 721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983).
432. Id. at 1467.
433. Id at 1461-62, 1465. Defendants Kalik and Spetz sought to suppress the evidence
uncovered during the search pursuant to the warrant on the grounds that the warrant was
partially supported by observations made during the allegedly unlawful protective sweep.
Id. at 1465. The Ninth Circuit held that the protective sweep was illegal, but it ruled that
independent probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant. Id at
1467-68.
434. Id. at 1465 (citing United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980)
(protective search upheld where weapons were observed on premises and persons could
enter residence without detection by police)).
435. Id. at 1466. In finding exigent circumstances, the district court stated:
[Tlhere were five men and five automobiles at a house that was away from the
beaten path, up by itsdlf. None of these agents knew how many people were there,
but with five cars there, they could assume that there were several. The doors were
open. If I were one of those agents, I'd jolly well want to know who else is in that
house, if anybody, and under the circumstances I think the agents were justified in
making [a protective search].
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ticulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, [would] reasonably warrant [the warrantless] intrusion."' "436
The Ninth Circuit held that the government failed to show specific
and articulable facts justifying the finding of exigent circumstances.
437
Nothing in the record indicated that the suspects arrested in the drive-
way were armed or that there were weapons in the house.438 The court
noted that the present case dealt "only with a crime of marijuana smug-
gling. 439 The court stated that mere speculation about the circum-
stances surrounding the warrantless search cannot support a finding of
exigent circumstances.440
Finally, the court noted that there is always a risk that persons
inhabiting a residence will be armed. However, if officers conducting
an arrest or a search could use this risk to justify a warrantless search,
there would never be a need for a warrant because every arrest or
436. Id (quoting United States v. Dugger, 603 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968))). The Spetz court did not decide whether the warrantless
search would have been valid had the purpose been to prevent destruction of evidence. 721
F.2d at 1466 n.18. Compare United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982)
(court upheld warrantless search and seizure pursuant to exigent circumstances exception
where destruction of evidence was likely) with United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781,789-90
(9th Cir. 1974) (court held invalid a protective search for additional armed suspects inside a
house). The Spetz court stated that the record clearly indicated that preservation of evidence
was not the purpose of the protective sweep. 721 F.2d at 1466 n.18.
437. 721 F.2d at 1466.
438. Id at 1467. See Basurto, 497 F.2d at 789. In Basurto, after the defendant was ar-
rested for marijuana importation and distribution, he yelled toward the house, "It's the po-
lice." The court did not believe that this statement or the fact that the defendant had
previously possessed a weapon "provided any indication. . . that there was anyone in the
house who might harm them or that weapons were in the house." Id
The Spetz court distinguished United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980),
where the court upheld a protective search. In Gardner, it was possible for someone to enter
the residence undetected by the surveillance team outside. Also, an undercover agent had
observed weapons in the house prior to the arrests. Id at 911-12 n.6. In Spetz, there were no
known confederates of the individuals arrested, and the agents were presumably able to
watch all of the house's entrances and exits. Furthermore, the agents "knew of no weapons
connected with any of the individuals arrested or the residence," nor had there been any
other articulable basis for concluding that a risk of violence existed. 721 F.2d at 1467.
439. 721 F.2d at 1466-67. See also United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), overruled on other grounds, United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1984). In Flickinger, the court noted that the exigent circum-
stances exception is justified where the suspect is arrested for a crime of violence. However,
the court stated that marijuana smuggling is not necessarily a crime of violence and there
was no evidence of violence in that case. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any of the
occupants of the house possessed weapons. Id at 1355.
440. 721 F.2d at 1466 (citing United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir.
1979) (no exigent circumstances where trailer was entered after fire inside had been
extinguished)).
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search involves the potential use of weapons." The court therefore
held that the protective sweep of the residence without a warrant was
unlawful." 2
The Ninth Circuit stringently applies the exigent circumstances ex-
ception. United States v. Chase 3 was the only case during the survey
period in which the court upheld a warrantless intrusion on the basis of
exigent circumstances. This suggests that the trend in the Ninth Circuit
is to strictly construe the requirement of a reasonable, articulable belief
that exigent circumstances justify the warrantless intrusion.
2. Search incident to arrest
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable to search the suspect and
the area "within his immediate control" for weapons or evidence that
could be concealed or destroyed. 4 " In United States v. Harvey,"5 the
Ninth Circuit held that, in order to be admissible, evidence produced
by a blood sample, taken without consent or warrant, requires a prior
formal arrest or an arrest substantially contemporaneous to the taking
of the blood sample.4 6 However, an exception to the arrest require-
ment exists if the defendant was so incapacitated that he or she could
not have comprehended the significance of an arrest." 7 In a consoli-
dated appeal, defendants Harvey and Chase contested their convictions
for involuntary manslaugther which arose from alcohol-related traffic
accidents. The court held that Harvey should have been arrested prior
to the taking of a blood sample, and therefore reversed her convic-
tion.448 As to Chase, however, the court held that he was so incapaci-
tated that a prior arrest was unnecessary in order to take an
unconsented blood sample, and therefore affirmed his conviction.449
Harvey was driving a truck which crossed the center line and hit a
van, killing the driver. Three and one-half hours after the accident,
Harvey was asked to consent to a blood sample, without being arrested.
She vehemently refused, but the blood sample was taken over her ob-
441. Id. at 1467 (citing Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1355).
442. Id. See supra note 433.
443. 692 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
444. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
445. 701 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983).
446. Id. at 804-05.
447. Id. at 805-06. For a discussion of the justifications of this exception, see infra note
458.
448. 701 F.2d at 805.
449. Id at 805-07.
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jections. The blood sample was tested and showed .19% alcohol.4 5 0
Chase was driving a car which struck a bridge abutment, killing
his passenger, and severely injuring himself. The trial court deter-
mined that at the time the officer requested the blood sample, Chase
was so delirious that it was unnecessary for the officer to have arrested
him prior to the taking of the blood sample. The blood test revealed an
alcohol content of .21%.45
1
Harvey and Chase argued on appeal that the blood test results
should have been suppressed because neither defendant had been for-
mally arrested when the blood samples were taken.452 The court recog-
nized that a police officer may obtain a blood sample for analysis
without a warrant, pursuant to the search incident to arrest excep-
tion.453 However, such an arrest must precede, or be substantially con-
temporaneous with, the search incident to the arrest.
454
In the present cases, the arrests did not occur until four months
450. Id at 802. Harvey was not formally charged until four months later. Id.
451. Id. at 802-03. Chase was indicted four months later. 1d. at 803.
452. Id. at 802.
453. Id. at 803 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)). In Schrner-
ber, the Supreme Court held that a police officer who had validly arrested a suspect may
obtain a blood sample for an alcohol test without a warrant. Unlike the defendant in
Schmerber, however, neither Harvey nor Chase were formally arrested prior to the taking of
the blood samples. Id
The Schmerber Court decided that the evanescent nature of blood alcohol levels makes
the requirement of a warrant highly impractical. However, because the taking of a blood
sample is a substantial intrusion, a warrantless seizure of blood is permissible only in con-
nection with a search incident to arrest. 384 U.S. at 770-72.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), where the
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless taking of fingernail scrapings without a formal arrest
based upon the existence of probable cause to seize and arrest the defendant. Id at 294-96.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Murphy Court "seemingly equating Murphy's seizure with
an arrest, . . . rationalized the taking of fingernail scrapings as a limited and reasonable
method to preserve evanescent evidence." 701 F.2d at 804. The Murphy Court allowed this
search since it was a "very limited intrusion." 412 U.S. at 296. The Ninth Circuit did not
find Murphy controlling "because it involved a much less intrusive search than the extraction
of a blood sample." 701 F.2d at 804.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has cited Murphy in support of a
search which is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. Id (citing Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980)). There are similar holdings in the Ninth Circuit. See United
States v. Chatham, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("As long as probable
cause to arrest exists before the search, a search substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest is incident thereto."); Dickey v. United States, 332 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir.) (upheld
warrantless seizure prior to arrest where probable cause to arrest existed at time of seizure
and arrest was made immediately after seizure), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 948 (1964).
454. 701 F.2d at 804 (citing United States v. Chatham, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977);
Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966)). In
Cipres, the court stated that "a prior search may be valid as incident to a substantially con-
temporaneous arrest without a warrant if the arresting officers had probable cause for the
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after the blood samples were taken.455 In light of this, the court re-
versed Harvey's conviction, concluding that an arrest must precede or
be substantially contemporaneous with the taking of a blood sample.456
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Chase was so incapacitated that
it was unnecessary to arrest him prior to taking a blood sample.457 It
found no compelling reason to determine that a prior arrest is neces-
sary when it is shown that the suspect could not have understood the
significance of an arrest.458
In United States v. Thornton,459 the Ninth Circuit upheld a war-
rantless search incident to arrest.460 A police officer received a radio
message about a parked vehicle partially in the traffic lane with its
lights on. The officer approached the vehicle and observed Thornton
in the car, apparently asleep or unconscious. Eight inches of an altered
arrest at the time of the search, and the circumstances suggested that immediate search was
necessary to preserve material subject to seizure." Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d at 98.
455. 701 F.2d at 804. See supra notes 450 & 451.
456. 701 F.2d at 805. The Ninth Circuit also cited as authority for its conclusion Holland
v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973) (arrest required prior to requesting motorist to
submit to blood test). Accord Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975), overruled on
other grounds, Anchorage v. Gober, 592 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 n.8 (Alaska 1979); People v.
Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972); State v. Richerson,
87 N.M. 437, 535 P.2d 644, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 450, 535 P.2d 657 (1975). But see Devaney
v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (1972) (prior arrest not required; exigent circum-
stances exception is sufficient to uphold blood sample based upon the court's reading of
Schmerber); accord State v. McMaster, 118 N.J. Super. 476, 288 A.2d 583 (1972).
457. 701 F.2d at 805-06. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), where the
Supreme Court upheld extraction of a blood sample taken while the defendant was lying
unconscious in the hospital. The defendant had been involved in an automobile accident,
an almost-empty pint whiskey bottle was found in his glove compartment, and the smell of
liquor was detected on his breath. 352 U.S. at 433.
.458. 701 F.2d at 805-06. The court recommended the following procedure to determine
whether the suspect's level of incapacity renders a prior arrest unnecessary. The officer
should first request the suspect's consent to take a blood sample. If the suspect refuses, he or
she should be arrested prior to taking the blood sample. The arrest and the removal of the
blood must be supported by probable cause. If the officer's request is not refused, and the
suspect is not in a lucid condition, a formal arrest is not required if the seizure of the person
and the blood is supported by probable cause. Id at 806.
The court observed that requiring a prior formal arrest not only aids in preventing
officers from arbitrarily violating a suspect's privacy rights, but also triggers other rights
which are granted to the accused at the time of the arrest. Arguably, the significance of these
rights would not be appreciated where the suspect is.in an incapacitated state. However, the
court also maintained that another justification for a prior arrest is that it would demarcate
the point at which the officer determined that probable cause to arrest existed. Thus, the
court found that this would "help prevent an after-the-fact justification of the seizure of the
suspect and the blood." Id. at 805. By not requiring a prior arrest where the suspect is
incapacitated, the court seems to obviate the importance of this later justification.
459. 710 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1983).
460. Id. at 515.
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gun stock was visible under the front seat, next to Thornton's leg. A
registration check revealed that the car was registered to a woman.
Thornton was arrested on charges of carrying a concealed weapon
within city limits. A pat-down search revealed five shotgun slugs,
which were seized. The officer also removed the shotgun from under
the seat. 61
The defendant moved to suppress the use of the gun as evi-
dence.462 The court held that the seizure of the gun resulted from a
valid search incident to arrest,463 and therefore affirmed Thornton's
conviction. 4 "
3. Stop-and-frisk searches
Another exception to the fourth amendment requirement for a
warrant prior to a search is the "stop-and-frisk" or "pat-down"
search.465 When a police officer reasonably concludes that a suspect
may be involved in criminal activity and may be armed and presently
dangerous, the officer may conduct a carefully limited search of the
suspect to discover weapons.4 66
In United States v. Prim,467 the Ninth Circuit held that a pat-down
search is illegal when its purpose is to uncover narcotics rather than
weapons. 468 The defendant purchased a one-way ticket to Hawaii at
the Portland International Airport. Two police officers became suspi-
cious because of the defendant's nervous movements. A DEA agent
was summoned, and the defendant was observed until his flight left.
After his departure, it was discovered that he was mentioned in a 1979
461. Id at 514-15. Thornton was indicted for possessing a firearm without a serial
number and possessing an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), (i)
(1982).
462. Thornton argued that there had not been probable cause to arrest him because:
(1) the gun stock was visible, therefore the weapon was not concealed; and (2) no specific
evidence existed to show that Thornton was not entitled to possess the gun. 710 F.2d at 515.
463. Id (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (Court upheld warrant-
less search of passenger compartment incident to the arrest of the car's occupant)).
464. The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court's finding of probable cause to
arrest the defendant for violating the concealed weapons statute was not clearly erroneous.
710 F.2d at 515. The district court had ruled that the gun was concealed even though the
stock was visible because the stock could be detached from the rest of the gun. The lower
court had further concluded that the officer's view of the stock justified his belief that a
concealed gun existed. The Ninth Circuit also determined that the officer's absence of spe-
cific evidence to show that Thornton was not entitled to possess the gun was irrelevant. Id.
465. This exception was first delineated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
466. Id. at 30.
467. 698 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1983).
468. Id. at 977.
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narcotics investigation, and that an outstanding nonsupport warrant
for the defendant existed. Authorities in Honolulu were notified of this
information. After arriving in Hawaii, the defendant was followed, but
he made no unusual or suspicious actions. He was then approached by
government agents, who examined his identification and plane ticket.
The officers informed the defendant of their suspicion that he was traf-
ficking in narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to an office. No
mention was made of the outstanding nonsupport warrant, nor was any
search for weapons conducted.469 In the interrogation room, the de-
fendant refused to consent to a search and requested a lawyer. Agent
Snyder conducted a pat-down search which uncovered an opaque en-
velope which had made a bulge in the defendant's pocket. The envel-
ope was later found to contain cocaine.4 7 °
The court stated that the purpose of a pat-down search is "to allow
the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence."' 47'
Therefore, the search is limited to an inspection reasonably designed to
discover hidden instruments for assault.47 2 In this case, Agent Snyder
used the pat-down as a ruse since he in fact expected to find narcotics
as the source of the bulge.4 73 The court therefore concluded that the
469. Id. at 973-74. The officers later testified that the reason the defendant was brought to
the interrogation room was not because of the outstanding nonsupport warrant, but to ques-
tion the defendant about narcotics and to obtain his consent to a search. Id. at 974.
470. Id. Prior to the pat-down search, Agent Snyder directed the defendant to place his
personal belongings on the table. The defendant did so, but did not remove the envelope
from his pants. After the pat-down search, Snyder placed the envelope on the table with the
defendant's other personal items. Snyder testified that the defendant asked for a cigarette
from his briefcase. After removing a cigarette, Snyder placed the envelope and the other
personal items inside the briefcase. The defendant testified that he does not smoke and did
not request a cigarette. Snyder left the room with the briefcase, which was then examined
by narcotics-detecting dogs. Id at 974-75. The court declined to discuss the issue of
whether the use of the dogs was an illegal search since it held that the detention and pat-
down search were unlawful. Id. at 977-78.
471. Id. at 977 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). The Adams Court
asserted that:
"When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious be-
havior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others," he may conduct a limited protective search for concealed
weapons. [citation omitted] The purpose of this limited search is not to discover
evidence of crime ....
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)).
472. See Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1969) (officer's squeezing of small
object which he realized was not a potential weapon, but might be narcotics, went beyond a
lawful search).
473. 698 F.2d at 977. The court reached this conclusion because the defendant passed
through a magnetometer, was under constant surveillance at both airports, and the officers
who asked the defendant to the interrogation room did not conduct a pat-down search. The
officers testified that nothing about the defendant's behavior indicated that he was armed or
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pat-down was not justifiable, and exceeded the permissible scope of a
weapons search.474
4. Consent searches
An exception to the requirement that a search be conducted pursu-
ant to a warrant arises when the party whose person or property to be
searched consents to the search.4 75 The consent must be voluntarily
given.476 Whether the consent is "voluntary" is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances.477
In United States v. Crenshaw,471 the Ninth Circuit upheld the war-
rantless search of a shaving kit based on consent, and a pat-down
search pursuant to either consent or reasonable suspicion that the sus-
pect was armed.479 Two armed men robbed a Washington bank. After
the robbery, witnesses observed two men with a suitcase crossing a field
toward the airport, and a small airplane was subsequently seen leaving
the airport. The airplane was traced to defendant Lehman in Sacra-
mento. Lehman and defendant Gordon were questioned, and Gordon
was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon which matched the de-
scription of one of the robbery weapons. Lehman was released, but
later arrested at the airport, where he described the two men who had
accompanied him. While holding Lehman at the airport, FBI agents
found a man matching the description Lehman had given. The man
dangerous. Furthermore, Snyder testified that he believed that probable cause existed to
further detain the defendant for narcotics investigation. Finally, contrary to the search in
this case, a pat-down search is usually conducted when an officer first comes in contact with
a person whom the officer justifiably believes may be armed and dangerous. Id.
474. Id See also United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972) (court held that
ten dollar bill folded to a size of 2" by 3/4" and containing 2.2 grams of cocaine, which was
felt by officer in the handkerchief pocket of defendant's suit coat, could not reasonably have
aroused officer's suspicion that it was a weapon).
Judge Alarcon dissented, arguing that the search was justified as a lawful search inci-
dent to arrest. 698 F.2d at 978-80 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Because of the outstanding non-
support warrant for the defendant, Judge Alarcon contended that sufficient probable cause
existed to uphold the arrest. Therefore, no added justification was required to support a
search. Id at 979 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The majority determined that there was no prob-
able cause to arrest, since the officer's actions were not based on the nonsupport warrant. Id.
at 975. However, the dissent maintained that the officer's intentions were "not legally rele-
vent in determining if the objective facts demonstrated probable cause." Id at 980 (Alarcon,
J., dissenting).
475. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
476. Id at 221-22.
477. Id at 227.
478. 698 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983).
479. Id. at 1062-63. The court made an alternative holding that the pat-down search was
justified by either of the two exceptions to the warrant requirement.
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identified himself as "Mr. Rudd," and denied knowing Lehman."'
In a subsequent search of the airplane, Lehman's phone directory
was discovered. Several phone numbers in this directory coincided
with the numbers in an address book found in Mr. Rudd's shaving
kit.48 1 A pat-down search of Mr. Rudd was conducted.482 Mr. Rudd
was arrested and later identified as defendant Crenshaw. 483 A motel
key which was found in Crenshaw's pocket during the pat-down search
led to the discovery, at the motel, of a handgun similar to a weapon
used in the robbery. It was also determined that the three defendants
had occupied rooms at that same motel.484
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that Crenshaw
voluntarily permitted the search of his shaving kit. The court ruled
that the lower court's finding that Crenshaw was not in custody was not
clearly erroneous. 485 The court also held that the pat-down search was
justified by either consent or reasonable suspicion that Crenshaw was
armed.486 It determined that the record disclosed no evidence that the
FBI agents led Crenshaw to believe he was under arrest when he con-
sented to the pat-down search.487
480. Id at 1061-62.
481. The specific circumstances surrounding the search of the shaving kit were not given
in the opinion.
482. The basis for the pat-down search was not stated in the opinion.
483. The opinion does not clearly explain at what point Crenshaw was arrested. There-
fore, it is difficult to determine the basis for his arrest. There is an implication that the arrest
followed the search of the motel room and the discovery of the gun.
484. Id.
485. Id. No evidence existed to show that the agents led Crenshaw to believe he was
under arrest when the shaving kit was searched. Id See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. at 248-49 (in a non-custodial consent search, the state must prove that the consent was
given voluntarily, "and [was] not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied").
486. 698 F.2d at 1062-63. Although the motel room key was not described, it is presumed
that if the pat-down search was justified on the basis of a weapons frisk and, if during the
pat-down search of the outside of Crenshaw's clothing the key felt sufficiently similar to a
weapon, it would justify the agent's further intrusion into Crenshaw's pockets to confiscate
the key.
487. Id at 1062. Crenshaw argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant to search his
room was inadequate. He contended that the pat-down search which produced the room
key and the subsequent arrest were without probable cause. The court disagreed because
the affidavit "clearly state[d] facts upon which the issuing magistrate could conclude that the
pat-down search was based on either consent or a reasonable suspicion that Crenshaw was
armed." Id at 1062-63. The court further stated that, even if the warrant was faulty, the
error was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence discovered
in Crenshaw's room, a gun similar to a weapon used in the robbery, materially affected the
verdict. Id at 1063. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1977) (an
appellate court need not reverse a constitutional error unless there is a "reasonable possibil-
ity" that the error materially affected the verdict).
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Permission to search may be obtained from a third party who pos-
sesses "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises . . sought to be inspected. '488  This "common authority"
rests upon mutual use of the property by persons who generally have
joint access or control. The assumption is that it is reasonable for any
co-inhabitant to permit the search in his or her own right, and that the
others have assumed the risk that a co-inhabitant might allow the com-
mon area to be searched.489
In United States v. Miller,n" ° the Ninth Circuit held that the con-
sent for a warrantless search granted by the defendant's son was valid
because the son possessed common authority over the property. The
court reasoned that the defendant assumed the risk that someone hav-
ing authority over the area to be searched would permit the
intrusion.491
In Miller, Szombathy's trailer and three conveyor belts were sto-
len. Government agents asked him to examine a trailer parked along-
side the frontage road running to Miller's property. Szombathy sought
and received permission from the agents to search Miller's property by
posing as a prospective buyer of mining equipment.492 When
Szombathy arrived at the property, Miller's son allowed him to enter,
and Szombathy saw his stolen trailer and conveyor belts. After
Szombathy reported his observations to the agents, they decided to ob-
tain a search warrant.
In the meantime, Szombathy decided to return to Miller's property
to photograph the stolen equipment. Despite the officers' objections,
Szombathy returned to take photographs. An agent accompanied and
observed him from a distance for protective reasons.493 Szombathy
again encountered Miller's son, who did not object to a return visit.
The photographs were eventually used as evidence at Miller's trial.494
488. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
489. Id. at 171 n.7.
490. 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
49 1. Id. at 658-59.
492. The agent stated that he "didn't see anything wrong with that at all," and agreed to
meet Szombathy when he returned from Miller's property. Id. at 655.
493. The agent watched Szombathy from a distance through binoculars. 'Id at 656. This
may or may not contradict the testimony that neither the stolen trailer nor the conveyor belts
were visible from the frontage road. 1d at 655. The court's opinion did not make clear
whether the frontage road was at the same elevation as the agent's vantage point.
494. Id. at 656. Three days later, a search warrant was obtained, but the stolen equip-
ment was not found on Miller's property. Miller was indicted for receiving and concealing a
stolen trailer. Szombathy's stolen property was subsequently recovered from locations other
than Miller's property. Id.
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Miller appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
the evidence obtained during Szombathy's visits to his property.495
The Ninth Circuit first found that there was no error in the district
court's decision that Szombathy acted in a private capacity and there-
fore was not subject to fourth amendment restrictions on government
activity.496 However, the court also concluded that even if Szombathy
had acted as an instrument of the government, Miller did not suffer an
unreasonable, warrantless intrusion into his privacy because his son
had consented to Szombathy's entrance onto the property.497
The court determined that Szombathy's examination of the trailers
parked along the frontage road which were marked "for sale" was
merely an examination of items that were exposed to plain view. When
Szombathy entered Miller's property, where he discovered his stolen
trailer and conveyor belts, he was escorted by Miller's son.498 The
court held that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy over
objects in the plain view of persons invited onto his premises. By plac-
ing the stolen trailer and conveyors on his property, Miller assumed the
risk that they would be observed by someone invited onto his property
through third party consent.499 Finally, the court noted that in walking
495. Id.
496. Id. at 656-58. A search by a private party does not violate the fourth amendment,
unless the party conducts the search as an instrument or agent of the state. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (when defendant's wife presented his clothing and guns
to the police, she was not acting as an instrument of the government). The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court's finding that Szombathy's contacts with the law enforcement
officers did not make him an agent of the government; therefore, he was acting as a private
citizen. 688 F.2d at 656-58.
497. 688 F.2d at 658.
498. Id The court found that Miller's son had the authority to invite Szombathy onto the
premises, since Miller's son had access to and control over Miller's shop area and the area
surrounding his residence. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (consent
may be given by a third party who has "common authority over or other sufficient relation-
ship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected"). Matlock defined common authority
as that which rests on:
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for
most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants
has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have
assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched.
Id at 171 n.7.
499. 688 F.2d at 658-59. See United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d 759, 764 (2d
Cir.) (third party consent "validates a search only when a defendant can be said to have
assumed the risk that someone having authority over the area to be searched would permit
the governmental intrusion in his own right"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
Miller also argued that Szombathy gained entry to his property by utilizing a "false
pretext," by pretending to be a prospective trailer buyer without explaining the true purpose
of his visit. The Ninth Circuit found that "this alleged pretext did not spoil the fruits of
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about Miller's premises, Szombathy never exceeded the scope of his
invitation.500
5. Automobile searches
The automobile exception50 ' permits a warrantless search of a ve-
hicle where there is probable cause to believe that evidence is in the
vehicle and circumstances exist to support the belief that the vehicle
might be removed from the area before a warrant could be obtained.0 2
In United States v. Wiecking,5 °3 a store detective noticed head-
phones and some foam on a desk in the stockroom. After a store em-
ployee told him that this was suspicious, he returned to check on the
headphones, but they were gone. He looked for Wiecking, the only
stockman on duty, but Wiecking had left. He also noted that some
garbage cans in the stockroom had just been emptied. The detective
then went to the parking lot where he observed Wiecking taking a
plastic bag and some foam out of a dumpster and putting them into his
car. When the detective approached, Wiecking slammed the door shut.
The detective identified himself and asked Wiecking to bring the
plastic bag from the car into the manager's office. Wiecking then ad-
mitted that the bag contained the headphones.5 4
The Ninth Circuit found that the vehicle search was supported by
probable cause. 5 The court said that the detective's observation that
Szombathy's visit." 688 F.2d at 659. SeeLewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,211-12 (1966)
(Court upheld governmental intrusion into defendant's home when undercover agent was
invited into home to purchase marijuana after agent had misrepresented his identity). See
also United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1973) ("an officer may legitimately
obtain an invitation into a house by misrepresenting his identity"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941
(1974).
500. 688 F.2d at 659. See Glassel, 488 F.2d at 145 ("once inside the house, [the officer]
cannot exceed the scope of his invitation . . . but he may seize anything in plain view").
The Ninth Circuit also found that Szombathy's second visit to Miller's property, to take
pictures, was justified because it "was preceded by at least implicit consent." 688 F.2d at
659. Szombathy testified that, during his second visit, he told Miller's son that he wanted
another look at what he had previously been shown. The court concluded that because there
was no objection to the second visit, this "search" was similarly premised on consent. Id. at
659.
501. This exception was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
502. Id. at 153-54.
503. 703 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1983).
504. Id. at 409.
505. Id. at 410. "Probable cause does not require proof of criminal activity, but only facts
and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that an offense has been commit-
ted." Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). The Court in Brine-
gar stated that "fp]robable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] suffi-
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the headphones and stockroom trash had just been removed, coupled
with Wiecking's suspicious action in removing foam and a plastic bag
from the dumpster, provided probable cause to believe that the plastic
bag contained the headphones. °6
Wiecking was about to leave in a car that the detective had prob-
able cause to believe contained stolen goods. The court held that the
search was lawful under the automobile exception. 0 7 The court also
held that the fact that the headphones were in a plastic bag made no
difference to the legality of the search. 0 8
In Michigan v. Long,509 the United States Supreme Court held that
a Terr-type protective search for weapons may be extended to a search
cient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed." 338 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
at 162). See also United States v. Garza-Hernandez, 623 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[a]s
the term itself implies, probable cause exists if the probability is that the thing sought is in
the place to be searched; probabilities are to be assessed in the light of practical experience
and the practical inferences to be drawn from known or reliable facts"). Once the Wiecking
court had ruled that probable cause for the search existed, it determined that it did not need
to decide whether Wiecking had consented to the search, as the district court had held. 703
F.2d at 409-10.
The court further declared that it was not clear whether Wiecking wished to suppress
the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search or an illegal arrest. However, the court found
that this distinction made no difference because the inquiry into whether there was probable
cause to arrest Wiecking was the same inquiry necessary to determine whether there was
probable cause to search. Therefore, the court concluded that its discussion of probable
cause applied to the legality of both the search and the arrest. Id. at 410 n.2.
506. 703 F.2d at 410.
507. The court compared the present case to United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982),
where the Supreme Court held that police may conduct a warrantless search of a car when
there is probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of criminal activity. Id at 824-25.
In Ross, police officers received information that a described individual was selling narcotics
kept in the trunk of a specified car parked at a certain location. The officers stopped the car
and arrested the driver. A search of the trunk revealed a closed brown paper bag, and, upon
inspection of its contents, heroin was discovered. A subsequent warrantless search of the
trunk at police headquarters disclosed a zippered leather pouch containing cash. Id at 800-
01.
The Wiecking court found that the facts of this case were different from those in Ross in
that the defendant's car was not stopped as it moved along a street, but the essential consid-
erations were identical because Wiecking was about to drive off in a car that the detective
had probable cause to suspect contained stolen goods. Under these circumstances, the court
ruled that no warrant was needed. 703 F.2d at 410.
508. 703 F.2d at 410. "If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search." Id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825).
The court distinguished Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), relied upon
by the defendant as supporting the argument that the search required a warrant. The court
found that unlike Wiecking, the suspect in Coolidge was already in custody and therefore
had no opportunity to destroy the evidence sought inside the vehicle. 703 F.2d at 410 n.3.
509. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
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of the passenger compartment of an automobile, if limited to those ar-
eas in which a weapon might be hidden.510 In Long, two police officers
observed a car at night, travelling erratically at an excessive speed. Af-
ter the car swerved into a ditch, the officers stopped to investigate and
were met at the rear of the car by Long, the car's only occupant. Long
"appeared to be under the influence of something," and did not re-
spond to initial requests to produce his license and registration. 51' As
he walked to the passenger compartment, apparently to obtain the re-
gistration, the officers observed a hunting knife on the floorboard of the
driver's side of the car. Consequently, the officers subjected Long to a
pat-down search but did not find any weapons. One of the officers
shined his flashlight into the car, saw something protruding from under
the armrest, and, upon lifting the armrest, discovered an open pouch
containing marijuana. Long was arrested for possession of marijuana.
After the officers impounded the vehicle, seventy-five pounds of mari-
juana were found in the trunk. 12
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the officer's entry could
not be justified under the authority of Terry v. Ohio,513 because "Terry
authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of
criminal activity" rather than the inspection of an area.-t 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the state court decision because of the
danger involved in an investigative automobile stop.515
The Supreme Court has noted in cases subsequent to Terry that
investigations involving suspects in vehicles are especially dangerous to
510. Id. at 3480. The Terry.-type search is lawful if the police officer possesses a reason-
able belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer to believe that the suspect is armed
and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30-31 (1968).
511. 103 S. Ct. at 3473.
512. Id
513. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court upheld the legality of a "stop-and-frisk," in
the absence of probable cause and a warrant, where an officer detained persons suspected of
being involved in criminal activity. The officer, fearing that the suspects were armed, patted
down the outside of their clothing and discovered two revolvers. The Court ruled that when
an officer has a reasonable belief that the suspect being investigated at close range is "armed
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would. . . be clearly unreasonable to
deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm." Id at 24.
514. 103 S. Ct. at 3478 (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461,472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869
(1982)).
515. Id at 3481-82. See also Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE 93 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bristow]. In
Bristow, 32% (35 of 110 cases) of the shootings studied occurred while the officer attempted
to investigate, control, or pursue suspects who were in automobiles. Id.
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police officers.5 16 As a result, the Court has held that officers may order
persons out of their automobile during a traffic violation stop, and may
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that they
are armed and dangerous. 7
The Court also observed that suspects may injure police officers
through their access to weapons, even though they may not be person-
ally armed."I The Court has held that an officer may search incident
to arrest "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate con-
trol'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' 5 19 The
Court has also held that the passenger compartment of an automobile
is generally within this area.
5 20
The Long Court concluded that a protective search for weapons
inside the passenger compartment of an automobile is permissible if
the police officer reasonably believes that the suspect is dangerous and
may gain immediate control of weapons.52" ' The Court further ruled
that if contraband other than weapons is discovered during this search
the fourth amendment does not require that this evidence be
suppressed.
5 22
516. 103 S. Ct. at 3479. See Pennsylvania v. Simms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
517. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-12 (1977) (decision in part be-
cause of the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an
automobile.").
The Court has also held that the police may reach into the passenger compartment of
an automobile to remove a gun from a driver's waistband based only upon an informant's
tip, even though the gun was not apparent to the police from outside the car. Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972).
518. 103 S. Ct. at 3480.
519. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The ChimelCourt reasoned that "[a]
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested." Id. The Long
Court noted that the Chimel Court relied explicitly on Terry. 103 S. Ct. at 3480. Nonethe-
less, it must be noted that Chimel was a search incident to arrest case and did not merely
involve an investigative stop, as in Long. For search incident to arrest cases, see supra notes
444-64 and accompanying text.
520. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460-61 (1981) (Court ruled that police may search
contents of open or closed containers within passenger compartment if passenger compart-
ment is within reach of arrestee). Unlike the situation in Long, Belton involved a search
incident to arrest, rather than a mere investigative stop.
521. 103 S. Ct. at 3480. This belief must be based upon "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the
officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and that the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21). The Long Court empha-
sized that a Terry search is justified only for the protection of officers and others nearby, and
it is not justified by the prevention of the destruction of evidence. Id at 3480 n.14.
522. Id. at 3481 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)).
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The dissent argued that Terry did not support the Court's conclu-
sion and that the Court was "distorting Terry beyond recognition" by
using it as a "weapon against the Fourth Amendment's fundamental
requirement that searches and seizures be based on probable cause. '5 23
The dissent also maintained that the majority incorrectly relied upon
search incident to arrest cases524 to support its extension of Terry. 525
Terry expressly stated that stop-and-frisk searches must be care-
fully limited in scope.5 26 The dissent reasoned that the Long majority
upheld a search whose intrusiveness was much more severe than that of
a frisk.5 27 The dissent concluded by stating that "a search of a car and
the containers within it based on nothing more than reasonable suspi-
cion, even under the circumstances present here, cannot be sustained
without doing violence to the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. '5 28  The Long Court's extension of Terry-type searches to
automobiles reflects its current trend to broaden the government's abil-
ity to intrude into an individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle. It
can be argued that the Long majority should at least have established
some limitations upon the use of Long to justify an automobile search.
A weapon could be hidden anywhere within an automobile. Thus, it is
possible that there will be a temptation to use a weapon search as a
mere pretense to facilitate the search of an automobile.
523. Id at 3483 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent). The dissent stated that Terry authorized only a "carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of. . .persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault [an
officer]." Id at 3484 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
524. The cases relied upon by the majority were Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
525. The dissent stated that the Terry Court expressly recognized the difference between a
search incident to arrest and the limited weapons search in Terry. 103 S. Ct. at 3484-85
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227-
28 (1973) (Court relied upon difference between search incident to arrest and Terry pat-
down searches to reject argument that Terry limitations be applied to searches incident to
arrest). The Long majority declared that its use of Chimel and Belton was limited to their
recognition that part of the justification for a search incident to an arrest is the same as the
rationale for a Terry search, in other words, the protection of officers from injury. 103 S. Ct.
at 3480 n.14.
526. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30.
527. 103 S. Ct. at 3484-86. The dissent argued that the majority incorrectly considered
the search of an unoccupied car and any containers found therein as being as minimally
intrusive as a frisk. .d. Furthermore, the dissent felt that the majority should have estab-
lished some guidelines limiting this extension of the Terry search. Potential problems fore-
seen in interpreting the Court's holding included: a weapon may presumably be placed or
hidden anywhere in a car, a weapon may be hidden in any container; and, an individual
may lawfully possess many items that may be used as weapons, such as hammers or baseball
bats. Id at 3486-87.
528. Id. at 3488.
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6. Border searches
Neither a warrant nor probable cause are necessary to conduct a
border search.529 In the Ninth Circuit, the most intrusive border
searches require a relatively high level of suspicion.53 ° A strip search
requires authorities to have a "real suspicion" that the person is smug-
gling contraband. A body cavity search and an X-ray search require
the stricter standard of a "clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that
the person is carrying contraband within his or her body.53'
In United States v. Faherty,532 the Ninth Circuit upheld the strip
search of a defendant based upon the "real suspicion" standard.533
Airport customs officials discovered that Faherty was returning from a
narcotics source country, that she was self-employed but could not sub-
stantiate her employment, that she was overly friendly, that she was
displaying restricted movements, and that she was chilled and sleepy.
Faherty was detained, and a baggage search revealed a notebook con-
taining the name of a suspected drug smuggler. A strip search was con-
ducted but revealed nothing. Faherty subsequently refused to consent
to an X-ray search.
After being advised that she would be held while a court order was
being requested and that the court order would probably be granted,
she consented to the X-ray examination which revealed a foreign object
in her body. At the hospital, six hours after the strip search, Faherty
expelled a balloon containing heroin.53 4
The Ninth Circuit recognized that a strip search must be justified
through the application of the "real suspicion" standard.5 35 This test is
defined as "'subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable
facts that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent customs offi-
cial to suspect that a particular person seeking to cross [the] border is
concealing something on his body for the purpose of transporting it
529. United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981). This rule is not limited to the border itself. For example, the first United States
point at which an international flight lands is considered the functional equivalent of the
border. Id.
530. United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Aman,
624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980)).
531. Id. (quoting United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980)).
532. 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982).
533. Id. at 1260.
534. Id. at 1259-60.
535. The "real suspicion" standard was defined in United States v. Guadalupe-Garza,
421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (a customs official's simple good faith in having subjective
suspicion unsupported by objective facts does not convert "mere suspicion" into "real
suspicion").
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into the United States'" contrary to law.536 The court found that the
facts known to the agent who ordered the strip search constituted "real
suspicion. 5 37 Therefore, the search was valid.
In United States v. Shreve,5 38 the Ninth Circuit upheld an X-ray
search based on the "clear indication" standard.539 Shreve arrived at
Los Angeles International Airport from Peru, a known cocaine source
country. He brought attention to himself because he walked in an "un-
naturally erect and stiff manner" which is a trait of body cavity smug-
glers. Customs officials discovered that Shreve was unemployed,
travelling alone, and had paid for the airline ticket in cash. Using a
new passport, he had just returned from a short trip to a country where
he knew no one. The officials also noted that his eyes were dilated and
he was nervous and unusually talkative, although his speech was
slurred. Receipts uncovered in his luggage suggested that he had con-
sumed only beverages within the last three days, a characteristic of
body cavity smuggling. Also discovered was a bottle of oil which could
be used to lubricate objects inserted into the rectum. A subsequent X-
ray search determined that Shreve was smuggling cocaine within his
body.
540
The Ninth Circuit first noted that to conduct an X-ray search,
there must be a "clear indication" of body cavity smuggling. 41 The
Shreve court reasoned that the frequency of body cavity smuggling and
536. 692 F.2d at 1260 (quoting Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d at 879).
537. Id. Addressing the issue of whether Faherty's consent for the X-ray examination
was voluntary, the court recognized that the trial court's ruling should be reversed only if,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the lower court was
clearly erroneous. Id (citing United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976)). The question of whether the consent was voluntary is "a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances." 692 F.2d at 1261
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). In the present case, Faherty
understood that her consent or a court order was required for the X-ray search, that she
would be detained while a court order was requested, and that the court order would proba-
bly be granted. In light of these facts, the appellate court could not say that the trial court
was clearly erroneous in its finding that Faherty voluntarily consented to the X-ray search,
and therefore affirmed the trial court's decision. Id
538. 697 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1983).
539. Id. at 874.
540. Id
541. Id. (citing United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982)). In Ek, the court
held that the stricter standard required for a body cavity search also applies to an X-ray
search. 676 F.2d at 382. The court held that an X-ray search is more intrusive than a strip
search because it is "potentially [more] harmful to the health of the suspect. It goes beyond
the passive inspection of body surfaces." Id A body cavity search requires a "clear indica-
tion" or "plain suggestion" that the suspect is smuggling narcotics inside his body. Id.
(quoting United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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the danger to the public through narcotics use, compared to the "slight
intrusion of an X-ray search without a specific showing of medical dan-
gers, may make the wisdom of [requiring a "clear indication" of smug-
gling] doubtful. '5 42 Nevertheless, the court followed the precedential
law of the circuit. 43 Despite its dissatisfaction with the use of the
"clear indication" standard rather than some lower standard, the court
found that the customs officials' observations properly supported their
determination that there was a clear indication of body cavity smug-
gling here.54
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,545 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the suspicionless boarding of a vessel by cus-
toms agents in a channel accessible to the open sea.546 Customs officers
sighted an anchored, forty-foot sailboat near a Customs Port of En-
try.547 After the wake of a passing boat caused the sailboat to rock
violently, one of the sailboat's crewmembers shrugged his shoulders in
an unresponsive manner when asked if he and his companions were all
right. A customs officer and a Louisiana state policeman then boarded
the vessel and asked to examine the ship's documents.54  While exam-
ining the papers, a customs officer detected an odor that smelled like
burning marijuana. He looked through an open hatch and noticed bur-
lap-wrapped bales that were later found to be marijuana. The defend-
ants were arrested and a subsequent search revealed 5800 pounds of
542. 697 F.2d at 874.
543. Id. The Ek court, in finding that a showing of the stricter "clear indication" stan-
dard is required for X-ray examinations, determined that such searches are potentially
harmful to a suspect's health. See supra note 541. Nonetheless, Judge Kennedy in Shreve
expressed his disbelief of the harmful effects of X-ray radiation. Contrary to Ek, Judge
Kennedy opted for the use of a lesser standard, maintaining that an X-ray is a "slight intru-
sion." 697 F.2d at 874.
544. Id.
545. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
546. Id. at 2582. The boarding was authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976), which pro-
vides in pertinent part that "any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any
vessel. . . at any place in the United States or within the customs waters. . . and examine
the manifest and other documents and papers."
547. The customs officers were patrolling a ship channel that connects the Gulf of Mexico
with Lake Charles, Louisiana, a Customs Port of Entry. 103 S. Ct. at 2574.
548. The defendants argued that the government could not rely on the documentation
inspection statute because the authorities had been investigating an informant's tip that a
boat in the ship channel was carrying marijuana. The Court rejected this contention, declar-
ing that "'[w]e would see little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect
vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers.'" Id. at 2577 n.3 (quoting
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980)). Thus, many of the facts in Vii-
lamonte-Marquez were irrelevant and the real issue was the government's power to board
any vessel at any time, even when the documentation inspection was being used as a
pretense.
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marijuana stored throughout the vessel.5 49 The defendants were con-
victed of various narcotics offenses,55° but the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that the boarding violated the fourth amendment because it
occurred without a "reasonable suspicion of a law violation."5' 1
The government contended that the boarding was statutorily au-
thorized .5 5  The defendant argued that although the boarding was au-
thorized by statute, it violated the fourth amendment. 3  The Court
noted that a statute cannot authorize a violation of the fourth amend-
ment. Nonetheless, the First Congress authorized, in a predecessor to
the present statute, the suspicionless boarding of vessels.5 5 4 According
to the majority, this suggested that the same Congress which adopted
the fourth amendment did not view these boardings as
unconstitutional.
55 5
The Court observed that random vehicle stops away from the in-
ternational border are not permissible without reasonable articulable
suspicion. 56 However, the Court has recognized that stops at fixed
549. Id at 2577.
550. The defendants were found guilty of conspiring to import marijuana in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 963 (1981), importing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1981), con-
spiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1981),
and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1981). 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
551. 103 S. Ct. at 2577 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 488
(5th Cir. 1981)).
552. Id. at 2578 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976)). See supra note 546.
553. 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
554. Id at 2577-78. The purpose of the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35. 1 Stat. 145 (1790), was
"to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares
and merchandise imported into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels,"
Section 31 of that Act provided that:
[lIt shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors, and the
officers of the revenue cutters hereinafter mentioned, to go on board of ships or
vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof,
if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the
purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining and searching
the said ships or vessels ....
1 Stat. 164. The statute at issue in the present case, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976), provides that
"[amny officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel. . . at any place in
the United States or within the customs waters . . . and examine the manifest and other
documents and papers." 103 S. Ct. at 2577-78.
555. 103 S. Ct. at 2578-79 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). In Boyd,
the Court stated "[als this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption
the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did
not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced
within the prohibition of the amendment." Id. at 623.
556. 103 S. Ct. at 2579 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)). In
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court stated "[e]xcept at the border and its functional equivalents, of-
ficers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts,
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checkpoints or roadblocks which are away from the border are permis-
sible. 5 7 The Villamonte-Marquez Court noted that its focus on this
area of law was on the "reasonableness" of the type of governmental
intrusion. The permissibility of this intrusion is to be decided by bal-
ancing the intrusion upon the individual's fourth amendment rights
against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.55 8
The decisive factor in Villamonte-Marquez was that the stop was of
a vessel with ready access to the open sea. The Court stated that it was
clear that had this been an automobile stop on a public highway, it
would have been unlawful without reasonable suspicion.5 9 However,
the Court found that commerce in waters providing ready access to the
open sea is sufficiently different from highway traffic so as to make al-
ternatives to the "stop" made in the present case less likely to accom-
plish the essential governmental purposes involved. The Court ruled
that no reasonable claim could be made that permanent checkpoints
would be practical on waters which lead to the open sea, where vessels
can move in any direction and need not follow established routes.56°
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the
vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." 422 U.S. at 884.
557. 103 S. Ct. at 2579 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)). In
Marlinez-Fuerte, the Court upheld the maintenance of permanent checkpoints at or near
intersections of important roads leading away from the border at which a vehicle could be
stopped for brief questioning "even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehi-
cle contains illegal aliens." 428 U.S. at 545. The Martinez-Fuerte Court distinguished the
holding in Brignoni-Ponce stating:
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reason-
able suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling
operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.
Id. at 557.
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court held unlawful a random stop to
check the defendant's license and vehicle registration. The Court stated that the mere fact
that the government regulates "persons in automobiles on public roadways [does] not for
that reason alone [justify that] their travel and privacy [may be] interfered with at the unbri-
dled discretion of police officers." Id. at 663. The Court declared that states are free to
develop less discretionary methods, such as questioning all oncoming traffic at roadblocks,
which could similarly accomplish the state's purpose of enforcing auto registration and
safety laws. Id.
558. 103 S. Ct. at 2579.
559. Id.
560. Id. Another significant difference between automobiles and boats noted by the
Court is their system of external markings. An officer may often ascertain an automobile's
compliance with registration and safety laws merely by observing the license plate and other
external markings. However, no such licenses or decals are issued to vessels. The external
markings on American boats are placed on the vessel at the owner's discretion. Further-
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The Court stated that the government has a substantial interest in
assuring compliance with documentation requirements 5 6' especially
where there is a substantial need to deter or apprehend smugglers.
5 62
Further, the Court held that this is only a "modest intrusion," since it
"involves only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit
public areas of the vessel, and inspect documents. 5 63 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the boarding of the sailboat was "reasonable"
under the fourth amendment. 64
The dissent contended that "for the first time in the. . . history of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court approve[d] a completely random
. . . entry onto private, noncommercial premises by police officers,
without any limitations whatever on the officers' discretion or any safe-
guards against abuse." 565  The dissent disagreed with the majority's
more, as in the present case, where the vessel is foreign, the markings are only those required
by its home port. Here, the markings were Swiss, but the vessel carried French papers. Id
561. Statutes and regulations governing maritime documentation are more extensive and
complex than the typical state's requirements for vehicle licensing. Documentation laws
play an important role in regulating various trades, enforcing environmental laws, collecting
duties, regulating imports and exports, and preventing entry of controlled substances, illegal
aliens, adulterated foods, dangerous chemicals, prohibited agricultural products and ani-
mals, and illegal weapons and explosives. These interests are greatest in areas such as the
ship channel in this case, which connects the open sea with a Customs Port of Entry, Id at
2581.
The defendants suggested that while the public interest is great in stopping commercial
vessels, it is not so with "pleasure boats." However, the Court stated that the difficulty of
drawing such a line was exemplified by this case. Here, the defendants asserted that they
were in a "pleasure boat," however, they were involved in a "highly lucrative commercial
trade." Id at 2581 n.6.
562. Id. at 2581.
563. Id In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880, the Court stated that, ac-
cording to the government, the stops were modest-usually one minute, with no search of
the vehicle or its occupants, and visual inspection was limited to those parts of the vehicle
that could be seen by anyone standing alongside. The officers also required a response to
brief questions and possibly the production of a document showing a right to be in the
United States. Id. Despite this stop being arguably no more than a "modest intrusion," the
Court held that such stops must be based upon reasonable suspicion. .d. at 881. In contrast,
the Villamonte-Marquez Court stated that during the "modest intrusion" "[n]either the [ves-
sell nor its occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the [vessel] is limited to what can
be seen without a search." 103 S. Ct. at 2581 (quoting Martinez-Fuere, 428 U.S. at 558).
However, in Villamonte-Marquez the Court ruled that the stop did not require reasonable
suspicion. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
564. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
565. Id. at 2585 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dis-
sent). The dissent agreed with the majority that the relevant precedents were those address-
ing roving patrol or fixed checkpoint stops. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that "every one of the vehicle-stop precedents on which the Court relie[d] . . . re-
quire[d] that a stop or search be supported by either probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or
another discretion-limiting feature such as use of fixed checkpoints." Nonetheless, the ma-
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view that "every statute enacted by the First Congress must be pre-
sumed to be constitutional. ' 566 Furthermore, the dissent construed the
old statute to apply only to vessels entering the United States.
5 67
Finally, the dissent dismissed the majority's contention that there
are special maritime problems in law enforcement. First, although the
majority asserted that it is impractical to have fixed checkpoints on
water, the dissent argued that the boarding in this case occurred in a
channel similar to the interstate highway on which traffic funnels
through border patrol checkpoints. Thus, it argued, no distinction
should be made between concrete or water highways. 68 Second, the
dissent did not believe that random stops were a necessary tool for law
enforcement.569 Moreover, the dissent contended that the majority
failed to explain why a boarding was necessary to check documents,
when officers could easily acquire such information by pulling-along-
side the vessel, or by radio. 7 °
The trend in border searches appears to be toward a limitation of
the scope of fourth amendment protections. The court in United States
v. Shreve57 1 expressed its dissatisfaction with the current Ninth Circuit
standard requiring a clear indication of body cavity smuggling to jus-
tify an X-ray search, but stated that it had no choice but to follow pre-
cedent. More importantly, in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,572
the Supreme Court took a major step toward increasing the govern-
ment's ability to conduct a warrantless search by upholding the suspi-
cionless boarding of vessels which have ready access to the open sea.
7. Administrative searches
A warrantless administrative search of commercial property may
be permissible under the "pervasively-regulated industries" exception
to the fourth amendment.573 Generally, to conduct a warrantless
jority had approved a limitless and standardless authority. Id. at 2588-89 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
566. Id. at 2586 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
567. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
568. .d. at 2589 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
569. Id at 2590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
570. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Addressing the issue of external markings, the dissent
argued that it would be easy and inexpensive to provide vessels with markings similar to
those used for automobiles. See supra note 560.
571. 697 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1983).
572. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
573. This exception was first established in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless inspections of commercial premises in the regulation of li-
quor sales) and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless searches in regula-
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search pursuant to this exception, such a search must be authorized by
statute and be reasonably necessary to protect important federal inter-
ests. The benefits of obtaining a warrant must be minimal because the
search is made in "the context of a regulatory inspection system of
business premises which is carefully limited in time, place, and
scope." '574 In short, the owner is aware or should be aware that his
premises are subject to periodic inspections.
5 75
In United States v. Kaiyo Maru No. 53,576 the Ninth Circuit upheld
a warrantless search pursuant to the pervasively-regulated industries
exception. A crucial factor in this decision was that the discretion of
the inspecting officers was sufficiently limited so as to render the war-
rantless inspections "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. 7
The Japanese stem trawler Kaiyo Maru No. 53 (Kaiyo) was fish-
ing by permit in the Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) off the coast of
Alaska.57 8 A Coast Guard cutter sighted the Kaiyo, and was errone-
ously informed that the Kaiyo had not given the required notice to be
fishing in the area. 79 The Coast Guard decided to inspect the Kaiyo's
documents and catch, and determine whether she was fishing in the
proper area. 8
The Kaiyo was boarded and searched without a warrant or prob-
able cause to believe that any illegality had occurred.58' The search
disclosed serious violations of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act (FCMA or Act),582 including underreporting of fish, and a
large quantity of halibut, a species prohibited to foreign fishermen.8
The court first addressed the issue of whether there was statutory
authorization for the warrantless search. 84 The defendants argued
tion of firearms), and was recently applied by the Court in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981) (warrantless inspection of mines).
574. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
575. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600.
576. 699 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1983).
577. Id. at 996.
578. The FCZ is a 197 mile wide area of ocean beyond the United States territorial wa-
ters where federal fisheries management jurisdiction prevails. Id. at 992,
579. The Kaiyo moved from its assigned fishing area to another area. This change re-
quired notification of the Coast Guard, which had in fact been given. Id.
580. Id.
581. Despite the erroneous information about the notice, the government conceded that
any suspicion aroused did not rise to the level of probable cause to suspect wrongdoing Id.
at 992 n.3.
582. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
583. 699 F.2d at 992.
584. The FCMA provides that:
Any officer who is authorized by. . .the Secretary of the department in which the
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that the language of section 1861 of the Act requires the use of a war-
rant when practical but allows warrantless inspections under exigent or
other appropriate circumstances. 85 The Ninth Circuit studied the Act
as a whole, the objectives of the Act, and the circumstances surround-
ing its creation, and held that the Act authorizes warrantless searches
and seizures whether or not obtaining a warrant is practicable or exi-
gent circumstances exist.586
The court found that the circumstances under which the FCMA
was created supported its view that Congress intended to devise the
most "potent possible enforcement procedures." '587 Congress realized
that strong measures were required to protect an important national
asset which was being dangerously depleted. 88
Furthermore, the court reasoned that its interpretation of section
1861 was consistent with the objectives of the Act as a whole.5 89 The
FCMA requires an agreement between the United States, the foreign
nation, and the foreign vessel operators, which includes numerous con-
cessions by the foreign parties, including consent to routine searches.5 90
Moreover, the court found that the Act's stringent requirements sup-
Coast Guard is operating ... to enforce the provisions of this chapter may-with
or without a warrant or other process-board, and search or inspect, any fishing
vessel which is subject to the provisions of this chapter.
16 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(l)(A) (1976).
585. 699 F.2d at 993. The legislative history is silent on the matter. Id.
586. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) ("unlike searches of private homes,
which must generally be conducted pursuant to a warrant ... legislative schemes authoriz-
ing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate
the Fourth Amendment"). The Donovan Court further stated:
The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property re-
flects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property
enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individ-
ual's home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be ade-
quately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections.
Id. at 598-99.
587. 699 F.2d at 994. The FCMA was enacted when commercial and recreational fishing
in the areas beyond the three mile jurisdictional limit were threatened by overfishing. Due
to the lack of federal action, foreign fishermen were essentially unregulated in this area. Id.
at 993.
588. Id. at 995.
589. Id. at 994.
590. Id at 994 n.l 1. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(i) (1976) sets forth that "[t]he foreign na-
tion, and the owner or operator of any fishing vessel fishing pursuant to such [international
fishery] agreement, will abide by the requirement that any officer authorized to enforce the
provisions of this chapter. . . be permitted to board, and search or inspect, any such vessel
at any time." The defendants argued that "authorized officer" refers to officers authorized
by search warrant. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that in § 1861(b) the authorization
of officers is done by the Secretary of Transportation (which includes the Coast Guard), and
not by the courts by issuing a warrant. Thus, the court found that "an authorized officer" is
an officer designated by the government to enforce the FCMA. 699 F.2d at 994 n.12.
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port an interpretation that authorizes warrantless searches and
seizures."' Finally, the court determined that had Congress intended
warrantless searches to be allowed only under "exigent or other appro-
priate circumstances" this would have been expressly stated.
92
The court next addressed the issue of whether a warrantless in-
spection under the FCMA provided a "constitutionally adequate sub-
stitute for a warrant. ' 59 3 The court held that the statute and the
enforcement policy of the Coast Guard sufficiently limit the discretion
of the inspecting officers so as to render warrantless FCMA inspections
"reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 94 First,
the enforcement is limited to officers authorized by the Secretary of
Transportation. 9 Second, the fishing vessel is subject to search by a
591. 699 F.2d at 994. These stringent requirements include: (1) foreign fishing vessels in
the FCZ must allow official United States observers to board the ship, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c)
(2)(D) (1976), and search or inspect the vessel, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(i) (1976); (2) the
permits must be prominently displayed in the wheelhouse and must be shown upon request
to any authorized officer, 16 U.S.C. §§ 182 1(c)(2)(B), 182 1(c)(2)(A) (iii) (1976); and (3) it is a
criminal violation to refuse to allow any authorized officer to board a vessel in his quest to
search or inspect in connection with the enforcement of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(D)
(1976). Regulations implementing the Act require that extensive records be kept, and these
records are subject to inspection at any time. The regulations also require that foreign ves-
sels keep the Coast Guard constantly aware of their location and activities. 50 C.F.R.
§ 611.9 (1979).
592. 699 F.2d at 994. The court found that Congress "had no difficulty in expressing
limitations on warrantless arrests of persons by requiring 'reasonable cause to believe such
person has committed an act' prohibited by the FCMA." Id See 16 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(l)(A)
(1976). The court further stated that Congress acknowledged the physical difficulties of ob-
taining a warrant at sea and reasonably concluded that routine warrantless inspections are
necessary to enforce the Act. 699 F.2d at 994.
593. 699 F.2d at 996. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603-05 (1981) where the
Supreme Court found that the program of warrantless inspections authorized by statute pro-
vided a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant," and thus did not violate the
fourth amendment. The Donovan Court found that the statute clearly notified the operator
that inspections would be performed on a regular basis; the statute and the regulations is-
sued pursuant to it informed the operator of what standards must be met to comply with the
statute; the discretion of government officials to determine which facilities to inspect and
which violations to search for was directly controlled by the regulatory scheme; and the
statute itself contained a means by which special privacy concerns could be accomodated.
Id
594. 699 F.2d at 996. The court found that the established policy of an agency limiting
the inspecting officer's discretion may be considered in addition to the limitations in the
authorizing statute to determine whether an inspection program is sufficiently limited to
qualify as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Id at 996 n.17. See United
States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montonaya, 493 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir.) (where statute did not
limit inspection to business hours it was sufficient that Health Department's established pol-
icy did), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
595. 699 F.2d at 996.
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limited number of government officers. 596 Third, warrantless inspec-
tions are limited to specified fishing vessels.597 Fourth, the inspections
are not so random or infrequent that the vessel owner has no real ex-
pectation that his property will not be inspected from time to time.598
The court concluded that foreign fishing in the FCZ is so highly
regulated that, given the limitations on the inspection program, a war-
rant is unnecessary for periodic inspections of foreign fishing vessels to
determine compliance with the FCMA and applicable fishing
regulations. 599
In Illinois v. Lafayette,6° the United States Supreme Court held
that it is not unreasonable for police to search an arrestee's personal
effects during a routine administrative procedure at a police station in-
cident to booking and jailing the person.60 1 Lafayette was involved in
an altercation, and was arrested for disturbing the peace. At the police
602 arhostation, a search of Lafayette's shoulder bag revealed ten ampheta-
mine pills inside a cigarette package. The officer conducting the search
testified that it was "standard procedure to inventory 'everything'" in
an arrestee's possession, and that he did not seek or expect to find
weapons or contraband while conducting the search.
60 3
596. Id.
597. Id. The Coast Guard limits its boardings to foreign fishing vessels actually engaged
in fishing activities or otherwise within the FCZ after notifying the Coast Guard of intent to
commence fishing activities and before having "checked out." Id.
598. Id. In major statistical areas, all fishing vessels requiring an FCMA permit are to be
boarded once every three months. Id See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)
(owners of commercial property "cannot help but be aware that [their] property will be
subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes").
599. 699 F.2d at 997. In Donovan, the Supreme Court said that "the pervasiveness and
regularity of the federal regulation. . . ultimately determines whether a warrant is neces-
sary to render an inspection program reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 452 U.S.
at 606.
The FCMA warrantless searches are limited to those areas of the vessel necessary to
determine compliance with the FCMA. This would exclude living quarters and the crew's
personal property. 699 F.2d at 997 n.23 (citing United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp.
1223, 1229 (D. Alaska 1979)).
600. 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
601. Id. at 2611.
602. Lafayette was searched in the booking room. Id at 2607. The record was unclear as
to whether Lafayette would have been incarcerated after being booked for disturbing the
peace. Id. at 2611 n.3. The Court stated that this would be an "appropriate inquiry upon
remand." Id.
603. Id. at 2607. At the suppression hearing, the state argued that the officer conducted a
lawful inventory search. After the hearing but prior to the ruling, the state submitted a brief
arguing for the first time that the search was justified as a search incident to arrest. The trial
court ordered the suppression of the pills. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Id at 2605
(citing People v. Lafayette, 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 1383 (1981)). The appellate court
held that the argument of a valid search incident to arrest was waived by the state's failure to
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The Court recognized that the inventory search has been estab-
lished as an exception to the warrant requirement, 60 4 and does not re-
quire probable cause.60 5 Comparing the inventory search with the
search incident to arrest exception, the Court noted that upon arrest, an
officer may search the arrestee's person60 6 and the area within his con-
trol.6 07 The Court acknowledged that an arrestee's transport to the po-
lice station is no more than a continuation of the custody due to the
arrest. However, the Court observed that the factors justifying a search
at the station are dissimilar to the factors justifying an immediate
search at the time of the arrest.
608
After recognizing many governmental interests supporting an in-
ventory process, 60 9 the Court ruled that at the station it is proper for the
police to remove and list or inventory property found on the arrestee's
raise it at the suppression hearing. Nonetheless, the court discussed and dismissed both
arguments raised by the state. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 833-35, 425 N.E.2d at 1385-86.
604. 103 S. Ct. at 2608. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opper-
man, the Supreme Court upheld the search of the glove compartment in a car impounded by
the police. Id. at 376. The Court found that the search was reasonable because it served
legitimate governmental interests that outweighed the individual's privacy interests in the
contents of the automobile. These measures served to protect the owner's property while it
was in police custody and to protect the police against possible false theft claims. Id. at 369.
605. 103 S. Ct. at 2608. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5 ("t]he
probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of rou-
tine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protec-
tive procedures are a subterfuge for crimimal investigations"). In United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court stated that "[t]his is so because the salutary functions
of a warrant simply have no application in that context; the constitutional reasonableness of
inventory searches must be determined on other bases." 1d. at 10 n.5.
606. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (full search of person inci-
dent to lawful custodial arrest is exception to warrant requirement of fourth amendment).
607. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (it is reasonable to conduct search
incident to arrest of arrestee's person and area into which arrestee might obtain weapon or
evidence).
608. 103 S. Ct. at 2609. The Court noted that impractical, unreasonable, or embarrass-
ingly intrusive searches can be more readily and privately performed at the station. For
example, disrobing an arrestee should be performed at the station. Id.
609. Id. The standardized inventory assists in deterring false theft claims, theft of articles
removed from the arrestee, and weapons concealed in "innocent-looking" containers. Id.
The Court ruled that because of the need to protect against these risks, it is not important
whether police suspicion is focused on any particular container. Id. See United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), where the Court stated that:
[t]he authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while
based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what
a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
Id. The Lafayete Court also noted that the inspection may assist in identifying the arrestee.
103 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3, at 306-07 (1978)).
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person or in his possession.61° The Court concluded that "every con-
sideration of orderly police administration benefiting both police and
the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination of [de-
fendant's] shoulder bag prior to his incarceration."6 1
8. Dog sniffs
In United States v. Spet, 6 12 the Ninth Circuit upheld two separate
dog sniff investigations at the Los Angeles Harbor.61 3 On December
10th, customs inspectors ran narcotics-detecting dogs through a harbor
container yard where goods are placed after removal from ships arriv-
ing from foreign ports.6 4 The dogs alerted on two cargo containers.
On December 12th, after one of the suspected containers had been
devanned 61 1 and the individual van paks616 had been placed in a
container freight station, the inspectors again ran the dogs, which
alerted on a large van pak. A subsequent search of the van pak, pursu-
610. 103 S. Ct. at 2609.
611. Id. at 2610. The Court noted that when it decided South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976), there was no need to consider the existence of less intrusive means of pro-
tecting the police and the property in their custody, such as locking the car and impounding
it in safe storage under guard. 103 S. Ct. at 2610. In the present case, the Supreme Court
similarly held that the existence of alternative "less intrusive" means of protecting the
owner's property did not make the method actually employed unreasonable. Id See Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (Court rejected notion that public could have been
protected by posting guard over automobile). The Lafayette Court stated that, even if less
intrusive means existed, "it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday
course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items
may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit." 103 S. Ct. at 2610. See also New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court stated that "'[a] single
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and exper-
tise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.'" Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213-14 (1979)).
In a concurring opinion in Lafayette, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
stated that he "seriously doubt[ed] that the search incident to arrest exception would justify
the search of the bag. 103 S. Ct. at 2611 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall offered
three reasons for this. First, the officer did not feel that it was necessary to search the bag
when he arrested Lafayette. Second, a search at the time of the arrest could not have been
justified by a need to prevent the destruction of evidence as there was no evidence of the
offense of disturbing the peace, for which Lafayette was arrested. Finally, although the bag
might be seized because of a concern about weapons, this concern would not justify its
subsequent search. Id See supra note 603.
612. 721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983).
613. Id. at 1463-64.
614. See infra note 622 and accompanying text.
615. "Devanning" is the process of removing the individual crates from the container. Id.
at 1461 n.3.
616. A "van pak" is a shipping crate.
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ant to a warrant, revealed 1440 pounds of marijuana. 61 7
The Ninth Circuit observed that it has held that dog sniffing of
personal luggage constitutes an intrusion under the fourth amend-
ment.618 A dog sniff is not technically a search, however, that requires
probable cause before it can be conducted. 619 The relatively minimal
intrusion caused by a dog sniff instead requires an "articulable suspi-
cion" that the item contains contraband or evidence.620
In Spetz, the Ninth Circuit declared that the "determining factor
[in the December 10th canine sniff was] the location in which the snif-
fing occured." 621 The court upheld this dog sniff, not on the basis of an
articulable suspicion, but because customs officials are authorized to
run dogs through a customs area where goods are placed after arriving
from foreign countries.622 The court upheld the December 12th dog
617. Id. at 1460-61.
618. Id. at 1463 (citing United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1982), va-
cated, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as Beale A. In Beale , the court held that a
dog sniff is a limited intrusion which may be conducted without a warrant if based upon
"founded" or "articulable" suspicion. 674 F.2d at 1335.
Bealelwas vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). In Place, the Supreme Court declared that the
exposure of luggage, located in a public place, to a dog sniff did not constitute a search
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 2644-45. This form of investigation was found to be so
limited and minimally intrusive that it did not constitute a "search." Id. However, the
Court held that the initial seizure of the defendant's luggage was unlawful; therefore, it
affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id at 2646.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Beale 11], reaffirmed its holding in Beale I that a dog sniff examination
requires reasonable articulable suspicion. Id at 596. The Beale 11 court initially observed
that the Place Court's declaration that dog sniff inspections are not "searches" was dictum.
Id. at 593. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit did reconsider its decision in Beale I in light of
Place.
Prior to deciding the dog sniff issue, the Place Court observed that the initial seizure of
defendant's luggage required a showing of reasonable suspicion. 103 S. Ct. at 2644. Read-
ing Places "not a search" statement "in the context of the entire decision in Place," the
Ninth Circuit interpreted Place to merely conclude that once reasonable suspicion is estab-
lished, "no additional suspicion is required to justify exposing luggage to a trained canine."
731 F.2d at 594. Thus, the Beale II court ruled that "[w]e do not believe that Place should
be read to validate a canine sniff in the absence of the reasonable suspicion required for a
minimally intrusive detention of luggage, whenever fortuity makes a canine sniff feasible
without any seizure of the luggage." Id
619. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
620. Id. at 2644; Beale II, 731 F.2d at 593-94. See supra note 618.
621. 721 F.2d at 1463.
622. Id at 1463-64. The first dog sniff inspection was justified "[b]ecause 'mere entry
alone into the United States from a foreign country is sufficient reason' for a search." Id. at
1463 n.13 (quoting Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973) (border search)).
The court also noted that searches of arriving foreign goods have been justified by statutes
and regulations, "whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality directed to the particu-
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sniff because the first sniff created the founded or articulable suspicion
that a specific van pak contained illegal drugs. 623
9. The plain view doctrine
The plain view doctrine allows the warrantless seizure of an object
where an officer has prior lawful access to the item under the fourth
amendment.624 Three requirements have generally been required to
invoke the doctrine. First, the officer must lawfully occupy the place
from which he views the object to be seized.625 Second, the officer must
"inadvertently" discover the incriminating evidence.626 Third, it must
be "immediately apparent" to the police that the item observed may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.627
In Texas v. Brown,628 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
seizure of an opaque party balloon, later found to contain heroin,
based upon its presence in plain view in an automobile.629 Shortly
before midnight, police officer Maples stopped Brown's automobile at a
routine drivers license checkpoint. Maples stood near the driver's win-
dow and shined his flashlight into the car as he asked Brown for his
drivers license. Maples observed Brown remove from his pocket an
opaque green party balloon, knotted near the tip. Brown dropped the
balloon on the seat beside his leg as he reached across the passenger
seat to open the glove compartment.
630
Because of Maples' experience in drug-related offenses, he was
aware that narcotics are frequently packaged in similar party balloons.
Therefore, as Brown searched for his license in the glove compartment,
Maples shifted his position outside the car for a better view. Maples
saw plastic vials, loose white powder, and an open bag of party bal-
loons in the glove compartment. At that point, Brown told Maples that
lar ... thing to be searched." Id at 1463-64 n.13 (quoting United States v. Odland, 502
F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir.) (upheld inspection of incoming international mail), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1088 (1974)).
623. Id. at 1464 (citing Beale I, 674 F.2d at 1335). See supra note 209.
624. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1983) (plurality opinion). The term "plain
view," as used in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion), de-
notes the justification for the seizure of an object. That term must be distinguished from an
officer simply observing an object left in plain view or plain sight, which generally does not
constitute a search under the fourth amendment and may merely be the basis for probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 103 S. Ct. at 1541 n.4.
625. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 465-68.
626. Id. at 469.
627. Id. at 466.
628. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality opinion).
629. Id. at 1544.
630. Id. at 1538.
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he did not have his license. Maples then ordered Brown out of the car.
After Brown complied, Maples reached into the car and removed the
green balloon, which seemed to contain a powder within its tied-off
portion. Brown was then arrested. At the suppression hearing, a police
chemist testified that the balloon contained heroin and that narcotics
are frequently packaged in party balloons.63" '
Brown was convicted of possession of heroin. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed Brown's conviction on fourth amendment
grounds, rejecting the state's argument that the seizure was lawful pur-
suant to the plain view doctrine. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of the uncertainty in the application of the plain view
doctrine.632
The Supreme Court initially established that the plain view doc-
trine is not an independent "exception" to the fourth amendment,633
but merely an extension of the prior justification for an officer's "access
to an object." 634 The doctrine justifies the seizure of an item when an
officer has prior lawful access to the object under the fourth
amendment.635
The Court then applied the three requirements for plain view to
the present case.636 First, the officer must have "prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 637 The Supreme Court
631. Id. at 1538-39.
632. Id at 1537-38. The Supreme Court did not address whether the seizure was justified
under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1982) (warrantless search of automobile passenger
compartment, incident to arrest), because the facts were not clear regarding the time at
which Brown's arrest occurred, or the reason for the arrest-narcotics possession or failure
to produce his driver's license. 103 S. Ct. at 1538-39 n.2.
633. The Court stated that the Coolidge plurality's characterization of the doctrine as an
independent exception to the fourth amendment was inaccurate. 103 S. Ct. at 1540.
634. Id. at 1540-41. An officer must first justify his ability to occupy the area from which
he observes the object. Usually this prior justification will be based upon the existence of a
warrant or an exception to the fourth amendment. Once the officer is legally situated, any
criminal evidence he sees in plain view may be seized, subject to the qualifications of Coo-
lidge. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-71.
635. 103 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980) ("The
seizure of property [found in a public place] in plain view involves no invasion of privacy
and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the prop-
erty with criminal activity.")). The Brown Court distinguished between property that is in a
public place and property that is in view but is "'situated on private premises to which
access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer.'" 103 S. Ct. at 1540 (quoting Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. at 587 (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,
354 (1977))).
636. See supra notes 624-27 and accompanying text.
637. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
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agreed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the initial auto-
mobile stop to check Brown's drivers license was valid.638
Next, the Court addressed the second requirement that the officer
must "inadvertently" discover the incriminating evidence.639  The
Court ruled that this requirement did not bar the seizure. 640 The rec-
ord did not indicate that the roadblock was a pretext to uncover narcot-
ics violations, nor was there any evidence beyond a generalized
expectation by the officers that some of the cars they stopped would
contain narcotics.64 Furthermore, nothing indicated that Maples be-
lieved that narcotics or paraphernalia would be found in Brown's auto-
mobile or glove compartment." 2
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court dis-
agreed on whether the third requirement, that it must be "immediately
apparent" to the police that the objects may be evidence subject to
seizure, was satisfied. 43 The appellate court reversed Brown's convic-
tion because it found that this requirement was not fulfilled. 6' The
Supreme Court ruled that the third requirement was fulfilled after de-
termining that Officer Maples possessed probable cause 645 to believe
638. 103 S. Ct. at 1541 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) (Court
approved the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops" where the indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official in
the field")). It is presumed that the Brown "routine driver's license checkpoint" fulfilled the
requirement that a person's expectation of privacy not be subject to the officer's discretion.
The Brown Court further recognized that Officer Maples' use of the flashlight did not
violate the fourth amendment. Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). In
Lee, the Court stated that "[the] use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine
glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." 274 U.S. at 563. Nor did
Maples' actions in changing position to allow him to see inside Brown's automobile violate
the fourth amendment. The Court reasoned that because the public could peer into Brown's
car from any angle, no legitimate expectation of privacy existed. 103 S. Ct. at 1542.
639. The second requirement may also be stated as follows: The police may not use the
plain view doctrine as a pretense, "know[ing] in advance the location of [certain] evidence
and intend[ing] to seize it." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470.
640. 103 S. Ct. at 1543. Justice White, concurring, stated that he disagrees with the Coo-
lidge plurality that a valid plain view seizure requires "inadvertence." Justice White empha-
sized that the Brown majority did not "purport to endorse" the requirement of
"inadvertence" in its opinion. Id at 1544 (White, J., concurring).
641. Id. at 1543 (White, J., concurring).
642. Id. at 1543-44 (White, J., concurring).
643. Id. at 1542 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466).
644. Id The Supreme Court believed that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals errone-
ously interpreted this requirement to mean that the officer must possess "near certainty" that
the objects are seizable. Id
645. The Court stated that the Coolidge Court's phrase "immediately apparent" was
"very likely an unhappy choice of words," which could be interpreted as requiring an "un-
duly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence." Id. The Court
determined that the standard required was probable cause. id (citing Payton v. New York,
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that the party balloon contained an illicit substance.646 Because all
three requirements were satisfied, the Court concluded that the seizure
of the balloon was lawful under the fourth amendment.647
D. Warrantless Arrests
1. Terry stops
The concept of the "Terry stop" for investigative purposes
originated in situations where police were making routine stops based
on reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be com-
mitted.648 A Terry stop will be nonviolative of the fourth amendment
if the stop and the questions asked are brief.649 A frisk for weapons will
445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) ("The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of
privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate
the property with criminal activity.")).
The Court did not address the issue of whether a lesser degree of suspicion would sup-
port seizures in other cases. Id. at 1542 n.7.
646. Based upon his prior narcotics-related experience, Maples testified that balloons tied
in a manner similar to the one in Brown's possession were often used to package narcotics.
This information was corroborated by a police department chemist. Furthermore, the glove
compartment's contents suggested illicit activity. The Court stated that "[t]he fact that Ma-
ples could not see through. . . the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinctive character of
the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents-particularly to the trained eye of the
officer." Id. at 1543.
647. Id at 1544. The seizure of the balloon involved a warrantless physical intrusion into
the automobile. The Court found this to be lawful because the plain view doctrine require-
ments were satisfied. Id at 1542 n.6 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (auto-
mobile exception to warrant requirement)).
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, concurring, agreed that the seizure of the bal-
loon was lawful. However, it was contended that the plurality did not sufficiently consider
whether the balloon's contents could be used as evidence because it was opened by the state
without a warrant. Id. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring). In the concurrence, it was argued
that the balloon's contents must be excluded unless either of two situations justified the
search of the balloon. Id at 1547-48 (Stevens, J., concurring). The first situation is where
Maples' observations of the glove compartment's interior, the defendant, and the contents of
his pocket, provided probable cause to believe that narcotics were located somewhere in the
car, and not merely in the single balloon at issue. In this situation, it would be permissible to
search the contents of any container in the car, including the balloon. Id. at 1547 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817-25 (1982) (automobile excep-
tion)).
The second situation is where an uninflated balloon, tied as in this case, has as its sole
function the packaging of narcotics. A person would not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such a container because its "'contents can be inferred from [its] outward appear-
ance."' Id at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
764-65 n.13 (1979) (examples of such containers are a burglary tool kit or a gun case)).
648. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (detective observed three men who appeared to
be casing a store for a potential robbery).
649. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1979).
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
be legal if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed. °
In United States v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit addressed the legal-
ity of an initial stop of a defendant after he had been observed acting
suspiciously in a parking lot from which several automobiles had re-
cently been stolen.652
Smith was convicted of possessing burglary tools653 and of giving
false information to a federal officer.654 He was stopped by park police
officers just outside the park premises where he had fled after the of-
ficers spotted him crouching between two automobiles parked on fed-
eral property. Smith had been seen with one hand on a car door and
the other hand holding a metal pipe.655
Smith contended that the stop was an arrest without probable
cause and therefore the evidence seized by the officers must be sup-
pressed.656 The facts surrounding the initial stop were as follows:
(1) the officers identified themselves, and Smith was told to drop the
metal pipe; (2) the officers frisked Smith briefly; (3) when asked his
name, Smith gave a false name and claimed he had no identification;
(4) when asked why he was in the area, Smith stated he was going to
the museum, but there was no museum in the vicinity; and (5) when
asked why he had ducked between the cars when spotted by the police,
Smith ran away. The entire length of this detention was only forty to
ninety seconds.657 As Smith ran from the officers, a long screwdriver
fell from his clothes. Smith was arrested within two minutes.658
Smith's claim that the initial detention was an arrest without prob-
able cause was countered by the government's claim that it was merely
an investigative or Terry stop.659 Smith argued that, because he was
not free to leave, the stop became an arrest. Because the court ac-
650. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
651. 713 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1983).
652. Id. at 492.
653. Smith was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), the Assimilated Crimes Act which
makes a state's criminal laws applicable to areas within its borders which are under federal
jurisdiction if there is no federal rule governing that behavior. The applicable California
rule is found in CAL. PENAL CODE § 466, which states in pertinent part: "Every person
having upon him or in his possession a.. . tool with intent feloniously to break or enter
into any. . . vehicle. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
654. 36 C.F.R. § 2.10.
655. 713 F.2d at 492.
656. Id. at 493.
657. Id. at 492.
658. Id at 493.
659. Id "Smith concede[d], as he must, that there were sufficient grounds for a Terry
stop, and the Government concede[d] that there was no probable cause for an arrest." The
disagreement was simply one of definition. Id
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knowledged that Smith was seized, the court stated that Smith's free-
dom of movement would only become relevant if the officers had
exceeded the limits set forth in Terry, in which case an arrest would
have occurred. 660 The Ninth Circuit, in upholding the district court's
decision, agreed with the government.66'
The court held that the stop was not converted into an arrest by
the length, the detention or the type of questions asked. Additionally,
the court found that the frisk was a reasonable protective measure pre-
scribed by a Terry Stop.
662
In Florida v. Royer,663 the Supreme Court applied the Terry line of
cases to the stop of a defendant attempting to board a New York bound
plane at Miami International Airport.664 Royer attracted the attention
of two narcotics officers because of the way he appeared and the type of
luggage he was carrying. These characteristics were representative of
the "drug courier profile. ' 665  Unaware of the officers' observations,
Royer bought a one-way ticket to New York with cash, at which time
he checked in the two suitcases he was carrying. On each bag he placed
an identification tag with the name "Holt" and the destination "La-
Guardia" written on it.
666
Royer was stopped by the officers as he was crossing the con-
course, preparing to board the airplane. The officers identified them-
selves and Royer silently produced his drivers license and airline ticket
upon request. The drivers license had the name "Royer" while the air-
line ticket said "Holt," the same name as appeared on the luggage.
667
660. Id. The court noted that a person's subjective belief as to his freedom to walk away
from authorities goes to the question of whether a seizure, as opposed to a voluntary stop,
has occurred.
661. Id at 494.
662. Id. Park officials have the authority to conduct such an investigation pursuant to 16
U.S.C. § la-6(a)(3) (1976) which allows officials to "conduct investigations of offenses
against the United States committed in" the National Park System. Id
663. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
664. Id at 493-94.
665. The "drug courier profile" is an abstract of characteristics found to be typical of
persons transporting illegal drugs. In Royer's case, the detectives attention was
attracted by the following facts which were considered to be within the profile:
(a) Royer was carrying American Tourister luggage, which appeared to be heavy,
(b) he was young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casually dressed, (d) he
appeared pale and nervous, looking around at other people, (e) he paid for his
ticket in cash with a large number of bills, and (f) rather than completing the air-
line identification tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had space for a
name, address, and telephone number, he wrote only a name and the destination.
Id. at 493 n.2 (citation omitted).
666. Id at 493.
667. When Royer was questioned about the discrepancy, he stated that the reservations
had been made in the name "Holt" by a friend. Id at 494.
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Royer became increasingly nervous during this time, whereupon he
was told by the officers that they were actually narcotics investigators
and there was reason to suspect that he was transporting narcotics. 68
Rather than return his drivers license and airline ticket, the inves-
tigators requested that Royer follow them to a nearby room. Royer
silently complied with their request. One of the officers later described
the room as a "'large storage closet.' "669 Royer's baggage was re-
trieved from the airline by one of the officers using Royer's baggage
check stubs. Royer had not consented to the retrieval.67 °
The baggage was brought back to the room where the officers
asked Royer if he would give his consent to a search. Royer unlocked
one of the suitcases without responding orally to their request. The
officers opened and searched the suitcase without asking for further
consent from Royer. Drugs were found.67 Royer gave permission to
the officers to break open the second suitcase after claiming he did not
know the combination to the lock. The officers opened the bag and
additional marijuana was found. At this time, Royer was told that he
was under arrest. Fifteen minutes had elapsed since Royer had ini-
tially been stopped.672
Royer was convicted of felony possession of marijuana.673 He ap-
pealed his conviction, claiming that his motion to suppress the evidence
found in his suitcases had been wrongly denied.674 The conviction was
reversed by the Florida District Court of Appeal.6 75 That court held
that Royer's involuntary confinement in the small room was without
probable cause and exceeded the limitations on restraint established in
Terry. Therefore, the court held that any consent to the search by
Royer was invalid because it was "tainted" by his illegal
confinement.676
The Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari and
affirmed the court of appeal reversal.677 However, prior to reviewing
668. Id





673. FLA. STAT. § 893.1(1)(a)(2) (1975) states in pertinent part: "[I]t is unlawful for any
person to. . .possess with intent to sell. . . a controlled substance. Any person who vio-
lates this provision with respect to: [marijuana] is guilty of a felony ....
674. 460 U.S. at 495.
675. 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
676. 460 U.S. at 495.
677. Id. at 497.
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the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court made several "prelimi-
nary observations" of its Own.
678
In the discussion of Royer's stop, the Court found that the validity
of that stop would depend upon his consent, which must be freely
given.679 Additionally, the Court discussed what would be required in
this or any other detention to enable it to find that the detention, where
consent was given, was reasonable. The Court held that fourth amend-
ment guarantees would not be violated when a person is at all times
free to leave.6 80  Furthermore, when there is reasonable suspicion
under Terry, a brief detention is permissible if the purpose is the fur-
therance of a substantial public interest.6 8 1 However, that detention, if
for investigative purposes, must be brief and last no longer than neces-
sary to complete the purpose for which the stop was initiated. 2 Any
voluntary statements made during an illegal detention would be inad-
missible if a product of that detention and not made independently.
6 83
The Court concluded this discussion by stating that if Royer's deten-
tion had been reasonable under Terry, his voluntary consent would
have validated the search of his luggage. 84
Following these "preliminary observations," the Court announced
its holding in the case. In stating the plurality opinion, the Court dis-
counted the three reasons which the state had offered for reinstating
Royer's conviction.685
First, the Court did not agree with the state's claim that Royer
consented to the seizure and was therefore not held against his will.
The Court held that the initial stop, where Royer relinquished his driv-
ers license and airline ticket, was permissible. However, when the of-
678. Id. at 497-501.
679. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (consent by a clerk
in an adult book store given "in the face of'colorably lawful coercion' cannot validate...
illegal acts").
680. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (defendant not
seized where she had no objective reason to believe she was not free to leave).
681. Here, the public interest involved was the "suppression of illegal transactions in
drugs." 460 U.S. at 489-99. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981) ("some
seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on
the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial enforcement
interests").
682. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) ("The scope of the search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissi-
ble.") (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
683. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (defendants' state-
ments excluded where found to be "'fruits' of. . . agents' unlawful action").
684. 460 U.S. at 501.
685. Id. at 501-07.
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ficers revealed their status as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents and had Royer accompany them to the small room without noti-
fying him that he was free to leave, Royer was seized as defined by the
fourth amendment.686
Second, the state contended that the detention was justified by rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion and that the detention never went be-
yond the limits of Terry.6 87  The Supreme Court did not agree.
Although there was reasonable suspicion, based on the officers' initial
observations, for the original detention, the Court held that when
Royer was taken to the small room, and his luggage retrieved without
his consent, Royer was no longer merely detained, but rather "[a]s a
practical matter, Royer was under arrest. 688
Additionally, the Court held that the conduct by the officers was
more intrusive than what was necessary for an effective investigative
detention. The Court could find nothing in the record which could ex-
plain how the original purpose of the detention was furthered by mov-
ing Royer to the room prior to attempting to gain his consent to search
his luggage.689
The state's third argument, that there was probable cause to arrest
Royer at the time his consent was given, was also rejected by the Court.
The facts available to the officers at the time consent was given were
"that a nervous young man with two American Tourister bags paid
cash for an airline ticket to a 'target city.' ",690 The Court could not
agree with the state that probable cause to arrest Royer was present
based on these facts. This would open the door for any person fitting
686. Id at 501. The Court stated that "[t]hese circumstances surely amount to a show of
official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave."' Id at 502 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1979)).
687. Id.
688. Id at 503. "What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated
into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied
with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions." Id.
689. Id at 505.
The Court set forth three ways in which the officers' conduct could have been reason-
able: (1) by returning Royer's license and ticket and informing Royer that he was free to go;
(2) by justifying Royer's removal for reasons of safety and security; and (3) by searching the
baggage on the spot where Royer's consent was obtained and by searching it in a more
expeditious manner, i.e., using trained dogs.
However, the Court did not wish to "suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distin-
guishing a consensual encounter from a seizure.. . . There will be endless variations in
the facts and circumstances. . . that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence
a rule that will provide unarguable answers . Id at 506-07.
690. Id. at 507.
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that description to be arrested on a similar felony charge.6 9 '
The Supreme Court affirmed the Florida District Court of Ap-
peal's decision that Royer's consent was ineffective because it was ob-
tained in the midst of an illegal detention.
6 92
In United States v. Place,693 the Supreme Court upheld a district
court's application of the Terry standard6 94 to the detention of personal
property. However, the Court affirmed the court of appeal's reversal of
the district court's conviction, 695 holding the seizure of the property ex-
ceeded the permissible limits of a Terry stop.
6 96
In Place, the defendant was initially detained at Miami Interna-
tional Airport after he, Place, had aroused officers' suspicions while
waiting in line to purchase a plane ticket to New York's LaGuardia
Airport. Place presented identification and his airline ticket upon the
officers' request, and, in addition, gave his consent to a search of his
two suitcases. The officers decided against the search because Place's
flight was about to depart.6 97
Because of Place's remark that he knew that they were police, the
officers checked the luggage tags and found discrepancies between the
691. Id
692. Id. at 507-08. Justices Powell and Brennan concurred in the result. Justice Brennan
felt it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of the legality of the initial stop where
"the officers' subsequent actions clearly exceeded the permissible bounds of a Terry 'investi-
gative' stop." Id at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring).
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor,
stated that the detention of Royer was reasonable given the legitimate governmental purpose
and given the specific facts of this case. The dissent found the conduct of the officers emi-
nently reasonable in that they moved Royer out of the busy airport concourse to more pri-
vate surroundings, and retrieved his luggage so that it would not arrive at the intended
destination without Royer there to pick it up. Justice Rehnquist also did not believe the size
of the room should be determinative of reasonableness. Id at 532 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). He asked: "If the room had been large and spacious, rather than small, if it had
possessed three chairs rather than two, would the officers' conduct have been made reason-
able by these facts?" To Justice Rehnquist, the reasonableness of the detention depends on
the specific facts of Royer's stop. According to the dissent, "[o]n this point the plurality
stutters, fudges, and hedges." Id at 529 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the dissent did not agree with the plurality where they stated that Royer's
initial consent evaporated when he was under arrest in the room. Because there was no
evidence of coercion, the dissent did not find the consent tainted. Id at 531 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
693. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
694. United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("If detention of a
person can be based on reasonable suspicion, . . there is no reason why detention of phys-
ical objects cannot be based on the same standard.").
695. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981).
696. 103 S. Ct. at 2646.
697. Id. at 2639-40.
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addresses on the tags and those Place had given.698 Based on this infor-
mation and Place's comment, the Miami officers alerted DEA agents in
New York who watched Place as he deplaned. The New York DEA
agents became suspicious when Place called for a limousine after
claiming his baggage. The agents approached Place who again com-
mented that he had pegged them as "cops" as soon as he had gotten off
the plane.699
Place was informed that, based on the information from the
Miami authorities and on what the New York officers had observed, he
was under suspicion of carrying narcotics. Place then claimed that he
had been questioned and that his baggage had been searched in Miami.
The DEA agents stated that this was not the information they had re-
ceived.7" They then asked for Place's permission to search the lug-
gage. Place refused. Instead, he relinquished his bags to the agents,
who informed Place that they were taking the bags to a federal judge in
order to obtain a search warrant. The agents gave Place a telephone
number where they could be reached when he declined to accompany
them.
The suitcases were then taken to New York City's Kennedy Air-
port, where a trained narcotics dog performed a "sniff test." The dog
reacted positively to one of the suitcases. This test occurred approxi-
mately ninety minutes after the bags had been seized. Because it was
late Friday by the time the test was performed, the agents kept the lug-
gage until Monday morning when they obtained a search warrant for
the bag singled out by the dog. When the bag was opened, the agents
found 1,125 grams of cocaine.70
Place pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute,70 2 but reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of
his motion to suppress the contents of his suitcase.70 3 His conviction
was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,7M who agreed
with Place's contention that the seizure of his suitcase violated his
698. After investigating further, the officers discovered that the addresses did not exist.
Furthermore, the phone number given to the airline by Place belonged to another address




702. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) states in pertinent part: "[Ilt shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally-to. . . possess with intent to. . . distribute. . . a con-
trolled substance. .. ."
703. See supra note 694.
704. See supra note 695.
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rights under the fourth amendment. °5 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the applicability of the Terry
standard to warrantless seizures of a person's luggage.70 6
Traditionally, the Court has upheld the seizure of property prior to
issuance of a search warrant if there are exigent circumstances or an-
other exception to the warrant requirement present.70 7 The Court rea-
soned that the justification for these exceptions is that the risk of losing
the luggage before it is searched outweighs the party's possessory inter-
est. In Place, the Court found the rule in Terry to be an additional
exception to the warrant requirement for the seizure of personal
luggage.
70 8
In applying the Terry standard, the Court balanced the govern-
ment's strong interest in preventing the flow of narcotics 70 9 against the
intrusion into the fourth amendment rights of the individual.710 The
Court found that the balance tipped in favor of an investigative stop,
provided, however, that it is within the limitations set regarding the
scope of the detention.
71'
The Court held that the same standards applicable to the investi-
gative detention of persons, those based on reasonable suspicion rather
705. "The Fourth Amendment protects the 'right of the people to be secure in their...
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2641 (emphasis in
original).
706. I. at 2641-42. The Court was asked by the government "to apply the principles of
Terry v. Ohio ... to permit such seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion,
premised on objective facts, that the luggage contains contraband."
Place also petitioned the Court to decide whether reasonable suspicion existed at the
time of his detention. The Court denied certiorari as to this issue. Id at 2640 n.l.
707. Id at 2641. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (exception to
warrant requirement present when police stop a vehicle and seize luggage which they rea-
sonably suspect contains marijuana).
708. 103 S. Ct. at 2642.
709. Id at 2643. "Because of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at
airports, allowing police to make brief investigative stops ... on reasonable suspicion of
drug-trafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the
flow of narcotics into distribution channels." Id (footnote omitted).
710. Id at 2643-44. The Court examined both the nature and the extent of the intrusion,
dismissing the defendant's argument that degrees of intrusion do not apply where a person's
luggage is seized. Place unsuccessfully argued that when luggage is seized "dispossession is
absolute," and the "substantially less intrusive" measurement of Terry has no application,
Id. The Court held that the degree of intrusion can vary from where the owner has already
given up control to a third party, United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (suspi-
cious packages left at post office), to where the luggage is seized directly from the owner, as
in this case. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
711. 103 S. Ct. at 2644. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968) ("The manner in which
the seizure [was] conducted is ... as vital a part of the inquiry as whether [it was] warranted
at all.").
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than on probable cause, are applicable to a stop of an individual's lug-
gage.7" In Place, the Court held that the permissible limits set forth in
Terry had been exceeded by the length of time the luggage had been
detained.7 13 The officers failed both in the lack of brevity of the seizure
and in the absence of diligence in pursuing the investigation. 4 The
Court stated that where the officers at LaGuardia had prior notice of
Place's arrival, they had plenty of time to make the necessary arrange-
ments for an on the spot investigation.715 Because the Court found the
seizure unreasonable under the fourth amendment, the evidence found
in the suitcase was held to be inadmissible and, accordingly, the Court
affirmed the reversal of Place's conviction.716
2. Investigative stops-custodial interrogations
Cases involving border detentions, especially in the area of drug
smuggling or the detention of suspected illegal aliens, have created spe-
cial problems relating to the reasonableness of investigative stops and
the legality of custodial interrogations.
Investigative or Terry stops7 17 are brief, minimally intrusive, and
712. 103 S. Ct. at 2645. The Court rejected the suggestion made by the government that
the probable cause requirement should be triggered much later where luggage is being de-
tained rather than an individual. "Particularly in the case of detention of luggage within the
traveler's immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's possessory
interest in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary." Id
713. I1d The luggage was initially detained for ninety minutes to facilitate the dog sniff
and then, as it was Friday afternoon, it was kept until Monday morning at which time a
warrant was obtained. Id at 2640.
714. I.d at 2645.
715. Id The Court also stated that the unreasonableness of the seizure "was exacer-
bated" by the agents' conduct in failing to give the defendant accurate information regard-
ing the location of his baggage and the length of time it would be detained. Id at 2646.
716. Id
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result but did not agree with the major-
ity's need "'to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis than
the record before [it] imperatively require[d]."' Id (Brennan, J., concurring).
According to Justice Brennan, the officers violated Place's fourth amendment rights at
the moment his luggage was seized where the seizure was based on less than probable cause.
Id at 2650 (Brennan, J., concurring). Additionally, in Justice Brennan's view, "dog sniffs of
people constitute searches." Id at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurred in the result but
voiced his concern with "what appears. . . to be an emerging tendency on the part of the
Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment
requires only that any seizure be reasonable." Id at 2652 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
717. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The requirement of reasonable suspicion applies
equally here as it does in other detentions. See, e.g., United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d
1038 (9th Cir.) (reasonable suspicion required when suspect was detained following a rob-
bery), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2106 (1983).
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usually involve only a few questions.71 8 Such brief detentions have
been found to be nonviolative of traditional probable cause require-
ments where there is a governmental interest of significant proportion
involved.7 19 Custodial interrogations are detentions or investigative
seizures.720 Because these detentions are more severe intrusions upon
protected rights, they require the safeguards traditionally associated
with lawful arrests.72'
These definitions are particularly important, yet difficult to apply,
when the courts are required to decide when an investigative stop has
blossomed into a custodial interrogation or a full blown arrest, in
which case fourth amendment protections would be required.722
a. generally
Prior to an actual arrest, officers may briefly stop an individual for
the purpose of investigating the possibility of criminal activity although
probable cause is not present for an actual arrest.723 The permissibility
718. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
719. Id. at 881. Brignoni-Ponce concerned the regulation of illegal aliens. See also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police officers may briefly detain suspects while investigating
criminal activity).
720. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
721. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1978).
722. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[tihe right of
people to be secure in their persons." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This has been interpreted as
requiring "that searches and seizures be founded upon an objective justification ... "
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980).
In United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 205
(1983), the Ninth Circuit gave a brief interpretation of the difference between an investiga-
tive stop and a custodial interrogation. In Wilson, the defendant had been stopped and
asked to identify himself, whereupon he produced two pieces of false identification. Follow-
ing production of the identification, Wilson was told that "unless he could better identify
himself, they [the officers] would have to detain him." Id. at 1274. Miranda warnings were
not given and, therefore, the court held that statements made by Wilson at this point were
inadmissible. Id
The court found that the initial request for identification occurred during an investiga-
tive stop. This stop did not trigger fourth amendment protections as long as "questioning
does not occur in police-dominated or compelling atmosphere." Id. However, the state-
ments made following the production of the identification were inadmissible. The court
held that these statements were made during a custodial interrogation. "A 'custodial inter-
rogation' occurs, for purposes of triggering the requirement of a Miranda warning, when
. . . officers initiate questioning after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
On the facts presented in Wilson, the court held that it appeared that "Wilson's freedom
was significantly restricted," therefore, as the requisite Miranda warnings were not given, the
statements made during that time should not be admitted. 690 F.2d at 1274.
723. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of this brief detention is based on the officer's "reasonable" or
"founded" suspicion that there may be criminal activity afoot.
7 24
Founded suspicion725 has been defined as those specific facts, com-
bined with inferences based on those facts, that would- reasonably jus-
tify a suspicion that the individual detained has committed or was
about to commit a crime.7 26
In United States v. Burnette,7 27 the Ninth Circuit rejected a defend-
ant's claim that police officers lacked founded suspicion to detain her
following a bank robbery.7 28 The bank had been robbed by a black
man who was observed entering an automobile occupied by two black
persons.729
Approximately one hour following the robbery, the getaway car
was discovered at a nearby inn. Two black females, Lynette and The-
resa Burnette, were spotted near the car. Lynette appeared to be wip-
ing off the driver's door, while her co-defendant, Theresa, appeared to
be removing the license plate from the rear of the car. The court stated
that from the officers' observations it could be reasonably inferred that
Lynette was in some way connected with the car.73 °
Additional factors establishing founded suspicion were the of-
ficers' observations of the two women fleeing into a room at the inn
after they had spotted one of the police officers. Shortly thereafter, a
black man fitting the robber's description ran from the room into an
alley. Lynette was seized as she was attempting to leave the inn.73
The court held that the police officers' knowledge of the bank robbery,
together with their observations of the defendants' suspicious behavior
at the inn, constituted the founded suspicion necessary to make the de-
tention of Lynette reasonable.732
Subsequent to Lynette's detention, the officers requested photo
identification. Lynette's reluctance to comply with the request, to-
gether with her furtive manner, convinced the officers that she was
724. United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1047 (9th Cir.) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2106 (1983).
725. "Founded suspicion is identical to 'reasonable' suspicion." Id at 1047 n.16.
726. Id at 1047.
727. Id at 1038.
728. Id. at 1046. The defendant's conviction as to the armed portion of the offense of
bank robbery was reversed on other grounds.
729. Id. at 1047.
730. Id
731. Id
732. Id See also United States v. Collum, 614 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1979) (police officers
had founded suspicion to detain suspects after officers were alerted to a possible auto theft
and discovered suspects stooping next to missing car), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
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about to flee and therefore Lynette was placed under arrest.733 The
officers once again requested identification, but instead seized Lynette's
purse when she attempted to block their view as she took a small black
object from the purse. The court held that the evidence seized from the
purse was properly admitted.3 The court found that where founded
suspicion for the detention had ripened into probable cause to arrest,
the purse was properly seized pursuant to that arrest.
735
The requirement of founded suspicion is also present where roving
patrols stop vehicles in border areas when alien smuggling is sus-
pected.736 This standard of founded suspicion is identical to that ap-
plied in the Burnette case where the defendant was detained following a
bank robbery. However, the facts known to the officers must reason-
ably justify suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.7 37
In United States v. Garcia-Nunez,738 the defendant appealed his
conviction for transporting illegal aliens, 73 9 claiming that the officers
were without the necessary founded suspicion which would justify the
stop.740
In affirming the conviction, the Ninth Circuit listed all the infor-
mation received by the officers from third parties, and the observations
by the officers themselves, which together provided the necessary
founded suspicion.74' The factors considered were: (1) an anonymous
733. 698 F.2d at 1048.
734. The evidence included a large sum of money and money orders. Id at 1048 n.21.
735. Id. at 1048.
736. United States v. Garcia-Nunez, 709 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1983).
737. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). Facts which may be
considered include illegal traffic patterns, information about recent illegal border crossings,
erratic driving, attempts to escape or a heavily laden car. United States v. Avalos-Ochoa,
557 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
738. 709 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1983).
739. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976) states in pertinent part: "Any person .. who...
transports... any alien.., shall be punished ...."
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (1976) states in pertinent part: "Any person. . . who. . . will-
fully or knowingly conceals.. . any alien... shall be punished ...."
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) states in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire. . . to
commit any offense against the United States. .. [they] shall be fined. .. or imprisoned
740. 709 F.2d at 560. Co-defendant Benson was also convicted of conspiracy to "conceal
and transport undocumented aliens" and additionally of "aiding and abetting Garcia-Nunez
in the transportation of an undocumented alien." Benson's conviction for aiding and abet-
ting was reversed when the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with Benson, held that there was insuffi-
cient admissible evidence to support that conviction. Id.
741. Id. at 561. Prior to listing the facts which constituted probable cause in this case, the
court cited United States v. Patterson, 492 F.2d 995 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846
(1974). Relying on Patterson, the court stated that officers, in assessing the presence of
founded suspicion, "need not rule out all possibility of innocent behavior." 709 F.2d at 561.
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tip implicating the defendant's car in alien smuggling and giving the
location of the car at the home where the defendant was spotted;742
(2) a neighbor's complaint that Mexican-looking men were standing by
the car exchanging money; and (3) a subsequent report from the same
neighbor that the men had entered the home mentioned earlier. Fur-
ther, the officers observed that: (4) a man from the house was appar-
ently surveying the neighborhood by driving continuously around the
block; (5) the defendant exited from the house presumably acting as a
lookout; (6) upon a signal from the lookout, four men hurried from the
home to the suspect's car; (7) the defendant was driving the car identi-
fied in the tip while the men in the back seat were sitting low; (8) the
men in the back seat "appeared" to be illegal aliens as evidenced by
their dress, demeanor, and appearance;74 3 and (9) the men riding in the
back seat were of Mexican descent.7 "
The Ninth Circuit concluded that these facts were sufficient to give
the officers the necessary founded suspicion to stop the automobile.745
Upon stopping the car, the passengers were asked about their citizen-
ship and they admitted to being illegally present in the country.746 The
defendant and his passengers were subsequently arrested.
In United States v. Doe,747 founded suspicion was held to be pres-
ent when border patrol agents stopped a juvenile driving a car which
officers suspected was transporting illegal aliens.748 The defendant's
car had been seen riding high southbound on a route commonly used
by illegal aliens hoping to avoid a border checkpoint. A few minutes
Founded suspicion may exist even though a suspect's activities, looked at one at a time, may
appear perfectly innocent. In Patterson, the Ninth Circuit had stated that "[t]he succession
of superficially innocent events [may proceed] to the point where a prudent man could say to
himself that an innocent course of conduct was substantially less likely than a criminal one."
492 F.2d at 997. In Garcia-Nunez, some of what the officers observed may have appeared
perfectly innocent, but there was enough activity to warrant the officers' suspicion. 709 F.2d
at 561.
742. 709 F.2d at 561. Anonymous tips may be taken into consideration in assessing
founded suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
743. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) ("[T]rained officers
can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such
factors as the mode of dress and haircut.").
744. 709 F.2d at 561. "Mexican appearance [is] a relevant factor. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975).
745. 709 F.2d at 561.
746. Id. at 560.
747. 701 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1983).
748. Id. at 821. The defendant was attempting to suppress evidence obtained from the
stop of his car. When the car was stopped, six illegal aliens from Mexico were found inside
the vehicle.
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later, the car was again spotted, this time headed north, heavily
laden.749
The court, relying on several earlier decisions involving similar
factual patterns,75° held that the stop of the defendant's car was lawful
based on the facts known to the agents at the time of their decision to
pull the car over.75 1 The commonly used route and the low-riding car
were sufficient to constitute founded suspicion necessary for the stop.7" 2
The court stressed that in determining the existence of founded suspi-
cion only those facts known to the officers prior to the stop may be
taken into consideration.753
However, in an actual arrest without a warrant, the Ninth Circuit
may allow facts accumulated after the arrest order to be considered
when determining if there was probable cause to make the arrest. In
United States v. Manuel754 the defendant appealed his conviction of
second degree murder. One of his contentions was that his arrest was
illegal because it had been ordered before the arresting officers had
probable cause to support a belief that he, Manuel, was one of the par-
ties responsible for the slaying.7 5
The murder was investigated by both Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agents and Tribal Police because the body was found on an Indian
Reservation. Prior to the detention of Manuel, the officers gathered
information regarding the slaying. They obtained a statement from the
uncle of the victim who claimed he had stabbed Manuel after Manuel
had admitted committing the murder. 6 Further evidence of the crime
was gathered by searching the area where the murder occurred and by
interviewing witnesses at the scene.757
Manuel contended that the tribal police officer had ordered his
arrest prior to obtaining any of the evidence from the scene or from the
749. Id. at 820-21.
750. See United States v. Roberts, 470 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he route is one
frequently used by those transporting aliens. . . [and] [t]he rear seemed to be riding low
. ... "), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 854
(9th Cir.) ("That particular stretch of Interstate 8 was known by the agents to be an area
with a high incidence of transportation of 'illegal' aliens. . . . [T]he car was 'riding low
. '"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
751. 701 F.2d at 821.
752. Id When Doe was spotted northbound, he disregarded the agents' red lights and
sped up the highway. After he crashed into a concrete wall, he was caught as he was trying
to flee on foot. Id
753. Id (citing United States v. Morrison, 546 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1976)).
754. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983).
755. Id. at 911.
756. Id at 910.
757. Id
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witnesses.7  Manuel was arrested the day after the arrest was ordered
but the officers chose not to question him until twenty-four hours later
when he sobered up.759 Prior to questioning, Manuel was given his
Miranda rights and he subsequently confessed to his role in the mur-
der.760 Because the district court record did not contain the necessary
factual findings on this contention, the Ninth Circuit was unable to rule
on Manuel's claim regarding the premature arrest order.76
At the time of Manuel's arrest, the only evidence known to the
officers was the location of the body, the results of an autopsy, and the
hearsay statement from the uncle of the decedent.7 62 The Ninth Circuit
was unable to decide if this evidence was sufficient to constitute prob-
able cause.763 However, the court did not believe that a determination
of probable cause was necessary. Regardless of whether there was
probable cause when the arrest was ordered, sufficient evidence was
gathered by the officers shortly after their arrival to justify the arrest.
764
Finally, because of the sufficiency of this evidence, Manuel's confession
was held to be admissible although his initial arrest may have been
illegal.765
In Bernard v. City ofPalo Alto, 7 6 6 the plaintiff was arrested without
a warrant and released fifty-one hours later without a magistrate ever
having determined whether probable cause existed for the arrest.76 7
758. Id. at 911.
759. Id at 910.
760. Id
761. The district court had ruled that the admissibility of evidence in a federal prosecu-
tion could not be affected by the illegality of a tribal arrest. The Ninth Circuit did not agree.
"[T]hough Indian tribal governments are to be viewed as 'separate sovereigns' from the
federal government akin to states for purposes of criminal procedure issues, . . . statements
obtained by state officials in violation of the fourth amendment may not be used in a subse-
quent federal prosecution." Id. at 911 n.3 (citations omitted).
762. Id. at 911.
763. The court stated that the probable cause determination would turn on the credibility
and reliability of the hearsay claimant. Id at 911. In a footnote, the court disclaimed any
intention of suggesting that probable cause did not exist in this case. Here, the uncle's state-
ments were claimed to be based on personal knowledge and his story was corroborated by
the findings of the autopsy. "[The court's] discussion [was] meant only to show the presence
of an issue we need not decide .... " Id. at 911 n.4.
764. Id at 911. The most important evidence obtained was the eyewitness statements.
Id.
765. Id at 912. The court distinguishes Manuel from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), where the Supreme Court had
suppressed confessions which had been obtained "by exploitation of the illegality of [the]
arrest." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 217. In Manuel, "probable cause was amply
established before the officers began their interrogation." 706 F.2d at 911-12.
766. 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
767. Id at 1024. The Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable detention to complete the
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The defendants claimed that probable cause for Bernard's arrest was
established by the discovery of several outstanding warrants. These
warrants were not discovered until after the plaintiff was arrested.
7 68
The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether or not this discovery, subse-
quent to Bernard's arrest, constituted probable cause, as this case in-
volved a class action suit.7 6 9 Because Bernard was found to adequately
represent the class and therefore the suit was to go forward, his individ-
ual claim would not dispose of the class action and was not decided.770
b. alien detentions
In Benitez-Mendez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,77
the Ninth Circuit dealt directly with the question of when the stop of a
suspected illegal alien "rises to the level of a 'seizure' under the Fourth
Amendment. '772 Upon finding a seizure occurred, the court applied a
standard which had previously been formulated to deal with the consti-
tutionality of detentions for the purpose of questioning workers of sus-
pected illegal alienage.773
In Benitez-Mendez, the petitioner was detained in a Border Patrol
car after an initial questioning in the open field where he had been
working. Officers had questioned Benitez-Mendez regarding his status
in the United States. He answered that he had papers in his car which
proved his legal status as an alien. The officers then detained the peti-
tioner in their patrol car while these documents were examined. 7
administrative details incident to an arrest should be no more than twenty-four hours. Id at
1025. Under the defendant city's procedures, the probable cause determination was to be
made within forty-eight hours. Id. at 1024. However, several officers testified to the fact that
no more than eight to ten hours were required to book an arrestee under the worst condi-
tions. Id Therefore, the court held that given the maximum time of ten hours required,
twenty-four hours was more than enough time within which to require a probable cause
hearing to be held. Id at 1025.
768. Id. at 1026.
769. The class action suit was brought by Bernard to challenge the city's policies of de-
taining arrestees for an unreasonably long period of time. See supra note 767.
770. Id. at 1026.
771. 707 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1983).
772. Id at 1108.
773. Id
Relying on United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981), announced the test to be used in
determining under what factual circumstances the activity of law enforcement officers would
rise to the level of a seizure under the fourth amendment. The Anderson test states: "[A]
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." 663 F.2d at 939 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
774. 707 F.2d at 1108.
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Although the court stated that the initial stop in the field did not
amount to a seizure, it held that when the petitioner was placed in the
patrol car, he had been seized under the test established in United
States v. Anderson."75 Having established that Benitez-Mendez had
been seized, the court proceeded to determine whether the seizure was
legal. In order to justify the seizure, the Border Patrol must have been
able to articulate objective facts providing reasonable suspicion that the
petitioner was illegally in the country.77 6
The court did not find the required objective facts to justify the
seizure of the petitioner.777 The knowledge held by the officers at the
time of the seizure consisted only of the fact that Benitez-Mendez was
working in a field, that his co-workers had fled at the sight of the patrol
car, that Benitez-Mendez was an alien, and that he claimed possession
of documents which would prove his legal status.778 The court there-
fore did not believe that the officers had sufficient grounds to suspect
Benitez-Mendez to be of illegal alienage at the time he was seized.7 79
c. border detentions
Intrusions by the government on the mobility of its citizens at in-
ternational borders have been traditionally reviewed under different
standards by the courts than other investigatory techniques employed
by law enforcement personnel.730 Congress has conferred the authority
to search for contraband at borders by way of a federal statute.7 ' The
Ninth Circuit has interpreted this grant of power as authorizing deten-
775. Id. See supra note 773 for Anderson test. "Once petitioner was placed inside the
vehicle and told to wait, it [was] clear that he reasonably 'would have believed that he was
not free to leave.'" 707 F.2d at 1108 (citing Anderson, 663 F.2d at 939).
776. 707 F.2d at 1109. In determining whether such objective facts exist, the Ninth Cir-
cuit follows the standard established in ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'dsub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1958 (1984). Under this standard, officials may
not detain workers unless they have "objective facts providing [them] with a reasonable
suspicion that each [individual] . . . is an alien illegally in this country." 681 F.2d at 638.
777. 707 F.2d at 1109.
778. Id.
779. Id. Benitez-Mendez also contended that because the information used' at this depor-
tation hearing was obtained during his illegal arrest, it should have been inadmissible at that
hearing. The court agreed, having recently found the exclusionary rule applicable to depor-
tation hearings in Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1075 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 52
U.S.L.W. 5190 (1984).
780. United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Shorter v. United
States, 469 F.2d 61, 63 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973)).
781. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Any . . . officers . . . may stop,
search and examine . . . any vehicle, . . . or person on which or whom he or they shall
suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the
United States in any manner contrary to law."
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tions and searches by officials at borders that are not based on probable
cause but based on reasonable suspicion alone.78 2
This type of analysis was applied by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Faherty.783 Facts sufficient to meet the standard of reasonable
suspicion were found by the court to exist for Faherty's initial detention
and strip search. 8 4  Following the strip search, which proved to be
unproductive, the court held that Faherty's further detention was legal
despite the absence of probable cause.785
Faherty was convicted of importing and possessing heroin.78 6 She
was initially detained upon her arrival from Thailand, considered a
source country.7 87 At this initial detention, Faherty was subjected to a
strip search which produced no contraband. 8 While detained,
Faherty disclosed that she was self-employed. Customs agents became
suspicious of Faherty's overly friendly attitude and her restricted body
movements. The agents discovered a name in her notebook of a person
suspected of drug smuggling. Further suspicion was aroused by
Faherty's unusual travel arrangements and her chilliness and
sleepiness.789
Following the nonproductive strip search, the customs officials
continued to detain Faherty while an order was obtained to conduct an
x-ray search. The court did not distinguish this time from the initial
detention during which Faherty was searched. Although the court did
not designate this part of the detention as an actual arrest, it did discuss
the absence of the probable cause requirements usually mandated by
the fourth amendment in a detention of this type not occurring at a
border.790
782. Shorter v. United States, 469 F.2d at 61, 63 (9th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 918
(1973).
783. 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982).
784. Id at 1260.
785. Id.
786. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1981) states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful to import
... into the United States ... any controlled substance .... "
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1981) states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance ..
787. 692 F.2d at 1259.
788. Id The Ninth Circuit has previously held that a strip search requires reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (reason-
able suspicion is defined as "objective, articulable facts that would reasonably lead an exper-
ienced, prudent customs official to suspect that a ... person ... is concealing something on
his body .. ").
789. 692 F.2d at 1259-60. Faherty traveled to Thailand with a ticket bought through a
travel agent in Chicago. Her return flight necessitated an overnight stop in San Francisco.
790. Id See, e.g., Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1983) (suspected illegal
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The Ninth Circuit held that for searches by customs officials at
borders, it is not required by the fourth amendment that there be a
warrant or probable cause.9 Where probable cause is not required,
the reasonableness of the detention will be judged by the length of time
the suspect is held. The court stated that so long as the length of the
detention is no longer than reasonably necessary for a valid search to
be conducted, the detention of persons for border searches will not re-
quire a warrant or probable cause.7 92
A case very similar to Faherty was presented to the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Couch.7 93 Couch had been indicted for importing
and possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute.7 94 His motion to
suppress evidence obtained during his detention at Los Angeles Airport
was granted by the district court,79 5 and the government appealed.
Couch was detained following his arrival from Peru at Los Ange-
les International Airport by DEA agents. The detention was based on
information they received from an informant who had a reputation for
reliability.796 The information supplied to the agents included the
manner in which the drugs would be smuggled, the week during which
several individuals would return to the United States, and finally, that
alien detained in patrol car while police checked his immigration papers-probable cause
required).
791. 692 F.2d at 1260.
792. Id. Faherty, who was held at the airport for six hours, claimed that she was detained
longer than reasonably necessary to obtain an order to conduct the x-ray search. Id The
court was faced with a similar claim in United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982),
where a defendant had been detained ten to twelve hours while a search order was being
sought. Id. at 382.
In Ek, the Ninth Circuit held that a ten to twelve hour detention was reasonable given
the time consuming procedures involved in obtaining a search order. Id. In Faherty, the
Ninth Circuit, focusing on the requirement of reasonableness as the substitute criteria for
probable cause, relied upon Ek in finding that a six hour detention was also not unreasona-
ble. 692 F.2d at 1260. In order to defeat the finding of reasonableness, Faherty would have
had to produce evidence that the government intentionally delayed obtaining the x-ray or-
der. Id. Because no such evidence was produced "to suggest that the government did not
move as expeditiously as possible," the detention was legal and Faherty's conviction was
affirmed. Id.
793. 688 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982).
794. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1981). See supra note 786 for statutory language.
21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1981) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who-
. .. knowingly... imports.. . a controlled substance .. shall be punished."
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1981) states in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to . . .possess with intent to. . .distribute. . . a con-
trolled substance ...."
795. 688 F.2d at 600.
796. Id. Although there was no disclosure of the basis of the informant's information, the
court held that "the detail in the . . . tip was sufficient to establish a 'clear indication' of
body cavity smuggling." Id. at 606.
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Couch would refuse to allow an x-ray examination as he had done sev-
eral months earlier when he had been detained in Peru. The informant
stated that Couch would claim that he had been overexposed to x-rays
at an earlier time and that he was afraid of any further exposure.79 7
Couch and another individual798 were moved to a secondary area
where Couch's person and baggage were searched. The agents found
no narcotics and no indicia of smuggling. Couch then refused to con-
sent to an x-ray search of his stomach, explaining his previous overex-
posure to x-rays and his fear of further damage to his health. 799 This
initial detention presented no constitutional issues for the court.8°° Re-
lying on a prior Supreme Court case,8 0' the Ninth Circuit held that
routine border searches are permissible without probable cause.
80 2
Couch was then removed to the DEA office and detained for ap-
proximately nine hours while a court order for an x-ray examination
was obtained. During this detention, Couch was constantly watched,
he was not allowed any phone calls, and he was aware that he was not
free to leave. 0 3 Couch was asked several routine questions, to which
he reiterated his fear of x-rays and gave a false employment history
regarding his alleged overexposure. During this time, Couch refused to
eat or drink.8°4
Couch contended that the detention in the DEA office was an
arrest requiring probable cause.8 0 5 Couch's argument rested on the dis-
797. Id at 600. The informant had stated that the drugs would be smuggled into the
country in the individuals' stomachs.
798. Robert Ek was detained at the same time as Couch. They were tried separately and
Ek's pretrial suppression motion was denied. Another panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the denial of the motion as well as Ek's conviction. United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir. 1982). It appeared to the Couch court that although Ek was detained separately, the
circumstances surrounding his detention were similar to Couch's. 688 F.2d at 601 n.3. See
supra note 792.
799. 688 F.2d at 601.
800. Id at 602.
801. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
802. 688 F.2d at 602. In Ramsey, the Court stated "[t]hat searches made at the border,
pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examin-
ing persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the
fact that they occur at the border." United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
803. Couch was given his Miranda rights, but agents refused Couch's request for an attor-
ney. The agents believed that Couch was asking for an attorney to be appointed, while
Couch claimed he was merely asking for permission to contact one. 688 F.2d at 601 and n.2.
804. Id at 601.
805. Id at 602. Additionally, Couch claimed that because his detention was based on an
informant's tip, the warrant should have been prepared prior to his arrival at the airport. Id.
at 603. The court dismissed this claim because it was not convinced that preparing a war-
rant ahead of time would have been preferable. Id at 603-04. Some of the informant's tips
could not be verified until Couch actually arrived in Los Angeles. Further, Couch may have
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tinction previously made by the Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New
York" 6 between brief investigative stops and custodial interrogations
which trigger the probable cause requirement. The Ninth Circuit did
not find this distinction controlling. Couch's detention was for the pur-
pose of obtaining a search warrant, whereas the arrests that concerned
the Supreme Court in Dunaway were ones in which suspects were de-
tained for the explicit purpose of eliciting information. 0 7 Instead, the
court used an analysis similar to that employed in United States v.
Faherty.808 Because government agents are given broad discretion at
borders,80 9 the standard applied must be that which has been devel-
oped specifically for border searches.810
In Couch, the original search of the defendant's person and lug-
gage revealed nothing. Therefore, the defendant claimed that he was
detained in order for the officers to obtain additional evidence before
the warrant was issued rather than merely to await the administrative
details associated with procuring a warrant.1
The court did not agree that Couch's detention was unreasonable
even though the earlier search had produced no evidence of smug-
gling.8312 The court found that Couch's detention was reasonable in
light of the border search standard previously established.1 3 The court
acknowledged that a detention pending a warrant would be more rea-
sonable if the initial search had produced evidence of smuggling.81 4
changed his plans or perhaps consented to the x-ray search, which would have made a war-
rant unnecessary. Id. at 604.
806. Couch cited Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), in which a suspect had
been detained at the police station for interrogation. The Court held that this type of custo-
dial interrogation was illegal as it was an arrest without probable cause. Id at 212-13.
807. "Dunaway stressed that the objectionable feature of the suspect's detention was cus-
todial interrogation . . . ." 688 F.2d at 602.
808. 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982).
809. See supra text accompanying note 782.
810. 688 F.2d at 602. This special standard was developed and applied by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980). In Erwin, the court held that
a detention was reasonable where the purpose of the detention was to obtain a search war-
rant. Erwin had been detained by customs agents who had become suspicious after observ-
ing her restricted body movements. Her baggage was searched and evidence was found
which indicated body cavity smuggling. Id at 840. Erwin refused to give her permission for
a strip search and was detained while an order was prepared. Id
811. 688 F.2d at 603.
812. This holding is consistent with its holding in Faherty, where the initial search was
also unproductive. See text accompanying note 785.
813. 688 F.2d at 603.
814. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, where "items" found in defendant's suitcase led
customs agents to believe defendant was attempting to smuggle something in a body cavity.
625 F.2d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 1980).
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However, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to give Couch more protec-
tion simply because his method of concealment, swallowing the cap-
sules, was more effective than other smuggling methods.
1 5
In the prior cases, the defendants were detained as they entered
the United States from a drug source country. In the following case,
the borders crossed by the defendant were only state borders, not inter-
national. Had the defendant entered from a foreign country, the analy-
sis applied in Faherty and Couch would be appropriate.
In United States v. Prim,8 16 the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court's ruling8 17 and held that a detention was unconstitutional where
agents continued to hold the defendant, without probable cause, after
he refused to consent to a search.818
Prim had been initially observed at Portland International Airport
by DEA agents whose suspicions were aroused by Prim's furtive behav-
ior. Following his departure on a plane bound for Hawaii, the agents
checked and found Prim's name mentioned in a 1979 drug investiga-
tion. This information was communicated to agents in Hawaii and
Prim was detained shortly after he deplaned in Hawaii. 819 The Hawai-
ian agents also had knowledge, communicated to them by agents in
Portland, of an outstanding nonsupport warrant for Prim. However,
no mention of the warrant was made to Prim when he was stopped.
820
Prim did not question the validity of the initial detention.82 He
was asked to accompany the agents and was then led to the DEA of-
fice.8 22 However, shortly after arriving at the office, Prim was moved to
an adjoining interrogation room where he twice refused to consent to a
search. Following Prim's refusals, he was ordered to empty his pockets
whereupon an agent performed a pat-down search for weapons. The
agent felt an envelope, later found to contain cocaine, and directed the
815. 688 F.2d at 603.
816. 698 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1983).
817. The defendant was convicted for possession of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 844 (1981). See supra note 786 for statutory language.
818. 698 F.2d at 977.
819. Id at 973-74.
820. Id at 974. The agents in Hawaii testified that, although they were aware of the
warrant, the reason they detained the defendant was their suspicion of his trafficking in
narcotics.
The Ninth Circuit disapproved of the trial court's reliance on the warrant as justifica-
tion for probable cause to arrest. It believed that this was after the fact justification because
the nonsupport warrant was not the cause of the officers' actions. The Ninth Circuit stated
that "[s]uch pretextual use to justify an arrest or search has been clearly recognized as viola-
tive of the fourth amendment." Id at 975.
821. Id
822. Id at 974.
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defendant to remove it. The defendant removed the envelope from his
pocket and placed it on the table.823
Unlike FaherI12 4 and Couch,825 the purpose of relocating Prim to
the interrogation room was not to obtain a search warrant. One of the
arresting officers testified that the true purpose was for interrogation
and to obtain Prim's consent to a search.
826
The district court found that Prim had not voluntarily consented
to accompany the agents to the DEA office. Therefore, the court re-
jected the government's argument that because Prim initially agreed to
accompany the officers to the office, the relocation should not constitute
an arrest.8 27
Because consent was lacking, the Ninth Circuit relied on the stan-
dard set in Dunaway v. New York,8 2 8 where a detention for the purpose
of custodial interrogation was held to violate the fourth amendment
protections against illegal arrest.8 29 The Ninth Circuit held that when
officers continued to detain Prim after his refusal to give his consent for
a search, it was a custodial interrogation requiring probable cause.83°
The evidence obtained from the pat-down search was therefore tainted
by the illegal arrest and could not be admitted.83'
823. Id. The court found that the purpose of the pat-down search was not in fact to
search for weapons, but rather to search for narcotics because none of the arresting officers
suspected that Prim was armed. If the agents had suspected that Prim was armed, a pat-
down search should have been conducted immediately upon coming into contact with Prim.
Id. at 977. Therefore, the court held that the pat-down search exceeded the "permissible
scope of a weapons search" and that the envelope should be suppressed. Id.
824. 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982).
825. 688 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982).
826. 698 F.2d at 974.
827. Id. at 975-76. The government cited United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980), where a passenger was relocated to a DEA office following an initial stop as she
deplaned. The Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers. As there was no finding of consent
in Prim, Mendenhall was not appropriate where "the Court was not addressing the issue of
whether there was sufficient cause for the relocation, absent consent." 698 F.2d at 976.
828. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See supra note 806.
829. 442 U.S. at 216.
830. 698 F.2d at 977. See also United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir.
1979) (officers, wishing to question suspect, detained him for twenty minutes in the back of a
police car;, found to be a custodial interrogation).
831. 698 F.2d at 977.
In his concurrence, Judge Hug agreed with the majority's finding that the detention was
a custodial interrogation without probable cause and, therefore, the evidence was illegally
obtained. Id at 978 (Hug, J., concurring). Judge Hug also rejected an after-the-fact justifi-
cation for the search based upon the nonsupport warrant. Id (Hug, J., concurring). Judge
Alarcon, in his dissent, agreed with the district court's finding that the outstanding nonsup-
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3. Arrests
Law enforcement officers may arrest suspects without a warrant, if
at the time of the arrest, the arrest is supported by probable cause.A32
Probable cause will exist if, at the time the stop is made, the officers
have within their knowledge reasonably trustworthy information, to-
gether with facts and circumstances which would justify a "prudent
man" in believing that the arrestee was involved in a crime. 33 The
following cases presented situations where initial stops were made prior
to an arrest. The defendants in these cases claimed that an actual arrest
was made illegally, in that it was made without probable cause. 34
In United States v. Lomas,s35 the Ninth Circuit held that the facts
supported a finding of probable cause in an arrest of two defendants
following a drug investigation.836 In Lomas, the defendants were ar-
rested after drug enforcement officers observed them in the vicinity of a
car known to have been used in a drug conspiracy. 837 The car had been
rented by one of the defendants and had been followed by officers to its
final destination at the bank where the defendants were arrested.
838
Based on the agents' belief that the defendants were canvassing the
area around the bank looking for the presence of police officers, and
the belief that the defendants were connected with the car, the court
found that there was probable cause to arrest.8 39 The court also consid-
ered the agents' belief840 that one of the defendants was checking the
dashboard of an unmarked DEA car to see if it had the type of radio
port warrant was sufficient to justify probable cause for the detention. Id. at 978-79 (Alar-
con, J., dissenting).
832. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975).
833. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
834. "Founded suspicion may ripen into probable cause to arrest ... through the occur-
rence of after-the-stop facts and incidents." United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299,
1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
835. 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984).
836. Id at 895.
837. Id. at 889.
838. On the day of the arrest, the defendants had driven the car to the Hilton Inn where a
briefcase was removed from the truck by another individual suspected of involvement in the
drug deal. Two males were then observed in the car as it followed other suspects in a van as
it proceeded to the bank. Id. at 899.
839. Id at 892.
840. The court stressed that the beliefs of experienced agents must be weighed differently
than those of the "ordinary lay person." Id What appears innocent to the inexperienced
eye may carry an "entirely different [message] to the ... trained observer." Id (quoting
United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted)). See also
United States v. Thornton, 710 F.2d 513, 515 (9th Cir. 1983) ("An officer's experience may
be considered in determining probable cause.").
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usually identified with law enforcement. 841 The court held that these
observations and beliefs were sufficient to justify a "prudent man's"
belief that these defendants were involved in the crimes under
investigation.
842
In United States v. Thornton,8 43 the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower
court ruling that a police officer had probable cause to arrest where
observations by the officer led him to believe that the defendant was in
violation of the Idaho concealed weapons statute.844 In Thornton, the
arresting officer approached the defendant's car which was parked par-
tially blocking a traffic lane.845 Upon reaching the car, the officer
found the defendant apparently asleep or unconscious behind the
wheel and observed eight inches of the altered stock of a gun sticking
out from beneath the front seat of the car.846
The defendant argued that probable cause to arrest did not exist
under the concealed weapons statute since the stock of the gun was in
plain view.8 47 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's inter-
pretation of Idaho law. The district court had held that, because a gun
stock need not be part of a gun, a gun could be concealed even if the
stock were visible.848 The Ninth Circuit held that an officer could also
reasonably conclude that Idaho law would be violated where a gun was
being carried with just its stock visible.
8 49
Finally, the district court found that the officers were warranted in
their belief that a gun was present by the amount of the gun stock
which was visible.850 The Ninth Circuit held that, considering the ex-
perience of the officer, his belief that the statute was being violated was
sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest.85" '
841. 706 F.2d at 892.
842. Id.
843. 710 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1983).
844. Id. at 515. IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (1979) states in pertinent part: "If any person
• . . shall carry concealed upon or about his person, any... gun... within the limits or
confines of any city.., or on public highways within the state of Idaho; . . . he shall, upon
conviction, be punished .
845. 710 F.2d at 514.
846. Id
847. Id. at 515.
848. Id. The court also disagreed with the defendant's argument that because the officer
did not specifically know that defendant illegally possessed the gun, the officer lacked prob-
able cause to arrest. Id The court stated that "[pirobable cause does not require specific




851. Id See supra note 840.
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4. Exceptions to the probable cause requirement
The United States Supreme Court has carved out an exception to
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrests where legitimate
government interests outweigh the public's expectation of privacy.
8 5 2
Law enforcement personnel have often attempted to apply this excep-
tion in cases involving the stopping of automobiles.853
In United States v. Munoz,85 4 the Ninth Circuit applied the
Supreme Court's balancing test but did not find an exception to the
probable cause requirement where patrols were stopping all vehicles
within an area of a national park. In Munoz, a roving patrol routinely
stopped the defendant's truck to check compliance with woodcutting
regulations. Subsequently, the patrol officers discovered that the de-
fendant had in his possession a dead golden eagle in violation of the
Eagle Protection Act.8 -5 The court held that these roving vehicle stops
violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights and reversed his
conviction.
856
In reversing the conviction, the court balanced the government's
interest in park management and resource preservation against the
public's interest in freedom from unreasonable intrusions by the gov-
ernment.857 In weighing the public's right to privacy, the court consid-
ered both objective and subjective intrusions by the government.8 8
Objectively, the court found the intrusion only slight,85 9 because the
invasion caused by the stop, questioning, and visual inspection was
minimal. However, the court found the subjective intrusion, the gener-
852. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
853. Id. at 653-55 (policeman stopped automobile to check driver's license and car regis-
tration, subsequently discovered marijuana). See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 875 (1975) (border patrol stopped automobile because "three occupants appeared
to be of Mexican descent," and subsequently discovered respondent was transporting two
illegal aliens).
In both Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse, the Supreme Court found the exception inapplica-
ble. The Court was "not convinced that the legitimate needs of law enforcement require
[that] degree of interference with lawful traffic." Id at 883.
854. 701 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983).
855. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1976) states in pertinent part: "Whoever, . . . without being
permitted to do so.. . shall knowingly. . . possess. . . any golden eagle. . . shall be fined
• . . or imprisoned. .. ."
856. 701 F.2d at 1301.
857. Id at 1297-301.
858. Id. at 1297 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1979); United States v.
Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 767 (9th Cir.) (subjective intrusion not unduly burdensome as Coast
Guard took steps to reduce concern or fright before boarding ship), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1038 (1982)).
859. Id (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) ("The intrusion
is modest.")).
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ation of fright and apprehension on the part of the traveler, too great to
subordinate to the governmental interest.
860
The government argued that the privacy interest held by persons
visiting national parks is similar to the privacy interest held by persons
involved in "pervasively-regulated industries."86' The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument for several reasons. First, part of the purpose
envisioned by Congress when establishing national parks was to pre-
serve a peaceful and reflective setting for the public.862 Second, war-
rantless intrusions of this type must be expressly authorized by
statute.8 63 Lastly, while the purpose of intrusions into regulated indus-
tries is to correct or prevent conditions which may be harmful, the stop
of Munoz's truck was to detect the possibility of criminal activity. 8 4
The court concluded that the anxiety produced by the roving stops in-
creased the subjective intrusion felt by the public beyond the level
which could be justified by any governmental interest.
8 65
In balancing the government's interest, the court noted that there
were alternatives available which would be less intrusive. For exam-
ple, questionnaires could be distributed at the entrances and exits of
parks.8 66 The court was also not convinced that the government's pri-
mary interests were served at all by the roving patrol.8 67 The court held
that because the primary purpose of the stop was to detect criminal
activity, the stop "must be based on individualized suspicion."
8 68
Although the exception for "pervasively-regulated" industries substi-
tutes for probable cause in some situations, a national park is not such
an industry. Where the governmental interest is to protect the national
860. Id at 1301.
861. Id. at 1297. In such industries, the subjective intrusion is slight. See, e.g., Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) where the warrantless search of a mine was upheld
because the mine was part of the heavily regulated mining industry. The Court stated that
"[t]he greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the
fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such
property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home." Id at 598.
862. 701 F.2d at 1298.
863. Id. at 1299 (citing Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104
S. Ct. 3536 (1984)).
864. Id at 1300.
865. Id The court stated this to be true regardless of whether the stops were randomly or
universally applied.
866. Id Although questionnaires may not give information of park misuse, witnesses
often will report misuseAhey observe.
867. Id. at 1301.
868. Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) ("officers on
roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts. . . that
reasonably warrant suspicion")).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that a warrantless
seizure of an automobile is not unreasonable if: (1) there is probable
cause that the automobile is being used for illegal purposes; and
(2) there are circumstances surrounding the seizure which make it im-
practical to obtain a warrant beforehand.870 This exception also ex-
tends to vehicles other than automobiles.87'
In United States v. Spetz,172 the Ninth Circuit was presented with
the warrantless seizures of a Mercedes and a Datsun pickup truck. 73
869. Id. Although Munoz's conviction was reversed, the court did express its dislike for
this particular defendant. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit quoted Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
where he said:
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently
been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are
concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context
of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment.
870. United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 287 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). These cases are exceptions to the general rule that
warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
871. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (besides automobiles, the excep-
tion embraces ships, motor boats and wagons).
872. 721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983).
873. The seizure of a Mercedes was also at issue in United States v. One 1977 Mercedes
Benz, 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983). The owner of the automobile claimed that the car was
illegally seized in connection with a drug investigation. The day before the seizure, the car
had been searched and cocaine found. Id. at 446. The owner was not the driver at the time
the cocaine was discovered. A warrant was issued for seizure of the car based on two pre-
sentencing reports from prior prosecutions prepared regarding the driver of the vehicle. The
car's owner claimed that these reports were illegally obtained and, therefore, the seizure of
the Mercedes was tainted. Id at 450.
The court held that an illegal seizure by itself does not protect the car from forfeiture.
The Ninth Circuit stated "that forfeiture may proceed if the Government can satisfy the
requirements for forfeiture with untainted evidence." Id. Since the cocaine was not seized
in violation of the owner's fourth amendment rights, the court did not need to decide if the
owner's claim had merit. Here, the cocaine was "sufficient untainted evidence to establish
probable cause for forfeiture of the automobile." Id
The owner also contended that the court lacked jurisdiction where the jurisdiction is
based on improperly seized property. Id The court rejected this argument citing United
States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
In the Harley-Davidson case, the Ninth Circuit had previously held that there is no validity
to the argument that "an object illegally seized cannot in any way be used. . . as the basis
for an in rem jurisdiction." Id at 351.
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Both vehicles were seized in conjunction with an investigation by the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
The Mercedes was first spotted by DEA agents who were stationed
at a freight terminal waiting to see who would arrive to claim a pack-
age known to contain marijuana. A beeper was planted in the package
and would go off if the package was opened. 74 Defendant Gulino ar-
rived at the terminal in the Mercedes. A Ford truck driven by a hired
driver arrived simultaneously. The package was loaded into the Ford.
The vehicles had traveled approximately thirty-five miles when Gulino
parked the Mercedes and joined the driver of the Ford. They then pro-
ceeded to a residence approximately two miles further down the street.
Before Gulino got into the truck, he placed a briefcase in the trunk of
the Mercedes. 75
The DEA agents had watched the residence for about one-half
hour when the beeper was triggered. The agents moved in to make the
arrests. Defendant Spetz was spotted attempting to get away in a Dat-
sun truck which had been parked next to the Ford truck containing the
marijuana. The Datsun was stopped and Spetz was arrested. Gulino
was also arrested on the scene.
76
Following the arrests, the agents obtained the keys to the Mercedes
from Gulino, having previously told him that the car was to be for-
feited. The briefcase was removed from the trunk for "safekeeping"
and the car was taken to a DEA office.
877
Later that same evening, when the agents returned to the house
with a search warrant, they also returned with the keys to the Datsun
truck which they had obtained from Spetz. Spetz had been identified
as the owner of the truck. When the truck was seized, a "bulging tar-
paulin" that agents had observed earlier in the back of the truck8 78 was
removed and 400 pounds of marijuana was discovered.
8 79
Spetz and Gulino appealed their convictions of conspiring to dis-
tribute and of possessing marijuana.8 80 They argued that the district
874. 721 F.2d at 1461. The contents of the package had been established several days
earlier pursuant to a valid search warrant. The beeper placed in the package "beeps once
every five seconds until disturbed at which point it beeps more rapidly." Id. at n.8.
875. Id. at 1462.
876. Id.
877. Id. at 1463.
878. Id. at 1462.
879. Id at 1463.
880. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Any person who. . . conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable ....
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) states in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any
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court had erred when it denied their motions to suppress the evidence
found in the back of the Datsun and in the briefcase found in the trunk
of the Mercedes.88'
Gulino contended that the forfeiture of the Mercedes was illegal
because the car was seized without a warrant. The Mercedes was
seized pursuant to Title 21, section 881(a)(4) of the United States
Code882 which allows the government to seize vehicles suspected of
transporting drugs. Under subsection (b)(4) of section 881, the seizure
of the property to be forfeited must be accompanied by a warrant ex-
cept where there is probable cause to believe that the property has been
involved in illegal activity.
883
After noting the differing ways in which other circuits handle the
warrant provision of section 881(b)(4), 884 the Ninth Circuit held that
section 88 l(b)(4) seizures are governed by the constitutional standard
requiring a warrant. 885 If conducted without a warrant, the seizure is
"per se unreasonable." However, there are specific exceptions to this
rule.
886
Accordingly, the government claimed that the seizure of the Mer-
cedes fell under the automobile exception found in Carroll v. United
States.8 87 The government based their claim on the fact that the DEA
agents had no prior knowledge regarding the Mercedes and also be-
cause the car was parked on a public thoroughfare and could have been
driven away by an accomplice of the defendant without much diffi-
culty.888 The Ninth Circuit did not agree.88 9 It noted that in a recent
person knowingly or intentionally to ... possess with intent to ... distribute. . . a con-
trolled substance."
881. 721 F.2d at 1461. They also sought to suppress evidence seized when DEA agents
searched the residence.
882. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1976) states in pertinent part: "The following shall be subject
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them ... [a]Ul...
vehicles ... which are used ... to transport [controlled substances]."
883. 721 F.2d at 1469 n.19 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1976)). Section 881(b)(4)
states in pertinent part: "[Sleizure without such process may be made when-the Attorney
General has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be
used in violation of this subchapter." 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1976).
884. 721 F.2d at 1469. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981) (war-
rantless seizure permitted on probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances).
885. In Spetz, the court stated that "[a]lthough automobiles are inherently mobile, '[t]he
word "automobile"is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears."' 721 F.2d at 1471 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
461-62 (1971)).
886. Id at 1470 (citing United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) where
the court found these same principles applicable to a similar forfeiture statute).
887. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
888. 721 F.2d at 1470.
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Supreme Court case, 9 ° the Court had restated the reasoning behind
the automobile exception.8 91 Following this reasoning, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the applicability of the exception is found most fre-
quently in a situation where a moving automobile is detained and there
is probable cause to suspect that there is contraband contained
within.
8 92
The court found neither of the two factors present in the seizure of
the Mercedes.8 93 The Mercedes was parked at the time of the seizure
and there were no exigent circumstances present which would make
agents believe that anyone other than Gulino, who was already in cus-
tody, would move the car.894 Second, there was no reason for agents to
believe that the car contained any contraband. 95 The only thing that
agents had observed was a briefcase being placed in the trunk.
As to the Datsun truck, Spetz argued that the agents lacked the
probable cause required for a forfeiture under section 881(b)(4) when
the vehicle was seized.896 The court did not agree. Under the exception
found by the Supreme Court, the Datsun could be forfeited without a
warrant if there was probable cause to believe that contraband was be-
ing carried in the Datsun. 97 The court found probable cause present
here. The truck was of a type which could transport contraband.
Although that alone is not sufficient for a forfeiture, this truck was near
an area where marijuana had been present, the tarpaulin could reason-
ably be thought to be concealing contraband, and Spetz had fled in the
truck when he spotted the DEA agents.8 98 These factors provided the
probable cause.8 99
Spetz also argued that even if probable cause did exist, there were
889. Id.
890. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
891. In Ross, the Court stated:
Thus, since its early days Congress had recognized the impracticability of securing
a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods. It is this im-
practicability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the basis for the Car-
roll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized
that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile is not unreasonable.
Id. at 806-07.
892. 721 F.2d at 1471.
893. Id.
894. Id. at 1472.
895. Id. at 1472-73.
896. Id. at 1474. See supra note 883.
897. 721 F.2d at 1474. See supra note 887.
898. 721 F.2d at 1475.
899. Id.
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no exigent circumstances present which would justify a warrantless
seizure of the truck.9"' Here, the Ninth Circuit stated that the automo-
bile exception did apply.9 1 The court found the two factors necessary
for the application of the auto exception.902 The agents had probable
cause to believe that there was contraband contained in the Datsun
truck, and the vehicle was "in transit" when seized by the agents.
90 3
Therefore, the court held that the warrantless forfeiture seizure was
valid, and the subsequent search, which turned up over 400 pounds of
marijuana, was lawful.
2. Ships
In United States v. Ka ,o Maru No. 53,1o the Ninth Circuit held
that a warrantless seizure of a tuna boat met the requirements of the
Carroll exception.90 5 The boat had been seized by the United States
Coast Guard after a routine investigation exposed an illegal harvest.
The court found the first factor of the Carroll exception present where
the Coast Guard had direct knowledge of the illegal use.906 The second
factor, exigent circumstances, was found in the fact that it would have
been unreasonable to have the Coast Guard stay on board the boat
awaiting a warrant when the other occupants of the boat were "poten-
tially hostile."9 7 The court likened the tuna boat to an automobile
which was still playing an active part in the unlawful activity when it
was seized on a public roadway. 90 8
900. Id
901. Id
902. See supra text accompanying note 892.
903. 721 F.2d at 1475. See supra text accompanying note 898.
904. 699 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1983).
905. Id. at 998.
906. Id The Coast Guard boarded the boat pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1861(b) of the FISH-
ERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT Acr of 1976. Under the Act, any authorized of-
ficer may board, search and seize any fishing boat where it reasonably appears that the boat
is used in a manner which violates the Act. This may be done "with or without a warrant."
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that Congress intended that "rou-
tine warrantless inspections or search and seizures [be] part of the enforcement scheme of
the Act." The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to determine if this intention violated the fourth
amendment. Id at 993-94.
907. Id at 998.
908. Id (citing United States v. Kimak, 624 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court distin-
guished Kaio Maru from United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) where
the seized automobile had been parked unused on a street for over two months. 699 F.2d at
997.
Following the seizure, an arrest warrant was issued promptly for the boat pursuant to
FED. R. CIv. P. C (Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims) which
states in pertinent part: "Upon a filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a
[Vol. 18
CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
F Fruits of the Poisonous Tree
The "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine provides that secondary
evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights is inadmissible. 90 9 However, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized certain exceptions to the doctrine. If evidence is obtained from
two sources, only one of which was related to the original constitutional
violation, the evidence is admissible under the "independent source"
exception.910 Evidence which would have been discovered by constitu-
tionally approved methods had it not been first obtained through un-
lawful means is admissible under the "inevitable discovery"
exception.91' Lastly, if sufficient factors intervene between the original
illegality and the discovery of the evidence, the evidence is admissible
under the "purged taint" exception, even though the evidence would
not have been obtained "but for" the illegality.912
warrant for the arrest of the vessel. . . .No notice other than the execution of the process
is required."
Defendants claimed that the prompt issuance of the arrest warrant was unnecessary
where the boat was already in the government's possession and therefore their due process
rights to pre-arrest notice or hearing were violated. 699 F.2d at 999. The Ninth Circuit
agreed that the "need for prompt action did not exist," but held that since the boat had
already been seized, there was no further deprivation of property in violation of the defend-
ants' due process rights. Id.
909. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
In Silverthorne, federal officers illegally seized and photographed documents belonging
to a lumber company for use in a grand jury investigation. A federal court ordered the
originals returned, but impounded the photographs. A subpoena was then issued to regain
the originals. Id. at 390-9 1.
The Supreme Court held that the lumber company need not comply with the subpoena
because it was issued on the basis of knowledge obtained by the illegal seizure of the origi-
nals. .d. at 391. The Court stated the rule prohibiting the unlawful acquisition of evidence
not only requires that evidence so acquired may not be used in court, but that it may not be
used at all. Id. at 392.
910. Id. The Silverlhorne Court stated that facts obtained through illegal means do not
become "sacred and inaccessible." Id. Therefore, evidence of these facts is admissible if
also obtained from an independent source. Id.
911. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407-08 n.12 (1977). In Brewer, the Court ruled
that the police had unlawfully elicited the location of a murder victim's body from the de-
fendant. Id. at 404. The Court observed, however, that evidence of where the body was
found and the condition it was in might be admissible on retrial, based on the theory that the
body would have been discovered in any event. Id. at 407-08 n.12.
912. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents, acting on an informant's tip, broke into the
home of Toy, the proprietor of a laundry. A search of the premises did not yield any narcot-
ics. Toy denied knowledge of any drug trafficking activities; however, he accused Yee of
selling narcotics. When the authorities confronted Yee, he surrendered heroin to them and
identified Wong Sun as the person who sold him the drug. A search of Wong Sun's home
again yielded no narcotics. Id. at 473-75.
All three suspects were subsequently released on their own recognizance after being
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In United States v. Lopez-Martinez,"3 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether evidence of a statement made by the defendant following
an alleged illegal arrest was admissible in subsequent proceedings on
an unrelated offense.914 Defendant Lopez-Martinez was arrested on
charges of importing and possessing a package of heroin with intent to
distribute. The defendant waived his Miranda rights,915 and informed
border patrol agents that he had been offered $1,000 to transport the
package across the border. Lopez-Martinez claimed he was not aware
of the contents of the package, but had suspected it might contain mari-
juana.91 6 To refute this defense, the government introduced evidence
of a statement the defendant had made to a Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) agent in 1974 while under arrest for possession of ma-
rijuana with intent to distribute. Despite Lopez-Martinez's objection,
the agent testified that, at the time of the 1974 arrest, the defendant told
him he was paid $1,000 for driving two vehicles containing 680 pounds
of marijuana from Mexico to Arizona.
917
arraigned. Wong Sun, Yee and Toy were all quesioned by federal narcotics agents a few
days later after each had been advised of his rights. Both Toy and Wong Sun made confes-
sions. Id at 476-77.
At trial, the government submitted into evidence Toy's statements made at the time of
the break-in, the heroin surrendered by Yee, and Wong Sun's and Toy's confessions. The
defendants moved to suppress the evidence as fruits of the unlawful arrests and attendant
searches, but the trial court denied the motion. Id. at 477. Both Toy and Wong Sun were
convicted of knowingly transporting and concealing illegally imported heroin. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the convictions and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 473.
The Court held that Toy's statements, made immediately after the federal agents in-
vaded his home, could not be used against him because they constituted a fruit of the illegal
break-in, stating Toy's decision to speak was not a sufficient intervening act of free will to
purge the taint of the unlawful invasion of Toy's home. Id. at 484-86. The Court concluded
its opinion by ruling that, although Wong Sun's arrest was without probable cause, his con-
fession was voluntarily made several days after his release. As a result, the connection be-
tween his unlawful arrest and his confession had "'become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint,"' thereby justifying its admission. Id at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
913. 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1983).
914. Id. at 475-76.
915. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court stated that proce-
dural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Prior
to questioning, a suspect must be advised that (1) he has the right to remain silent, (2) any-
thing he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed prior to question-
ing if he so desires. Id at 444.
916. 725 F.2d at 472.
917. Id The Ninth Circuit observed that having previously been paid $1,000 to transport
680 pounds of marijuana across the border in 1974, Lopez-Martinez could not possibly have
believed he was being paid the same amount to smuggle a mere pound and a half of the
same substance. Therefore, the jury could reasonably infer the defendant must have known
he was carrying a drug worth considerably more than a pound of marijuana. .d. at 475.
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On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial judge erred in
admitting the DEA agent's testimony without a hearing to determine
whether the stop that led to his 1974 arrest was illegal. 918 The Ninth
Circuit stated that the exclusionary rule " 'has never been interpreted to
proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons,' "919 and application of the rule is unwarranted
when it does not result in considerable deterrence of police miscon-
duct.920 Noting the absence of collusion or bad faith on the part of the
arresting officers,921 the court held that the trial judge had not erred in
admitting the DEA agent's testimony because the measure of deter-
rence provided by exclusion of the statements made by Lopez-Martinez
at his 1974 arrest did not outweigh the cost to society resulting from the
loss of relevant and probative evidence in the 1982 trial.
922
In United States v. Garcia-Nunez,923 the Ninth Circuit addressed
the novel issue of whether the guilt of a co-conspirator may be attrib-
uted to another defendant in order to establish a charge of aiding and
abetting when the evidence supporting the co-conspirator's conviction
was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.92 4
Police officers placed defendant Benson's home under surveillance be-
cause they suspected the house was being used in a scheme to smuggle
undocumented aliens. After a short period of time, a few men left the
house and drove away. An officer stopped the car and the passengers
admitted they were in the United States illegally. Police officers then
searched Benson's home and discovered several undocumented aliens,
918. Id. at 476. The government argued Lopez-Martinez had waived any claim concern-
ing the legality of the 1974 arrest when he pled guilty in the subsequent trial. Id In addi-
tion, the government argued Lopez-Martinez was collaterally estopped from challenging the
legality of the arrest. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not consider either argument because Lo-
pez-Martinez was challenging only the legality of the stop,.an issue which was not deter-
mined in the 1974 proceeding. Id
919. Id (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (use of exclusionary
rule confined to situations where the government seeks to use illegally obtained evidence to
incriminate victim of the unlawful search)).
920. Id. (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (minimal likelihood of
deterrence of state police misconduct does not justify exclusion of evidence from federal
civil proceedings that was illegally seized by state law enforcement officials)).
921. Id. The court stated that because eight years separated the two arrests, and use of
the defendant's unlawfully obtained statement in the present proceedings could not possibly
have been foreseen by the arresting agents in 1974, the 1982 trial against Lopez-Martinez
was not within the agents' "'zone of primary interest.'" Id. See United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 458 (1976); Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 311 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1014 (1983).
922. 725 F.2d at 476.
923. 709 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1983).
924. Id. at 562.
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including Medina.925
Benson was charged with conspiring to conceal
926 and transport 927
undocumented aliens, harboring Medina,9 28 and aiding and abetting a
co-conspirator in transporting Medina.9 29  The district court granted
Benson's motion to suppress Medina's testimony, ruling it was a fruit of
the illegal search of Benson's home and was thus inadmissible against
Benson.930 Benson was acquitted of harboring Medina, but was con-
victed of conspiracy and aiding and abetting.93'
On appeal, Benson contended that sufficient evidence did not exist
to support his conviction for aiding and abetting.932 The prosecution,
on the other hand, argued Benson was vicariously liable for the trans-
portation of the undocumented aliens because it was an act by his co-
conspirator in furtherance of the smuggling conspiracy.
933
925. Id at 560-61.
926. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire.. . to commit any offense against the United
States. . . or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
927. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any person. . . who (1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any
means of transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another,
to bring into or land in the United States, by any means of transportation or other-
wise; (2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing
or having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States
occurred less than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to
transport or move, within the United States by means of transportation or other-
wise, in furtherance of such violation of law; (3) willfully or knowingly conceals,
harbors, or shields from detection,. . . in any place, including any building or any
means of transportation. . . any alien . . not duly admitted by an immigration
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States. . . shall
be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both,
for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs.
928. Defendant Benson was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3). See supra note
927.
929. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) provides that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal."
930. 709 F.2d at 561.
931. I1d
932. Id at 562.
933. Id (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-47 (1945) (party to a contin-
uing conspiracy may be responsible for substantive offenses of co-conspirator committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy absent participation in, or knowledge of, the co-conspirator's
acts); United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979) (while part of the conspir-
acy, each conspirator is responsible for his co-conspirator's acts committed in furtherance
thereof)). The court noted evidence supporting guilt of the principal offense may be used to
convict co-conspirators charged with aiding and abetting. 709 F.2d at 562 (citing United
States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 95-97 (3d Cir. 1973) (evidence demonstrating defendant was
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The appellate court noted that the co-conspirator's conviction was
supported solely by evidence gathered in violation of Benson's fourth
amendment rights.9 34 In reversing Benson's conviction on the aiding
and abetting charge, 935 the Ninth Circuit held the connection between
the illegal search of Benson's home and the use of the co-conspirator's
conviction was not so attenuated as to remove the taint of the unlawful
search.936 The court reasoned that use of the illegally obtained evi-
dence against Benson was not only foreseeable, but intentional as
well.9 3 7 Moreover, the court reasoned that attributing the guilt of the
co-conspirator, who lacked standing to object to the use of the illegally
obtained evidence, to Benson would eliminate the deterrence function
the principal, not the aider and abettor in the crime charged, does not constitute an amend-
ment of the indictment for aiding and abetting); United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1235
(5th Cir. 1972) (jury had authority to find defendant guilty as a principal even though he was
only indicted on charges of aiding and abetting)).
934. 709 F.2d at 562. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
935. 709 F.2d at 562.
936. Id. (citing United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); United States v. Duncan,
570 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1979)).
In Ceccolini a police officer was in the defendant's flower shop conversing with one of
the employees when he noticed an envelope with money protruding from it lying on the cash
register. Upon closer examination, the officer discovered the envelope also contained bet-
ting slips. The employee informed the officer that the envelope belonged to the defendant.
The police officer reported his findings to local detectives and the FBI. Four months later,
FBI agents questioned the employee without referring to the earlier incident in the flower
shop. After another six months, the defendant was summoned before a federal grand jury
where he testified he had never taken bets at the shop. The employee, however, testified to
the contrary, and the defendant was subsequently found guilty of perjury. United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 269-72 (1978).
The district court then granted the defendant's motion to suppress the employee's testi-
mony because "she 'first came directly to the attention of the government as a result of an
illegal search"' and the government had not sustained its burden of proving the employee's
testimony would have been obtained from a source independent of the illegal search. Sup-
pression of the employee's testimony was affirmed by the Second Circuit. Id at 272-73.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the degree of attenuation between the illegal
search and the flower shop employee's testimony at trial was sufficient to dissipate the taint
of the illegal search. Id at 279-80. The Court noted that the employee's testimony was
clearly an act of her own free will which was in no way coerced .or induced by police offi-
cials. Id at 279. In addition, a substantial amount of time had passed between the illegal
search and both the initial contact with the witness by police officials and the witness' testi-
mony at trial. Id. The Court concluded its opinion by observing that there was no evidence
that the police had made the unlawful search with the intent of finding physical evidence
bearing on an illegal gambling operation or a witness willing to testify against the defendant.
Thus, application of the exclusionary rule would not serve as a deterrent. Id. at 279-80.
937. 709 F.2d at 562.
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of the exclusionary rule in future conspiracy cases.938
When a confession is the fruit of an illegal search or seizure, the
giving of Miranda warnings, while significant, is not sufficient to estab-
lish that the confession was an exercise of free will, thereby breaking
the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. 93 9 The
court must also consider the purpose and flagrancy of the police mis-
conduct, the length of time between the unlawful police conduct and
the confession, and the presence of intervening circumstances. 4 °
In United States v. Manuel,941 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the defendant's confession, made the day after he was arrested,
was tainted because the police had prematurely ordered his arrest.94 2
While investigating a stabbing incident, a Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agent learned that defendant Manuel had admitted his part in the
murder of an individual whose body had been found on the Salt River
Indian Reservation earlier that same day. The FBI shared this infor-
mation with the tribal police who went to the defendant's home the
next day to question him. The sequence of events that followed was
disputed at trial.
943
The government contended the FBI and the tribal police inter-
viewed members of the defendant's family who claimed to have been
eyewitnesses to the killing, and found evidence at the scene which cor-
roborated the witnesses' stories. They subsequently located Manuel
and placed him under arrest. The defendant, on the other hand,
claimed his arrest was ordered as soon as the FBI and the tribal police
938. Id.
939. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
In Brown, two detectives broke into defendant Brown's apartment, searched it, and then
arrested Brown without a warrant and without probable cause. The officers took him to the
police station where the defendant subsequently made an inculpatory statement concerning
a murder after having been read his Miranda rights. The defendant repeated his confession
when interrogated five hours later. The trial court denied Brown's motion to suppress the
statements, and his trial resulted in a murder conviction. Id at 592-96.
The Supreme Court held the receipt of Miranda warnings, per se, did not make the
defendant's inculpatory statements admissible. Id at 603. The Court noted that Brown's
arrest was investigatory and the manner in which it was executed indicated it was "calcu-
lated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion." Id. at 605. The Court further observed that
less than two hours had passed between Brown's illegal arrest and his first confession, and
no intervening event of any significance had occurred to break the causal chain between the
two events. Thus, evidence of Brown's first confession was inadmissible. Id. at 604-05. The
Court further held the second confession was a fruit of the first confession and, therefore, it
too was inadmissible. Id. at 605.
940. Id. at 603-04.
941. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983).
942. Id. at 911.
943. Id at 909-10.
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arrived at his home.944 The morning following his arrest,945 Manuel
readily confessed his role in the killing, after carefully being instructed
with regard to his Miranda rights.
9 4 6
On appeal, Manuel claimed his arrest was illegal because it had
been ordered before the tribal police had probable cause to arrest
him.94 7 Manuel further contended his confession should have been
suppressed because it was the fruit of his illegal arrest.948 The Ninth
Circuit, however, concluded that it need not determine the legality of
the arrest because intervening events had sufficiently attenuated the
confession from any initial taint of illegality.9 4 9 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that, although the order for Manuel's arrest may have been pre-
mature, probable cause was amply established by the time Manuel was
actually arrested.950 Furthermore, the court decided that additional
factors weighed in favor of a finding of attenuation: (1) the trial court
expressly found Manuel's statements to be voluntary; (2) a considerable
period of time had elapsed between Manuel's arrest and his interroga-
tion; and (3) tribal police conduct, if illegal, was neither flagrant nor
designed to pressure Manuel into confessing.951
In United States v. Lee,95 2 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the trial court had correctly suppressed the defendant's second murder
confession, as well as evidence uncovered by law enforcement officials
as a result of the defendant's two confessions.953 Federal agents went
to Lee's home to investigate the murder of Lee's wife. The defendant
944. Id. at 910.
945. Id. At the time of their arrest, all three suspects were heavily intoxicated. The FBI
and the tribal police resolved not to question them while they were under the influence of
alcohol and allowed the suspects to sleep until the following morning. Id
946. Id. Manuel was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder.
947. Id. at 911. The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court had not made factual
findings essential to determining whether sufficient cause to arrest Manuel existed at the
time the arrest was ordered. Id
948. Id.
949. Id The Manual court noted that the United States Supreme Court stresses the pres-
ence or absence of intervening discovery as an essential element in determining whether a
confession is sufficiently attenuated from an illegal arrest to be admissible. Id at 912 (citing
Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04
(1975)). See supra notes 939-40 and accompanying text.
950. 706 F.2d at 912. The court distinguished the case at hand from Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975) and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), because probable
cause was firmly established before Manuel was interrogated, a factor not present in Brown
or Dunaway. In Brown and Dunaway the defendants were arrested without probable cause
and immediately questioned by the authorities. 706 F.2d at 911-12.
951. Id at 912. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218; Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.
952. 699 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
953. Id at 468.
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informed them that his wife had been killed while he was away from
home. Without advising Lee of his Miranda rights, the agents ques-
tioned Lee in an FBI vehicle parked in front of the Lee home. The
defendant confessed to the homicide, signed a waiver of rights form,
and, shortly thereafter, allowed the agents to search his tool shed. The
officers located the murder weapon, a lead pipe, but declined to arrest
the defendant. 954
The next day, Lee voluntarily appeared at the Bureau of Indian
Affairs office and again signed a standard waiver form. After agents
read the defendant his Miranda rights in both Navajo and English, Lee
repeated his confession and surrendered the pair of shoes he was wear-
ing at the time of his wife's murder.955 At Lee's trial for first degree
murder,956 the district judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress
both confessions, the murder weapon, and the shoes. 57
After deciding Lee's initial confession had been unlawfully ob-
tained,958 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court had correctly sup-
pressed the lead pipe because its discovery was a direct result of the
unlawful confession. 959 The Ninth Circuit further held that Lee's sec-
ond confession was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal interro-
gation on the day of the murder and, therefore, was correctly
suppressed by the trial judge.96 The court reasoned that the defend-
ant's second confession was not an act of free will sufficient to purge
the taint96' because it was obtained less than twenty-four hours after
the first confession had been elicited, without a Miranda warning and
954. Id. at 467.
955. Id. at 467-68.
956. The defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1976). 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "[m]urder is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by
poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated
killing. . . is murder in the first degree." 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976) provides in relevant part
that "[a]ny Indian who commits against. . . another Indian or other person any. . . mur-
der . . . within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all
other persons committing [that same offense], within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States."
957. 699 F.2d at 467.
958. Id at 468. The court determined that a reasonable person could have concluded he
was in custody during the time Lee was questioned by the agents in the FBI vehicle. There-
fore, Lee should have been instructed with regard to his Miranda rights before his confession
was elicited. IM.
959. Id The government had previously conceded that, if the defendant's confession was
illegally obtained, the lead pipe should be suppressed as a fruit of the poisonous tree. Id
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963)). See supra note 912.
960. 699 F.2d at 468-69 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)),
961. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)). See supra note 939.
[Vol. 18
1985] CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
because the confessions were identical.962
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's suppression of
the defendant's shoes.963 The court stated there was an insufficient con-
nection between Lee's initial confession and the shoes to justify their
suppression as a fruit of the poisonous tree.964 The court reasoned that
since federal agents had discovered footprints at the murder scene
before they interviewed Lee, a subsequent investigation would have in-
evitably led to the discovery of the shoes that made the footprints.9 6 5
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
1. Scope of the privilege
In South Dakota v. Neville,9 66 the United States Supreme Court
held that admission into evidence of the defendant's refusal to submit
to a blood-alcohol test did not violate his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.9 67 The defendant refused to submit to a blood-alco-
hol test after being warned by the arresting officer that he could lose his
drivers license for so refusing.968 The Court had previously ruled that
the fifth amendment privilege applies only to compelled "communica-
tions or testimonial" evidence; because it characterized a blood test as
"physical or real" evidence, the Court held that the privilege did not
apply.969 In Neville, rather than categorize a refusal to submit to a
blood-alcohol test as either "physical" or "testimonial" evidence, 97 ° the
962. 699 F.2d at 468.
963. Id at 469.
964. Id (citing United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1980) (ongoing
illegal seizure of defendant's hotel room while awaiting issuance of search warrant sufficient
to justify suppression even though warrant not procured based on information discovered
pursuant to the illegal entry)).
965. Id.
966. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
967. Id at 554, 564.
968. Id at 555-56. After failing field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested and read
his Miranda rights. The defendant waived his rights to silence and to counsel. The officer
then asked the defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could
lose his drivers license if he refused. The defendant was asked to take the test three different
times and refused each time, stating that he was too drunk to pass it. The defendant was not
warned any of these times that his refusal could be used against him in court.
969. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
970. The Court noted that many courts have made such a distinction and have catego-
rized a refusal to take a blood test as "physical" evidence and, therefore, outside the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege. These courts reason that a refusal to take a potentially
incriminating test is a physical act and is like other circumstantial evidence. This view was
expressed in People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 546, 421 P.2d 401, 403, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393,
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
Court preferred to focus on the element of compulsion involved in a
suspect's refusal to take a blood test. Because the defendant was given
a choice of submitting to the test or refusing it, the Court found that he
was not coerced into refusing to take the test.97' Consequently, the de-
fendant was not protected by the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination and his refusal could be admitted into evidence.972 Rely-
ing on Doyle v. Ohio,9 7 3 the defendant further contended that his due
process rights were violated because he was not warned that his refusal
to take the blood test could be used against him.974 The Court distin-
guished Doyle975 on the fact that Miranda warnings carry implicit as-
surance that an arrestee's silence will not be used against him or her;
here, no assurances are implied in the warning that a refusal could be
used at trial. The Court pointed out that the defendant was warned
that he could lose his driving privileges for refusing to take the test and
that it would be "unrealistic" to believe that no other consequences
would follow a refusal. 976  The Court concluded that the failure to
warn of the further consequences of a refusal was not an implicit prom-
ise which "tricked" the defendant and, therefore, it was not fundamen-
tally unfair to offer this evidence against the defendant at trial.977
395 (1966) (Traynor, CJ.) ("no constitutional right to refuse a test designed to produce phys-
ical evidence in the form of a breath sample"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967). A majority
of'jurisdictions concur with this view. See Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir.
1969) (refusal to take blood test not testimonial), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970); People v.
Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 533, 537, 421 P.2d 393, 395, 397, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387, 389 (1966)
(Traynor, C.J.) (result of voice identification test is real or physical evidence, and refusal is
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt).
A minority of courts view a suspect's refusal to take a potentially incriminating test as a
"communicative act involving [the suspect's] testimonial capacities." South Dakota v. Nev-
ille, 459 U.S. 553, 557 (1983) (citing State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1981)). These
courts find such a refusal to be within the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and thus, not admissible into evidence.
971. 459 U.S. at 562-63. The Court noted that the fact that a suspect was given a choice
does not mean that there was no coercion involved. It stated that if the "proferred alterna-
tive was to submit to a test so painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious
beliefs, that almost inevitably a person would prefer 'confession,'" then such a choice is not
a "true choice." Id. at 563-64 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966)).
972. Id at 564.
973. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
974. 459 U.S. at 564. See supra note 968 and accompanying text.
975. In Doyle, the defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings was used at his
trial for impeachment purposes. The Court held that the use of the defendant's silence was
fundamentally unfair because of the implicit assurances contained in the Miranda warnings
that his silence would not be used against him. 426 U.S. at 617-19.
976. 459 U.S. at 565-66. The Court noted that the state now fully warns suspects of the
consequences of refusal, including the possibility that refusal to take the blood-alcohol test
may be used against them in court. Id at 566 n.17.
977. Id. at 566.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention in United
States v. Greene978 that his fifth amendment and fourteenth amendment
rights were violated when the government cross-examined him con-
cerning his pretrial silence. The defendant had refused to answer ques-
tions or provide records to Internal Revenue Service agents
investigating his income tax returns. He provided some information
during pretrial discovery proceedings. At trial, the defendant offered
the defense that the alleged unreported income was attributable to
money repatriated from foreign bank accounts. The defendant had not
disclosed the existence of these personal bank accounts before trial.
979
The defendant argued that the cross-examination about his failure to
raise this defense was a violation of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In response, the Ninth Circuit stated that,
even if the questions were comments on his pretrial silence, there was
no fifth amendment violation because a defendant's credibility may be
impeached with his own silence when he chooses to testify in his own
defense.
980
The defendant then contended that he was denied due process be-
cause he was induced to remain silent because of "governmental ac-
tion"-the instigation of the criminal investigation by the Internal
Revenue Service. The court determined that there was no fundamental
unfairness here because there was no governmental action which gave
"affirmative assurance" that the defendant's silence would not be used
against him.98 1 The defendant was neither arrested and taken into cus-
tody nor given Miranda warnings.9 82 The court concluded that the
978. 698 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1983).
979. Id. at 1367, 1373.
980. Id. at 1373 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) ("[I]mpeachment
follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence. . . . We conclude
that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a crimi-
nal defendant's credibility."); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926) (defendant
who takes stand on retrial may be properly cross-examined about his prior silence)). See
also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (statement taken in violation of de-
fendant's Miranda rights may be used to impeach defendant's testimony).
981. 698 F.2d at 1374 (citing Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980) (per
curiam) (while Miranda warnings implicitly assure an individual that silence will not be
used against him or her, one who "voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has
not been induced to remain silent"); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982) (per
curiam) (arrest, by itself, is not governmental action which implicitly induces defendant to
remain silent; cross-examination about post-arrest silence when defendant takes stand is not
violation of due process); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (use of defendant's silence
following arrest and Miranda warnings for impeachment purposes is violation of due pro-
cess)). See also supra note 975 and accompanying text.
982. 698 F.2d at 1374. The court stated that the record was not clear as to whether the
defendant received Miranda warnings, but noted that he did not contend that he did. Id
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"mere institution of a criminal investigation" by the Internal Revenue
Service did not give implicit assurances that the defendant's silence
would not be used against him.983
The defendant in United States v. Coleman9 84 contended that the
registration requirements of the National Firearms Act9"5 violated his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The defendant was
convicted of conspiring to commit mail fraud, and of making and
transferring a destructive device in violation of the registration require-
ments of the National Firearms Act.986 The Act provides that informa-
tion regarding an offense occurring prior to or concurrent with the time
of registration which is disclosed in compliance with the registration
provision cannot be used either directly or indirectly as evidence
against an accused in a criminal proceeding. 987 In an unusual analysis,
the defendant argued that the registration requirements were unconsti-
tutional because they forced him to incriminate himself for future crim-
inal acts. The defendant's co-conspirators had committed acts of mail
fraud following his making and transferring of the firebombs. There-
fore, the defendant contended that, although registering the bombs
would not have subjected the defendant to liability for his acts prior to
and concurrent with the registration, evidence of the making and trans-
fer of the bombs, as given through registration, could be used to prose-
cute him for subsequent criminal acts as a co-conspirator.
988
The court noted that this interpretation of the fifth amendment
privilege "would mean that any deceptive practices committed as part
of a larger criminal scheme would be subject to the self-incrimination
clause. ' 989 The Ninth Circuit rejected such an argument because it
found it to be outside the scope of the protection afforded by the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination.99 The court also pointed
983. Id
984. 707 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 171 (1983).
985. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1976).
986. The defendant conspired with a woman to insure the life of her husband, murder
him, and then collect the proceeds from the insurance policies. To that end, the defendant
made Molotov cocktail firebombs to be used to kill the husband. Two co-conspirators at-
tacked the husband with the firebombs and also attempted to shoot him, but were unsuccess-
ful. 707 F.2d at 376.
987. 26 U.S.C. § 5848(a) (1976). The statute was upheld by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971).
988. 707 F.2d at 377.
989. Id at 378.
990. Id at 377 (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1971) (periphery of
protection offered by privilege against self-incrimination does not "suppl[y] insulation for a
career of crime about to be launched")). The Ninth Circuit succinctly stated that the "fifth
amendment is not a partner in prospective criminal acts." Id.
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out that the defendant's concern that the registration information could
be used as evidence against him on the conspiracy charge was ill-
founded because the government would be precluded from using such
information if the conspiracy was formed prior to registering the
bombs.991
The Ninth Circuit in Jones v. Cardwe1992 ruled that the right
against self-incrimination applied to statements made by the defendant
in a presentence interview conducted by a probation officer.993 During
this interview the defendant admitted other criminal activity which was
used by the judge in determining his sentence. 994 The court relied on
Estelle v. Smith995 for its ruling, finding that the rationale there sup-
ported application of the fifth amendment privilege to the interview
here.9 96 Because of the serious consequences to the defendant of hav-
ing his statements used to enhance his sentence, the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that the defendant was protected by the privilege.997
In McCoy v. Commissioner,998 the plaintiffs petitioned the Tax
Court for redetermination of a tax deficiency. The plaintiffs claimed
the fifth amendment privilege in refusing to comply with both discov-
ery requests and a court order for production of documents. The Tax
991. Id See supra notes 987-88 and accompanying text.
992. 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982).
993. Id. at 755. The defendant, convicted of first-degree burglary and rape, was in cus-
tody awaiting sentencing when he was questioned by the probation officer.
994. Id. The court noted that, while a sentencing judge's discretion is broad in imposing
a sentence, the judge may not consider information obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights in determining the sentence. Id at 756. Cf. United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (remand affirmed where, in determining defendant's sentence,
judge relied on two prior felony convictions obtained in violation of defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 609-13 (9th Cir. 1968)
(remand appropriate where, in determining defendant's sentence, judge considered evidence
obtained in violation of defendant's fourth amendment right against illegal searches and
seizures), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971).
995. 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (fifth amendment privilege applicable to penalty stage of capital
proceeding where statements were obtained during pretrial psychiatric examination without
warning of consequences).
996. 686 F.2d at 756. The Estelle Court stated that the essence of the privilege is that the
state must produce independent evidence to "convict and punish" an individual rather than
rely on compelled confessions of an accused. 451 U.S. at 462 (citing Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961)). Furthermore, the protection of the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination "'does not turn upon the type of proceeding. . . but upon
the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites."' 451 U.S. at
462 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967)).
In Estelle, the Court determined that the defendant's exposure to the possibility of the
death sentence was of the gravest consequence and that, therefore, "the State is not relieved
of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees." 451 U.S. at 463.
997. 686 F.2d at 756.
998. 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Court subsequently dismissed the case for failure to prosecutef 99 The
Ninth Circuit stated that the fifth amendment privilege may only be
invoked against real and substantial hazards against self-incrimina-
tion.t°°° According to the court, any such hazard in this case appeared
speculative. The court thus held that the plaintiffs must explain their
fear of criminal prosecution to justify invocation of the privilege.10 '
Because the plaintiffs did not make a "positive disclosure" of any
hazards inherent in complying with discovery, the court upheld dismis-
sal of the case.1
°2
2. Requirement of Miranda warnings
The ruling of Miranda v. Arizona'00 3 requires that any person who
is in custody must be warned of his or her constitutional rights before
being interrogated by law enforcement officers.' 0t 4 The suspect must
be advised of his or her right to remain silent, that anything the suspect
says may be used against him or her in court, that he or she has the
right to counsel before and during questioning, and that counsel will be
appointed if the suspect cannot afford one."'
The Ninth Circuit in Baumann v. United States'00 6 held that Mi-
randa warnings are not required prior to a routine presentence inter-
view with a probation officer for a defendant convicted of a non-capital
crime.1007 The court construed Estelle v. Smith °°n narrowly to apply to
the facts of that case.009 The court distinguished Estelle from the pres-
999. TAX COURT RULES 123(a) & (b) provide that noncompliance with any court order,
including one directing production of documents, may result in dismissal of the case.
1000. 696 F.2d at 1236 (citing United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980)).
1001. Id at 1236.
1002. Id The court found the plaintiffs appeal from dismissal by the Tax Court to be
frivolous and awarded double costs to the appellee. Id at 1237.
1003. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1004. Id at 444, 467, 478-79.
1005. Id at 467-74.
1006. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
1007. Id at 576.
1008. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, the defendant underwent a competency examination
prior to his trial for murder. At a separate sentencing proceeding after his conviction by a
jury, the psychiatrist who had examined him prior to trial was allowed to testify as to the
defendant's dangerousness, a factor used to enhance the defendant's sentence. The United
States Supreme Court held that, because the question of dangerousness was critical to the
defendant, he should have been given the Miranda warnings so that he could decide whether
to invoke his rights to remain silent or consult with an attorney. Id at 466-69.
1009. The Court in Estelle stated: "[W]e do not hold that the same Fifth Amendment
concerns are necessarily presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might be
ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination." Id at 469 n.13.
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ent case in two ways. First, Estelle was a capital case entailing a bifur-
cated proceeding in which the defendant could have been sentenced to
death. Here, the defendant was convicted of mail fraud, a non-capital
crime with no such grave consequences. Second, Estelle involved the
issue of the defendant's future dangerousness, a critical factor because
it could be used to enhance his sentence if proved by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt. In Baumann, however, the issue of the defendant's
remorsefulness was merely information which the judge could use in
the exercise of his substantial discretion in imposing sentence. 010
The court also pointed out that the purpose of the warnings out-
lined in Miranda is to protect a suspect who is confronted by the inher-
ently coercive pressures of a custodial interrogation.0 11 The court
found that no such compelling atmosphere prevailed at the defendant's
routine presentence interview. Therefore, no warnings were required
to be given the defendant.1
0 1 2
3. Custody
A suspect who is in the custody of law enforcement officers must
be warned of his or her constitutional rights before he or she may be
interrogated, as necessitated under the ruling of Miranda v. Arizona.013
The Ninth Circuit has looked recently at the circumstances which
would constitute a custodial interrogation and thereby require Miranda
warnings prior to any questioning.
In United States v. Allen,10 14 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the defendant was not in custody when ques-
tioned by agents at his place of business.10 1 5 The agents had no knowl-
edge that the defendant was a convicted felon, but were merely seeking
information for an investigation of a firearms dealer from whom the
defendant had ordered parts. The court based its determination of
whether the defendant was in custody on the "totality of facts" present
at the time of questioning. 0 16 The court found no evidence that the
1010. 692 F.2d at 576.
1011. Id. at 576-77; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
1012. 692 F.2d at 576.
1013. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) ("[W]hen an individual is taken into custody. . . [h]e
must be warned prior to any questioning . .
1014. 699 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1982).
1015. Id. at 459.
1016. Id. at 458. The court stated:
Pertinent areas of inquiry include the language used by the officer to summon the
individual, the extent to which he or she is confronted with evidence of guilt, the
physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention and the
degree of pressure applied to detain the individual. Based upon a review of all the
1985]
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agents exerted any pressure on the defendant to answer their questions
or that the defendant was threatened or physically restrained in any
way. The court decided that a reasonable, innocent person being ques-
tioned in the defendant's circumstances would feel that he or she would
be free to leave.10 1 7 Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant
was not in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time the agents ques-
tioned him.0 18
The Ninth Circuit reiterated its prior holdings in United States v.
Wilson'019 that a request for identification in the course of a routine
investigatory stop does not constitute custody so as to warrant recita-
tion of the Miranda warnings. 0 20 In Wilson, officers were looking for
the defendant after he failed to return to a federal half-way house. Af-
ter observing the defendant leave his girlfriend's house, the officers ap-
proached him on the street and identified themselves. In answer to
their request, the defendant produced two forms of identification. The
court concluded that the "mere request for written identification" of a
suspect does not require Miranda warnings.' 02 1 Here, the request for
the defendant's identification occurred on the street as part of a routine
investigation by the officers. The defendant was not coerced in any
way before giving the officers his identification. As long as such re-
quests for identification are part of a routine investigation, and any
questioning does not take place in a police-dominated or compelling
setting, the request does not constitute a custodial interrogation. 0 22
However, the officers in Wilson then told the defendant that they
would have to detain him unless he could better identify himself.1
0 23
pertinent facts, the court must determine whether a reasonable innocent person in
such circumstances would conclude that after brief questioning he or she would not
be free to leave.
Id at 458-59 (quoting United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1017. Id. at 459.
1018. Id
1019. 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
1020. Id. at 1274.
1021. Id
1022. Id In United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976), the defendants were suspected of bringing contraband into the country
aboard a boat. Customs agents stopped the defendants by driving their car in front of the
defendant's truck which was towing the boat. The agents asked defendant Hickman for
identification and for the name of the owner of the truck, trailer and boat. The Ninth Cir-
cuit found that, because no weapons or threats were used by the agents to stop the defend-
ant's truck, and the questioning was not done in a compelling setting dominated by police
officers, the stopping and questioning of the defendants was an investigatory stop which did
not trigger the requirement of giving Miranda warnings. I1d




The court concluded that at this point the defendant's freedom was sig-
nificantly impaired so that the officers' questioning constituted a custo-
dial interrogation under the criteria outlined in Miranda.0 24
Therefore, the statements made by the defendant after this point were
obtained in violation of the defendant's fifth amendment rights because
no Miranda warnings were given. 1025
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Lee'0 26 concluded that the
defendant was in custody while he was being questioned in a Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) car parked in front of his house.
Although the defendant had been told upon entering the car that he
was free to leave at any time, the court held that, considering the total-
ity of the circumstances, the defendant was reasonable in believing he
was not free to leave the site of the questioning.' 27 While the defend-
ant was being questioned, police were investigating in and around his
house. After more than an hour of interrogation in the closed car, the
defendant confessed to choking his wife. 0 28 Because the defendant
was never advised of his constitutional rights before the interrogation,
the court affirmed the suppression of the confession obtained during
questioning. 1
0 29
4. Waiver of Miranda rights
An individual may waive his or her fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Such a waiver can occur
only following a reading of the warnings required by Miranda v. Ari-
zona10 30 so that the individual may knowingly and intelligently decide
whether to exercise his or her rights or waive them. Whether a valid
1024. Id. at 1274. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda 384 U.S. at 444.
1025. 690 F.2d at 1274. However, the court held that, while the defendant's statements
were admitted into evidence in error, a reversal was not justified. The court pointed out that
there was "substantial, independent, and credible evidence of defendant's guilt," so that the
error of admitting the statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1275.
1026. 699 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1982).
1027. Id. See United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8, 13 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[lIt is neverthe-
less true that close and persistent questioning, accompanied by. . . an evident belief by the
interrogating officers that the suspect is lying, may reasonably induce in a suspect the belief
that he is no longer free to go about his business without significant restraint.").
1028. 699 F.2d at 467. See United States v. Scharf, 608 F.2d 323, 325 (9th Cir. 1979)
(defendant in custody while being questioned in police car in front of his house while other
officers remained on the scene).
1029. 699 F.2d at 468.
1030. 384 U.S. 436, 475-79 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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waiver has been made is determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. 1
031
In Oregon v. Bradshaw,l °32 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the defendant waived his fifth amendment rights after
he had requested the assistance of counsel during a police interroga-
tion. The defendant in Bradshaw had been given his Miranda warnings
and had responded to police questioning. After the defendant re-
quested counsel, the interrogation was terminated. While being trans-
ferred from the police station to jail, the defendant initiated
communication with the police officer who accompanied him. 0 33 The
officer responded that the defendant did not have to talk to him since
he knew the defendant had requested an attorney. The defendant an-
swered that he understood his rights. As a result of the discussion with
the officer, the defendant underwent a polygraph test the following day
after signing a written waiver form. The defendant confessed to the
crime when the test was over.
The lower court determined that the defendant's inquiry itself
amounted to a waiver. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice
Rehnquist, 0 34 four members of the Supreme Court emphasized that
determination of whether the defendant has made a valid waiver of his
previously invoked fifth amendment rights is a two-step process. First,
the court must inquire whether the suspect, in fact, initiated the dia-
logue with authorities as required by the rule in Edwards v. Arizona.°
35
Second, if the court finds such an initiation of communication, 0 36 it
must ask whether a valid waiver of the suspect's fifth amendment rights
1031. The determination whether a purported waiver was knowing and intelligent depends
"upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-75 (1979) (express waiver not re-
quired, but waiver may be inferred from "actions and words" of the accused).
1032. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983) (plurality opinion).
1033. Id. at 2833. While the Court found the defendant's inquiry "ambiguous," it stated
that "[t]here can be no doubt in this case that in asking, 'well, what is going to happen to me
now?', [defendant] 'initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that
word." Id at 2835.
1034. Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment and delivered the opinion, joined by the
Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice O'Connor.
1035. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("We. . . hold that an accused, ... having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.").
1036. The Court defined such an initiation of conversation as a question by the suspect
"evinc[ing] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation
[and] not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relation-
ship." 103 S. Ct. at 2835.
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had occurred. 1037 Applying this two-part test, the Court concluded that
the defendant in Bradshaw had initiated the dialogue with the police
officer 0 38 and, further, that the defendant had validly waived his rights
to silence and to the assistance of counsel.1
0 39
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed that the defend-
ant made a valid waiver of his constitutional rights.'° 0 Justice Powell
argued, however, that the two-part test is not required when a defend-
ant has invoked his fifth amendment rights during interrogation. He
would prefer to make this determination by looking only at the totality
of circumstances present in each case.1°41
Justice Marshall,'° 2 writing for the dissent, agreed with the plural-
ity that a two-step inquiry is necessary to determine whether a valid
waiver has been made by a defendant after he has previously invoked
his fifth amendment rights. 1 4 3 However, the dissent reasoned that the
defendant's query to the officer in this case was not an initiation which
would invite further interrogation and, thus, fall within the scope of
Edwards)044 Because there was no initiation of communication by the
defendant here, the dissent found it unnecessary to discuss the waiver
issue.' 045
1037. The Court phrased the second part of the test as follows: "'[W]hether the purported
waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circum-
stances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue
with the authorities."' Id. at 2835 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9).
1038. See supra note 1035.
1039. 103 S. Ct. at 2835. The Court did not dispute the trial court's finding that the de-
fendant's statements were voluntary and a result of a knowing and intelligent waiver be-
cause it was based on the court's "first-hand observation of the witnesses to the events
involved." Id
1040. I. at 2838 (Powell, J., concurring).
1041. Id at 2837-38 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938); seesupranote 1030
and accompanying text). Justice Powell's concern was that the Court had not offered any
clarification and guidelines to lower courts which are faced with this issue. The Court has,
instead, outlined a two-part test which Powell asserts will only result in confusion for the
lower courts. 103 S. Ct. at 2837 n.3.
1042. Justice Marshall was joined in the dissent by Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun,
and Justice Stevens.
1043. 103 S. Ct. at 2840 & n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting): "If an accused has himself initi-
ated further communication with the police, it is still necessary to establish as a separate
matter the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver. .. "
1044. Id at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that the initiation of
further communication with the authorities as described in Edwards meant "obviously...
communication or dialogue about the subject matter of the criminal investigation." Id. at
2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
1045. Justice Marshall noted that, "unless the accused himself initiates further communi-
cation with the police, a valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be established." Id at
2840 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The defendant in United States v. Ramirez'°46 argued that his con-
fession should not have been admitted into evidence because the gov-
ernment had failed to show that he waived his Miranda rights and gave
his statements voluntarily. °47 The Ninth Circuit agreed that, before
any incriminating statements are admitted into evidence, the prosecu-
tion must first lay a foundation that the defendant had been given
proper Miranda warnings, and that these rights were then knowingly
and voluntarily waived."° 8 The court found that the district court
erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's inculpatory statements
before a showing that he had made a valid waiver of his fifth amend-
ment rights. The Ninth Circuit determined that it was not reversible
error, however, because it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.°049
5. Voluntariness of statements
Whether or not Miranda warnings have been given, any statement
volunteered by a suspect may be used against him or her in a criminal
proceeding. As long as the statement was made freely and without any
coercive influences, it will be found to be voluntarily made and, there-
fore, admissible into evidence. 0 50 That determination will be reversed
by the reviewing court only if it is clearly erroneous.
The defendant in United States v. DeLuca °5 I had not been given
1046. 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983).
1047. Id. at 542. The defendant confessed to his participation in conspiracy to steal two
airplanes which were used to smuggle contraband into the country; he was subsequently
convicted of foreign transportation of stolen aircraft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
710 F.2d at 537-38.
1048. 710 F.2d at 542 (citing United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 133 (9th Cir. 1981)
(when a confession or admission is admissible in evidence, the prosecution need only lay a
foundation that "proper Miranda warnings were given and the elucidated rights were
waived"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ("[A] valid waiver will not be pre-
sumed simply from . . . the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.")).
1049. 710 F.2d at 542. The error was harmless because subsequent testimony by both the
defendant and the government was adequate to show that the defendant had rights. Id.
In another case on the issue of waiver of Miranda rights, United States v. Barrett, 703
F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit accepted the trial court's finding that the de-
fendant had been given his Miranda rights and waived them. Id. at 1087. The trial court
found the FBI agent's testimony more credible than the defendant's in making its determi-
nation. The Ninth Circuit held that this finding was not clearly erroneous and, therefore,
did not disturb it on appeal. Id The court did not address the question of whether the
defendant was in custody or not. The trial court had found that he was neither in custody
nor under arrest at the time he made the statements admitted into evidence. The court
pointed out that, even if the defendant was in custody, he had been given the Miranda
warnings and waived his rights and, therefore, it did not need to reach that question. Id.
1050. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) ("Any statement given freely and vol-
untarily without compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.").
1051. 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
Miranda warnings before he volunteered to federal agents that he was
involved in criminal activity. The defendant was serving a prison sen-
tence when interviewed by federal agents. Without being told of his
fifth amendment rights, the defendant admitted setting several fires.
Agents answered his request for immunity by stating that they prom-
ised only to inform the prosecutor of the defendant's cooperation. The
defendant initiated a second meeting in which the agents reiterated the
same promise to the defendant's second request for immunity. When
his request for immunity was denied, the defendant was no longer will-
ing to cooperate.105 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusion that the admission was voluntarily made by the defendant
in an attempt to get an offer of immunity.
0 53
The defendant in United States v. Brookier'054 was convicted of
conspiring to engage in racketeering acts in violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. 0 55 Statements that the
defendant made to an FBI agent were admitted at trial. The defendant
contended that he had been promised that his statements would be kept
confidential if he cooperated with the agent.10 5 6 The district court
found that there was no such binding agreement between the defendant
and the agent.
The Ninth Circuit determined that there had been no offer of im-
munity. In the absence of an unconditional promise that the defend-
ant's statements would be kept confidential, he was not immune from
prosecution. Nor were the threats of a grand jury investigation and
subpoena offers of immunity. The court noted that the defendant had
been warned to be careful about what he said to the agent.105 7 Because
the defendant's statements were obtained without coercion or threats,
the court found them to be voluntary and, therefore, admissible into
1052. Id at 1285.
1053. Id
1054. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 1194 (1983).
1055. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of. . . this section.
1056. 685 F.2d at 1217. After being subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, the
defendant called the FBI agent to request his help. Statements made by the defendant dur-
ing conversations with the agent were admitted at trial. Id
1057. Id at 1217-18.
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evidence at trial. 0 58
In Jones v. Cardwell,1°59 the Ninth Circuit found that the state-
ments made by the defendant in a presentence interview initiated by
the defendant's probation officer were not voluntary. 10 60 The defend-
ant's confession of other criminal activity obtained during the interview
was used by the judge in imposing sentence. The district court found
that the admissions were not spontaneous, but were made as a result of
the probation officer's questions-questions the defendant was in-
structed that he had "no choice but to answer."''0 61 The Ninth Circuit
held that, because the state was "aggressive" in obtaining the state-
ments without warning the defendant that they could be used in deter-
mining his sentence, the admissions were involuntary. Therefore,
consideration of the involuntary confession by the sentencing judge
was a violation of the defendant's fifth amendment rights.1
0 62
In United States v. Allen, 0 63 FBI agents went to the defendant's
home with a warrant to search for firearms. The district court found
that the defendant volunteered a request for the agents to be careful of
three of his rifles before the agents asked him any questions. The lower
court had based its finding that the defendant's request was voluntary
on the credibility of the agent's testimony.'0 The Ninth Circuit did
not find this determination to be clearly erroneous and, therefore, up-
held the district court's finding that the statement was made voluntarily
by the defendant.
0 65
The court in United States v. Manuel 1066 found that the defend-
ant's confession was voluntary, even though there was an eighteen hour
delay between his arrest and interogation 0 67  The defendant urged
1058. Id at 1218.
1059. 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982).
1060. Id. at 757. The court first determined that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applied to the defendant's statements made during the presentence interview.
See supra notes 1006-12 and accompanying text.
1061. 686 F.2d at 757. The defendant was instructed in writing that he was being inter-
viewed "under court order and it [was] imperative that [defendant] follow all instructions,
both in writing and as given verbally." These instructions were also read to him at the time
of questioning. Id The Ninth Circuit did not find that the district court's factual determi-
nations were clearly erroneous. Id
1062. Id
1063. 699 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1982).
1064. Id. at 459.
1065. Id at 459-60.
1066. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983).
1067. Id. at 914. The defendant was arrested in the afternoon while he was intoxicated.
The arresting officers took him to the police station and, because of his condition, waited
until the next day before questioning him.
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that his confession should have been suppressed under the rule of Mc-
Nabb-Mallory,10 68 which states that a confession obtained from a crimi-
nal suspect held in federal custody who is not arraigned "without
unnecessary delay" may not be used at trial.
10 69
Instead of the McNabb-Mallory rule, the court applied 18 U.S.C.
section 3501 1070 in deciding the voluntariness issue. According to sec-
tion 3501(b), pre-arraignment delay is the first of several factors a trial
judge must consider in determining whether a confession was volunta-
rily made.10 7 ' The court decided that under its holding in United States
v. Halbert,10 72 wherein it analyzed the legislative intent of section
3501,1073 that in the circumstances involved in Manuel, the delay was
1068. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957). In McNabb, the Supreme Court held that confessions obtained from the defend-
ants had to be excluded from evidence. 318 U.S. at 341. The defendants were arrested for
the murder of a federal officer. They were held in a detention room and questioned over a
two-day period until officers were satisfied with their story. The Court did not reach the
constitutional issue but, instead, rested its decision on its supervisory authority over federal
criminal prosecutions. Because the defendants were not taken before a committing magis-
trate with reasonable promptness, as "explicitly commanded" by Congress, the Court held
that the defendants' detention was unlawful and the resulting confessions inadmissible. Id.
at 340-45.
The Court used this same rationale in Mallory, holding that the defendant's confession
had to be excluded. 354 U.S. at 455-56. The arresting officers did not take the defendant
before a magistrate until after he had been detained for several hours and had finally con-
fessed following a lie-detector test. The Court emphasized that an arrested suspect "is not to
be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself,
even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest and ultimately
his guilt." Id. at 454. The Court found that the extended delay in arraigning the defendant
violated the standard of FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 354 U.S. at 456. See infra note 1069.
1069. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) provides in pertinent part: "An officer making an arrest...
shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate or. . . before a state or local judicial officer . .. ."
1070. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States. . . .a confes-
sion. . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given ....
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, in-
cluding (I) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment . ...
Section 3501 was enacted as part of the Title II Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1969, intended to supersede the McNabb-Mallory rule as the source of federal
supervisory power to suppress confessions obtained in violation of Rule 5(a). 706 F.2d at
912.
1071. See supra note 1070.
1072. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
1073. The court concluded from the legislative history of § 3501 that: (1) a confession
obtained during a period less than six hours after arrest of the suspect is admissible per se,
unless found to be inadmissible for reasons other than delay; (2) a confession obtained dur-
ing a period greater than six hours after arrest of the suspect is not inadmissible per se.
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When a witness refuses to testify based on his or her privilege
against self-incrimination, the prosecutor may request immunity for the
witness in order to gain the witness' testimony at trial. The traditional
form of immunity, transactional immunity, protects the witness from
ever being prosecuted for any offense to which he or she testifies.1
75
Another form of immunity, use immunity, protects the witness from
use of his or her testimony and any "fruits" derived from it, in any
criminal proceeding; however, the witness is not immune from prose-
cuting for any offense related to the subject matter of the testimony.
0 76
Recently, courts have been willing to grant immunity to defense wit-
nesses in certain circumstances, such as when the witness refuses to tes-
tify due to prosecutorial misconduct.
0 77
The Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v. Lord' 78 that a defense
witness may be granted use immunity when the witness invokes his or
her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to
prosecutorial misconduct. 10 79 In Lord, a witness who could provide
testimony relevant to the defense refused to do so, asserting that he
However, an unreasonable delay in excess of six hours may itself be found to make the
confession involuntary. 706 F.2d at 913 (citing Halber, 436 F.2d at 1233-37).
1074. 706 F.2d at 914.
1075. L. TAYLOR, WITNEss IMMUNITY 4 (1983).
1076. Id. at 4, 79; United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
1077. 711 F.2d at 890, see infra notes 1078-85 and accompanying text. See also Virgin
Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980), infra note 1083; United States v.Morrison, 535
F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976) (defendant's due process rights violated where prosecutor's intimida-
tion induced defense witness to invoke her privilege against self-incrimination).
1078. 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983).
1079. Id at 890. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with [an order by the court] on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony. . . may be used against
the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement .
(a) [The] district court . . . shall issue . . . upon the request of the United
States attorney. . . any order requiring such an individual to give testimony...
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. ...
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(b) A United States attorney may . . . request an order. . . when in his
judgment-
(I) the testimony. . . from such an individual may be necessary to the pub-
lic interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify . . . on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
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feared criminal prosecution if he testified.' 8 o The government refused
to grant the witness any immunity at the trial.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the standard outlined in United States
v. Herman,1081 requiring the defendant to show that the government's
refusal to grant use immunity to a defense witness was done "'with the
deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process.' "1082
Upon such a finding, the court must enter a judgment of acquittal for
the defendant, unless the prosecutor grants use immunity to the wit-
ness.10 8 3 Here, the court found a prima facie showing that the witness'
testimony would be relevant, and that the prosecutor's pretrial remarks
to the witness could be determined to be a distortion of the fact-finding
process. 084 Therefore, the court remanded for an evidentiary hearing
to determine "whether the prosecutor intentionally distorted the fact-
finding process by deliberately causing [the witness] to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege."'' 085
7. Defendant's right not to testify
In addition to the privilege against self-incrimination, the fifth
amendment also grants a criminal defendant the privilege of not hav-
ing to take the witness stand to testify. The United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Hasting'0 86 reiterated the principle announced
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the rationale for extending use immunity to defense
witnesses is to protect the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. 711 F.2d at 890, 892.
See United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d at 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A defendant has no
absolute right to elicit testimony from any witness. . . whom he may desire. . . . [Tihe key
issue in the due process analysis remains whether or not the defendant was denied a fair
trial." (citation omitted)).
1080. 711 F.2d at 889.
1081. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
1082. 711 F.2d at 890 (quoting Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204).
1083. ld at 891-92 (citing Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980) (if
district court found evidence that prosecutorial misconduct prevented defense witness from
giving relevant testimony, defendant must be acquitted unless use immunity extended to
witness)).
1084. A prima facie showing was made, first, because the witness' testimony would be
relevant to corroborate the defendant's version of events, and also relevant to the defend-
ant's defense of entrapment. Second, the prosecutor had told the witness before trial of the
privilege against self-incrimination and that the witness would not be prosecuted if he testi-
fied truthfully at trial. The witness understood the prosecutor's remarks concerning the
truthfulness of his testimony to mean that he could be prosecuted "depend[ing] on his testi-
mony." Id at 891.
1085. Id The district court was directed to enter an acquittal for the defendant if it found
such prosecutorial misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the prosecutor
ordered use immunity for the defense witness at a new trial. Id at 892-93.
1086. 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983).
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in Chapman v. California,10 87 that a violation of a defendant's fifth
amendment right not to testify does not require automatic reversal, but
may be deemed harmless in some circumstances. 10 88 In Hasting, the
defendants did not testify at trial. While not making a direct statement
on the defendants' failure to take the stand, the prosecution commented
during summation on the scanty evidence presented and the inconsis-
tent defense theories offered by the defendants.108 9 The court of ap-
peals reversed the defendants' subsequent convictions. 10 90
The Court determined that the lower court had erred in not apply-
ing the harmless error doctrine of Chapman.'0 9' The Court concluded
that a review of the whole record 10 92 showed "overwhelming evidence
of guilt" so that, even if the prosecution violated the defendants' fifth
amendment right not to testify, the error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
0 93
B. The Right to Counsel
1. The right to appointed counsel
The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainrght 094 recognized an indi-
1087. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
1088. In Chapman, the Court rejected a per se rule of automatic reversal and held that
"there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so
unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless." Id. at 22 (emphasis deleted).
1089. 103 S. Ct. at 1977. The defendants were charged with kidnapping, transporting wo-
men across state lines for immoral purposes, and conspiring to commit such offenses. Id. at
1976-77. The defendants relied on two defenses: consent, and mistaken identity. In com-
menting on the defendants' evidence during summation, the prosecution pointed out what
the defendants did not offer into evidence. The defendants' motion for mistrial was denied.
Each defendant was convicted by the jury on all counts. Id at 1977.
1090. Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). The Court held in Griffin that
prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to testify was a violation of the defendant's
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 380 U.S. at 615. The lower court in Hast-
ing found that even without direct comment on the defendants' failure to testify, a Griffin
error occurred. 103 S. Ct. at 1977.
1091. The lower court stated that the application of the Chapman harmless error rule
would "'impermissibly compromise the clear constitutional violation of the defendants'
Fifth Amendment rights."' 103 S. Ct. at 1977 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d
301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).
1092. The Court exercised its power to examine the record to evaluate a harmless error
claim (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (reviewing court must deter-
mine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that trier of fact would have returned a
verdict of guilty, absent alleged error)).
1093. 103 S. Ct. at 1982. The Court relied on the lower court's acknowledgment of the
"'clear evidence of guilt,'" Id. (quoting Hasting, 660 F.2d at 303), and the inconsistency of
the defendants' defense in making its determination. Id at 1982.
1094. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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gent defendant's constitutional right to have court-appointed counsel in
all felony cases. l095 The sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel 10 96 has since been held to apply to any case in which the
defendant is sentenced to imprisonment.
10 97
In Morris v. Slappy,10 98 the Supreme Court, in dicta, disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the right to counsel enjoyed by
indigent defendants includes the right to have a "meaningful relation-
ship" with his or her attorney. 10 99 In Slappy, the defendant was as-
signed a deputy public defender who represented him at his
preliminary hearing and undertook an extensive pretrial investigation.
Six days prior to trial, a senior trial attorney was substituted to repre-
sent Slappy because the deputy public defender had been hospitalized
for emergency surgery. During the six days prior to trial, the newly-
appointed attorney interviewed Slappy and advised him of the attorney
substitution, reviewed the files and investigation prepared by the dep-
uty public defender, and subsequent to his review again met with
Slappy on three occasions. On both the first and second day of trial,
Slappy complained to the court that his new attorney, Hotchkiss, had
not had sufficient time to prepare the case.' 110 The court reviewed the
circumstances of Hotchkiss' appointment and questioned him. Hotch-
kiss informed the court that he was prepared for trial. Convinced that
Hotchkiss was prepared, the court construed Slappy's statements as
1095. Id. at 345. The Gideon Court held that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the
sixth amendment right to appointed counsel, and that, therefore, the right is guaranteed in
state felony cases. Id at 342. An indigent defendant's constitutional right to have appointed
counsel in federal felony cases was previously established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 467 (1938).
1096. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). The McMann Court rec-
ognized a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court stated, however,
that it is within the trial courts' discretion to establish the proper standards of attorney per-
formance necessary to guarantee the right. Id. at 771. For a discussion of the standard used
by the Ninth Circuit, see infra notes 1158-59 and accompanying text.
1097. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1971). In Argersinger, the defendant was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon. He was not represented by counsel at his trial,
and was convicted and sentenced to ninety days in jail. Id. at 26. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction and held that unless a person makes a valid waiver of his or her right
to counsel, "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37.
1098. 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983).
1099. Id at 1616.
1100. Id at 1613-14. On the first day of trial, Slappy stated that he was " 'satiFed with the
Public Defender [Hotchkiss]. . . ."' Id. at 1613 (emphasis in original). On the second day,
Slappy again stated his attorney was not prepared but stated, " 'I don't have anything against
him.'" Id. at 1614 (emphasis in original).
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motions for a continuance and denied them."10' On the third day of
trial, Slappy presented the court with a pro se petition claiming, for the
first time, that he was unrepresented. Slappy claimed that the initial
deputy public defender was his attorney and he refused to cooperate
with Hotchkiss. 02 Slappy's first trial ended in a mistrial on two counts
and a guilty verdict on three counts. A second trial, at which an unco-
operative Slappy was again represented by Hotchkiss, resulted in a
guilty conviction on the remaining two counts.1 03
The conviction on all five counts was affirmed by the California
Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court denied review.' 104
The district court denied Slappy's pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, finding that the trial court had not abused its discretion by de-
nying either a continuance to allow Hotchkiss additional time to pre-
pare or a continuance to permit the original public defender to
represent Slappy."10 5 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the sixth
amendment right to counsel includes the right to a meaningful attor-
ney-client relationship. 0 6 The court concluded that because the trial
court failed to balance Slappy's interest in continued representation by
the original public defender against the state's interest in proceeding
with the trial, Slappy's right to counsel was violated."
0 7
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion by denying Slappy's motion for a continuance to give Hotchkiss
additional preparation time." 10 8 The Court also held that Slappy failed
to make a timely motion for a continuance based on the deputy public
defender's unavailability.' 0 9
While the Court unanimously agreed that Slappy failed to make a
timely motion for substitution of attorney, I 1o the Court was divided on
the issue of the right to counsel. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice
1101. Id.
1102. Id at 1614-15. Following his claim of no representation, Slappy refused to cooper-
ate with Hotchkiss and ignored his attorney's advice to take the stand. Id
1103. Id.
1104. Id The district court agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that Hotchkiss had
sufficient time to prepare for the trial. The district court also concluded that the need for
efficient administration of justice reasonably precluded a continuance to permit the deputy
public defender to recover from surgery and represent Slappy. Id
1105. Id
1106. Id. at 1615-16. The Ninth Circuit, having concluded that Slappy's right to counsel
was violated, went on to hold that Slappy need not show prejudice for a reversal. Id. at
1616.
1107. Id
1108. Id at 1616-17.
1109. Id at 1617.
1110. Id at 1620 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 1625 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Stevens joined, declined to address the issue, stating that because no
timely motion was made any such discussion was unnecessary." I I The
majority read the Ninth Circuit opinion broadly and construed the de-
cision to imply that a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
includes a right to a "meaningful relationship" with his or her attor-
ney." 2  The Court noted that there was no authority cited for the
Ninth Circuit's position and, accordingly, rejected the claim. The
Court stated that no court could "guarantee" a meaningful relationship
with one's attorney, whether the attorney be privately retained or
appointed. 1' 
3
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, disagreed
with the majority's characterization of the Ninth Circuit decision. Jus-
tice Brennan interpreted the decision as providing a qualified right to
continued representation by an attorney once the defendant expresses
the interest in doing so.'t 4 This right, although not "absolute," would
be balanced against those existing factors that weigh in favor of pro-
ceeding even in the particular attorney's absence.'
5
Justice Brennan cited several cases in support of his position." 6
While Justice Brennan noted that each case involved retained counsel
rather than appointed counsel, he stated that the distinction does not
warrant precluding continued representation for an indigent defend-
1111. Id. at 1625 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1112. Id. at 1617.
1113. Id.
1114. I. at 1623 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1115. Id (Brennan, J., concurring).
1116. I. at 1621 (Brennan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d
298, 299-301 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant's conviction reversed because trial judge's insistence
that an attorney, not chosen by defendant, represent defendant when retained counsel was
hospitalized violated defendant's right to counsel of his choice); Gandy v. Alabama, 569
F.2d 1318, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978) (denial of a continuance to permit retained counsel to con-
duct trial was a due process violation because defendant was forced to proceed with trial
counsel who was neither chosen by the defendant nor prepared for trial); Linton v. Perini,
656 F.2d 207, 209-11 (6th Cir. 1981) (denial of a continuance which retained counsel needed
for trial preparation, and court appointment of substitute counsel following retained coun-
sel's withdrawal, violated defendant's right to counsel of his choice), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
983 (1982); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 356-61 (7th Cir. 1972) (failure to grant a
continuance to permit defendant time to hire substitute retained counsel violated defend-
ant's right to counsel of his choice). Cf. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to retain additional counsel
once fair and reasonable opportunity to retain adequate counsel is given, if delay would be
unreasonable), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240-
43 (6th Cir. 1971) (no constitutional violation caused by denial of continuance to permit lead
counsel to try case because requested continuance was open-ended and defendant did not
object to the attorneys who represented him even though neither attorney was chosen by the
defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972).
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ant.'117 Additionally, the cases are distinguishable on another ground:
they involved the defendants' right to counsel of their choosing, a right
that indigent defendants do not enjoy.' 11 8 Justice Brennan recognized
that a state's interest in economy and efficiency may preclude permit-
ting an indigent defendant from choosing his or her own counsel."'t 9
He did not believe, however, that the interest outweighed an indigent
defendant's interest in continuing a relationship with an attorney with
whom a relationship of trust and confidence had developed." 120 Justice
Brennan stated that recognition of a qualified right to continued repre-
sentation would impose only a minimal burden on the trial courts by
requiring them to balance the defendant's interest in continuing the at-
torney-client relationship against the state's interest in proceeding; the
decision would be subject to an abuse of discretion standard of
review. 121
Justice Brennan also agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding that
once a violation occurred because the trial court failed to balance the
interests involved, the defendant should not be required to show preju-
dice for a reversal." 22 He reasoned that because there would be no
way to determine whether the trial would have proceeded differently if
the deputy public defender, instead of Hotchkiss, had represented
Slappy, any inquiry into the question would be "'unguided specula-
tion.' "1123 In conclusion, Justice Brennan noted that indigent criminal
1117. 103 S. Ct. at 1622 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1118. Id. at 1622 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1119. Id (citing Tague, An Indigent'sRight to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV.
73 (1974)). Tague also identifies fairness, orderliness, and protection of the bar as legitimate
governmental concerns. Tague, supra, at 99. Although the article recognizes various legiti-
mate governmental concerns that should be balanced against an indigent defendant's inter-
est in selecting his or her own counsel, it concludes by stating that there are less intrusive
ways to protect the various interests and that, therefore, an indigent defendant should have
the opportunity to choose his or her own attorney. Id Justice Brennan, however, recog-
nized that governmental interests may preclude permitting an indigent defendant from
choosing his or her own counsel, and conceded that certain state interests may outweigh an
indigent's interest in continuing an attorney-client relationship. 103 S. Ct. at 1622 n.5 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
1120. 103 S. Ct. at 1622 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1121. Id. at 1623 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1122. Id at 1624 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1123. Id (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978)). Justice Brennan
stated that it would be reasonable to assume that the defendant suffered some prejudice
because of an arbitrary denial of a continuance. He added, however, that relief should not
be granted if the state shows existing factors which would have made the denial of the con-
tinuance reasonable. In this situation, the court's failure to inquire into the length of the
attorney's unavailability and balance the defendant's interest in continued representation
against the state's interest in proceeding would be harmless error. Id at 1624-25 n.9 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
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defendants are "entitled to the enforcement of procedural rules that
protect substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution."1124
2. Effective assistance of counsel
a. on appeal
An indigent defendant's constitutional right to assistance of coun-
sel on his or her first appeal as of right was established in Douglas v.
California.I"25 In Douglas, the Supreme Court ruled that a meaningful
appeal is dependent on having the benefits of an attorney's "examina-
tion into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments
on [the client's] behalf.' 126 In Anders v. California,1127 the Court re-
fined this rule and held that the attorney must vigorously and compe-
tently argue the appeal." 128 Additionally, the Anders Court held that an
attorney may not withdraw from an appeal if there is anything in the
record that "arguably" supports the appeal.1
29
Recognizing that Anders compels attorneys to argue nonfrivolous
appeals, the Second Circuit recently held that Anders also mandates
that an attorney argue on appeal any nonfrivolous claims requested by
the defendant." 3 ° The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Barnes," 3 1 rejected
this Second Circuit extension of Anders, however, and held that the
attorney's decision not to argue claims requested by the defendant did
not violate the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel."
132
In Jones, the defendant, Barnes, was convicted of robbery and as-
sault. 133 Michael Melinger was assigned to represent Barnes on ap-
1124. Id. at 1625 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1125. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
1126. Id. at 358.
1127. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
1128. Id at 744.
1129. Id In Anders, the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, a felony. His
court-appointed counsel concluded from a review of the record and a discussion with the
client that there was no merit to the appeal. The attorney informed the court of his conclu-
sion and of Anders' desire to file a pro se brief. Id at 739-40. The .4nders Court held that an
attorney may not abandon a nonfrivolous appeal. The Court nevertheless indicated that, if
an attorney finds the case to be completely frivolous, he or she may advise the court of the
finding, file a brief that refers to anything in the record that might support the appeal, and
request the court's permission to withdraw from the case. Id at 744.
1130. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). See
supra note 1129.
1131. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
1132. Id. at 3313-14.
1133. Id at 3310. Barnes' arrest was based on the victim's statement that he recognized
one of his assailants as a person known as "Froggy" and on a physical description of the
assailant. Barnes was known as "Froggy." Id
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peal. 1134 Barnes sent Melinger a letter suggesting several claims he felt
should be raised on appeal, as well as a copy of a pro se brief he had
written. 1135 Melinger then sent Barnes a list of seven claims he was
considering asserting on appeal."1 36 In the appellate brief, Melinger
asserted three of the seven listed claims. Melinger also submitted
Barnes' pro se brief. Subsequently, Barnes submitted two additional
pro se briefs in which he raised three more of the seven claims Mel-
inger had considered but had not included in his brief."1 37 At oral ar-
gument, Melinger argued only the three claims presented in his brief.
He did not mention any of the claims set forth in the pro se briefs.
Barnes' conviction was affirmed by summary order."1 38
Barnes filed a habeas corpus petition in which he claimed ineffec-
tive assistance of appellate counsel."1 39 Concluding that there was no
basis in the record for the claim, the district court dismissed the peti-
tion.1140 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that appellate counsel
must, to the best of his professional ability, argue additional colorable
points requested by the defendant.141 The circuit court construed An-
ders v. California142 as barring appellate counsel from abandoning
both nonfrivolous appeals and nonfrivolous issues."1 43
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger characterized the
Second Circuit decision as a per se rule requiring appellate counsel to
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client.1144  He stated
that the Second Circuit's interpretation of Anders in fact contravened
1134. Id.
1135. Id.
1136. Id Melinger included some of the claims listed in Barnes' letter; however, Melinger
rejected most of the claims because he thought that they would not be helpful in obtaining a
new trial and were not based on evidence in the trial record. Id.
1137. Id. at 3311.
1138. Id The New York Court of Appeals denied Barnes' leave to appeal the summary
order. Id
1139. Id Prior to filing this habeas corpus petition, Barnes had challenged his conviction
in both federal and state courts claiming, among other things, ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Id
1140. Id Before denying Barnes' petition, the district court determined that Barnes had
exhausted his state remedies. Id
1141. Id By the time the Second Circuit heard Barnes' case, at least twenty-six state and
federal judges had rejected Barnes' claim that he was unjustly convicted. Id at 3311 n.3.
1142. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
1143. 103 S. Ct. at 3311. The Court stated the Second Circuit had held "when the 'appel-
lant requests that [his attorney] raise additional colorable points [on appeal], counsel must
argue the additional points to thefull extent of his professional ability."' Id. (quoting Barnes
v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added by the Court)).
1144. Id at 3312.
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the Anders decision. t145 Chief Justice Burger noted that the appellate
attorney's role requires him or her to use professional judgment to se-
lect the most important issues for review" 146 and to avoid diluting the
impact of the important issues by adding weak arguments.' 147 He con-
cluded that the per se rule announced by the Second Circuit would
restrict vigorous and effective advocacy and, thus, would thwart the
goal behind the Anders decision." 1
48
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun opined that a lawyer
has an ethical duty to raise nonfrivolous claims requested by the client
even if, in the lawyer's judgment, the claims are unlikely to succeed.' 11
However, Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that this ethical
consideration does not amount to a constitutional duty."5 °
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, dissented.'I'1
Relying on the sixth amendment guarantee of "assistance of counsel,"
Justice Brennan believed that a defendant, not his or her attorney, is
afforded the right to decide which nonfrivolous issues should be
presented on appeal." 52 Accordingly, Justice Brennan would have re-
manded the case for a determination of whether Barnes actually in-
sisted that Melinger brief the requested nonfrivolous issues.' t' If
Barnes did insist that the issues be briefed, and the court found that
Barnes was dissatisfied with merely filing his pro se briefs, Justice Bren-
nan indicated that he would conclude that Barnes was deprived of his
right to assistance of counsel.' 
54
1145. Id at 3313.
1146. Id. at 3312.
1147. Id. at 3313 (citing Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25
TEMP. L.Q. 115, 119 (1951); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 266
(1981)).
1148. Id at 3314.
1149. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun noted the similar position adopted
by the American Bar Association. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals, Standard 21-3.2, Comment, 21-42 (2d ed., 1980)).
1150. Id. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1151. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1152. Id. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe right to 'assistance of counsel' carries
with it a right, personal to the defendant, to make [the] decision, against the advice of coun-
sel if he chooses.").
1153. Id at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For purposes of review, the majority assumed
that Barnes did not merely accept Melinger's decision but, instead, insisted that Melinger
raise the issues he requested. Id. at 3312 n.4.
1154. Id at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan strongly disagreed with the
analysis of the majority opinion. Although he agreed with the majority's description of good
appellate advocacy, Justice Brennan proffered his belief that the majority placed too much
emphasis on the interest of the state and too little emphasis on the client's interest. Id at
3317-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Brennan stated, "any restriction on
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b. at trial
An accused's constitutional right to counsel" 15 includes the right
to effective assistance of trial counsel."1 56 Standards for determining
the requisite attorney performance are established by the trial courts.
Although given broad discretion, the Supreme Court has admonished
trial courts from establishing standards that would permit a defendant's
case to be handled by an incompetent attorney.' 5 7 The standard used
in the Ninth Circuit, established in Cooper v. Fitzharris,115 8 is a two-
prong test that requires a defendant to show, first, attorney errors or
omissions which reflect a failure to act as a reasonably competent, con-
scientious criminal attorney and, second, prejudice to his or her defense
resulting from the attorney's conduct." 59
In United States v. Gibson,"16 0 the Ninth Circuit, applying the
Cooper test, held that the defendant's failure to show counsel errors
that prejudiced his defense precluded relief on a claim of ineffective
individual autonomy and dignity should be limited to the minimum necessary to vindicate
the State's interest in a speedy, effective prosecution." Id at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1155. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .assistance of counsel for
his defense." In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932), the Court recognized the
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel where an indigent defendant is accused of a
capital offense, is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of adequately representing
himself because of ignorance, illiteracy, feeble-mindedness, or the like. The Court's decision
in Powellwas extended in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to include any defend-
ant charged with a felony.
1156. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (constitutional guarantee of right
to counsel includes right of a defendant facing felony charges to be represented by effective
counsel; counsel's effectiveness is determined by whether advice given is within range of
competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases).
1157. Id
1158. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
1159. I. at 1330-31. In Cooper, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected a requirement that a
conviction could be overturned on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, only if the
attorney's conduct made the trial a "farce and mockery." Id at 1328-29. Instead, the Ninth
Circuit standard of review now requires that a defendant receive assistance of counsel that
reflects the level of competence expected from a reasonably competent criminal defense at-
torney. The standard required is consistent with that established by the Supreme Court in
McMann v. Richardson, supra note 1156. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit standard requires
that it appear that the defendant was prejudiced by the errors or omissions claimed to be the
result of the ineffective assistance of counsel. 586 F.2d at 1331. The prejudice requirement
is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
In Chambers, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's denial of relief on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The denial was premised on a finding that the error com-
plained of was harmless and, therefore, did not prejudice the defendant's defense. Id. at 53-
54.
1160. 690 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1446 (1983).
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assistance of counsel." 6 In Gibson, the defendant was convicted of
mail fraud, wire fraud, and inducing people to travel interstate for
fraudulent purposes.' 62 On appeal, the defendant listed nineteen in-
stances where his trial counsel failed to object or move to strike certain
testimony as the basis for his claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. 63 The court rejected the defendant's claim because he failed to
meet the second prong of the Cooper test. The defendant failed to show
that the listed errors and omissions prejudiced his defense." 64
In United States v. Christopher,1 65 the court held that counsel's
failure to object to the defendant's absence at his arraignment and trial
did not prejudice the defendant's defense." 66 The defendant was con-
victed of misdemeanor charges of being present on federal property
after normal working hours. 167  Although the defendant's absence
from his arraignment could not be explained, the trial court decided to
proceed with his trial. The defendant's attorney did not object to the
court's decision to proceed in his client's absence."1 68
On appeal, the defendant contended that his attorney's failure to
object to his absence at the trial violated his right to effective assistance
1161. Id. at 704. See Hall v. Sumner, 682 F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant's failure
to meet first prong of Cooper test eliminated need to address second prong).
1162. 690 F.2d at 699.
1163. Id. at 703.
1164. Id.
1165. 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983).
1166. Id. at 1261. Although the court denied the defendant's ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim, the courts vacated his conviction because Michel's (one of the defendants) absence
violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. The rule provides in pertinent part:
(c) A defendant need not be present in the following situations:
(2) In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for
not more than one year or both, the court, with written consent of the defend-
ant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial, and imposition of sentence in the
defendant's absence.
FED. R. CRM. P. 43(c)(2). The Ninth Circuit found that Michel did not consent in writing
to his absence at the arraignment. 700 F.2d at 1262. The court also held that the error was
not harmless because the trial judge did not find that Michel had adequate notice of the
charges against him to permit a finding that he voluntarily waived his right to attend the
trial. Such a finding requires the defendant to answer the indictment by personally pleading
in court. Id. (citing United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1209 (2d Cir. 1972)).
1167. 700 F.2d at 1255. The defendant was a member of an organization whose goal was
to pass the California Marijuana Initiative. The group set up a table on the corner of the
federal property to collect petition signatures, distribute information, and to register voters.
The group selected this site because there was pedestrian traffic and because it was close to a
busy entertainment center, a commercial area, and the U.C.L.A. campus. The defendant
was cited when he was asked to leave the federal property and he refused to do so. The
citation was issued on the fourth night of the group's activity. Id. at 1256.
1168. Id.
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of counsel. 1169 The Ninth Circuit held that, while the attorney's omis-
sion was "significant," the defendant failed to show that his defense
was prejudiced."170 The court reasoned that the trial was brief and con-
cerned only the question of the federal property's normal working
hours, that only two witnesses appeared for the government and none
for the defense, and therefore, the defendant's absence was not prejudi-
cial. 117' The court also stated that mere error on the part of the defend-
ant's attorney is insufficient to warrant reversal. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit reaffirmed its use of the Cooper standard."
1 72
In United States v. Coleman," 73 the Ninth Circuit considered the
effect of cumulative attorney errors on the applicability of the Cooper
test. In Coleman, the defendant was found guilty of conspiring to com-
mit murder and conspiring to fraudulently collect life insurance pro-
ceeds.1174 At trial, his counsel insisted that a three hour tape, containing
admissible and inadmissible damaging statements, be played in its en-
tirety instead of the edited version offered by the government. 1175 On
appeal, Coleman argued that he was deprived of effective assistance of
counsel, basing his contention on his attorney's decision to play the
entire damaging tape as well as instances when the attorney failed to
object to hearsay testimony and long, nonresponsive answers."1
76
In considering the defendant's claim, the Ninth Circuit recognized
the rule that trial attorneys have broad discretion in the use of trial
tactics.1177 The court concluded that the attorney's decision, which the
trial court construed as an attempt to minimize the tape's impact, was
one of trial tactics and did not amount to attorney ineffectiveness.'178
The Ninth Circuit found that the additional errors merely permitted
testimony that was of minimal significance to the trial. 179 The court
recognized the need to consider the cumulative effect of all trial errors
1169. Id at 1261.
1170. Id
1171. Id
1172. Id For a discussion of the Cooper test, see supra notes 1158-59 and accompanying
text.
1173. 707 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 171 (1983).
1174. Id at 375.
1175. Id at 378.
1176. Id
1177. Id (citing United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant
claimed he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney should have made
motion to suppress illegally found evidence sooner; court characterized decision as one of
trial tactics to be given broad discretion and held that, even if it was an error, it was not one
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in evaluating a trial counsel's effectiveness," 8 ° but held that the errors
of Coleman's attorney fell short of establishing a sixth amendment vio-
lation. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant failed to show
that his defense was prejudiced, and therefore failed to satisfy either
prong of the Cooper test." 8'
In Hudson v. Rushen,"82 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court's denial of a motion for substitution of attorney resulted in
neither a denial of the defendant's right to counsel nor in a denial of his
right to effective assistance of counsel. In Hudson, the defendant was
convicted of kidnapping, forcible rape and forcible oral copulation, all
committed while armed with a deadly weapon." 18 3 Following the pros-
ecution's case-in-chief, the defendant made a motion for substitution of
his appointed attorney. The court held a hearing out of the jury's pres-
ence, found the defendant's request to be without merit, and denied the
motion. 1 84 The court adjourned the trial until the next morning to
give the defendant and his attorney time to confer. The next morning,
the attorney advised the court that his client would not participate in
the trial at all. The defendant then told the court that he did not want
his attorney to represent him, and that his attorney in effect was fired.
The defendant, Hudson, was then removed from the courtroom."8 "
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether Hudson was denied his
constitutional right to counsel by the trial court's denial of his motion
for substitution of attorney. The Ninth Circuit evaluated the propriety
of the trial court's decision in light of the timeliness of Hudson's mo-
tion, the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the reasons for the mo-
tion, and the extent of the conflict that existed between Hudson and his
attorney, Mr. Wong." 86 The Ninth Circuit found that Hudson's mo-
1180. Id. (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979)). The defendant also attempted to raise a fifth amendment claim by
contending his attorney's failure to raise the claim constituted ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The court said, however, that no reasonably competent attorney would have made the
argument. Id
1181. Id Where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt in cases such as this, it is very
difficult for a defendant to show prejudice and meet the second-prong of the Cooper test. Id
(citing United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938
(1981)).
1182. 686 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1896 (1983).
1183. Id. at 828.
1184. Id.
1185. Id at 829. The Ninth Circuit characterized Hudson's removal from the courtroom
as an "obstreperous departure." Id at 831.
1186. Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979)). In Mills, the
Ninth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mills' motion
to dismiss his attorney. The court based its decision on the following factors: (1) Mills'
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tion, made after the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief,
would have resulted in a significant delay or mistrial, and that the trial
court's inquiry was as "comprehensive as the circumstances reasonably
would permit."' 8 7 Additionally, the court noted that no complete
breakdown in communication between Hudson and Mr. Wong had oc-
curred until after the trial court made its inquiry into Hudson's reasons
for wanting a different attorney." 88 Finally, the Ninth Circuit stated
that while a defendant's loss of confidence in his attorney weighs heav-
ily in the defendant's favor, it is not controlling."l8 9 The defendant's
constitutional right to counsel must be balanced against society's inter-
est in an efficient and prompt judicial system."190 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit held that Hudson's right to counsel was not violated." 9'
The Ninth Circuit further held that Mr. Wong effectively represented
Hudson and that, therefore, Hudson's right to effective assistance of
counsel was not violated.'
192
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defend-
ant must not only establish that his or her attorney did not act in a
reasonably competent manner, he or she must also show that the inef-
fective performance prejudiced his or her defense. The Ninth Circuit's
use of this two-prong approach, in addition to the broad discretion ac-
corded attorneys in their use of trial tactics, makes it extremely difficult
for a defendant to establish a violation that will result in a reversal.
motion was made only one week before trial and probably would have delayed the trial;
(2) the conflict between Mills and his attorney had not resulted in a complete lack of com-
munication; and (3) the attorney presented an adequate defense. United States v. Mills, 597
F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979).
1187. 686 F.2d at 831. Although not stated on the record, the Ninth Circuit inferred "that
the trial court knew what the defendant's defense was, that trial counsel had consulted suffi-
ciently with the defendant, that trial counsel was prepared, and that his advice to the defend-
ant to testify was not aberrational." Id.
1188. Id The Ninth Circuit distinguished Hudson from an earlier decision, Brown v. Cra-
ven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), in which a trial court's summary denial of a motion for
substitution of attorney was held to be error. The court stated that in the present case,
unlike Brown, it was not reasonable to think that the result in Hudson would have been
different if Hudson had had confidence in his attorney. 686 F.2d at 831-32.
1189. 686 F.2d at 832.
1190. Id (citing Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1610
(1983)). See discussion of Slappy, supra notes 1098-1124 and accompanying text, suggesting
that it may not be constitutionally necessary to balance the defendant's interest in having a
different attorney against the state's interest in proceeding with the trial.
1191. 686 F.2d at 832.
1192. Id The court stated that there was no basis for granting a substitution of attorney
because of Mr. Wong's representation; Mr. Wong effectively represented the defendant. Id.
The court did not state the factors it considered in determining that Mr. Wong effectively
represented Hudson.
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3. Right to self-representation
An individuals right to represent oneself is provided for both by
statute"1 93 and by the United States Constitution." 94 However, before
being permitted to proceed pro se, a defendant must make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his or her right to counsel, which necessitates
a finding that the defendant is aware of the disadvantages that may be
faced by electing to proceed without the benefit of counsel. 95
In Evans v. Raines,I"96 the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
state court for a determination of whether the defendant was competent
to waive counsel and whether the waiver was made intelligently. 1197 In
Evans, the defendant was charged with rape and kidnapping for rape.
On the issue of the defendant's competency to waive counsel, the Ninth
Circuit noted that there was neither a hearing nor a finding on the issue
in the record.1198 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court deci-
sion that, given substantial evidence of the defendant's inability to
competently choose to waive counsel, the trial court was required, as a
matter of law, to hold a hearing on the issue." 99 The Ninth Circuit
also found that, absent a record showing that the defendant was ad-
vised of the penalties which could be imposed and the seriousness of
the charges against him, it was impossible to say that the defendant
intelligently waived his right to counsel. 200 For these reasons, the case
1193. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976) provides: "In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel 'as, by rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct cases therein."
1194. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the sixth amendment guarantees a de-
fendant a constitutional right to self-representation). Prior to the Court's decision in Farefta,
the Supreme Court, in Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), held that a defend-
ant is not constitutionally required to have a lawyer. Although the Adams Court stated in
dicta that there is a right to self-representation, the right was not expressly recognized until
Faretta was decided. The Faretta Court held that there is a constitutional right to self-
representation. 422 U.S. at 807. This right is implicit in the sixth amendment and is sup-
ported by both the structure and the legal history of the amendment. Id. at 818-19.
1195. 422 U.S. at 835 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (waiver of a
constitutional right is not presumed; trial judge should determine whether accused intelli-
gently and competently waived right to counsel)).
1196. 705 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1983).
1197. Id. at 1481.
1198. Id. at 1480.
1199. I1d The defendant had a pretrial hearing to determine his competence to stand trial,
but it did not establish the higher degree of competence necessary to waive counsel. See
Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam) (higher degree of competence re-
quired to waive counsel than is required to stand trial).
1200. 705 F.2d at 1480. A defendant must be informed of the consequence of his decision
to waive counsel before the decision can be made "intelligently." Id (citing Hodge v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1969) (en banc)).
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was remanded to the district court to be sent back to the state court for
a further hearing. 120'
In United States v. Wilson,1202 the Ninth Circuit held that a de-
fendant's constitutional right to represent himself does not include the
right to have pretrial law library access.1203 At Wilson's arraignment, a
magistrate denied Wilson's motion to proceed pro se and appointed an
attorney to represent him. Wilson then filed a notice of intent to appeal
the denial, following which the magistrate held a hearing on Wilson's
ability to represent himself. Based on Wilson's lack of education, the
magistrate recommended that Wilson not be permitted to represent
himself."12 04 Although Wilson objected to the recommendation, the dis-
trict court failed to act on it until the day of trial. 120 5 When asked by
the court if he still wanted to represent himself, Wilson stated that he
was not prepared to defend himself because he had been denied access
to a law library and was unfamiliar with trial procedures. Wilson,
therefore, agreed to have appointed counsel with the understanding
that he could ask questions of witnesses himself and make suggestions
to his appointed attorney.
206
On appeal, Wilson contended that he was denied his sixth amend-
ment right to proceed pro se.12 °7 He claimed that although he was ulti-
mately given the right to represent himself, the failure to notify him
before trial effectively denied him the right. 20 1 Wilson also claimed
that denying him pretrial law library access violated his sixth amend-
ment rights. 120 9 The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Faret/a v. Calfor-
nia,1210 held that the constitutional right to represent oneself does not
include the right to do research at the government's expense.' 21 ' The
court further held that, because Wilson was not entitled to pretrial li-
brary access, the district court's failure to rule on his motion to proceed
pro se until the day of trial did not violate any constitutionally pro-
1201. Id. at 1481. The Ninth Circuit left the method of determination to the state's discre-
tion. Id.
1202. 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 205 (1983).
1203. Id. at 1273.
1204. Id. at 1270.
1205. Id
1206. Id Although he was permitted to participate in his trial, Wilson's only involvement
in the trial was when he renewed his complaint about being denied law library access. Id.
1207. Id at 1270.
1208. Id. at 1270-71.
1209. Id at 1271. Wilson claimed that the right to self-representation recognized in
Farella implicitly included the "right of access to legal facilities and materials necessary to
prepare legal arguments and documents." Id
1210. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See supra note 1206.




In Locks v. Sumner,1213 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court's
refusal to appoint advisory counsel to assist a pro se defendant did not
violate the defendant's right to counsel. 2 4 In Locks, the defendant
requested that he be permitted to have his appointed attorney act as co-
counsel while he defended himself at trial on two counts of first-degree
murder.1215 Following the district court's denial of his request, Locks
dismissed his attorney, voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and
elected to proceed pro se.1216 Prior to trial, Locks again requested addi-
tional counsel. The judge agreed to bring back Locks' original attorney
to try the case. Locks declined, stating that although he wanted the
help of the appointed attorney, he still wanted to represent himself. 2 17
The request was again denied.
218
On appeal, Locks argued that the trial judge's refusal to appoint
advisory counsel violated his right to counsel. 12 19 In an earlier deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit had held that a criminal defendant does not
have a constitutional right to both self-representation and the assist-
ance of co-counsel, but that the court has the discretion to permit such
"hybrid representation."'' 220  In Locks, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the right to advisory counsel' 22 ' deserves no "higher status" than
the right to co-counsel. 222 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that
the trial court could, within its discretion, appoint advisory counsel for
the defendant, 223 but was not constitutionally required to do so.
1212. Id at 1273.
1213. 703 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 338 (1983).
1214. Id at 407-08.
1215. Id. at 404.
1216. Id. at 405.
1217. Id.
1218. Id
1219. Id at 407. Locks also claimed a violation of his right to counsel based on his own
errors. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim. Id at 408 (citing United States v. Trapnell,
512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) ("A defendant representing himself cannot be heard to com-
plain that his Sixth Amendment rights have been violated.")).
1220. Id at 407 (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396-97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974)). The
Ninth Circuit assumed Locks requested advisory counsel, not co-counsel. Id Co-counsel
permits both the defendant and his or her attorney to participate directly in the trial. Advi-
sory counsel permits a defendant to conduct his or her own defense with the advice of an
attorney; however, the attorney has no direct participation in the trial.
1221. See infra note 1223.
1222. 703 F.2d at 407.
1223. Id. at 408. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Tenth Circuit has afforded "standby"
counsel similar status. Id. at 407 (citing United States v. Figax, 605 F.2d 507, 516-17 (10th
Cir. 1979)). Standby counsel not only assists a pro se defendant, he or she will take over
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4. Conflict of interest
An individual's constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
sel'224 includes the right to representation that is free from conflict of
interest. 1225 In cases where the possibility of a conflict of interest is
apparent, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire further.
22 6
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a
conflict on interest, a defendant is required to show that an actual con-
flict existed which adversely affected his or her attorney's perform-
ance.22 7  A defendant may make an intelligent, competent waiver of
his or her right to have independent counsel.
1228
In United States v. Powell,1229 the defendant and her son had dual
representation by privately retained counsel. The trial judge, in open
court, warned the defendant about the potential conflict of interest.
Despite repeated warnings and opportunities for the defendant to re-
tain separate counsel, she told the court she understood her rights and
wanted to be represented by the same attorney as her son. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the defendant's insistence on retaining her attor-
ney constituted a valid waiver of her right to independent counsel, and
that the waiver precluded her claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.' 230 The court further stated that the defendant failed to sufficiently
completely if the defendant is unable to continue representing him or herself. Id. at 407 n.3.
While the Supreme Court has recognized the value of permitting "hybrid representation" in
helping the defendant present a defense and in maintaining the integrity of the judicial
process, the Court has not held that a pro se defendant has a constitutional right to the aid of
an attorney at trial. Id at 407 (citing Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975)). Thus,
the Ninth Circuit's decision is consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
1224. See supra notes 1155 & 1156 and accompanying text.
1225. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1980) (sixth amendment right to counsel in-
cludes right to representation that is free from conflict of interest) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978)).
1226. 450 U.S. at 272 (record showed petitioner's representation by employer's counsel
may have involved a conflict of interest; trial court has affirmative duty to inquire further),
1227. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980) ("a defendant who shows that a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate
prejudice"). AccordHolloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1978) (denial of attorney's
request for independent counsel based on his belief that a conflict existed in his representa-
tion of multiple defendants held to satisfy requirement that actual conflict of interest be
shown; no prejudice had to be shown).
1228. Glaser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (trial court should determine if ac-
cused made an intelligent and competent waiver of the right to counsel) (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).
1229. 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3540 (1984).
1230. Id. at 456-57. The Ninth Circuit did not cite any authority for its conclusion that the
defendant made a valid waiver. However, the conclusion appears to be consistent with the
requirements of FED. R. C~iM. P. 44(c). Rule 44(c) states that when two defendants, jointly
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demonstrate prejudice and noted that this failure was perhaps more
important in denying her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.'
23'
The Ninth Circuit's consideration of prejudice in this case was contrary
to prior Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. 1232  Previous
cases have held that once a defendant shows that an actual conflict of
interest existed, he or she is only required to show that the conflict of
interest adversely affected the attorney's conduct at trial.
233
charged, are represented by the same attorney and it appears that a conflict of interest is
likely to arise, the court shall take appropriate measures to protect the defendant's right to
counsel. The notes of the advisory committee on rules, following Rule 44(c), indicate that a
court may find and accept a valid waiver of the right to separate counsel if the defendant has
been advised of the probable risks involved and the defendant has voluntarily, clearly, and
unequivocally stated that he or she understands the risks and chooses to waive the right. In
Powell, the record showed that the district judge informed the defendant of her right to
separate counsel and explained the potential conflict in detail. The defendant stated that she
understood her rights and wanted to be represented by the attorney. 708 F.2d at 456-57.
1231. 708 F.2d at 457 (citing United States v. Altamirano, 633 F.2d 147, 150-53 (9th Cir.
1980) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on attorney incompetency), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 839 (1981); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (attorney
errors claimed to result in ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974
(1979)).
1232. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on conflict of interest, unlike claims
based on attorney errors or omissions, do not require a showing of prejudice before relief
will be granted. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980), the Supreme Court held
that, once a defendant shows that his or her attorney actually represented conflicting inter-
ests that adversely affected his or her performance, the defendant does not need to demon-
strate prejudice to obtain relief. In United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981), the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that in cases
where a defendant's claim is based on a conflict of interest, the Cuyler rule, not the Cooper
test, see supra notes 1158 & 1159 and accompanying text, applies. The court interpreted
Cuyler to require that a defendant need show only that the conflict of interest adversely
affected the attorney's performance, not that the representation resulted in prejudice.
Since Cuyler was decided, courts have struggled with its language. The Cuy/er Court,
although affirming its Holloway holding that a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice,
failed to clarify how the prejudice requirement differed from requiring a defendant to show
that his or her attorney's performance was adversely affected. The Cuyler Court also failed
to clearly articulate how the courts should analyze claims based on conflict of interest. That
is, should a court determine, first, that an actual conflict existed and, second, that the attor-
ney's performance was adversely affected, or, as suggested by Justice Marshall, should a
court infer that the conflict adversely affected the performance of the attorney? 446 U.S. at
358. Although the Ninth Circuit read Cuyler as establishing a two-pronged analysis, some
courts have interpreted the decision as also requiring that prejudice be shown. Still other
courts read Cuyler as precluding the necessity of showing anything in addition to the actual
conflict. See Note, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Auitple Criminal Defendants
Clarifying Cuyler v. Sullivan, 70 GEo. L.J. 1527 (1981-82).
1233. The use of the Cuyler standard, as opposed to the Cooper test, may be particularly
important in cases involving overwhelming evidence of guilt, as noted by the Hearst court.
For example, overwhelming evidence of guilt might (as in Cooper itself) make al-
most impossible a showing that a relatively minor error resulted in actual preju-
dice. But such evidence would be completely irrelevant to an inquiry whether the
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C The Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense
The sixth amendment guarantees several rights to criminal de-
fendants that are fundamental to an adversary system of justice. The
amendment provides that an accused has the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor. 1234 Moreover, the sixth amendment protections have been ex-
panded under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
include the right of access to evidence.
1235
1. Access to evidence
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the
accused to discover and inspect the government's evidence.1236 How-
ever, the prosecution's violation of a discovery order does not reach
constitutional due process dimensions unless the evidence requested by
the accused is favorable to his cause and material to the issue of his
guilt or punishment.
237
In United States v. Tamura,12 38 the defendant was convicted, inter
alia, of bribery and conspiracy for his participation in the illegal award
same error, if caused by an actual conflict of interest, showed an adverse effect on
counsel's performance.
United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938
(1981).
1234. The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1235. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975), the United States Supreme Court
stated that the rights of the criminal defendant set forth in the sixth amendment are also
covered by the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. In Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963), the Court held that the prosecutor's deliberate withholding of
favorable evidence from the accused violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
1236. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l) provides that upon request by the defendant the govern-
ment must disclose evidence pertaining to: (1) the defendant's statements; (2) the defend-
ant's prior record; (3) documents or other tangible objects that the government intends to use
as evidence or is material to the preparation of the defense; and (4) reports of examinations
and tests that the government intends to use as evidence or is material to the preparation of
the defense.
1237. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), see supra note 1235.
1238. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
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of a telephone cable contract to his employer. 239 Prior to the trial, the
district court ordered the government to issue a pretrial statement to
permit defendant Tamura to prepare his defense. 240 The govern-
ment's statement did not disclose any evidence linking Tamura to the
conspiracy's inception. Tamura, therefore, raised the defense that he
was unwittingly drawn into the scheme at a later date.' 24 ' One month
prior to trial, the key witness recanted his prior statement and con-
tended that Tamura had been involved in the illegal contract scheme
from its inception; the prosecution, however, failed to disclose this new
development until the opening remarks at trial. 242 Tamura's counsel
objected, claiming unfair surprise. She moved, in the alternative, for a
mistrial, a dismissal, or a continuance to prepare a rebuttal to the new
evidence. 1243 The trial court denied these motions and offered either to
prohibit the surprise testimony or permit it with a cautionary instruc-
tion. Tamura refused these alternatives, and the trial court permitted
the testimony with a cautionary instruction.' 2 " The Ninth Circuit up-
held the trial court's denial of the continuance on the ground that the
defense failed to show prejudice or to demonstrate that a continuance
was necessary to prepare a rebuttal to the new evidence.
245
1239. Id. at 594.
1240. Id. at 599. The order required the government to disclose before trial its theory
concerning when, where, and how Tamura entered the conspiracy so that Tamura would
know which witnesses to call. Id.
1241. Id.
1242. Id at 598-99.
1243. Id. at 599.
1244. Id. On appeal the Ninth Circuit recognized that the surprise testimony prejudiced
Tamura's opportunity to prepare his defense. Id (citing United States v. Roybal, 566 F.2d
1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecution's failure to disclose pursuant to discovery order
that accused had sold narcotics to a government informant made it improper to offer evi-
dence of sale at trial); United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798, 801-03 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (prose-
cution's denial in response to formal request for any statements made by defendant at time
of arrest prevents disclosure of such statements at trial)). However, the Ninth Circuit did
not apply its holding in Roybal but, instead, held that the trial court's decision to give a
limiting instruction rather than the relief Tamura sought was not an abuse of discretion. 694
F.2d at 599-600 (citing United States v. Sukomolachan, 610 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1980)
(denial of continuance was not abuse of discretion where defense could not specifically sup-
port need for continuance); United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1977)
(refusal to order mistrial was not abuse of discretion, even though prosecution engaged in
serious impropriety, since trial court offered to give a curative instruction); United States v.
Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutorial misconduct, failure to produce in-
culpatory evidence when ordered to do so, did not bar subsequent prosecution for perjury
based on the evidence that was not produced), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979)).
1245. 694 F.2d at 600 (citing United States v. Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 623 (9th
Cir. 1980) (after government shows that it immediately informed defense counsel of defend-
ant's inculpatory statement, and of its intent to offer it as proof, defense has burden to show
prejudice and either request a continuance or exclusion of the testimony)).
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The Tamura decision illustrates the Ninth Circuit's reluctance to
reverse the trial court's decision to only give the accused minimal due
process protection from prosecutorial indiscretions.1246 Procedurally,
the effect is that the accused need not be informed of new evidentiary
developments as they arise. When these new developments are offered
at trial, the accused has the burden to show unfair surprise which re-
sulted in prejudice. Moreover, the relief need not be fashioned to the
requests of the defense, but appears to be left to the discretion of the
court.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in Tamura considered two ancil-
lary issues. The defense had requested a one or two day recess at the
close of the prosecution's case-in-chief to depose a nonresident,
unindicted co-conspirator whose testimony would controvert the gov-
ernment's new evidence. 247 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of the request. The court found that the request had
merit, but held that in light of the strength of the evidence against
Tamura, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 48
The trial court also refused to permit the defense to call the prose-
cutor to testify as to the sudden change in the key witness' testi-
mony.2 49 The Ninth Circuit observed that such a practice is
universally disfavored unless justified by a compelling need. It found
no such compelling need and affirmed the trial court's decision to use a
stipulation reciting the prosecutor's recollection of the facts rather than
permit his testimony. 25
In United States v. Greene,'251 the Ninth Circuit summarily dis-
posed of the defendant's claim of prejudice based on the district court's
1246. See supra note 1244 and accompanying text.
1247. 694 F.2d at 600.
1248. Id (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1241
(9th Cir. 1978) (permitting depositions of fugitive co-defendants would not further interest
ofjustice as required by FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979)). See also
United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 195 (9th Cir. 1973) (to allow testimony of a fugitive
to be taken by deposition would amount to an injustice), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974).
But see United States v. Wilson, 601 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1979) (fact that person whose
deposition defendants sought to take and introduce at trial was a fugitive did not provide
basis for denying motion to have deposition taken).
1249. 694 F.2d at 601.
1250. Id (citing United States v. Schwartzbaum, 527 F.2d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1975) (no
compelling need to cross-examine government counsel concerning government-prepared
memorandum used to refresh government witness' memory where use of memorandum it-
self would have been sufficient), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Birdman,
602 F.2d 547, 553 (3d Cir. 1979) (circuits unanimously disapprove of the double role of
advocate-witness), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980)).
1251. 698 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1983).
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denial of his motion for a two-week continuance of the trial. 252 Greene
argued that the government failed to provide meaningful discovery un-
til five days before the initial trial date. The Ninth Circuit found this
argument specious since the commencement of trial was subsequently
delayed four weeks to permit the defense to seek an interlocutory ap-
peal on an unrelated issue; therefore, Greene actually received much
more preparation time than his counsel had requested.
253
In Camitsch v. Risley,254 the accused sought to expand the right of
a criminal defendant to comment on a juvenile witness' delinquency to
include the right to review the otherwise confidential case files of juve-
nile witnesses.' 2 5  Camitsch sought to apply the rule of Davis v.
Alaska. 25  In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the
confidentiality of a juvenile delinquency record must, in certain cir-
cumstances, yield to the sixth amendment right of the accused to cross-
examine the juvenile witness.
257
Camitsch had been prosecuted for sexual assault and nonconsen-
sual sexual intercourse with four juvenile girls. Prior to trial he sought
discovery of the entire contents of the complaining witnesses' juvenile
files.' 211 In Camitsch, the Ninth Circuit held that Davis does not stand
for the unfettered discovery of confidential juvenile records. 259 The
court noted that Davis only permits disclosure of a juvenile witness'
delinquency record after a careful balancing of the respective rights of
the juvenile witness and the criminally accused. 260 Here, the court
ruled that Camitsch failed to demonstrate that the information in the
juveniles' files was so probative of bias that disclosure was war-
ranted.' 26' The Ninth Circuit therefore upheld the district court's deci-
sion not to allow disclosure of the files.
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit has narrowly con-
strued the accused's constitutional rights with respect to access to evi-
dence which may be helpful in the preparation of a defense. The court
has applied this narrow construction to both the sixth amendment right
1252. Id at 1374.
1253. Id
1254. 705 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1983).
1255. Id at 352-53.
1256. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
1257. Id at 319. In Davis, the defendant was charged with burglary. The key prosecution
witness, a juvenile, was on probation for having committed burglary, and initially had been
a suspect in the crime.
1258. 705 F.2d at 352.
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to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and to the due
process right to obtain favorable evidence. 262
2. Confrontation of witnesses
The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment is the accused's right to cross-examine witnesses. 263
Additionally, the confrontation clause requires the government to
make a good faith effort to assure the availability of each prosecution
witness at trial.
264
In United States v. Peltier,1265 the accused sought to establish the
bias of a government witness on cross-examination. The trial court
refused to permit the cross-examination on the grounds that the wit-
ness, an FBI agent, had not testified regarding any material allegations
against Peltier.
1266
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the accused's right to cross-
1262. The other circuits generally recognize the accused's right to prepare a defense
through appropriate discovery. See United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 1980)
(when defense counsel makes an appropriate discovery request, the government must re-
spond by turning over the materials), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980); United States v.
Truong Dinh Hung, 667 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1981) (when production is ordered, ac-
cused has right to see and know what has been produced), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 114 (1982).
As in the Ninth Circuit, this right is narrowly construed. See United States v. Kubiak,
704 F.2d 1545, 1549 (1Ith Cir.) (prosecution's failure to provide co-conspirator's exculpatory
statement in timely manner did not violate Brady since accused was not denied access to
information sought, but transmittal was merely delayed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 163 (1983);
United States ex rel. Davidson v. Wilkerson, 618 F.2d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir.) (accused sought
to review trial records prior to initiating a proceeding to vacate his sentence; he was re-
stricted to thirty days to review records), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980); United States v.
Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1354 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant charged with tax evasion was not
entitled to discovery of documents relevant to his selective prosecution defense prior to es-
tablishment of a colorable claim of selective prosecution).
Moreover, as in the Ninth Circuit, the government's failure to supply the requested
documents is seldom considered reversible error. See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d
1131, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982) (government's failure to produce allegedly exculpatory informa-
tion prior to trial did not violate rule mandating disclosure of evidence favorable to accused,
because Rule 16 does not require disclosure prior to trial); United States v. Crouthers, 669
F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir. 1982) (where defendant expressly requested prosecutor to provide
specific information and the prosecutor refused, conviction must be set aside if suppressed
evidence might have affected outcome of the trial, whether it relates to issue of an accused's
guilt or innocence, or credibility of the prosecutor's witness).
1263. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974).
1264. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
1265. 693 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). The defendant was being prosecuted for
escaping from federal prison and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 97.
1266. Id. The trial record revealed a lengthy and abrasive contest between opposing coun-
sel as to the proper scope of cross-examination. The government's presentation of evidence
was prolonged by such aggressive cross-examination that the trial judge abbreviated the
cross-examination. Id
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examine a prosecution witness may be curtailed by the trial court
where the prosecution's witness did not give testimony relevant to the
allegations against the accused and where any potential bias of the wit-
ness was explored by counsel representing other defendants.1267 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that although, as a general proposition, "a de-
fendant is always allowed to bring out facts tending to show bias or
prejudice on the part of a prosecution witness,"' 1268 the curtailment of
the cross-examination was, in this instance, not prejudicial and fully
consistent with the requirements of a fair trial.
269
In United States v. Miller,27° defendant Miller's counsel had ex-
amined the government's key witness, Szombathy, twice during the
trial and had extensively questioned him regarding inconsistent state-
ments he had made during prior proceedings. At the conclusion of the
trial, Miller's counsel sought Szombathy's testimony in order to im-
peach him by reading his prior inconsistent statement into the record.
The trial court refused this request. Miller appealed on the ground that
he was denied his right to effective cross-examination.' 27'
The Ninth Circuit held that Miller had ample opportunity to chal-
lenge Szombathy's credibility during trial, and had done so; therefore,
no sixth amendment violation occurred.1272 The court pointed out that
the trial court has discretion to control the mode and order of interro-
gation and presentation of witnesses. 273 Miller's counsel addressed
Szombathy's prior inconsistent statement twice during the trial; there-
fore, it was determined that the additional reading of the prior incon-
sistent statements into the record would have been a waste of time. 2 7 4
1267. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the witness had not testified as to any relevant
evidence against Peltier, and that counsel for the other defendants had drawn out all the
facts upon which an inference of bias against Peltier could have been drawn. Id.
1268. Id. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
1269. 693 F.2d at 97. But see United States v. Willis, 647 F.2d 54, 58 (9th Cir. 1981) (the
denial of the right of cross-examinaton was prejudicial).
1270. 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982). Miller had been convicted of receiving stolen goods in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976).
1271. 688 F.2d at 660. Miller was accused of receiving a trailer stolen from Szombathy.
At trial, "Szombathy explained that during the earlier proceedings his testimony was based
on trailer dimensions recorded on an inventory card, and that his trial testimony was based
on measurements of the stolen trailer after its recovery." Id
1272. Id at 660-61.
1273. Id at 660. See FED. R. EVID. 611. See also United States v. Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245,
1248-49 (9th Cir. 1982) (effect of trial court's ruling limiting cross-examination was simply to
delay, not restrict, testing of the witness' credibility); United States v. Bleckner, 601 F.2d
382, 385 (9th Cir. 1979) (test of abuse of discretion by trial court is whether jury had suffi-
cient information to appraise biases and motives of witness).
1274. 688 F.2d at 660-61 (citing FED. R. EvID. 61 l(a)).
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The court ruled that the jury already had an adequate basis to make a
discriminating appraisal of Szombathy's credibility.1
2 75
In United States v. Tornabene,1276 the accused unsuccessfully
sought to force a government informant to testify at trial. The Ninth
Circuit applied the principle that the trial court has a duty to carefully
hear and weigh testimony to determine whether the government made
reasonable efforts to produce an informant whose presence had been
properly requested by the defendant. 277 Tornabene had been prose-
cuted for distribution of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); he had
been arrested on the basis of one sale to government agents that had
been arranged by an informant. Tornabene raised the defense of en-
trapment at trial.1278 Prior to trial, the defense requested the name and
present whereabouts of the informant. The government, in lieu of pro-
viding the requested information, agreed to produce the informant
himself. However, the government failed to do so, and although con-
tinual assurances were made to the court and to the defense during
subsequent' hedrings that the informant would be made available, the
informant was never produced. Inexplicably, the trial judge found that
the government had made reasonable efforts to produce the informant
and ordered the trial to proceed.
1279
Upon review of the entire record, the Ninth Circuit found that
through either neglect or intentional avoidance the government's ac-
tions were not designed to produce the informant. It thus reversed the
district court's findings.
28 0
1275. Id at 661. Cf. United States v. Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982) (impeach-
ing evidence gave jury adequate basis to appraise witness biases and motives).
1276. 687 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1982).
1277. Id at 315-16 (citing United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977)). In Hari, the government had used two Mexican
nationals to develop its case against the defendants leading to their arrest. Although re-
quested to do so, the informants failed to appear at trial. The government argued that it did
not know of the informants' whereabouts in Mexico and, therefore, could neither ensure nor
compel their attendance at trial. The Ninth Circuit held that the government need only use
reasonable efforts to produce the informants and that it had met this burden. United States
v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
1278. 687 F.2d at 313.
1279. Id at 314-15. The basis of the trial court's finding is unclear. The Ninth Circuit's
review of the record shows that the government failed to take the steps necessary to produce
the witness. See infra note 1280 and accompanying text.
1280. Id The alleged sale occurred in San Francisco; the informant resided and owned a
place of business in San Antonio, Texas. Prior to trial, Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents met with the informant in San Antonio, but did not advise him of the govern-
ment's agreement to produce him in San Francisco. The agents merely told him that he may
have to go to San Francisco. Subsequently, the informant called the DEA agents and in-
formed them that he would be moving shortly; the agents did not obtain or request his new
[Vol. 18
CRIMINA L L4W SJR VEY
In recent decisions addressing the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment, the Ninth Circuit has attempted to delicately balance the
almost inviolable right of the accused to confront adverse witnesses'
28'
with the need of the criminal justice system to proceed toward resolu-
tion of cases in a forthright and timely manner.
3. Attendance of witnesses
The sixth amendment does not by its terms grant a criminal de-
fendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all
witnesses; it only guarantees compulsory process for obtaining
favorable witnesses.1282 A violation of the sixth amendment may occur
if the defendant is arbitrarily deprived of testimony that is relevant and
material to his defense.
283
In United States v. Kahan & Lessin Co.,1284 two health food distrib-
utors had been convicted of price fixing and other violations of federal
antitrust laws. 1285 The defendants contended that they had been de-
prived of needed testimony at trial because the government would not
extend immunity to a number of their witnesses. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this contention on the ground that the defendants failed to
show that the testimony would have been favorable to them.
286
The defendants also asserted that the government actively discour-
aged a number of witnesses from cooperating with the defense, thereby
depriving the defendants of their testimony. 287 The Ninth Circuit
found that the district court had given the defendants access to at least
one witness during trial, and that the defendants failed to show that
they were denied access to any other witnesses. The court thus held
address. Thereafter, the agents could not locate the informant's new residence. The agents
drove by the informant's business but never went inside. Id
1281. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) ("The Sixth Amendment to the Con-
stitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution 'to be confronted with
witnesses against him.' ").
1282. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982); U.S. CONST. amend.
vi.
1283. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963), see supra note 1235.
1284. 695 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1285. Id. at 1123.
1286. Id. at 1124 (citing United States v. Garner, 663 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 1981) (de-
fendant must demonstrate that favorable testimony was actually suppressed), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 905 (1982)). See also United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1978)
(before a claim of denial of due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) may
succeed, defendant must show that favorable evidence was actually suppressed).
1287. 695 F.2d at 1124.
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that the defense had not been unduly handicapped. 288
4. Juvenile proceedings
In juvenile proceedings the state is considered the parens patriae
rather than the prosecuting attorney and judge. 28 9 The criminal jus-
tice adversary system and its attendant milieu of sixth amendment
rights and privileges is replaced by a proceeding that is civil in nature
wherein the only constitutional safeguard provided the child is the fun-
damental due process right to fair treatment.1290 Implicit in the broad
procedural guarantee of fair treatment is the requirement that parents
of the accused juvenile be informed of their child's alleged violation of
the law and be given notice of scheduled court proceedings sufficiently
in advance to afford a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense.
291
In United States v. Doe,2 92 the Ninth Circuit found that the failure
to immediately notify the parents of a juvenile's arrest,1293 and the fur-
ther failure to advise the parents of the child's pending hearings on his
delinquency, did not infringe upon the child's due process rights be-
cause the parents were notified in a timely manner by their child's law-
yer.1294  The court declined to uphold the per se requirement of
1288. Id (citing United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1034 (1980)).
1289. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
1290. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-56 (1966) (on issue of whether juvenile
court should take jurisdiction or remit the matter to trial court for adult proceedings, the
juvenile is entitled to only due process rather than the full rights of adult criminal defend-
ants). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971) (adversarial aspects of
juvenile hearings require attendant constitutional safeguards, including right to appropriate
notice, to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination, and privilege against self-
incrimination).
1291. This principle, established in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), was subsequently codi-
fied by Congress as § 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act at 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1976).
In Gault, the authorities had failed to notify the juvenile's parents of his custodial arrest
or the hearing on his delinquency. The Court reversed the boy's conviction, holding that
these omissions violated the child's due process rights. 387 U.S. at 33. The Gault holding
probably survives McKeiver since the issue was a procedural rather than an adversarial as-
pect of the juvenile justice system. See supra note 1290.
Section 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act states in pertinent part: "Whenever a
juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act ofjuvenile delinquency, the arresting officer
shall immediately ... notify the parents ... of the rights of the juvenile and of the nature
of the alleged offense." 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1976).
1292. 701 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1983).
1293. Id at 821-22. The failure to immediately notify the parents of a juvenile of his arrest
is technically a violation of § 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act. See supra note 1291
and accompanying text.
1294. 701 F.2d at 822. The facts are therefore distinguishable from Gault. See supra note
1291 and accompanying text.
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parental notice and held that the failure of the authorities to give notice
to the parents did not adversely affect the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings.
12 95
The Ninth Circuit in Doe has relaxed the rigid notice to parents
standard and replaced it with a more flexible due process inquiry tai-
lored to ensure that the accused receives a fair disposition of his juve-
nile delinquency adjudication.
1296
D. The Right to a Speedy Trial
1. The Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act of 19741297 is a statutory scheme that pro-
vides both time limits within which various components of a criminal
prosecution must occur and sanctions that are to be imposed for failure
to comply with the time limits. The Speedy Trial Act (the Act), in-
tended to make a speedy trial a reality, supplements a defendant's con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial.
12 98
a. triggering the Act
The Act states that the time period between the date of arrest and
the return of an indictment or the filing of an information shall not
1295. 701 F.2d at 822-23 (citing United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 6-8 (10th Cir. 1975)
(notice requirement is more of a prophylactic safeguard than a fundamental due process
protection); United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1982) (notice is an
additional safeguard to ensure that due process rights are not violated)).
1296. The decision in Doe, although contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Gault, is
consistent with the recent cases of other circuits, see supra note 1295, and is in accordance
with recent developments in the Supreme Court's approach to procedural safeguards. For
example, the court in United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1975), cited Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), in which Miranda warnings were held to be procedural safe-
guards, not constitutionally protected rights. From Tucker, the circuits have extracted and
broadened the proposition that certain procedural safeguards, once deemed inviolable, are
now only prophylactic measures designed to ensure the maintenance of basic rights, but of
insufficient constitutional dimensions to require reversal if not followed. 513 F.2d at 8.
1297. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The sections of the Speedy Trial Act
deal with the following areas: § 3161 (time limits and exclusions); § 3162 (sanctions); § 3163
(effective dates); § 3164 (person detained or designated as high risk); § 3165 (district plans-
generally); § 3166 (district plans-contents); § 3167 (reports to Congress); § 3168 (planning
process); § 3169 (Federal Judicial Center); § 3170 (speedy trial data); § 3171 (planning ap-
propriations); § 3172 (definitions); § 3173 (sixth amendment rights); § 3174 (judicial emer-
gency and implementation).
1298. 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1976) provides: "No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted
as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitu-
tion." The sixth amendment of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .. . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
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exceed thirty days. 1299 Recently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
thirty-day period is triggered only by a federal arrest of an individual
who is also formally charged with an offense.130 0 Additionally, the
court decided that the dismissal requirement applies only in situations
where no indictment has been filed within the thirty-day period.'
30 '
In United States v. Candelaria,130 2 the Ninth Circuit held that the
Act's mandatory dismissal of a complaint when the indictment has not
been filed within thirty days after the individual is charged with an
offense applies only to situations where formal charges have been
filed. 30 3 In Candelaria, the defendant was arrested by military police
outside a telephone booth where he had just placed a call to the emer-
gency 911 number and said, "There is a bomb threat at Madigan Club,
okay." The defendant, not a member of the military, was released
within an hour and told that subsequent action would be taken against
him by the proper authorities. Forty-four days later, the defendant was
indicted on one count of communicating a false bomb threat. 30 4 Prior
to his trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment under the
Speedy Trial Act. 130 5 The defendant contended that the thirty-day
time limit to file an indictment, as imposed by section 3161(b) of the
Act, ran from the day of his arrest and, therefore, the indictment
against him was filed fourteen days too late. The defendant also con-
tended that the Act's sanction of dismissal applies to arrestees, regard-
less of whether charges have been filed. 130 6 The court, noting that the
1299. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976).
1300. United States v. Candelaria, 704 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed infra at notes
1302-07 and accompanying text; United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3085 (1983), discussed infra at notes 1308-11 and accompanying text;
United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed infra at notes 1312-14 and
accompanying text.
1301. United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed infra at notes
1315-24 and accompanying text.
1302. 704 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983).
1303. Id. at 1131-32.
1304. Id. at 1130. The defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (1976),
which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, through the use of the. . . telephone. . . willfully makes any threat, or
maliciously conveys false information knowing the same to be false, concerning an
attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made,. . . to. . .unlawfully...
damage or destroy any building. . . by means of an explosive shall be imprisoned
for not more than five years or fined not more than $5,000, or both.
1305. 704 F.2d at 1130. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any infor-
mation or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed
within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a
summons in connection with such charges."
1306. 704 F.2d at 1131. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "If, in
the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with
CRIMINAL LAW SWR VEY
statute explicitly provides both the sanction and those who may invoke
it, reasoned it was not the intent of Congress to extend the thirty-day
protection of section 3161(b) to persons arrested but not charged with
an offense. 1307
In United States v. Adams, 318 the Ninth Circuit held that a state
arrest does not start the thirty-day time limit for indictment provided
by section 3161(b), regardless of the amount of federal involvement in
the investigation and arrest.130 9 Three of the five defendants contended
that, because their state arrest followed a joint federal and state investi-
gation, the time period for filing the federal indictment began on the
date of the state arrest. 310 The defendants were arrested by the state
on June 12, 1980 but were not arrested and indicted by federal authori-
ties until August 7, 1981. The Ninth Circuit held that only a federal
arrest triggers the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act and, therefore, the
filing of the federal indictment on the same day as the federal arrest
met the time limitation of the Act.
1311
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v.
an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by section
3161(b) . . .such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dis-
missed or otherwise dropped."
1307. 704 F.2d at 1131. The Ninth Circuit generally agreed with the Eighth Circuit's rea-
soning in a case involving similar facts. In United States v. Jones, 676 F.2d 327, 329-30 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1983), the court found from the legislative history of
the Act that Congress assumed that an arrested individual would also be a "charged" indi-
vidual. The Eighth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court view that charges must be
pending to trigger the Act's protection. Accordingly, where the defendant was indicted ten
months after his arrest and release, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a
motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(1) and concluded that § 3161(b) applied only to situations
where formal charges had been filed. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982)
(no claim of a constitutional right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending).
1308. 694 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3085 (1983).
1309. Id. at 202 (citing United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264-69 (4th Cir. 1982)
(defendant's arrest by state officers, although accompanied by federal officers, did not consti-
tute "arrest" for purposes of Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755, 767
(5th Cir. 1981) (even though no state prosecution developed following defendant's state
arrest for a drug-related incident which later served as basis of federal indictment, state
arrest did not trigger the time limits of Speedy Trial Act), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982);
United States v. Lai Ming Tanu, 589 F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1978) (defendant's state arrest, with
agreement of the federal government, did not cause the defendant to be an "accused" for
purposes of Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435, 441-42 (2d Cir.) (time
limits of Speedy Trial Act not triggered by state arrests of defendant more than one year
prior to federal indictment and arrest, notwithstanding state and federal cooperation in in-
vestigation and prosecution of incident and presence of federal agents at each of two ar-
rests), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977)).
1310. 694 F.2d at 202.
1311. Id See supra text accompanying note 1303.
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Manuel,13 12 a case involving an arrest by tribal authorities. The de-
fendant was arrested and held for custodial interrogation for two days
by tribal police following a brutal killing on an Indian reservation.
Although federal authorities were involved with the investigation,
questioned the defendant following his arrest, and decided to prose-
cute, a grand jury indictment against the defendant was not obtained
until almost four months later. 1313 The defendant contended that the
delay violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the indictment against
him should have been dismissed. The Ninth Circuit, affirming the dis-
trict court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluded that
"only afederal arrest" will trigger the Act's thirty-day time period. 1314
Absent a federal arrest, no amount of federal involvement in a state or
tribal investigation and arrest will start the running of the thirty-day
period.
In United States v. McCown,3 "5 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
an indictment issued more than thirty days after the defendant's arrest
did not violate his right to a speedy trial since an identical indictment
had been issued within thirty days of his arrest. 316 The defendant was
arrested on October 9, 1981 and indicted on November 3, 1981 by a
federal grand jury for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
317
On December 15, 1981, the same grand jury indicted the defendant on
seventeen counts. Count seventeen was identical to the single count
indictment issued on November 3rd.13 18 On December 18, 1981, the
court granted the government's motion to dismiss the November indict-
1312. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983).
1313. Id at 914.
1314. Id. at 915 (emphasis in the original) (citing United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200,
202 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3085 (1983); United States v. laquinta, 674 F.2d
260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755, 767 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982); United States v. Leonard, 639 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1981)).
In each case cited by the Ninth Circuit, the defendants argued that a non-federal arrest
triggered the Speedy Trial Act time limits and, therefore, the subsequent federal indictments
violated their right to a speedy trial. The courts in each case held that, regardless of the
amount of federal involvement in the non-federal arrest, the Speedy Trial Act time limit was
not triggered unless, and until, a federal arrest occurred.
1315. 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
1316. Id at 1448.
1317. Id. at 1445. Defendant's conviction was based on a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1976) which provides in pertinent part: "(a) Except as authorized by this sub-
chapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally - (1) to . . . dis-
tribute. . . or possess with intent to. . . distribute. . . a controlled substance."
1318. 711 F.2d at 1445. The same facts formed the basis of both counts. The only differ-
ence between the November 3rd indictment and count 17 of the December indictment was
the use of the defendant's full middle name in one and his middle initial in the other. Id. at
1445 n.2.
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ment based on the duplication. The defendant then moved to dismiss
count seventeen of the December indictment on the ground that it had
not been issued within the thirty-day period prescribed in section
3161(b).1319 The Ninth Circuit held that section 3161(b) did not sup-
port dismissal, based on the express language of the statute 1320 and the
purposes for requiring a speedy indictment.' 321 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that because of the identical single count indictment issued on
November 3rd, this was not a case where "no indictment"'' 32 z had been
filed; nor was the defendant hampered in any way in preparing his de-
fense. If the government had moved to dismiss the later indictment,
instead of the November 3rd indictment, the defendant would have no
speedy trial violation claim.1323 The court also noted that the Decem-
ber 15th indictment did not create an impermissible delay in the de-
fendant's trial because the time limit ran from the defendant's
November 10th arraignment, not from the date the indictment was
issued. 
324
1319. Id. at 1445. See supra note 1305 for the statutory language. The defendant argued
that § 3161(d)(1) required the original thirty-day time limit to apply to any subsequent in-
dictments filed against him. The pertinent language of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1) (Supp. V
1981) provides: "If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defend-
ant ...." The Ninth Circuit concluded that, based on the statutory language, the section
did not apply because it concerns only dismissal upon a motion of the defendant, not dismis-
sals in cases such as this where the dismissal is based on a motion by the government. 711
F.2d at 1446. The court also reasoned that § 3161(h)(6), applicable to dismissal upon the
government's motion, did not apply because it contemplates a situation where the first in-
dictment is dismissed before a subsequent indictment is issued. Id The pertinent language
of 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(6) (1976) provides: "If the. . . indictment is dismissed upon motion
of. . .the Government and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same
offense ...."
1320. 711 F.2d at 1447. The court stated: "Section 3161(b) cannot properly be construed
independently of§ 3162(a)(1) and the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act." Id. (citing United
States v. Candelaria, 704 F.2d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court relied on the language
in § 3162(a)(1) which requires dismissal if "no indictment" is filed within the time limit. 711
F.2d at 1447 (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit). The purpose of the Speedy Trial Act is
to help reduce crime and the danger of recidivism. To achieve this purpose, the Act requires
speedy trials and increases the supervision over persons released pending trial. H.R. REP.
No. 1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7401,
7402.
1321. Speedy indictment serves two purposes: (1) it notifies the defendant of the charges
against which he or she must defend him or herself; and (2) it gives the defendant a clear
statement of the allegations against him or her so the defendant can raise them as a bar
against subsequent prosecution. Only the first purpose applies before trial. 711 F.2d at
1447.
1322. Id. (emphasis added by the court).
1323. Id. at 1448.
1324. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides in pertinent part:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence
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In United States v. Wilson,3 25 the Ninth Circuit held that the re-
capture and return to custody of an escapee does not trigger the thirty-
day limit within which an indictment must be filed charging the person
with escape. 326 The government contended, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed, that the statutory time limit is triggered only by an arrest or
service of summons in connection with an indictment. 1327 Wilson was
not arrested in connection with his indictment for escape, 328 and, there-
fore, the thirty-day time requirement did not apply. 329
b. pretrial preparation
In 1979, section 3161(c)(2) 1331 was added to the Speedy Trial Act.
This subsection expressly provides that, absent written consent of the
defendant or an election to proceed pro se, there must be a minimum of
thirty days between the time defendant first appears through counsel
and commencement of the trial.
In United States v. Day,13 3 1 the Ninth Circuit held that providing
a defendant with less than thirty days for pretrial preparation is inade-
quate and constitutes a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.' 332 The court
within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or
indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of
the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
1325. 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 205 (1983).
1326. Id. at 1276. The defendant, Wilson, was sentenced to six months in a federal half-
way house for a misdemeanor to which he pled guilty. About two weeks into the sentence,
Wilson signed out and failed to return. Wilson was recaptured and returned to custody two
months before an indictment was filed against him charging him with escape. Id at 1270.
1327. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976) states in pertinent part: "Any information or indictment
charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days
from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connec-
tion with such charges."
1328. Wilson was arrested and returned to custody two months prior to the filing of an
indictment for escape. 690 F.2d at 1270. The court said that Wilson's arrest was not "in
connection with" his escape, but that he was merely being returned to custody to complete
his previous sentence. Id at 1276. See supra note 1327.
1329. 690 F.2d at 1276. Accord United States v. Kripplebauer, 463 F. Supp. 291, 292
(E.D. Pa. 1978) ("Speedy trial times are triggered, however, by arrest (or indictment) for the
crime in question, not detention for some other offense."); United States v. Grant, 433 F.
Supp. 1113, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no speedy trial violation by an indictment on an escape
charge four months after return to custody).
1330. Section 3161(c)(2) provides: "Unless the defendant consents in writing to the con-
trary, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on which the defend-
ant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se."
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
1331. 716 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1456 (1984).
1332. Id at 1504. See supra note 1330. In Daly, none of the defendants consented in
writing to the trial date nor did any of the defendants waive their right to counsel and elect
to proceed pro se. 716 F.2d at 1504 n.2.
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also held that the thirty-day minimum time period begins to run when
an attorney appears on the defendant's behalf, unless the attorney is
appearing for a limited purpose only and will not represent the defend-
ant at trial.
1333
In Day, four defendants, Criswell, Daly, Klemp and Diaz,
claimed the district court erred by setting their trial date for September
15th in violation of section 3161(c)(2) of the Act. 1334 On August 14th,
Criswell, Daly and Klemp each appeared with counsel before a magis-
trate for a determination of their bail status. Klemp's attorney was ap-
pointed explicitly to represent him at the hearing while counsel for
Daly and Criswell subsequently represented them at trial. Criswell,
Daly and Diaz were arraigned on August 17th. Klemp's trial counsel
was also appointed on August 17th and appeared to seek a delay of
Klemp's arraignment. Klemp was arraigned on August 20th.
1335
The Ninth Circuit found a clear violation of Diaz's right to the
thirty-day preparation period. His initial appearance was at his ar-
raignment on August 17th and he, therefore, could not be tried before
September 16th without violating section 3161(c)(2). 1336 In contrast,
because Daly and Criswell each appeared at their August 14th bail de-
termination hearing with counsel who continued to represent them at
trial, the court determined that the September 15th trial date was
timely. 1337 Klemp, however, was not appointed trial counsel until Au-
gust 17th, at which time the attorney appeared on Klemp's behalf to
seek a delay of his arraignment. The court held that this August 17th
appearance triggered the thirty-day period. 1338 Therefore, September
1333. Id. at 1505. Appearances made by an attorney on the defendant's behalf will not
begin the thirty-day pretrial preparation period if either (1) the attorney has been appointed
to represent the defendant for a limited pre-arraignment purpose or (2) the attorney states
his intention not to represent the defendant further. Id.
1334. Id. at 1503. See supra note 1330.
1335. 716 F.2d at 1503-04. See supra note 1333. The district court had concluded that in a
multi-defendant case the statutory thirty-day period began to run from the first appearance
of any of the defendants. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the language of
§ 316 l(c)(2), see supra note 1330, indicates that each defendant must be considered individu-
ally. The court stated that the language of the Act does not support the district court's
position which, in effect, would make each defendant's statutory right dependent on the
government's decision to join the cases and on the time of arrest of the co-defendants. 716
F.2d at 1504.
1336. The Ninth Circuit followed the procedure set out in FED. R. CruM. P. 45(e) to com-
pute the various time periods. The rule provides in pertinent part: "In computing any pe-
riod of time the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to
run shall not be included." 716 F.2d at 1504 n.3.
1337. 716 F.2d at 1505.
1338. Id at 1504-05.
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16th was the earliest trial date that should have been set. Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the September 15th trial date violated
Klemp's right to the section 3161(c)(2) preparation period.'
339
Because the Act offers no specific guidance as to the appropriate
remedy for a violation,' 31 the Ninth Circuit fashioned its decision
from the purpose of section 3161(c)(2). The court determined that be-
cause section 3161(c)(2) was enacted to afford the defendant reasonable
time to obtain counsel and to grant counsel reasonable time to prepare
the defendant's case, 134 1 the violation denied Diaz and Klemp a fair
trial. 342 The court characterized the procedural error as tantamount to
an erroneously denied motion for a continuance. Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions of both Diaz and Klemp and
remanded for a new trial.' 343
c. arrest-to-indictment delay
The Act also provides a sanction for failure to comply with the
thirty-day period within which an indictment must be returned follow-
ing an arrest. The charges in the complaint must be dismissed or
dropped. 
344
In United States v. Antonio, '345 the Ninth Circuit held that section
3162(a)(1)1 346 requires dismissal of a complaint against a defendant
when an indictment is not issued within the thirty-day limit required by
1339. id at 1505.
1340. Id at 1506. The Ninth Circuit declined to determine whether the sanction provided
in § 3162(a)(2), requiring dismissal of an indictment, applied because § 3162 expressly pro-
vides that a motion for dismissal may be ordered only on a motion of the defendant.
Although the defendants had sought a continuance, neither defendant had made a motion to
dismiss at the trial. Id.
1341. Id at 1504-05 (citing Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comm. on the Admin, of the
Crim., Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, 11-12
(1981)).
1342. Id at 1506.
1343. Id.
1344. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (1976) provides in part:
If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such
individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the [thirty
day] time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this
chapter, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be
dismissed or otherwise dropped.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides a comprehensive list of reasons for
delay which will cause the delay period to be excluded from the computation of time within
which the trial must commence. Section 3161(h)(1) expressly states that only a period of
delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant is excludable. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
1345. 705 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1983).
1346. See supra note 1306.
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sectidn 3161(b). 1347 In Antonio, a criminal complaint was filed on June
22, 1981 charging the defendant with involuntary manslaughter.1348 On
June 23, 1981 he was arrested and appeared before a United States
magistrate. Thirty-five days later the defendant filed a motion to dis-
miss the criminal complaint against him. He contended that because
an indictment had not been returned within thirty days after his arrest,
the court was required under section 3162(a)(1) to dismiss the com-
plaint against him, either with or without prejudice. 349 Several hours
after the defendant filed his motion to dismiss, he was indicted by the
grand jury. The defendant's motion subsequently was heard and de-
nied. Thereafter, a superseding indictment was filed. The defendant
filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint, which was also denied.
The defendant was tried and convicted of involuntary manslaugh-
ter.' 350 The government contended, and the district court agreed, that
because an indictment had been returned before the defendant's mo-
tion was heard, dismissal of the complaint would not "nullify" the in-
dictment. The district court found that even if the charge was
dismissed, it could be refied. The district court thus concluded that
dismissal of the complaint would be a nullity.'
35'
The Ninth Circuit held that section 3162(a)(1), when read in con-
junction with section 3161(b), requires dismissal of a complaint, even if
an indictment may be pending, whenever a motion to dismiss is filed
before trial and when neither an indictment nor an information has
been filed against the defendant within thirty days after his arrest.1
352
1347. 705 F.2d at 1485. See supra note 1305.
1348. Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 and 1153. 18 U.S.C. § 1112
(1976) provides in pertinent part: "(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful.killing of a human
being without malice .... Involuntary - In the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution
and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death." 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976)
provides in pertinent part: "Any Indian who commits against the person ... of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses .... manslaughter ... within the
Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons .
1349. 705 F.2d at 1484. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court
shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the
offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the
impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the adminis-
tration of justice.
1350. 705 F.2d at 1484.
1351. Id at 1485.
1352. Id at 1486. Although not expressly stated, implicit in the court's holding is that the
motion to dismiss is filed by the defendant. Section 3162(a)(2) (1976) states that if the de-
fendant is not brought to trial within the required time limit the information or indictment
"shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant." The legislative history of § 3162 expressly
recognizes that while the dismissal is mandatory it is not automatic since the defendant is
1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
The court further stated that although the dismissal is mandatory, it is
within the trial court's discretion whether the dismissal is with or with-
out prejudice. 1353 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment
and sentence of the district court and remanded the case for a determi-
nation by the district court of whether the dismissal should have been
with or without prejudice. 1354
In United States v. Mehrmanesh,1355 the Ninth Circuit held that the
Act's sanction for an arrest-to-indictment delay does not apply to cases
in which the defendant was arrested prior to July 1, 1980.1356 In
Mehrmanesh, the defendant was arrested on March 20, 1980 and in-
dicted on July 9, 1980, a total of 111 days after his arrest. Mehrmanesh
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that 64 of the Ill
days were nonexcludable1357 and that, therefore, a violation of the Act
occurred which required dismissal of the indictment. 358  The district
court denied the motion to dismiss.
The government did not dispute that a violation of the Act oc-
curred.1359 Therefore, the government's only claim was that the sanc-
tions did not apply because Mehrmanesh was arrested before July 1,
1980, the effective date of the statute. 1360  The Ninth Circuit, noting
that neither the statutory language of section 3163(c)1361 nor the legisla-
tive history provided an express answer as to whether Congress in-
tended the sanction to apply, 1362 concluded that the construction
advanced by the government was the only one that gave meaning to all
the statutory language and was consistent with the Act's structure and
purpose. 1363 The court held, therefore, that sanctions for an arrest-to-
required to move for dismissal and the government is free to contest the motion. See H.R.
REP. No. 1508, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws
7401, 7431.
1353. 705 F.2d at 1486. See supra note 1349.
1354. 705 F.2d at 1487.
1355. 689 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1982).
1356. Id at 829.
1357. Id at 827 n.2.
1358. Id at 827.
1359. Id
1360. Id
1361. 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c) (Supp. V 1981) provides that the sanctions for a violation of the
Act "shall become effective and apply to all cases commenced by arrest or summons, and all
informations or indictments filed, on or after July 1, 1980."
1362. 689 F.2d at 828.
1363. Id at 829. Mehrmanesh argued that the dismissal sanction applied to his case be-
cause the indictment occurred after July 1, 1980. The Ninth Circuit rejected the construc-
tion because it would render the phrase" 'all cases commenced by arrest or summons' mere
surplusage." Id. (citing United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 767 (9th
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indictment delay apply only in cases where the arrest occurs on or after
July 1, 1980 and that sanctions for an indictment-to-trial delay apply
only to cases where the indictment is filed on or after July 1, 1980.1364
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Mehrmanesh's
motion to dismiss, stating that because he was arrested before July 1,
1980, the dismissal sanction did not apply.
13 65
d indictment-to-trial delay
In any case in which a defendant pleads not guilty, the time period
within which the trial must begin is established by section 3161 (c)1
3 66 of
the Act. The section provides that the trial must begin within seventy
days from either the date on which the indictment is filed or the date on
which the defendant appears before a judicial officer of the court in
which the charge is pending. The seventy-day period runs from the
later of the two dates.
1367
In United States v. Haiges,1368 the Ninth Circuit held that where a
defendant is indicted prior to his arraignment, the day of the defend-
ant's arraignment is excludable in computing the time within which the
defendant must be brought to trial. 13 69 In Haiges, the defendant was
arrested on November 6, 1981. He appeared before a magistrate on the
day of his arrest and was held to answer the charges against him. He
was indicted on November 10th, and on November 18th, he pled not
guilty at his arraignment. His trial was set for January 19, 1982. On
January 14, 1982 the clerk filed a minute order which vacated the Janu-
Cir. 1980) (government's interpretation of RICO would have rendered part of statutory lan-
guage redundant; therefore, construction was untenable)).
1364. Id. The court's statutory construction is recommended by the Judicial Conference of
the United States. Although not binding, the Ninth Circuit considered the Judicial Confer-
ence's recommendation persuasive. Id. at 829 n.7. The Ninth Circuit also discussed and
rejected a third possible interpretation of the statute. Senator Biden interpreted the sanc-
tions in the original language of§ 3163(c) (1976) to apply to late indictments when the arrest
occurred before the effective date but only if the indictment was filed more than thirty days
after the July 1, 1979 effective date. Id. at 829 n.6. Section 3163(c) was amended on August
2, 1979 making July 1, 1980 the effective date.
1365. 689 F.2d at 830.
1366. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (Supp. V 1981).
1367. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides in part:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence
within seventy days from the filing date. . . of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in
which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
1368. 688 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1982).
1369. Id. at 1275.
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ary 19th trial date and reset the trial for January 20th, 1370 seventy-one
days from the filing date of the indictment.
At trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment against
him, contending that the government failed to bring him to trial within
seventy days after the filing of the indictment as required by the Speedy
Trial Act.'37 ' The trial court denied the motion, holding as a matter of
law that the day of arraignment constituted an excludable delay under
section 3161(h)(1). 1
37 2
Under the District Court of Arizona's plan for implementation of
the Speedy Trial Act, 1373 the district court automatically excludes the
day of arraignment in computing the time between indictment and trial
when the defendant has made an initial appearance before his indict-
ment. In approving the practice, the district court concluded that "ar-
raignment was a 'proceeding concerning the defendant,' and therefore
excludable under section 3161(h)(1)."' 137 4  The defendant contended
that because arraignment triggers the Act's time limits it cannot also be
a "proceeding" that tolls the time limit. 137-
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court holding, noting that
the list provided in section 3161(h)(1) of "proceedings concerning the
defendant" which are excludable is not exhaustive. 1376 Additionally,
the Ninth Circuit relied on the United States Judicial Conference
1370. Id. at 1274.
1371. See supra note 1367.
1372. 688 F.2d at 1274. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides in pertinent
part:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the
time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant ....
(8)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by a judge on
his own motion. . .. if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
The trial court also held that January 19th, the day Haiges' trial was continued, was excluda-
ble under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue since, by
holding the day of Haiges' arraignment excludable, the defendant's trial began within the
prescribed time period.
1373. Sections 3165 and 3166 of the Speedy Trial Act require each district court to prepare
a plan of disposition of criminal cases in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 18
U.S.C. § 3166(b)(2) (1976) provides "[e]ach plan shall include information concerning the
implementation of the time limits and other objectives of this chapter, including: the inci-
dence of, and reasons for, periods of delay under section 3161(h) of this title."
1374. 688 F.2d at 1274. See supra note 1372.
1375. 688 F.2d at 1274.
1376. Id. at 1275.
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Guideline's conclusion that arraignment proceedings are excludable.
The court also found this interpretation to be consistent with the stat-
ute's legislative history.
13 7 7
In United States v. Jones,1378 the Ninth Circuit held that the con-
tinuance granted by the district court did not violate the defendant's
right to a speedy trial. 379 On appeal, the defendant contended that the
government sought to continue his trial from December 7, 1981 until
March 22, 1982 for the purpose of getting a superseding indictment.
13 0
The court found, however, that the record clearly showed that the con-
tinuance was necessary to permit continuity of counsel for a co-defend-
ant. 1381  The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the continuance was warranted due to the complexity
of the case.' 382 Because both reasons for the continuance are contem-
plated by the Speedy Trial Act 383 and account for time that is ex-
cluded when computing the time within which a trial must commence,
the Ninth Circuit held that the Act had not been violated.
384
1377. Id See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comm. on the Admin. of the Crim. Law,
Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, at 44 (1981).
See also H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. N-ws 7401, 7414 (House Report indicates Congress' intent to permit tolling of time
limits of Speedy Trial Act by hearing, proceedings and other necessary delays which nor-
mally occur prior to a criminal trial).
1378. 712 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 434 (1983).
1379. Id. at 1322-23.
1380. Id at 1323.
1381. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) governs periods of delay which are excludable in computing
the time within which a trial must commence. Section 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) specifically provides
that a trial judge may grant a continuance, the time of which is excludable, if a denial would
"unreasonably deny the defendant . . . continuity of counsel."
1382. 712 F.2d at 1323. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) provides that a judge may grant a
continuance, the delay of which is excludable under the Speedy Trial Act, if the judge finds,
and states in the record, that "the case is. . . so complex, due to the number of defendants,
the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation. . . for the trial itself within the time limits
established by [the Speedy Trial Act]." In Jones, the defendant and two co-defendants were
charged with misappropriation of funds and conspiracy. Additionally, the defendant and
one co-defendant were charged with mail fraud and securities fraud. 712 F.2d at 1320. The
Ninth Circuit stated that the decision not to sever the cases and try the defendant separately
was not an abuse of the court's discretion given the complexity of the case and the overlap-
ping proof involved in the different counts. Id at 1323 (citing United States v. Nolan, 700
F.2d 479, 483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3095 (1983)).
1383. See supra notes 1381 & 1382.
1384. 712 F.2d at 1323. The court also held that, given the complexity of the case and the
overlapping proof on different counts, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court
to decide not to sever the case and try the defendant separately. Id
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2. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 19741385
(the Juvenile Justice Act) is a comprehensive statutory scheme enacted
to provide a coordinated approach to the problems of juvenile delin-
quency and to improve the quality of juvenile justice. 1386 Section 5503
of the Juvenile Justice Act establishes procedural steps that must be
followed whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of
juvenile delinquency.387  The section requires that the juvenile be
taken "forthwith" before a magistrate and provides that he or she may
never be detained for an unreasonable period prior to a court
appearance.
388
In United States v. Doe, 389 the Ninth Circuit held that, given the
particular facts of the case, the one and a half day time period between
the juvenile's arrest and arraignment was reasonable and did not con-
stitute a violation of the Juvenile Justice Act. 1390 In Doe, the defendant
was arrested on the night of April 28, 1983 for transporting illegal
aliens from Mexico to the United States. The following day he was
moved from the first detention center to another and then, that after-
noon, he was taken to a metropolitan correctional center. An informa-
tion was filed against him at his arraignment before a magistrate on the
morning of April 30th. 139 1
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was detained for an un-
reasonably long time before his arraignment. 392 The district court
1385. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). These sections of the Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Act of 1974 deal with the following: § 5032 (delinquency proceedings
in district court, transfer for criminal prosecution); § 5033 (custody prior to appearance
before a magistrate); § 5034 (duties of magistrate); § 5035 (detention prior to disposition);
§ 5036 (speedy trial); § 5037 (disposition hearing); § 5038 (use of juvenile records); § 5039
(committment); § 5040 (support); § 5041 (parole); § 5042 (revocation of parole or probation).
1386. See H.R. REP. No. 1011, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5283, 5283.
1387. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1976) provides that, once a juvenile is taken into custody, the
'Juvenile shall be taken before a magistrate forthwith. In no event shall the juvenile be
detained for longer than a reasonable period of time before being brought before a
magistrate."
1388. See supra note 1387.
1389. 701 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1983).
1390. Id. at 824.
1391. Id at 821.
1392. Id, at 821-22. See supra note 1387. The Ninth Circuit distinguished two Second
Circuit cases where the juvenile was afforded relief for shorter periods of delay than that
involved in Doe. Each of the cited cases was decided based on a predecessor statute which
provided that a juvenile could not be detained for longer than "necessary." More currently,
however, in United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 707, 710 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986
(1978), the court held that a six hour delay between the arrest of a juvenile and his appear-
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found that the delay was not unreasonable under the circumstances
and, thus, did not constitute a violation of the Juvenile Justice Act.
The agents were extremely busy the day the defendant was taken into
custody and had to give priority to more urgent cases. 1393 The govern-
ment made a good faith effort to arraign the defendant as soon as possi-
ble; however, no magistrate was available until April 30, 1983.1
3 11
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding but limited
its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. The
court's willingness to say that Doe appeared "forthwith" before a mag-
istrate was premised on two facts. First, the government made a good
faith effort to arraign Doe as soon as possible, and, second, the govern-
ment did not use Doe's pre-arraignment statement at the juvenile adju-
dication hearing. 139
5
E. The Right to a Jury Trial
1. Gravity of the offense
The sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies only to "serious"
offenses and not "petty" offenses. 1396 As a basis for deciding the grav-
ity of an offense, the Supreme Court has generally looked to the maxi-
mum penalty authorized, rather than the penalty actually imposed. 1
397
Offenses carrying a maximum penalty not exceeding six months, a $500
fine, or both are usually considered "petty."' 1398 However, in criminal
contempt cases 1399 and collateral consequence cases, 14°° the use of the
ance before a magistrate was reasonable under the circumstances and, thus, did not consti-
tute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1976).
1393. Cases given priority included a woman in the late stages of pregnancy and women
with small children and infants. 701 F.2d at 824.
1394. Id
1395. Id.
1396. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540 (1888).
1397. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 70 (1970) (plurality opinion) (most rele-
vant standard is the maximum penalty possible); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62
(1968) (defendant entitled to jury trial where crime held a maximum two year punishment).
1398. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
1399. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) (petitioner was charged with
criminal contempt for violating an injunction); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476-77
(1975) (petitioner guilty of criminal contempt for violating temporary injunction against
picketing); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (defendant sentenced by
state to seven contempt terms of six months aggregated to three years and three months
considered serious). Congress has not specified the penalty in contempt cases so the court
looks to the fine or imprisonment actually imposed.
1400. See United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 25-27 (9th Cir. 1981) (possibility that de-
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maximum penalty as a criterion of the gravity of the offense is not dis-
positive. 40  For example, in United States v. Craner,40 2 the defendant
was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in Yosemite
National Park, which carries a maximum penalty of six months impris-
onment, a $500 fine, or both. 40 3 The possibility that Craner could have
had his driving license revoked by the State of California, if he was
convicted, acted as a collateral consequence which reclassified the of-
fense as "serious."' 4 4 Therefore, the court held that Craner was enti-
tled to a trial by jury.
4 5
In United States v. Arbo, 1416 the defendant was convicted of inter-
fering with forest officials in the performance of their official duties.1
40 7
Arbo's motion for a jury trial had been denied by the district court.
40 8
On appeal, Arbo did not argue collateral consequences or that the max-
imum penalty of 16 U.S.C. section 551 1409 was not a considered legisla-
tive judgment, 410 but rather that his offense was malum in se. In an
older line of cases, inquiry into whether the offense was malum in se or
malum prohibitum4 1 was a frequently used criterion for deciding the
seriousness of an offense. 412 Arbo contended that because he could
fendant could lose his driver's license where maximum penalty was within "petty" classifica-
tion, made crime "serious" and entitled defendant to a jury trial).
1401. Id.
1402. 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981).
1403. 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1983). The maximum penalty in Craner of six months, or $500, or
both was set by the Secretary of the Interior and not by Congress. Since those rules were not
promulgated by Congress, and therefore did not represent considered legislative judgment,
the court felt justified in diminishing the import of the maximum penalty rule. The court
underscored the lack of considered judgment by pointing out that driving under the influ-
ence carries the same penalty as digging for bait in a national park. 652 F.2d at 25.
1404. 652 F.2d at 28 (Sneed, J., concurring).
1405. Id at 27.
1406. 691 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1982).
1407. Id. Arbo violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.3(a) (1983) and 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1976). 36 C.F.R.
§ 261.3(a) (1983) prohibits: "[tlhreatening, resisting, intimidating, or interfering with any
forest officer engaged in . . .the performance of his official duties in the protection, im-
provement, or administration of the National Forest System." The penalty for a violation is
not to exceed six months imprisonment, a $500 fine, or both. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
Arbo had a mining claim in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. Two rangers with the
United States Forest Service visited Arbo to determine whether Arbo was complying with
certain mining regulations. Arbo refused to allow the rangers to make an inspection and
ushered them off his property at gunpoint.
1408. 691 F.2d at 863.
1409. See supra note 1407.
1410. See supra note 1403.
1411. Malurn in se refers to an offense that is evil or wrong in itself while ma/lumprohibitum
refers to an offense prohibited by statute but which is not inherently wrong or evil.
1412. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (gravity of crime
should be considered with the moral quality of the act to determine classification of the
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have been charged with forcible interference with federal officers under
18 U.S.C. section 111,1413 which is a felony under federal law, the inter-
ference for which he was charged under 16 U.S.C. section 551 should
be considered malum in se.'4 1 4 The court disagreed, citing the regula-
tory nature of section 5511415 and characterized the statute as malum
prohibium 41 6 The distinction between 18 U.S.C. section 111 and 16
U.S.C. section 551 is that section 111 includes the additional element of
force, which makes it a felony and therefore malum in se.14 17 The court
held that even though Arbo could have been charged under 18 U.S.C.
section I 11, it did not alter the regulatory nature of the offense for
which he was charged. 418 Thus, Arbo's offense was considered "petty"
and he was not granted a right to trial by jury1419
In United States v. Jenkins,142 ° the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the imposition of a two-year probation term altered the seri-
ousness of a charge and thus entitled the defendant to a jury trial.'
42
1
Jenkins was a civilian visiting a Marine military base. He was detained
while seeking a guest pass, and an argument ensued. The argument
escalated into a scuffle when a military policeman attempted to restrain
Jenkins. The defendant tried to hit the policeman with his elbow, and
the force of the blow carried both of them through a plate glass win-
dow. Jenkins was originally charged with assault by striking, beating,
or wounding in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 113(d). 4 22 Jenkins re-
offense); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (driving recklessly is malum in
se). In a recent case, the moral quality distinction in Colts and Clawans was not repudiated.
United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1976). Colts was cited without
disapproval in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 n.6 (1970), the case which supposedly
erased the moral character of the offense as determinative of whether a defendant had a
right to a jury trial.
1413. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[w]hoever forcibly assaults, re-
sists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person. . . while engaged in or
on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both."
1414. 691 F.2d at 864.
1415. The purpose of 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1976) is to regulate the use and occupancy of public
forests and prevent their destruction. The section authorizes the promulgation of rules rea-
sonably designed to effectuate that purpose. See United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296, 298
(9th Cir. 1981) (Secretary may adopt regulations which do not impermissibly impair mining
claims).
1416. 691 F.2d at 864.
1417. See United States v. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (defendant
resisted federal officers who tried to make him participate in line-up).
1418. 691 F.2d at 864.
1419. Id. at 865.
1420. 734 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1983).
1421. Id. at 1326-27.
1422. 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1976) provides: "Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, [is
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quested a jury trial and his request was granted. Subsequently, the
government filed a superseding information which reduced the charge
to a simple assault under 18 U.S.C. section 113(e).1423 The superseding
assault charge carried a maximum imprisonment of three months, or a
fine of $300, or both. 424 Jenkins' request for a jury trial was denied.
He was convicted and given a suspended ninety-day sentence and
placed on two years probation.
425
The Ninth Circuit decided that the seriousness of the offense was
not altered by the two-year probation term. 1426 The court relied on
Frank v. United States,1427 which held that a three-year probation term
did not entitle the defendant to a jury trial.1428 The Ninth Circuit
found Frank to be controlling and denied Jenkins' appeal.
429
2. Not guilty by reason of insanity pleas
In Pennywell v. Rushen,143° defendant Pennywell argued that his
sixth amendment right to a jury trial was violated by the failure of a
California state court to dispose of his plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity.' 431 Pennywell was convicted in California Superior Court of
murder and attempted murder.1432 He appeared pro se at the arraign-
ment and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of temporary
insanity. The court attempted to apprise Pennywell that, under Cali-
fornia law, a plea of temporary insanity is not recognized and is, in
fact, nugatory. Although he continued to hold to this plea, the court
pled Pennywell not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)
on its own motion.
At subsequent proceedings, the court referred to Pennywell's plea
as a not guilty plea only. 14 33 Neither Pennyweil nor the counsel ap-
punishable] by fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both."
1423. 734 F.2d at 1324.
1424. 18 U.S.C. § 113(e) (1976) provides: "Simple assault, [is punishable] by fine of not
more than $300 or imprisonment for not more than three months, or both."
1425. 734 F.2d at 1324.
1426. Id. at 1326-27.
1427. 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
1428. Id. at 150.
1429. 734 F.2d at 1327.
1430. 705 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1983).
1431. Id at 357.
1432. Pennywell's conviction was appealed and denied. He then exhausted his state reme-
dies and filed for a federal writ ofhabeas corpus which was also denied. He appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. Id
1433. Id After the arraignment, a suppression hearing was held before a new judge. The
record is unclear as to whether the second judge was aware of the NGI plea. From the
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pointed for him made an objection to this characterization of Pen-
nywell's plea. They introduced no evidence at trial on the NGI plea
and did not object to the court disposing of the NGI plea at any time
prior to appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 434
Pennywell's argument was that California did not adhere to its
own methods of dealing with NGI pleas.1 435 The Ninth Circuit inter-
preted his claim not as a sixth amendment claim, but rather as a due
process claim. 436 The court stated that it was necessary for Pennywell
to show that his trial was rendered "so 'arbitrarily and fundamentally
unfair'" by California's alleged error of failure to follow its own proce-
dures that due process was violated. ' 437 The court held that there was
no error and that, even if there was error, Pennywell failed to make the
requisite showing that the error rendered his trial "arbitrary" or "fun-
damentally unfair."'
1438
The court found that there was no error because a plea in Califor-
nia must be entered personally by a defendant. 439 If that defendant
does not cooperate, the trial court's only option is to enter a plea of not
guilty.1440 If the trial court pleads NGI on its own initiative, that plea
is invalid.1441 Pennywell contended that he should be entitled to rely
on the NGI plea whether validly entered or not,' 442 and cited People v.
suppression hearing to voir dire, the selection of a jury, and sentencing, the court character-
ized the plea as not guilty.
1434. Id
1435. Id California mandates separate jury trials for issues of guilt and sanity. A defend-
ant entering a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity along with another plea or pleas is
tried first as to the other pleas and then as to his sanity. During the initial determination, the
defendant is presumed to have been sane. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1984).
The defendant's sanity must be determined prior to sentencing once a valid NGI plea has
been entered. People v. Lyons, 18 Cal. App. 3d 760, 96 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1971).
1436. 705 F.2d at 357. In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit justified its interpretation by stating
that federal law does not mandate that the jury consider an NGI plea in every case where
such a plea is entered. The defendant has the responsibility of introducing evidence which
indicates he was not legally capable as to the committed acts. Id at 357 n.1 (citing United
States v. Henderson, 680 F.2d 659, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1982)). Pennywell did not place his
sanity in issue by introducing evidence of his lack of capability. Id at 357.
1437. Id. (citing Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir. 1982)). Relief is only
available when violation of state law makes the trial arbitrary and fundamentally unfair. In
Powell, there was no showing that the judge allowing the jury to separate overnight met that
standard. Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1982).
1438. 705 F.2d at 357.
1439. Id (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 1970)).
1440. d. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1024 (West Supp. 1984)).
1441. Id. See People v. Vanley, 41 Cal. App. 3d 846, 854-55, 116 Cal. Rptr. 446, 451-52
(1974) (defendant never manifested his assent to his own counsel's plea).
1442. 705 F.2d at 357.
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B/ye' 443 for support. B ye involved an escapee of a mental institution
who openly admitted his guilt on the counts charged. 4" After confer-
ring with counsel, the trial court entered an NGI plea for Blye, and in
that case the entered plea was upheld." 5 The Pennywell court distin-
guished B/ye by stating that whereas Blye was not capable of entering
and understanding an NGI plea, Pennywell appeared at his arraign-
ment pro se and demonstrated an understanding of the law. 144 6 Even
after the arraigning judge explained California's non-recognition of the
temporary insanity plea, Pennywell refused to plead NGI. 1
447
The court then held that, even if it was error under California law
not to try Pennywell on his NGI plea, due process was not violated
because the facts underlying an NGI claim were brought out at
trial. 144 Pennywell alleged that an injection of heroin and cocaine
made him temporarily insane. '449 The trial court gave consideration to
that allegation and recognized that Pennywell had a diminished capac-
ity defense. He was allowed to support that defense by introducing
evidence, and his requested diminished capacity instruction was deliv-
ered by the trial judge.1450 Therefore, the court found that the trial was
not "arbitrary or fundamentally unfair" because the jury was exposed
to, and rejected, the allegations on which an NGI plea would have
been based.'
45'
F The Right to a Public Trial
The first amendment provides the public a right of access to crimi-
nal trials. 452 This right of access encompasses pretrial proceedings
such as suppression hearings.1453 In recent times, this right of access
has clashed with a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial by
1443. 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965).
1444. Id at 145, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 233. Blye was charged with the burglary of three watches
from a pawnshop. Three other counts of burglary, including one for stealing five cookies
from a bakery, were dropped prior to trial.
1445. Id
1446. 705 F.2d at 357.
1447. Id




1452. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980) (plurality opinion) (although no provision of the Constitution expressly guarantees
the public or press a right of access to criminal trials, the Court recognized that historically
the public has had access to criminal trials).
1453. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1982).
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an impartial judge or jury.1454
The Ninth Circuit, in Associated Press v. District Court,1455 ex-
tended the right of access in a criminal trial to documents filed in con-
nection with pretrial proceedings. As a prologue to its decision, the
court reviewed the events which gave rise to the suit.
In October 1982, John DeLorean and two co-defendants were in-
dicted in a Los Angeles federal district court on charges of violating
federal narcotics statutes. 1456 Hordes of newspaper, magazine, and tel-
evision people attended the proceedings and created tremendous public
interest in the case. This was partially, if not wholly, attributed to Mr.
DeLorean's celebrity status and the strange circumstances of the
case. 1457 The district judge responded to the extensive media coverage
by closing the records and files in the case to the public and press on
December 22, 1982.1458 The closure order was issued sua sponte with-
out notice to the parties, the press, or the public and unaccompanied by
any findings, specific or otherwise. 1459 None of the interested groups
were consulted or given an opportunity to be heard.1460 Pursuant to a
press request to vacate or stay the December 22nd order, the district
judge held a hearing on January 25, 1983, at which time the parties and
the press expressed their views.116 1 On March 22, 1983, the request was
denied in an opinion which carefully analyzed the competing interests
in the case. 14 62 Although all of the documents filed in the case were
1454. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)
(criminal trial closed in order to protect defendant's fair-trial right); Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (public's right of access did not overcome defendants'
rights on appeal).
1455. 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983).
1456. Id. at 1144.
1457. Id John DeLorean is a former executive of General Motors, Pontiac and Chevrolet
divisions, who was responsible in large part for two vastly successful automobiles, the GTO
and the Firebird. He is also an engineer who holds more than 100 patents and whose credits
include concealed windshield wipers, radio antennae, stacked headlights, and "wide track"
styling. After leaving General Motors, DeLorean started his own automobile manufactur-
ing company, the DeLorean Motor Company (DMC). He raised nearly $240 million, and
built and staffed a factory in Northern Ireland in less than two and one-half years. DMC
eventually failed. DeLorean was subsequently arrested for trafficking in cocaine, allegedly
in an effort to keep DMC afloat.
1458. Id The order provided that all future filings of documents were to be in camera and
filed under seal. The district court would then review the documents and make a determina-
tion as to their disclosure based on first amendment rights of access and sixth amendment
fair-trial rights as set forth in United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
1459. 705 F.2d at 1144.
1460. Id
1461. Id at 1145.
1462. Id
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still to be automatically sealed, the procedure for handling the docu-
ments was modified. 463 The Associated Press and other news-gather-
ing agencies were not mollified and proceeded to file for a writ of
mandamus to vacate the closure orders of December 22nd and March
22nd.
t4 64
In Associated Press, the Ninth Circuit saw no reason to distinguish
between pretrial proceedings and pretrial documents. t465 The court
reasoned that historically the press and public have had a common law
right of access to pretrial documents, with few exceptions, 466 and that
pretrial documents are frequently important to the full understanding
of judicial processes and government functioning. 467 Therefore the
public and press were found to have a first amendment right to pretrial
documents in general.
468
The Ninth Circuit noted that the first amendment right of access
might at times conflict with a defendant's sixth amendment right to a
fair and impartial trial. 14 6 9 The court then placed the burden on the
party seeking closure to establish a strict necessity for sealing the docu-
ments. 470 In order to discharge this burden, the Ninth Circuit relied
on a three-part test enunciated in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale47 1 and
adopted in United States v. Brooklier.1472 First, there must exist a sub-
stantial probability that a party's fair-trial right will be irreparably
damaged if pretrial documents are not sealed; second, there must be a
1463. Id When the court received a document, the clerk would notify the City News
Service of the filing by the title of the document. The parties would then have forty-eight
hours to submit written comments as to the necessity for closure. After the forty-eight hour
response period, the court would then rule on whether or not to unseal the document. The
closure order did not prohibit the court from ordering that a document be unsealed prior to
the expiration of the forty-eight hour period if the court determined that sealing of the docu-
ment was unnecessary. The order allowed the parties the right to comment, but in practice
the district court extended this right to the press, too. Id
1464. Id
1465. Id In erasing any distinction between pretrial proceedings and documents filed in
regard to them, the Ninth Circuit relied on two principal justifications underlying the pub-
lie's first amendment right of access: (I) criminal trials have historically "been open to the
press and general public;" and (2) "the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole."
Id (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982)).
1466. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (right
of public to know not as important as need to safeguard defendants' rights on appeal).





1471. 443 U.S. 368, 440-42 (1979).
1472. 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
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substantial probability that alternatives to sealing the documents would
not adequately protect a party's fair-trial right; and, third, there must
be a substantial probability that closure would effectively prevent the
threatened harm. All three prongs must be met for the burden to be
discharged. 
1473
The court disposed of the issue of irreparable damage to
DeLorean by alluding to Abscam and Watergate. The court empha-
sized that very few potential jurors had more than "cursory knowl-
edge" of Abscam, 1474 despite extensive publicity. Watergate was cited
for the related proposition that extensive publicity did not prevent the
selection of an impartial jury.
14 7 5
As to the second requirement of inadequate alternatives to closure,
the court interpreted Brooklier to mean that "no less drastic alternative
[is] available."' 1476 The court asserted that trial judges have the ability
and means to persuade parties to act responsibly in filing documents
that might prejudice the right to a fair trial. 1477 The court was also
satisfied that careful jury selection is an adequate alternative, especially
in a population center as large as Los Angeles.
1478
Given the vast amount of publicity generated even after the trial
judge's orders, the court expressed grave doubt that the closure orders
would have any significant protective effect on DeLorean's fair-trial
rights. 1479 Besides the finding that none of the three substantive prongs
of the test were met, 480 the court reasoned that the "presumption of
openness" that underscores criminal proceedings was being violated
even by the limited forty-eight hour period the documents might be
kept under seal. 148' The court held that the record of the case revealed
no necessity for blanket closure and directed the district court's orders
1473. Id at 1167. The court in Brooklier counseled adherence to this test which was
promulgated by Justice Blackmun and supported by three other Justices in Gannet, but the
Supreme Court has not resolved the issues of the proper allocation of the burden or the
standard for determining whether a criminal proceeding may be closed. Id
1474. 705 F.2d at 1146 (citing United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980)
(court granted television networks permission to copy FBI videotape in order to broadcast it





1479. Id The court noted that there was "currently no shortage of information for the
press to exploit." Id
1480. Id at 1147. In a footnote, the court stated that the parties agreed that the trial judge
had instituted the closure order after prosecutorial allegations had linked DeLorean to the
Irish Republican Army. Id at 1146 n.2.
1481. Id at 1147.
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to be vacated on the ground that the public's first amendment right of
access had been violated.
482
Rather than demand that the sealed documents be immediately
released as is customary under an unconstitutional order, the court rec-
ognized that the parties may have filed documents in reliance upon
those orders. 1483 The parties were therefore given three days in which
to make a motion to seal documents filed under the orders on an item-
by-item basis. 14 4 The district court was directed to apply the proce-
dural and substantive requirements of Brooklier in ruling on any mo-
tion.1485 Any document that the district judge determined should
remain sealed was to be accompanied by findings of a sufficiently spe-
cific nature so as to facilitate appellate review.
486
Judge Poole, in his concurrence, agreed that the court was bound
to follow Brook/lies procedural and substantive requirements until the
Supreme Court decides the issue. 487 He disagreed, however, with the
majority's implication that adverse pretrial publicity carries minimal
consequences. 1488 The judge chided the majority's conclusion that bias
could unfailingly be kept out of such a trial by the large pool of poten-
tial jurors in urban centers, the probing questions asked of those jurors
on voir dire, and limiting instructions to consider only evidence intro-
duced at trial. 4 9 Judge Poole professed such a view to be unrealis-
tic. 490 He suggested that the trial judge, as an alternative to closing or
sealing the documents, consider a partial excising of inflammatory ma-
terial. 149  The judge pointed out that a careful reading of relevant
cases indicates that the fair-trial right "is companion, not servant, to the







1487. Id at 1147-48 (Poole, J., specially concurring).
1488. Id at 1148 (Poole, J., specially concurring).
1489. Id (Poole, J., specially concurring). Judge Poole took issue with the majority's quo-
tation from Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1967), which formed the basis
of the court's conclusion that bias would not result, and branded the quotation as mislead-
ing. He also classified the conclusion as dictum. 705 F.2d at 1148 (Poole, J., specially
concurring).
1490. Id (Poole, J., specially concurring). Judge Poole stated that "[there] is no doubt in
the real world that pervasive adverse publicity can indeed contaminate the air for fair trial.
No one can now say what persistent effect, if any, lurid publicity will have on the trial, even
after months have passed." Id (Poole, J., specially concurring).
1491. Id at 1149 (Poole, J., specially concurring).
1492. Id (Poole, J., specially concurring).
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III. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Grand Jury Proceedings
1. Dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct
The grand jury "has been regarded as a primary security to the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves
the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser
and the accused."'49 The grand jury's purpose is to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and
to shield the defendant from groundless prosecution.
1494
The prosecutor is the only official present during grand jury hear-
ings, and under these circumstances he or she logically controls the di-
rection of the proceedings. 1495 The grand jury usually relies on the
prosecutor to determine which witnesses to call. 1496 The prosecutor ex-
amines the witnesses and determines which evidence to present to the
grand jury.1497  Additionally, the prosecutor usually prepares the
indictment.
1498
The Ninth Circuit has expressed reluctance to dismiss grand jury
indictments on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. 1499 Such a dis-
missal may be based on the fifth amendment due process clause, 15° or
on the court's inherent supervisory powers.'150 In either case, the integ-
rity of the judicial system must be upheld. However, a court's review
1493. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). For a discussion of the history and
importance of the grand jury, see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-46 (1974);
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
279-83 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
1494. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
1495. "It is the prosecutor who will explain and construe the myriad of laws that the
Grand Jury is charged to enforce. Moreover, this representative of the executive branch of
the government will also instruct the jury as to the quantum of proof necessary to justify an
indictment." Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 177
(1973).




1499. See, e.g., United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2097 (1983), infra notes 1507-44; United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir.)
(grand jury indictment would not be overturned unless prosecutorial misconduct created
intrusion into defendant's constitutional rights), cert. denied 434 U.S. 825 (1977). For a
review of some of the many cases in other circuits where motions to dismiss for prosecutorial
misconduct were denied, see Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1310-11.
1500. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Estepa,
471 F.2d 1132, 1135-37 (2d Cir. 1972).
1501. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977).
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of grand jury proceedings is by definition restricted by the constitution-
ally based independence of grand juries and prosecutors. 02
In reviewing appeals based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
the court considers whether there was prosecutorial error, preservation
of the issue for appeal, and prejudice to the defendant. 1 0 3 The defend-
ant must show that the prosecutor's conduct significantly interfered
with the grand jury's ability to carry out its independent judgment."5 0"
The Ninth Circuit will reverse only if it finds that it was more probable
than not that the misconduct affected the verdict. 150 5 The court will
dismiss a grand jury indictment if necessary to preserve the integrity of
the judicial process, and if there is gross misconduct resulting in a dis-
missal that has a clear basis in law and fact.15 0 6
A recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates the court's unwillingness to
depart from precedent. In United States v. A1 Mudarris,1507 the court
held that: (1) the use of a summary witness before the grand jury was
proper; (2) the prosecutor's improper comments on arson allegedly
committed by the defendants' brother were not prejudicial in view of
evidence against the defendants; and (3) the prosecutor's usurpation of
the grand jurors' obligations did not necessitate reversal.15 0 8 The court
recognized the broad discretion that prosecutors need in order to exe-
cute their law enforcement function. Yet the court noted that " '[a] line
must be drawn beyond which prosecutor's control over a cooperative
1502. United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
1503. See, e.g., United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1198-1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 979 (1979).
1504. United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981) (fact that prosecutor
conveys his impression to grand jury that indictment is warranted does not require dismis-
sal). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[d]ismissal of an indictment is required only in fla-
grant cases in which the grand jury has been overreached or deceived in some significant
way." United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978).
1505. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversal is neces-
sary when it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict).
1506. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 454 U.S.
1157 (1982) (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880-81 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1979)).
See also United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir.) (Attorney General has
prosecutorial discretion unless the conduct is "arbitrary, capricious, and violative of due
process"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978). A defendant who claims prosecutorial miscon-
duct in grand jury proceedings carries a heavy burden of proof. In United States v. Owen,
580 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1978), the court followed the rule of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits that the accused must suffer actual prejudice from the misconduct before a dismissal
is required. Id at 367-68. The federal court's supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment
"remain a harsh, ultimate sanction [which] are more often referred to than invoked."
United States v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
1507. 695 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2097 (1983).
1508. Id at 1185-89.
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grand jury may not extend.' "1509
The defendants in Al Mudarris were indicted and subsequently
convicted of mail fraud for filing false insurance claims for bum treat-
ment. 510 The defendants appealed their convictions, contending that
prosecutorial misconduct required dismissal of their indictments.' 51'
The grand jury, in one afternoon, had heard only a summary witness
and returned the indictments. That morning, the same grand jury had
heard summary testimony by the same witness on an indictment con-
cerning arson and conspiracy charges sought against the defendants'
brother and others. The morning indictment did not charge the de-
fendants. However, the prosecutors believed that the defendants were
setting fires for their brother and the other alleged arson conspirators
when one of the defendants sustained the burns which resulted in the
medical insurance fraud.
512
The defendants argued that the government presented its case im-
properly, thus preventing the grand jury from evaluating the witnesses'
credibility. 51 3 The court dismissed the defendants' objection that the
government used only the summary hearsay testimony of a witness and
the transcribed testimony of some previous witnesses. The court noted
that an indictment may be based solely on hearsay.15 14 The Ninth Cir-
1509. Id. at 1188 (quoting United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1979)
(prosecutor intentionally submitted transcript which was very prejudicial to defendant, re-
sulting in indictment that was deemed serious threat to judicial integrity)).
1510. Id at 1184. The defendants were brothers. Only one of them had medical insur-
ance. He signed insurance claims for his brother's burn treatment as if he himself had re-
ceived it. The claims were processed by mail. The government sought mail fraud
indictments against the brothers and a treating doctor who knew them before the injury. Id
1511. Id
1512. Id
1513. The defendants contended that the government: (1) used only the summary hearsay
testimony of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent; (2) failed to call available
witnesses who had testified before prior grand juries; and (3) gave the grand jury the tran-
scribed testimony of some earlier witnesses. Id at 1185.
1514. Id (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (indictment based
solely on hearsay evidence does not violate fifth amendment)).
The grand jury's sources of information are varied, and the validity of an indictment is
not influenced by the character of the evidence considered. United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974). Grand juries can properly indict suspects on the basis of evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. United States v. Zielezinski, No. 83-1130,
slip op. at 3589, 3591 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 1984). The grand jury may compel the production of
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it deems proper, and certain evidentiary rules do
not apply during grand jury proceedings. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343. See United States v.
Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978) (grand jury may base indictment solely on hear-
say), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979). In Romero, the court held that the grand jury indict-
ment could not be invalidated on grounds that the prosecutor presented no exculpatory
evidence, especially since the evidence sought to be presented did not clearly negate guilt.
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cuit rejected the Second Circuit rule which allows dismissal of an in-
dictment based solely on hearsay testimony when better evidence is
available. -15
Id at 399. See also United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 1983) (use of
hearsay evidence at prior grand jury proceeding did not warrant dismissal of indictment in
second grand jury proceeding); United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir.) (drug
manufacturing equipment, which was inadmissible at state trial, could be used in perjury
trial of defendant who had falsely testified before grand jury), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862
(1976).
As early as 1958, the Supreme Court held that a grand jury indictment may be based on
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348-50 (1958). In United States v.
Scheufier, 599 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 933 (1979), the Ninth Circuit
denied a defendant's claim that his fifth amendment rights were violated when a grand jury
witness commented on his failure to testify. The court held that the comments did not taint
an otherwise valid indictment. Id. The grand jury's broad power to hear evidence also has
resulted in the ruling that a witness may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
they are based on evidence derived from an illegal search and seizure. Calandra, 414 U.S. at
353-55.
The grand jury is not restricted by the same technical procedural rules imposed on trial
courts. Id "It is a grand inquest, . . . the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or
by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation
of crime." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). Thus when a grand jury consid-
ers an indictment, the defendant has no right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. No
absolute right to counsel attaches at this stage. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,
581 (1976); Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1969). A witness has no right of privacy before a grand jury. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 353.
Miranda warnings need not be given to a defendant interrogated before a grand jury.
Manduano, 425 U.S. at 580 (rationale of Miranda in protecting accused from custodial inter-
rogation by police did not apply to judicial setting of grand jury); United States v. Kelly, 540
F.2d 990, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1976) (target witnesses need not receive Miranda warnings), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
1515. 695 F.2d at 1185 (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880 n.6 (9th Cir.
1979) (use of hearsay testimony did not invalidate grand jury indictment even if direct testi-
mony was available)). The determinative factor is whether the grand jury has been deceived
into believing that it was hearing direct testimony, not hearsay. United States v. Chanen,
549 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
The Ninth Circuit has held that when a grand jury returns an indictment valid on its
face, the district judge is foreclosed from inquiring into the sufficiency of the evidence before
the jury. United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895
(1978). The United States Supreme Court, in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363
(1956) similarly noted:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the
merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not
required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted
and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on
its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amend-
ment requires nothing more.
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The court also held that the use of a single summary witness
before the grand jury did not invalidate the indictment. 151 6 The prose-
cutor was not obligated to present to the grand jury all issues concern-
ing credibility of witnesses or exculpatory evidence. 1517 The court
reasoned that most of the absent witnesses were hospital and insurance
personnel and handwriting experts. The co-defendant was the only
witness whose credibility was at stake, and the appellants said that he
would have been an exculpatory witness. 518
The court also rejected the defendants' contention that the govern-
ment submitted only partial testimony to the grand jury. The court
reasoned that this summary procedure was proper under the liberal
standards of the Ninth Circuit. 1519 The unsubmitted transcripts con-
cerned cumulative and irrelevant testimony. The court stated that the
omission was permissible, but suggested that it is generally preferable
to submit the transcripts of all former testimony that is summarized.
520
The defendants also argued that the prosecutor and the summary
witness improperly referred to an arson indictment of the defendants'
brother.' 52' The government representatives persistently asserted that
one of the defendants sustained the burn injuries while setting an arson
fire and that the defendants were part of an arson conspiracy. 522 The
government referred twice to news stories about arson-related deaths.
The court noted that the government had a coherent and convinc-
ing case for mail fraud without connecting this indictment to arson.
The information served only to prejudice the grand jury against the
defendants. 523 In criticizing the government's conduct, the court ob-
served that a prosecutor may not make prejudicial remarks to sway the
grand jury, thus denying an accused's right to have his or her indict-
ment tested by the grand jury's independent judgment.1
524
1516. 695 F.2d at 1185.
1517. Id (citing United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 944 (1982)). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that no independent inquiry may be
made into the type of evidence presented, when a duly constituted grand jury returns a valid
indictment. Id at 863 (citing United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974)). A
grand jury need not be informed of all issues affecting credibility. Dismissal of the indict-
ment is only necessary in extreme cases, as when the prosecutor knowingly presents perjured
testimony. Id (citing United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978)).





1523. Id. The court noted that the first reference to news stories was "blameless," and that
the second reference was "more inept than calculated." Id.
1524. Id (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor
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The court restricted its criticism, however, and held that in order
to reverse an indictment, "substantial" grand jury bias must be
proven.1525 The error in referring to arson activities was not deemed
prejudicial, given the credible and relevant evidence which tended to
establish the defendants' guilt. 5 26 The court held that the arson allega-
tion could not have prejudiced the defendants in any practical
sense. 
527
The defendants further contended that the prosecutor improperly
influenced the grand jury and usurped its role by resolving credibility
issues. 528 The court noted that a prosecutor may not deprive a grand
jury of the chance to determine the credibility of witnesses. 529 The
defendants also argued that the government swayed the grand jury
against a co-defendant doctor's credibility. The court observed that the
government was merely answering a grand juror's question concerning
the reason a perjury indictment had not been sought against the doc-
tor. 530  The court held that the response, even if expansive, was
necessary. '
53 '
The defendants also contended that the prosecutor discouraged
may not engage in overreaching conduct that deprives grand jury of autonomous and unbi-
ased judgment)).
1525. Id (citing United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1974) (no reason-
able inference of grand jury bias resulted from prosecutor's references to "Mafia" and
"Italians"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975)). In Polizzi the court noted that a cautionary
instruction cured improper closing remarks by the prosecutor which suggested that the de-
fendant was violent. "The prosecution, as the representative of the government, is expected
to follow high standards in conducting its case. . . .But during an extensive and fiercely
contested trial, we cannot realistically expect perfection." Polizzi 500 F.2d at 892.
1526. 695 F.2d at 1187. "Grand jurors, as a practical matter, . . . are aware that a case is
being presented to them because the prosecutor feels that an indictment is warranted. Thus
the fact that a prosecutor conveys such an impression to the grand jury does not require the
dismissal of the indictment." United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir.
1981).
1527. 695 F.2d at 1187 (citing United States v. Scheufler, 599 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir.)
(court deemed permissible grand jury testimony of Internal Revenue Service agent that de-
fendant had participated in drug transactions which yielded sums of money), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 933 (1979)).
1528. Id Cf. United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1978). In Thompson, the
Ninth Circuit held that the trial court properly refused to submit the defendant's instruction
that a witness' testimony may be discredited by prior inconsistent statements. The court
held that the jurors were adequately instructed when told that: they were the sole judges of
the witness' credibility; they should resolve conflicts in testimony; and they could consider
any matter they felt affected the credibility of the witness' testimony. Id at 786.
1529. 695 F.2d at 1187. See United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978):
"The jury is to determine what, if any, credibility to give. . .[a witness'] testimony."
1530. 695 F.2d at 1187.
1531. Id
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grand jurors from looking at the transcripts of former testimony.1531
The prosecutor had told the jurors that they were free to read them, but
that "after a while it gets a little tedious."1533 The court held that the
prosecutor must not pressure grand jurors into a premature decision or
otherwise discourage them from considering the original evidence.1
534
The court referred to United States v. Samango,1535 where the Ninth
Circuit overturned an indictment partly because the prosecutor had
given the grand jury several former grand jury transcripts and asked it
to reach a conclusion within eight days. 1536 In the present case, the
court held that the prosecutor's conduct was even more
blameworthy. 1537
The Ninth Circuit also found that the prosecutor erroneously
stated that it was sufficient for the jurors to believe a witness' summary.
One grand juror had expressed doubts as to establishing an essential
element of the indictment solely by hearsay of an absent witness. The
court held that dissatisfied jurors must not feel that producing anything
other than summary hearsay is an inconvenience. 538 Moreover, the
court found that the prosecutor misguided the grand jury in executing
its duties. The grand jury must independently determine whether ab-
sent declarants, the percipient witnesses of the events establishing the
indictment, are credible enough to establish probable cause. 539 The
court noted that even unintentional misconduct can result in usurpa-
tion of the grand jury's function. 540 Although the prosecutor has wide
discretion in grand jury proceedings, this discretion is not boundless,
and he or she may not engage in conduct that deprives the grand jury
of independent and unbiased judgment.154' The court emphasized that
"'[t]he very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by a
grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his
1532. Id.
1533. Id
1534. Id See United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981) (no
prosecutorial misconduct even though prosecutor presented indictment before close of testi-
mony, provided that grand jury independently adopted indictment as its own).
1535. 607 F.2d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
1536. 695 F.2d at 1187.
1537. Id
1538. Id at 1188.
1539. Id
1540. Id (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1541. Id at 1184-85. "'If the grand jury is to accomplish either of its functions, independ-
ent determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed and protection of
citizens against unfounded prosecutions, limits must be set on the manipulation of grand
juries by overzealous prosecutors.'" Id at 1185 (quoting United States v. Samango, 607
F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or
judge.' "1542
The court nonetheless affirmed the conviction. It stressed that it
was reviewing a trial court's exercise of its discretion to uphold an in-
dictment, where convictions were based on overwhelming evidence of
guilt. 1543 The court also expressed the belief that its opinion would
help to prevent prosecutorial misconduct.
15 4
2. Secrecy and disclosure of grand jury materials
Grand jury hearings are closed and secret. Witnesses' counsel
may not enter the chamber, and no judge presides to direct the pro-
ceedings. The grand jury deliberates in secret, and it alone determines
the course of its investigation. 1545 "[T]he grand jury has convened as a
body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to
indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special
favor." 15 4
6
1542. Id at 1188 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1960)).
1543. Id
1544. Id at 1189.
1545. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
1546. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
The United States Supreme Court explained the need for secrecy during grand jury
proceedings in United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958)
(quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)):
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have informa-
tion with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused
who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation,
and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
In United States v. Kahan & Lessin Co., 695 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1982), the de-
fendants contended that their indictment was invalidated because unauthorized persons in-
truded during grand jury proceedings in violation of FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(d). The Rule
provides:
Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when
needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a
recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no persons
other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
The Ninth Circuit held that since there were no proceedings during the inadvertent
intrusions, dismissal was unnecessary. 695 F.2d at 1124 (citing United States v. Rath, 406
F.2d 757, 757 (6th Cir.) (interruption did not invalidate grand jury proceedings or indict-
ment, where proceedings stopped at moment of stranger's presence), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
920 (1969)). The court based its decision on United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689
F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983), where five unauthorized intru-
sions were held to be "rare, inadvertent, and non-prejudicial." Id at 1184-85. The decision
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In In re McElhinney,5 47 the court held that a grand jury witness
was entitled to conditional access to: (1) the Attorney General's appli-
cation to conduct surveillance of his telephone; (2) affidavits submitted
in support of the application; (3) the district court's order authorizing
surveillance; and (4) affidavits describing the duration of the
surveillance.
54
The defendant, a witness, appealed an order of confinement for
contempt of court after his refusal to testify before a grand jury. Fol-
lowing his claim of privilege, he was granted immunity and ordered to
testify. Arguing that the government had illegally monitored his tele-
phone, he refused to comply.
549
After the government admitted using the court-ordered wiretap,
the defendant requested disclosure of certain documents for a limited
hearing on the legality of the surveillance. The secrecy of grand jury
proceedings was thus called into question. At issue was whether a
grand jury witness could have limited access to certain documents con-
cerning the validity of court-ordered electronic surveillance.1 550 The
court had not previously confronted the question of limited access. 55
Departing from the trial court's holding, the Ninth Circuit de-
clared that under certain circumstances a grand jury witness is entitled
to limited access to certain documents. 5 52 The court reasoned that the
policy against complete disclosure is not a bar to every disclosure. 553
If the government objects to disclosure on secrecy grounds, the district
court must decide in camera whether sensitive materials can be re-
moved or summarized so that the witness may retain access to ex-
in Computer Sciences Corp. was motivated by reasons of practicality: "Life must go on.
Attainable reality, not perfection, here suffices. It is simply inappropriate to nullify grand
jury work stretching out over a period of eighteen months because of technical, trivial,
harmless violations of no significant duration of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)." Id at 1185-86.
1547. 698 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1983).
1548. Id at 385.
1549. Id at 384.
1550. Id at 385.
1551. Id
1552. Id
1553. Id (citing In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 807 (lst Cir. 1974)). In Lochiallo, the court
drew the same conclusion, holding that a grand jury witness was entitled to precisely the
documents that McElhinney desired, unless the government showed a need for secrecy. Id
at 807-08. The court in McEihinney considered this holding when making its decision.
The McElhinney court constructed a balancing test, based on In re Persico, 491 F.2d
1156, 1161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1974). The court in Persico acknowledged
the problem of competing policies: exclusion of illegally acquired evidence, and mainte-
nance of uninterrupted grand jury proceedings. Id at 1161. The McElhinney court sought a
solution that would reconcile these conflicting policies. 698 F.2d at 385-86.
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cerpted material. 1554 The witness must show the court that a challenge
to the electronic surveillance can be supported by the papers then in
hand, without admission of additional evidence or a plenary hear-
ing. 155 5 The court may order the witness to testify or be punished for
contempt, if it finds that the affidavits are sufficient to support the
surveillance. 1
556
3. Subpoena duces tecum and attorney-client privilege
The grand jury has the authority to resort to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses.1557 The Ninth Circuit
recently considered two cases involving defendants' objections to a de-
nial of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum. In In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger),'558 the court held that the attorney-
client privilege did not destroy the obligation of two attorneys to ap-
pear before a grand jury and bring financial records of their fee ar-
rangements with the defendant, where the government already knew
the defendant's identity, and the jury sought only information regard-
ing the amount of fees paid. 559 This information is not generally con-
sidered an exception to the nonconfidentiality rule.
1560
1554. Id. at 385 (citing In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1974)).
1555. Id at 385-86. See In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1976) (appellant, a
recalcitrant witness, could not delay grand jury proceedings while litigating question of va-
lidity of electronic surveillance).
1556. 698 F.2d at 386.
1557. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (by conferring immunity, court
can compel testimony from unwilling witness who invokes fifth amendment).
The court may exercise its discretion to summon witnesses to give testimony before the
grand jury. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977). "[I]t is the court which must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he
refuses to do so." Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). The United States
Supreme Court has noted that "'citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from
grand jury subpoenas"' and that "'the long-standing principle that 'the public. . . has a
right to every man's evidence'. . . is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings."'
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 682, 688 (1972)).
1558. 695 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982).
1559. Id at 365.
1560. Id. If one party shows a legitimate need for such information, the disclosure of the
identity of an attorney's clients and their fee arrangements are not confidential communica-
tions under the attorney-client privilege. United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 190 (9th
Cir. 1980) (amount of legal fees was not protected by attorney-client privilege, since disclo-
sure would not implicate client in any known prior criminal activity); United States v.
Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (attorney-client privilege does not pro-
tect communications made in furtherance of criminal activities).
Such information is, however, privileged when the person invoking the privilege can
demonstrate that disclosure would probably implicate the client in the same matter for
which he or she sought legal advice in the first place. 695 F.2d at 365 (citing Baird v. Koer-
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The defendant, the target of a grand jury proceeding, appealed
from an order denying his motion to quash the grand jury subpoenas
duces tecum served on his former attorneys. He argued that the spe-
cific questions contained in the attorneys' subpoenas exceeded inquiry
into legal fees by seeking to identify the co-conspirators or others who
may have paid them. The court ruled that the issue was not ripe for
judicial review, because the subpoenas only commanded appearance
before the grand jury.156 1 An answer to the subpoena would not
amount to waiver of any right or privilege regarding questions attached
to the subpoenas. 1562 The court stated that the grand jury hearing
would be the proper forum for the defendant or his attorneys to assert
any privileges which they might wish to raise. 1563 A determination of
privileges should be made on the merits by the district court after they
have been asserted at the grand jury proceeding. 1564
In In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas),156 5 the court held that subpoe-
nas seeking attorney time records describing services performed by at-
torneys for clients created an unjustified intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship. 566 The defendants were two attorneys for tax
protestors who were under investigation by a grand jury. 1567 The attor-
neys appealed from an order finding them in contempt for refusing to
provide documents concerning their employment by the targets of the
investigation. 1568 The subpoenas sought attorney time records describ-
ing services performed by them, retainer agreements, contracts, and let-
ters of agreement. The attorneys filed a motion to quash the subpoenas
for various reasons, including the attorney-client privilege. 569
ner, 279 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney-client privilege protects ultimate motive of
litigation)). The court in Marger noted that the courts have narrowly applied this exception,
and the court was unwilling to apply it here. Id
1561. Id at 366.
1562. Id
1563. Id
1564. Id In Lowthian v. United States, 575 F.2d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth
Circuit held that the appropriate procedure for challenging a subpoena duces tecum is that
the attorney should refuse to produce the documents and then appeal any contempt judg-
ment entered against him or her.
1565. 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982).
1566. id at 362.
1567. The tax protest organization was the Belanco Religious Order, which espoused the
belief that payment of income taxes was immoral. Id at 360.
1568. Id
1569. Id at 360-61. The other theories underlying the motion included invasion of privacy
under the California State Constitution, violation of the first amendment, failure of the
grand jury to authorize the subpoenas, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The
district court summarily rejected these theories. Id at 361 n.2.
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The district court denied the motion to quash. The court then con-
ducted a brief contempt hearing based on one attorney's stated intent to
refuse to comply with the subpoenas. The attorneys were held in con-
tempt and filed notices of appeal.
570
On appeal, the defendants asserted a blanket claim that all of the
demanded information was protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.' 571 The court held that the subpoenas were in fact an unjustified
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship insofar as they sought
time records, retainer agreements, contracts and letters of agree-
ment. 572 However, the court observed that the defendants failed to
meet their burden of explaining how disclosure of attorney fees would
incriminate their clients in the activity for which they sought legal ad-
vice. 15 7 3 For this reason the court held that the district court properly
denied the motion to quash the subpoenas with respect to attorney
fees. 15
7 4
The court did not stop its analysis at this juncture. The court
stressed that the subpoenas demanded more than the amount of attor-
ney fees and method of payment. A simple invoice requesting payment
for unspecified services would not normally be privileged, as it reveals
nothing more than the amount of the fee. The attorney-client privilege
would, however, cover bills, ledgers, statements, and time records,
which, as in the present case, reveal the nature of the services pro-
vided. 1575 The court noted that any correspondence between an attor-
ney and client which reveals the client's ultimate motive for litigation
or retention of an attorney would be protected.1
5 7 6
1570. Id at 361.
1571. Id
1572. Id at 362. The court applied the same standard used in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Marger), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982), but arrived at a different conclu-
sion. See supra note 1560. Both courts cited Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir.
1960); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1980); and United States v.
Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977), for the following proposition: a nar-
row exception to the attorney-client privilege applies when revealing that information prob-
ably would incriminate a client on the same charges for which he or she originally sought
legal assistance. 695 F.2d at 361-62. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401-05 (1976), held that if a client submitted documents to an
attorney while seeking legal advice, the attorney may assert the attorney-client privilege in
response to a subpoena duces tecum. This rule applies, however, only if the client would
have a fifth amendment privilege if the documents had remained in his or her possession.
Id at 404.
1573. 695 F.2d at 362.
1574. Id
1575. Id
1576. Id (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674-75 (5th Cir. 1975)
(attorney-client privilege protected names of persons who might have arranged for bonds
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Thus the court held that the subpoenas for time records consti-
tuted an unjustified intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.
577
The subpoenas required in camera inspection by the district court, and
the defendants should have explained how the privilege covered the
information. 1578 In camera inspection permits the court to issue a pro-
tective order for any privileged portions before the grand jury receives
them.
157 9
4. Refusal to appear and testify before the grand jury
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ortlof,158 0 the Ninth Circuit
held that a conviction could not be reversed on the ground that the
judge neglected to state "you are hereby ordered," because he had re-
peatedly informed the defendant of his obligation to appear and testify
before the grand jury.
151
The defendant, a prisoner in state custody, appealed his conviction
for criminal contempt. The federal district court had issued a writ of
habeas corpus ad test'candum to compel the defendant's appearance
before a grand jury.1582 The court did not issue a grand jury subpoena
requiring him to appear and testify. The defendant refused to
comply.
583
and legal fees on clients' behalf, since the information would have pertained to criminal
activity of suspects of income tax offenses)). See supra note 1560. The grand jury may not
compel a person to produce books and papers that would incriminate him or her. United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-
35 (1886)).
1577. 695 F.2d at 362.
1578. Id The court decided to allow the defendants to make the required showing on
remand. Id
1579. Id
1580. 708 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 506 (1983).
1581. I1d at 1457.
1582. Id at 1456.
1583. Id The grand jury may compel the testimony of witnesses as it deems appropriate;
its operation is unhampered even by the technical procedure and evidentiary rules regulat-
ing the conduct of criminal trials. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
Quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919), the Court in Calandra observed:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope
of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or fore-
casts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particu-
lar individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
414 U.S. at 343.
The power of a federal court to require witnesses to appear and testify before a grand
jury is well established. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972). All citizens
have a duty to testify when their government so requests. Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 438 (1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand
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The United States Attorney applied for an order requiring the de-
fendant to show cause as to why he should not be held in criminal
contempt, under 18 U.S.C. section 401(3), and civil contempt, under 28
U.S.C. section 1826.1584 A hearing was held, at which the judge ex-
plained to the defendant the consequences of failing to testify and told
him that he was compelled to testify.- 8 5 When the defendant still re-
fused, the judge issued an order for him to show cause why he should
not be held in criminal contempt.5 86
At the conclusion of the trial for criminal contempt, the judge
found the defendant guilty of willful refusal to appear and testify.
58 7
The defendant was sentenced to six months' confinement. He was
given ten days to purge the contempt charge by testifying before the
grand jury.1-
5 8
On appeal, the defendant argued that the judge had erred by fail-
ing to enter an order requiring him to testify. The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that, despite the fact that the word "order" was not
jury subpoenas"). Compelling an individual by subpoena to appear before a grand jury
does not constitute a fourth amendment seizure, even though the summons may be inconve-
nient or burdensome. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) (grand jury's directive
to make voice recording did not infringe on fourth amendment interest). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's longstanding acknowledgment of a citizen's duty to appear and give
evidence before the grand jury, see Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443-44; Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 279-81 (1919); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9-13; 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2191 (1961).
1584. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976) provides: "A court of the United States shall have power
to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as . . .[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command."
28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whenever a witness in any pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without
just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify ... the court. . . may
summarily order his confinement."
1585. 708 F.2d at 1457. At the hearing the defendant told the judge that he had refused to
testify because he had no knowledge of the issues in question. The judge told him that if he
was unable to answer questions because of his lack of knowledge, he should have stated so
in his testimony in the grand jury room. Id
In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974), the Supreme Court considered
whether a grand jury witness could refuse to testify on the ground that the questions were
based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. The Court applied a
balancing test, weighing any possible damage to the grand jury's role against the potential
benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. Id at 349-50. The
Court concluded that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would
unduly interfere with the effective discharge of the grand jury's duties, and would achieve
only a speculative effect in deterring police misconduct. Id at 350-52.
1586. 708 F.2d at 1457.
1587. Id
1588. Id
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used, the meaning of the hearing was unequivocal. 5 8 9 The court ruled
that "[t]he statement of an additional order in the circumstances would
have been a mere formality."' 5 90 Since the judge's instructions clearly
informed the defendant of his obligation to testify, requiring the words
"you are hereby ordered" would have elevated form over substance. 1591
The Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant was brought before
the court to determine if an order to show cause for contempt should be
entered.1592 The court deemed it preferable to bring him before the
court to ascertain whether to enter an order to compel his testimony.
159 3
At the hearing for an order to compel testimony, the grand jury witness
should be informed of the consequences of failure to testify after being
ordered to do so. If the witness still refuses to testify, without giving a
lawful reason, and if the situation warrants, a specific unequivocal or-
der should be entered, requiring the witness to answer the grand jury
questions. If the witness again refuses to testify, he or she should be
given notice that a citation for contempt will be forthcoming. A time
should then be set for trial on the contempt citation. 19
The Ninth Circuit observed that in the present case the court did
not determine if an order to compel testimony before the grand jury
should be entered. 195 Nonetheless, the essence of that procedure was
followed, which was sufficient to uphold the judgment of criminal
contempt. 1
596
The court rejected the defendant's contention that he should have
been given Miranda597 warnings before being required to answer the
judge's questions at the hearing. 1598 The court reasoned that since the
1589. Id (citing Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1979)
("[c]riminal contempt is established where there is a clear and definite order of the court, the





1594. Id at 1457-58.
1595. Id at 1458.
1596. Id
1597. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In the absence of other effective proce-
dures, the following measures to protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation must be taken. Before interrogation, the person in custody must be clearly informed
that: he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in
court; he has the right to consult with an attorney and to have the attorney with him during
the investigation; and if he is indigent, an attorney will be appointed to represent him. Id at
467-73.
1598. 708 F.2d at 1458.
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hearing was ancillary to grand jury proceedings 599 and there was no
custodial interrogation,1 600 Miranda warnings were not required.
The court also denied the defendant's claim that he was entitled to
counsel at the hearing.' 60 1 The court noted that the sixth amendment
right to counsel "'attaches only upon the initiation of adversary judi-
cial criminal procedures.' ",1602 Thus the court properly appointed
counsel once the judge decided that criminal contempt proceedings
would be brought.
5. Composition of the grand jury
In United States v. Suttiswad,60 3 the Ninth Circuit held that the
trial court properly denied a request for funds for expert assistance to
show that blacks were underrepresented on grand juries in the North-
ern District of California. 16 4 The court held that blacks were not sub-
stantially underrepresented under Ninth Circuit standards, even
though there was one fewer black juror than required to achieve perfect
numerical representation.
60 5
The defendant was convicted of importing heroin and possessing it
with intent to distribute. 616 On appeal, he filed a motion to stay pro-
ceedings, grant discovery, and dismiss the indictment. He argued that
the grand jury selection procedures in the district did not satisfy the
Jury Selection and Service Act and the fifth and sixth amendments. 60 7
He contended that the grand jurors were not chosen randomly from a
fair cross-section of the community and that the selection methods un-
1599. Id (citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579 (1976) (purpose of Mi-
randa warnings is to avoid evils occurring during police interrogation of person in custody)).
1600. Id (citing Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1978) (Miranda warn-
ings not required where questioning of prisoner took place in prison library)).
1601. Id
1602. Id (quoting Fritchie v. McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 214 (9th Cir. 1981) (where right to
counsel under Miranda was never invoked, there was no need for discrete inquiry into effec-
tiveness of waiver of that right)).
1603. 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
1604. Id at 649.
1605. Id
1606. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful to import
into the customs territory of the United States from any place outside thereof (but within the
United States), or to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any...
narcotic drug ...."
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to... possess
with intent to. . .distribute.., a controlled substance .... "
1607. 696 F.2d at 648. Under the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a)
(1976), a defendant may move to dismiss an indictment and stay proceedings on the ground
of substantial failure to comply with the Act in the selection of grand or petit jurors. The
[Vol. 18
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lawfully excluded racial and ethnic minorities. A statistician concluded
that racial disparities existed in the composition of past grand juries,
suggesting that some non-random selection occurred in the district.
60 8
The defendant then sought funds under the Criminal Justice Act,
18 U.S.C. section 3006(a), 60 9 to finance professional assistance in com-
piling and interpreting statistical data. Two attorneys filed affidavits,
asserting that expert services could be provided "if the attorney had a
client who had the independent means to pay for them."'' 610 The court
denied the motion for funds for expert assistance.
The Ninth Circuit held that grand jury underrepresentation in ab-
solute terms of blacks by 2.8%, of Hispanics by 7.7%, and of Asians by
4.7% fell within allowable limits.' 6 " The court's determination of ade-
quate representation depended on numbers, not percentages. In a
grand jury of twenty-three people, there would be underrepresentation
of blacks by less than one juror, and underrepresentation of Hispanics
and Asians by slightly more than one juror. Under these circum-
stances, the court found no error in the district court's refusal to allow
defendant may present records and any relevant evidence to support his or her claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1867(d) (1976).
The fourteenth amendment prohibits racial discrimination in the selection of grand and
petit juries. All states acknowledge improper selection of the grand jury as a ground for a
motion to dismiss, at least where the defendant lacked the chance to present a pre-indict-
ment challenge. The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the grand jury
may not be chosen in a manner that deliberately and systematically discriminates against
any race. See, e.g., Peters v. Kifl, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (white petitioner had standing to
attack systematic exclusion of blacks from grand jury and petit jury service); Neal v. Dela-
ware, 103 U.S. 370, 391 (1880) (blacks cannot be excluded from jury due to discrimination);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (black defendant had right to challenge systematic
exclusion of blacks from his grand and petit juries).
Nonetheless, equal protection does not mandate proportional representation of all com-
ponent groups of a community on every grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 579
F.2d 1121, 1134 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (absence of Indians on three successive grand jury panels
did not constitute "substantial deviation"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979). Various cir-
cuits have expressly held that in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) of the Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act, jurors for a particular division should be selected from counties,
parishes, or similar political subdivisions; they need not come from the entire district of
which the subdivision is a part. See, e.g., United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir.
1972); United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106, 1111-12 (E.D. La. 1970).
1608. 696 F.2d at 648.
1609. Id 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Each United States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the
circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing repre-
sentation. . . .Representation under each plan shall include counsel and investi-
gative, expert, and other services necessary for an adequate defense.
1610. 696 F.2d at 648.
1611. Id at 649.
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funds to hire an expert. 1612
B. Indictments
1. Essential elements
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that an
indictment must be a "plain, concise and definite written statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged."' 1613 The courts will
review the indictment to see if it satisfies a defendant's inalienable right
"to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"'' 6 14 against
him. In so doing, the courts have concluded that the document must
set forth the elements of the offense charged, contain a statement of the
facts and circumstances that will inform the accused of the elements of
the specific offense, 61  and enable him to plead double jeopardy
against prosecution for the same offense.1
616
1612. The court followed the holding of United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 956
(9th Cir. 1980): "[A] reasonable attorney, after determining that there was no substantial
disparity in. . . representation. . . on the grand jury panel, would not decide, necessarily,
to incur the additional expense of retaining an expert statistician to analyze the master
wheel." Armstrong held that a court should rely on a test of substantiality based on absolute
numerical composition of the grand jury. Id at 955-56. See also United States v. Kleifgen,
557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant failed to show that blacks or males were
substantially underrepresented on grand jury).
The court in Suitiswadalso dealt briefly with the argument that there was prosecutorial
error, which it summarily rejected. 696 F.2d at 652-53. The defendant argued that the pros-
ecutor committed plain error in closing argument by commenting on highly incriminating
evidence outside the record. Id at 652. During cross-examination, the defendant estab-
lished that whoever hid contraband in a suitcase must have handled the false linings, but the
government had not attempted to find fingerprints. During closing argument, defense coun-
sel argued that this was a "major investigative failure," commenting that the evidence would
have been offered had it been incriminating. The prosecutor remarked in rebuttal: "If we
had fingerprints, we might have had more defendants in here. Maybe we have the defend-
ant's fingerprints, but that's not part of what you should consider." Id at 652-53. The de-
fendant argued that the prosecutor implied that the government did have the fingerprints,
but considered the evidence a diversion and thus refrained from producing the fingerprints
at trial. 1d at 653. The Ninth Circuit held that the comments were merely fair rebuttal to
counsel's argument, created no sinister connotation, and thus did not constitute plain error.
Id
1613. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) provides: "The indictment or the information shall be a
plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged."
1614. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
1615. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-19 (1974). See also United States v.
Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment fails where insufficient facts alleged
and other allegations left open-ended).
1616. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (legally sufficient indictment must state
elements of offense with sufficient clarity to enable defendant to defend himself and plead
double jeopardy).
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The Ninth Circuit, in concluding that the indictment was sufficient
in United States v. Buckley, 16 17 relied on common sense and reasonable
inferences 1618 when the government appealed the dismissal of one
count of mail fraud1 619 against the defendant Buckley. 1620 Defendants
were indicted for distributing monies on behalf of the Washington
Water Power Company (WWPC) to Washington State legislators.
Such distributions were not reported in violation of Washington
law. 16
21
Before reaching its decision on a de novo basis, the Ninth Circuit
discussed the standard for review in determining the sufficiency of an
indictment. First, an indictment must state the elements of the charged
crime in sufficient detail so that the defendant will be informed of the
charges and will be able to plead double jeopardy. 622 The court noted
that two corollary purposes of the indictment are "(1) to ensure that
the defendants are being prosecuted on the basis of the facts presented
to the grand jury, and (2) to allow the court to determine the suffi-
ciency of the indictment."' 1623 In addition, the presumption is that the
allegations of the indictment are true,' 624 and that these allegations
1617. 689 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1778 (1983).
1618. Id. at 899.
1619. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, . . . places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Office Department
• ..shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
1620. The district court in granting the dismissal determined that there was not only the
lack of explicit allegation, but also the lack of sufficient facts to support the implicit allega-
tion that the document was false and mailed in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. 689
F.2d at 896.
1621. Id at 895. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.170, 42.17.180 (Supp. 1984).
1622. 689 F.2d at 896 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)).
1623. Id. The court noted that the corollary purposes will generally be met if, before trial,
the defendant is informed of the charges so that he may defend himself and plead double
jeopardy. Id at 896 n.3 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117) (1974); United
States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1977) (indictment is sufficient if it fairly in-
forms defendant of charge and allows defendant to plead double jeopardy). Additionally, if,
after trial, the government's theory for conviction is clear, the corollary purposes assume
additional importance. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, 652 F.2d
804, 807 (9th Cir. 1981) (court may not substantially amend indictment through jury instruc-
tions); United States v. Gordon, 641 F.2d 1281, 1285-87 (9th Cir.) (charge of "bribery of
executive or administrative officers" rather than "bribery of public officers" not constructive
amendment, nor did it deprive jury of determining each essential element of offense), cer.
denied, 454 U.S. 859 (1981).
1624. 689 F.2d at 897 (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n. 16
(1952)).
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need only be the essential facts that are necessary to inform a defend-
ant of the crime or crimes charged. 1625 Later, in its determination, the
court also stated that an indictment should be "(1) read as a whole;
(2) read to include facts which are necessarily implied; and (3) con-
strued according to common sense."
'1 626
With this standard for review, the court then considered the alle-
gations of the indictment against what is required under the mail fraud
statute. When charging a defendant with mail fraud, the Ninth Circuit
has determined that the prosecutor need only make the specific factual
allegations regarding the mailing in furtherance of the scheme to de-
fraud. 627 The defendants attacked the sufficiency of the indictment
claiming that it failed to state either of the essential elements. 1628 The
court concluded that the allegations in the indictment that the citizens
of Washington were deprived of their statutory right to know who
made what political payments to whom, and that when defendant filed
the reports, he intentionally did not disclose the money that was paid to
him, were sufficient to adequately allege a scheme to defraud. 1629
The defendants also argued that the indictment was insufficient as
to the element of the use of the mails to execute the scheme to de-
fraud.16 30 However, the government argued that the allegation of a
1625. Id. (citing United States v. Markee, 425 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 847 (1970)). Thus, the government "need not allege its theory of the case or sup-
porting evidence." Id.
1626. Id at 899. See United States v. Inryco, Inc., 642 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
dismissed, 454 U.S. 1167 (1982); United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976). The court also noted that the rule that indictments chal-
lenged after trial are liberally construed in favor of validity did not apply to this case where
defendant timely challenged the indictment before trial.
1627. 689 F.2d at 900. The court cited United States v. Livengood, 427 F.2d 420, 423 (9th
Cir. 1970), where the "mail fraud indictment couched in the language of the statute was
sufficient and met the requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) where the alleged schemes were
particularized in some detail." 689 F.2d at 900.
1628. 689 F.2d at 896. According to this court, the essential elements of mail fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1341 are: "(I) a scheme to defraud; and (2) a knowing use of the mail to execute
the scheme." Id at 897 (citing United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 965 (9th Cir.), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977)).
1629. 689 F.2d at 898. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on its holdings in United
States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.) (depriving an employer of one's honest services
and of its right to have its business conducted honestly can constitute a scheme to defraud),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980), and United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.)
(scheme to gather private information by deception was fradulent), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978). The court concluded that a fraudulent scheme may include one that is "contrary to
public policy or which fail[s] to measure up to the 'reflection of moral uprightness, of funda-
mental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of
society.'" 689 F.2d at 897 (quoting Bohonus, 628 F.2d at 1171).
1630. 689 F.2d at 898. The district court agreed with defendant's claim, concluding that
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false mailing is "evidentiary in nature" and thus, it need not explicitly
state the filing of a false form in the indictment. 63' The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the government because dishonesty was implied when the
government alleged "a money laundering scheme, payments to legisla-
tors as a result of that scheme, and the mailing of the specific report in
furtherance of the scheme."'' 632 Thus, since the indictment implicitly
alleged the falsity of the disclosure report, the court concluded that it
was clear enough to meet the Hamling standard of giving the defendant
adequate notice of the crime charged to plead double jeopardy and
prepare a defense.
1633
The defendants in United States v. Christopher634 were charged
and convicted of the misdemeanor of being present on federal property
after normal working hours. 1635 The defendants were members of an
organization whose goal was the passage of the California Marijuana
Initiative. Seeking to collect signatures for a petition in support of the
initiative and to distribute information and to register voters, the de-
fendants set up a table on the comer of the federal building property in
West Los Angeles. In so doing, they announced their intention to oc-
cupy the area continuously for seventeen days. After repeated requests
by Federal Protective Service officers to leave the area after normal
working hours, many of the group members left the area. However, the
defendants did not leave, and accordingly, they were cited.
the indictment failed because it should have been alleged that the WWPC filed afalse Lob-
byist Employer's Report that did not disclose payments to legislators. Id. (emphasis in
original).
1631. Id. at 898.
1632. Id The court determined that the indictment implicitly alleged the falsity of the
disclosure report based on its analysis of three specific allegations in the indictment. The
first allegation was that WWPC had set aside money for payments to legislators. The second
allegation was that the payments to legislators were intentionally omitted from the disclo-
sure statement. The third allegation was that the WWPC mailed the disclosure form in
furtherance of the alleged scheme. Reading these allegations together, the court concluded
that "[t]he only way that the. . . form could have been mailed in furtherance of the alleged
scheme. . . is for WWPC [to have] intentionally omit[ted] the payments to legislators from
the disclosure statement .... " Id. at 899. See also Pipefitters Local Union v. United
States, 407 U.S. 385, 439 n.48 (1972) (dictum) (reading allegations of an indictment together
to draw inferences to determine sufficiency).
1633. The court found this to be so, despite the fact that it considered the indictment to be
confusing, lengthy and largely irrelevant. 689 F.2d at 900.
1634. 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983).
1635. This is a violation of 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-20.302 and 101-20.315 (1981). Although the
violation occurred after the 1981 amendment, the district court used the 1978 version. How-
ever, even though not an issue on appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that any changes
made in the 1981 amendment were insubstantial and insignificant to the issue at hand. 700
F.2d at 1255 n.l.
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The defendants appealed their convictions on a number of
grounds,"636 including that the charging information was vague and in-
definite. 637 They claimed that the information neither stated the times
that the defendants were trespassing, nor defined the "normal working
hours" of the federal facility.
638
The Ninth Circuit in Christopher first outlined the requirements
for stating the elements of a legally sufficient indictment. It stated that
an indictment must state with sufficient clarity the elements of the
crime charged, so as to inform a defendant and permit him to prepare
an adequate defense. 639 The court also noted that if the indictment
fails to allege an essential element of the offense, it may be considered
insufficient. 640 However, the court concluded that more specific infor-
mation was not necessary to the charge so long as the defendants were
sufficiently informed of the charges against them.' 64' On the facts of
this case, the court determined that there was no indication that the
defendants were not fully aware of the nature of the charges against
them and that nothing suggested that the phrase "normal working
hours" meant anything so unusual that they would have to guess at its
meaning. 1642
In Kreck v. Spalding,'11 3 however, the Ninth Circuit found that the
indictment was insufficient in stating the essential elements of the crime
charged. Kreck, a Washington prisoner, was convicted of second-de-
gree felony murder in state court.' 644 In his petition before the district
court, Kreck contended that the information filed by the state failed to
specifically set forth which subsection of the second-degree assault stat-
1636. See infra notes 1789-97 and accompanying text.
1637. 700 F.2d at 1255-56.
1638. Id at 1247.
1639. Id at 1257 (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)). See also
United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.) (indictment should be read in its
entirety, construed according to common sense and interpreted to include facts which are
necessarily implied), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976).
1640. 700 F.2d at 1257 (citing United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979) (bill
of particulars cannot save an invalid indictment that fails to allege an essential element of
the offense)).
1641. Id (citing United States v. Inryco, Inc., 642 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1981) (the courts
should consider the "plain language" and "inferences" when interpreting the indictment),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1167 (1982)).
1642. Id
1643. 721 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983).
1644. Kreck's conviction was reversed by the court of appeals, but that decision was re-
versed by the state supreme court, affirming the trial court's conviction. Kreck then filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court. The writ was
granted and the state appealed. Id at 1230-31.
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ute he violated, thereby depriving him of due process of law. 6 45
The district court, in reaching its decision, found the information
to be defective on two grounds.164 6 First, the information failed to al-
lege two of the essential elements of the second-degree assault
charge.1647 Second, the information failed to identify the specific crime
which was assisted by the second-degree assault. 1648 The district court
concluded that under federal law, the information was "fatally defec-
tive" since Kreck was not given "adequate notice of the charges against
him to enable him to adequately prepare his defense."' 9
The Ninth Circuit in Kreck acknowledged two purposes for re-
quiring that the charging document furnish a defendant with a suffi-
cient description of the charge against him. First, it enables the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense and second, it enables him
to plead double jeopardy against a second prosecution for the same
offense.1650 The court then affirmed the district court's ruling that the
information was legally insufficient because it failed to serve the first
intended function by not providing Kreck with adequate notice of the
charges against him so as to enable him to prepare his defense. 1651 It
concluded that the mandated inquiry showed that Kreck was
prejudiced in the preparation of his defense by the failure to set forth
the crime upon which the second-degree assault under subsection 2 of
the Washington Revised Code was founded.
652
1645. Id. at 1231.
1646. Under the fourteenth amendment, the constitutional sufficiency of an information is
determined under federal law. Id. at 1232.
1647. Those elements were "that the conduct of Kreck (1) enabled and assisted him to
(2) commit any crime." Id.
1648. The Washington "Assault in the Second Degree" statute states seven situations
whereby a defendant's conduct will constitute second degree assault. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9.11.020 (1974). 721 F.2d at 1231 & n.4.
1649. 721 F.2d at 1232.
1650. Id. (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); United States v. Gordon,
641 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859 (1981); United States v. Bohonus, 628
F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 298 (1980); United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294
(9th Cir. 1979)).
1651. The court found that the information, which charged the accused with second-de-
gree felony murder under Washington state law on the basis of death occurring from the
accused's use of chloroform on the victim, was constitutionally inadequate. It failed to spec-
ify whether the accused was charged with administering chloroform "with intent to injure,"
or in the alternative, with intent "to enable or assist himself or any other person to commit
any crime." If the charge was made on the latter basis, it failed to specify what underlying
crime the accused was charged with having committed. 721 F.2d at 1233.
1652. Id. See supra note 1648. Support for this conclusion was found in a decision of the
Washington State Supreme Court. State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975). In
its appeal, the state set forth some interesting suggestions. First, it proposed that requiring
the inclusion of the underlying crime on which the second-degree assault is founded "would
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In United States v. Mehrmanesh,'653 the defendant was found
guilty of importing heroin, attempting to possess with intent to dis-
tribute heroin, and with aiding and abetting these offenses. 1654 Appeal-
ing his conviction, Mehrmanesh claimed that the aiding and abetting
charge was fatally defective because "it did not name the principal
whom he was charged with aiding and abetting."'' 65 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, easily dismissed this claim as the court had previously
found that the identification of the principal is not an essential element
of the offense of aiding and abetting, and thus, not a fatal defect.
65 6
In United States v. McCown,6 57 the defendants were convicted of
crimes relating to conspiracy and the distribution of cocaine and fire-
arms. 165 8 Grounds for their appeal included the claim that one of the
counts of the indictment lacked sufficient specificity. 659 Specifically,
two of the defendants claimed that the conspiracy counts did not state
with sufficient specificity the time during which the conspiracy took
institute a return to code pleading," thereby defeating the purpose of simplifying the techni-
cal requirements of common law pleading and avoiding forcing a defendant to trial without
properly informing him of the crime with which he is charged. 721 F.2d at 1233. Both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit dismissed this suggestion as "merely begging the issue at
hand." Id A second suggestion set forth by the state was that the inclusion of the term
"chloroform" in the information necessarily limited the violation at issue to subsection 2 of
the second-degree assault statute, § 9.11.020 RCW. The district court accepted this propo-
sal. However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that Kreck's violation could fall within
the "purview of either subsection 1 or subsection 2 of that statute." Thus, the Ninth Circuit
determined that to allow the state to charge in such nebulous terms and to proceed to trial
on either subsection would be a violation of the "principle of fundamental fairness on which
due process of law is bottomed." 721 F.2d at 1233.
1653. 689 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1982).
1654. The charge of aiding and abetting the listed offenses was included in a superseding
indictment. Id at 825.
1655. Id at 835.
1656. Id. (citing United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure of indict-
ment to detail each element of offense generally constitutes fatal defect)). But see United
States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294, 300 (9th Cir. 1977) (identification of principal not an essen-
tial element of charge of aiding and abetting); Feldstein v. United States, 429 F.2d 1092,
1095 (9th Cir.) (identification of principal not an essential element of charge of aiding and
abetting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 920 (1970).
1657. 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
1658. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally. . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
1659. Another ground for the appeal was the claim of government misconduct. For a
discussion, see infira notes 1769-73 and accompanying text.
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place. 1660 The defendants claimed that the language in the indictment
was open-ended concerning the time frame of the alleged illegal activ-
ity.1661 The court disagreed, stating that the term "on or about" is suffi-
ciently specific and does not denote an indefinite time frame. Thus, the
court concluded that the indictment was sufficient.
1662
In United States v. Bennett,1663 the defendant was found guilty of
one count of conspiracy, forty-nine counts of making false statements
to the United States Department of Labor, seven counts of theft and
embezzlement of CETA funds, and two counts of filing false income
tax returns. 1664 In his appeal, Bennett claimed that the indictment was
"multiplicitous" in that it charged him for the same offense in several
separate counts. 665 Before addressing this specific issue, the court first
concluded that despite the similarities between the two statutes in-
volved in this case, 1666 they met the "Blockburger" test for separate
charges,1 667 and therefore did not violate Bennett's protective right
1660. The count alleged that "the conspiracy continued 'from on or about June 17, 1981, to
on or about October 10, 1981." 711 F.2d at 1450.
1661. Id. The defendants were relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), where the language that the court held insufficient
concerning the time a conspiracy took place read "beginning on or before" and "continuing
thereafter until on or after." The court found that this language was "open-ended in both
directions" and therefore "obscure." Id
1662. 711 F.2d at 1450-51.
1663. 702 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1983).
1664. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1976); and 26
U.S.C. § 7206(l) (1976), respectively.
1665. Specifically, Bennett charged that counts 2-45 concerning submitting certain mis-
leading invoices and counts 46-50 concerning submitted close-out reports which summarized
the misleading invoices were the same offense.
1666. 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or employee of, or connected in
any capacity with any agency or organization receiving financial assistance or any
funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act . . .knowingly
.obtains by fraud any of the moneys. . . or property which are the subject of a
financial assistance agreement. . . shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . by any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact. . . or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined. . . or imprisoned... or both.
1667. 702 F.2d at 835. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The
Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court determined that "[t]he double jeopardy clause
is not violated where separate charges are based on statutes, each of which requires proof of
a fact the other does not." 702 F.2d at 835. According to this court, "the Blockburger test is
met 'notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.'" Id
(quoting lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975)). See, e.g., United States v.
Anderson, 642 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1981) (count charging conspiracy to distribute and possess
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against double jeopardy. Thus, the court easily dismissed this argu-
ment on the basis of its previous ruling that each false document made
or submitted may be charged as a separate violation. 661 Since the
counts charged separate offenses under this rule, the court concluded
that they were not multiplicitous.
1669
Another case in which the court dealt with the claim that the lan-
guage of the indictment was multiplicitous was Baumann v. United
States. 670 Baumann was charged and convicted of mail fraud and of
aiding and abetting.' 67 1 One of his contentions on appeal was that the
indictment under which he was charged was invalid because it was im-
properly drawn due to the multiplicity and duplicity of the charges. 1
672
The Ninth Circuit first stated that a showing of "cause", such as inef-
fective assistance of counsel, was necessary to raise a collateral attack
on the validity of an indictment. 673 However, the court noted a further
limitation by stating that relief will only be granted if, because of coun-
sel's specific acts and omissions at trial, the defendant is prejudiced. 
674
The court concluded that Baumann could not be prejudiced by his
counsel's failure to move for dismissal of any of the counts of the in-
dictment because the district court had already concluded that they
were not defective as a matter of law.' 675 Since the failure to raise a
meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of
heroin and count charging income tax evasion was not improper where evidence on both
counts overlapped).
1668. 702 F.2d at 835. See United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 838-39 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
1669. 702 F.2d at 835.
1670. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
1671. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1342. For text of U.S.C. § 1341, see supra note 1619.
18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, for the purpose of con-
ducting, promoting, or carrying on by means of the Postal Service, any scheme or device
mentioned in section 1341 of this title. . . shall be fined ... or imprisoned. . . or both."
Baumann's conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on direct appeal. More than
two years later, Baumann petitioned the district court for post-conviction relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 2225 (1976). On referral, the magistrate recommended that the petition be dis-
missed because that section does not permit the relitigation of issues that have been or may
be raised on direct appeal. 692 F.2d at 569. The district court ordered the petition dis-
missed. Baumann then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Id.
1672. The district court ruled on the merits of the multiplicity claim by rejecting it because
each of the four counts charged Baumann with a separate violation of the mail fraud statute,
The district court also rejected the claim of duplicity because early in the trial it was stipu-
lated that he was not charged with a substantive offense under the first count but rather that
the references to Count 1 only incorporated the factual allegations of that count. 692 F.2d at
571.
1673. In his appeal, Baumann alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 1d at 572.
1674. Id.
1675. See supra note 1672.
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counsel, the court determined that there was not sufficient cause to at-
tack the indictment collaterally.
1676
In United States v. Brooklier,1677 one of the defendant's conten-
tions was that the first count of the indictment concerning violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute
was ambiguous.' 678 The Ninth Circuit reasoned, however, that con-
spiracies and attempts may be considered as the underlying racketeer-
ing activities in light of the statutory definition of "racketeering
activity."' 679  Thus, the court did not consider the count to be
ambiguous. 1680
In United States v. Ramirez,6 s' the defendants were convicted of
conspiring to transport stolen aircraft, and of importing, possessing and
distributing marijuana. One defendant argued that the signature
phrase "true bill," the names and signatures of the grand jury foreper-
son and the United States Attorney, and the introductory phrase "the
Grand Jury charges," on the indictment made it evident to the jury that
a higher jury had already found the facts in the indictment to be true
and the United States Attorney to have concurred. Thus, this defend-
ant contended that this information was prejudicial to him. The Ninth
Circuit, however, found this contention to be frivolous because the jury
was properly instructed that the indictment was neither evidence
against the defendant nor an inference of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. 
682
1676. The court further concluded that it was not error for the district court to dismiss this
appeal without ordering an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's allegations failed to state
a claim for relief. 692 F.2d at 572.
1677. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1194 (1983).
1678. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c), (d) (1976) provide:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
The defendants asserted that the racketeering activities "include conspiracy charges, and
that a 'conspiracy to conspire' to commit acts of extortion is an illogical and ambiguous
allegation." 686 F.2d at 1216.
1679. The court stated that a series of conspiracies or unsuccessful attempts constitutes "'a
pattern of racketeering activity'" within 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), even if no offense is completed.
685 F.2d at 1216.
1680. Id. The court also noted that the defendants failed to make a showing that the al-
leged ambiguity was prejudicial to them. Id.
1681. 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983).
1682. Id at 545. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the purpose of FED.
R. Civ. P. at 7(d), which allows language to be stricken from an indictment, is to protect a
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2. Variance
"A variance arises when evidence adduced at trial establishes facts
different from those alleged in the indictment."1 613  Variance is not
usually considered to be reversible error when it arises from a simple
clerical error or redundancy, or if it does not impair a defendant's right
to receive notice of the charges, or does not impair his or her right
against double jeopardy.168 4 However, it will be considered per se re-
versible error if the variance is found to either broaden or substantially
alter the essential elements of the offense charged.1
685
The Ninth Circuit found reversible error in United States v. Paz-
sint,1686 a case dealing with a variance between the charges of the in-
dictment and the proof offered for conviction. The indictment charged
the defendant with impeding, intimidating, and interfering with an In-
ternal Revenue Service officer by use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon. 1687 However, Pazsint's conviction was based on the forcible
assault of a federal officer with the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon. 68 8 One basis for Pazsint's appeal was that he was convicted
of an offense not charged in the indictment.
The caption of the indictment returned by the grand jury stated
"Assault on a Federal Officer, Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 11 l."'1689 How-
ever, the body of the indictment did not mention the offense of as-
sault. 1690 The Ninth Circuit observed that the caption to an indictment
defendant against prejudicial or inflammatory allegations which are not relevant or material
to the charges. Id. at 544-45. See United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir. 1979)
(language concerning prior felony conviction of carrying a handgun was prejudicial in an
indictment charging possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon); United States
v. Wilkerson, 456 F.2d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1972) (aliases struck from indictment where not
relevant to the issue of defendant's identification), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 926 (1972).
1683. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979) (citing Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935)).
1684. United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
931 (1979).
1685. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-17 (1960).
1686. 703 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1983).
1687. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) prescribes the penalty for forcible assault, resistance, im-
pedence, intimidation, or interference with any person designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
1688. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
1689. 703 F.2d at 422-23 (emphasis added).
1690. Rather, the body of the indictment read: "[defendant] did unlawfully and wilfully,
by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, forcibly impede, intimidate and interfere with an
officer of the Internal Revenue Service. . . in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 11 I." Id at 423.
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is not controlling and is complete surplusage. 1691 The court also noted
that because the statutory citation is not regarded as part of the indict-
ment, the statement that the defendant violated 18 U.S.C. section 111
does not imply that he is charged with all the unlawful acts listed in the
statute. 16
92
The court concluded that because the jury instructions and possi-
ble verdict forms used only dealt with the uncharged crime of assault,
the jury could not have found the defendant guilty of any other offense,
including those mentioned in the indictment. Since the defendant was
convicted of an offense that was not charged in the indictment, the
court found it to be reversible error.
693
In United States v. Kendrick, 694 the defendant was convicted of
securities law violations and perjury. 1695 Included in his appeal was the
claim that there was a variance between the charge of the indictment
and what was found by the jury.
16 9 6
The Ninth Circuit dealt summarily with this claim. The charge of
the indictment was that Kendrick knowingly converted money belong-
ing to one of his victims to his own use, but the proof was that the
alleged conversion was to the use of the business Kendrick & Com-
pany. The court dismissed this argument, finding that the jury could
have concluded that because there was evidence that on the same day,
the same amount of money was transferred from the Kendrick & Com-
pany account to the defendant's personal bank account, Kendrick
could have used the money when purchasing stock for his own ac-
count. 16 9 7 The court concluded that either way, the withdrawal was to
Kendrick's benefit, and that even if there was some slight variance,
1691. Id. (citing United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 804 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 423
U.S. 855 (1975)).
1692. Id (citing United States v. Clark, 416 F.2d 63, 64 (9th Cir. 1969)).
1693. Id at 424. "'In federal court a defendant may not be convicted of an offense differ-
ent from that specifically charged by the grand jury."' Id at 423 (quoting United States v.
Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 652 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1981) (although court may not
amend indictment through jury instructions, correction of clerical error may constitute
harmless error)).
1694. 692 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983).
1695. The principal issue before the court was "whether the actions taken by [the defend-
ant] in connection with margin accounts of two of his customers were taken 'in connection
with the purchase or sale' of securities in violation of§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5." Id at 1264 (footnote omitted).
1696. Defendant also claimed that the indictment should be dismissed for pre-indictment
delay. Id at 1267. See infra notes 1750-52 and accompanying text.
1697. 692 F.2d at 1266.
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there was no prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant.169
In United States v. Goodheim,1699 the defendant was charged with
and convicted of making false statements in connection with the acqui-
sition of, receipt of, and possession of, a firearm by a convicted
felon. "'7 On appeal, he claimed that the government failed to prove
the existence of an operable firearm, as alleged in the indictment.
170 1
In response, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory language of
the allegedly violated sections 1702 for the proper definition of "firearm."
It concluded that neither definition required that the weapon be opera-
ble. 170 3 Additionally, it noted that the defendant had stipulated at trial
that each of the weapons was a firearm as defined in those sections.
The court finally observed that although the government did not ap-
pear to undertake to define "firearm" as an operable weapon, a witness
who was a firearms dealer testified that he had test-fired all three weap-
ons. The court concluded that this testimony was sufficient to establish
"operability" and that Goodheim's argument of variance was without
merit. 1704
3. Competency and legality of evidence
"[Tihe validity of an indictment is not [normally] affected by the
character of evidence considered by the grand jury."170 An indictment,
valid on its face and returned by a legally constituted and unbiased
grand jury, is presumed to be founded upon sufficient evidence. 170 6 A
heavy burden is placed on the challenger. 170 7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
has upheld indictments founded on hearsay evidence, or testimony of a
1698. Id. See United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
831 (1978).
1699. 686 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1982).
1700. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . who
is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
1701. 686 F.2d at 778.
1702. The court reviewed 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1976), which defines "firearm" for the
purposes of § 922(h)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(3) (1976), which defines "firearm" for the
purposes of § 20(a)(1). 686 F.2d at 778 n.l. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(3) (1976) provides:
"'firearm' means any weapon. . . which will or is designed to or may readily be converted
to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. . . . Such term shall include any hand-
gun, rifle, or shotgun."
1703. 686 F.2d at 778.
1704. Id.
1705. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974).
1706. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1978).
1707. Id.
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single witness when other witnesses are available. 1708
Although an indictment usually cannot be attacked on the grounds
of improper evidence, the Ninth Circuit has recently considered cases
where the indictment has been attacked on the basis of incompetent
evidence. In United States v. DeLuca,170 9 the defendants were con-
victed of conspiracy and racketeering. 71 0  On appeal, one defendant
contended that the indictment should be dismissed because much of
the evidence before the grand jury was either hearsay or incomplete.
Previously, the Ninth Circuit had determined that to dismiss the indict-
ment on the basis of inadequate evidence before the grand jury, it must
be found that the grand jury failed to exercise its independent judg-
ment.' 7 1 ' Absent a showing that the "government flagrantly manipu-
lated, overreached, or deceived the jury," the court will not dismiss an
indictment valid on its face.' 7 12 The court in this case found neither
such a showing nor any suggestion that the grand jury failed to exercise
its independent judgment.17 13 Therefore, it upheld the indictment.
The Ninth Circuit also reviewed the sufficiency of evidence in
United States v. Gibson,17 14 where the defendant was convicted of mail
fraud, wire fraud and inducing persons to travel in interstate commerce
for purposes of fraud.1 7 15 On appeal, Gibson claimed that the use of
corporate checks written against insufficient funds as evidence was im-
proper. 71 6 The court found that such evidence was relevant because it
1708. United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2097 (1983). See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (indictment based en-
tirely on hearsay evidence from investigating officers upheld).
1709. 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
1710. In addition, some of the defendants were convicted of extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 844, use
of an explosive, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and arson. 692 F.2d at 1280.
1711. 692 F.2d at 1280 (citing United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir.
1981) (presumption that grand jury bases its decision on its independent judgment)).
1712. Id. (citing United States v. Stone, 633 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissal of
indictment required only where grand jury has been flagrantly overreached or deceived in
some significant way)).
1713. In its review of the claim, the court noted its previous criticism of the use of hearsay
evidence where more reliable evidence is available. See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 607
F.2d 877, 882 n.7 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment upheld against claim of incompetent evidence
before grand jury). However, it also recognized that such evidence is considered "wholly
adequate to support an indictment." 692 F.2d at 1280 (citing United States v. Garner, 663
F.2d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 1981) (presentation of complete transcripts of sworn testimony rather
than live witnesses is sufficient evidence for indictment), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982)).
See also United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.) (indictment may be based
solely on hearsay evidence), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2097 (1983).
1714. 690 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1446 (1983).
1715. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 2314 (1976), respectively.
1716. Gibson was president and chairman of the board of Gibson Marketing Interna-
tional, Inc. (GMI) and also held all of its capital stock. The purpose of the business was to
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had a tendency to show both thin capitalization of Gibson Marketing
International, Inc. (GMI) and Gibson's intent to deceive GMI inves-
tors. Thus, it concluded that the evidence was admissible since it re-
lated to the fraud charges in the indictment. 7 7
In United States v. Fierros,71 a the defendants were indicted for
and convicted of conspiring to harbor and transport illegal aliens.
1719
One defendant, Perez, included in his appeal a request for dismissal of
the indictment, claiming that his due process rights were violated when
the magistrate ordered seventeen aliens arrested in connection with the
case released without Perez's stipulation. 720 The district court, when
reviewing Perez's motion to dismiss, concluded that the magistrate did
not abuse his discretion because Perez did not attempt to show that the
aliens' testimony could be of conceivable benefit to him.'7
However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme
Court recently rejected the "conceivable benefit test" in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal,'722 and accordingly held that unless Perez showed
that the released witnesses' testimony would have been both "material
and favorable to his defense," the indictment would not require dismis-
sal. 1723 The court then noted that Perez did not endeavor to explain
what favorable material evidence the released witnesses would have
provided for his defense and the court could not determine what, if
any, evidence those witnesses could have supplied which might have
sell franchises and franchise distributorship rights to certain fast food restaurants. However,
it was found that "GMI did not provide certain of the promised business services." 690 F.2d
at 699.
1717. Id. at 703. In making his claim, Gibson relied on the Sixth Circuit's decision in
United States v. McFayden-Snider, 552 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1977) (excluding bad check evi-
dence unrelated to the fraud charged in the indictment), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
However, the Ninth Circuit found Gibson's reliance misplaced as McFayden-Snider did ap-
prove admission of bad check evidence when it is related to the fraud charged in the indict-
ment, as in the instant case. 690 F.2d at 703.
1718. 692 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3090 (1983).
1719. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976), respectively,
1720. The seventeen aliens were riding on the bus going to work when they were arrested
at the time Perez was arrested. Perez claimed that they would have been witnesses in his
defense. 692 F.2d at 1296.
1721. Id (citing United States v. Martinez-Morales, 632 F.2d 112, 114-15 (9th Cir. 1980)
(no constitutional principles offended when government releases witness when government
not aware of possible connection with other crimes); United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500
F.2d 234, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1974) (when facts show that retention of material witness would
be inappropriate or undesirable, court has power to release)).
1722. 458 U.S. 858, 871-73 (1982) (indictment can be dismissed on showing that govern-
ment deliberately procured absence of witness favorable to defense).
1723. 692 F.2d at 1296 (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)).
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aided his defense.'724 Therefore, the court concluded that the district
court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.
1725
4. Pre-indictment delay
If an indictment is not filed within the statutory time limit, a pre-
sumption may arise that the defendant's right to a fair trial has been
prejudiced. 1726 In United States v. Carruth,1727 the defendants were
convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States by tax fraud in
connection with the operation of limited partnership tax shelter
schemes. 1728 The defendants appealed their convictions on the basis
that pre-indictment delay had prejudiced their defense, thereby deny-
ing their right to due process of law.
17 29
When considering whether pre-indictment delay requires dismis-
sal, it must first be determined whether the defendant has suffered ac-
tual prejudice because of the delay. 1730  The defendant bears the
burden of establishing such actual prejudice using "definite, not specu-
lative" proof. 1731 If the defendant is able to show actual prejudice, the
court will then consider the reasons for and length of the delay. 1
732
The defendant, Carruth, attempting to show actual prejudice, con-
tended that during the delay periods he had destroyed many of his per-
sonal and business records. Moreover, his accountant had died shortly
before the indictment was issued, and thus could not testify on his be-
half. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed that these
contentions did not amount to actual prejudice. 1733 The court noted
that the defendant failed to establish that either the records or the ac-
1724. Id The court further noted that there was sufficient evidence of other acts per-
formed by Perez on different occasions to support his conviction.
1725. Id.
1726. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
1727. 699 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 698 (1984).
1728. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined. . . or imprisoned .. . or both.
1729. 699 F.2d at 1019.
1730. Id. (citing United States v. Swacker, 628 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980) (court must
find that actual prejudice due to pre-indictment delay has been suffered by defendant before
it can dismiss indictment)).
1731. Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.) (mere assertions of
actual prejudice considered speculative without additional proof of actual prejudice), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981)).
1732. Id. See infra note 1742 for further discussion of Ninth Circuit's balancing test for
pre-indictment delay.
1733. 699 F.2d at 1019.
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countant's testimony would have exonerated him. 17 3 4 The court re-
fused to grant a person under criminal investigation the right to destroy
his records and then plead prejudice because those records are unavail-
able to support the defense.
1735
The second defendant also pleaded actual prejudice because,
although microfilm copies of his business records were available, he
had destroyed the "hard copies."' 173 6 The court decided that since the
microfilmed copies were available, the defendant was not prejudiced in
his preparation for trial.
17 37
The court concluded that since there was no finding of actual prej-
udice against either defendant, it was not necessary to balance the prej-
udice suffered by the defendants against the reasons for and length of
the pre-indictment delay. 1738 The court also added that due to the diffi-
culty of unraveling the defendants' schemes, the three year delay from
the beginning of the criminal investigation to the return of the indict-
ment was not inordinate.
173 9
The Ninth Circuit also denied making a finding of pre-indictment
delay in United States v. Tornabene.174 0 The defendant Tornabene sold
LSD to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Novem-
ber, 1978, but was not indicted until June, 1980, eighteen months later.
The Ninth Circuit, in reaching its decision, applied the three balancing
factors from United States v. Mays17 4 1 for establishing the proper stan-
dard for dismissal due to pre-indictment delay. Those factors are:
(1) actual prejudice to the defendant, to be proved by the defendant,
(2) length of delay, and (3) the government's reason for the delay.1
742
1734. The government's case was founded on the assumption that defendants created doc-
umentation for nonexistent transactions, but Carruth failed to show that the destroyed docu-
ments would have proved that the transactions actually existed. Id.
1735. Id
1736. The defendant Reed claimed that he destroyed his records in reasonable reliance on
Tax Division letters. However, the court noted that the Tax Division responded to Reed's
letter requesting information about why his records were transferred to the IRS as a request
for an interpretation of their reference code number system. ld. at 1020.
1737. Id The court also noted that in Reed's case, the documents were destroyed because
of his "mistaken interpretation" of the Tax Division letters, and not because of the delay in
bringing the indictment. Id
1738. Id (citing United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1739. Id Cf. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977) (no due process violation
from four and one-half year delay).
1740. 687 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1982).
1741. 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
1742. 687 F.2d at 316-17. The Ninth Circuit developed this balancing test despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), that dismissal of
an indictment is necessary when the delay causes substantial prejudice to a defendant's right
to a fair trial andis intentionally used to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. Id. at
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The government argued that during the interim period, it was unsuc-
cessfully attempting to arrange further LSD sales by Tornabene to gov-
ernment agents. The court concluded that the "on-going investigation"
was a legitimate reason for the delay. 743 However, without any discus-
sion concerning Tornabene's proof of prejudice, the court determined
that the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous and therefore
affirmed it.""
In United States v. Burns, 745 the defendant, an Indian, was
charged and convicted of two robberies in Indian territory, 1746 posses-
sion of a firearm, 1747 and use of a firearm in the commission of a fel-
ony. 17 4 8  The defendant was not indicted for over a year after the
perpetration of the crimes and thus claimed that pre-indictment delay
violated his due process rights. Although the court found that the de-
fendant alleged actual prejudice, it noted that he failed to show how he
was prejudiced by the delay, or that the prosecution either intentionally
or recklessly delayed the indictment. 749  Thus, the court easily dis-
missed his claim that his due process rights had been violated.
Another case in which the Ninth Circuit reviewed a claim of pre-
indictment delay was United States v. Kendrick.175 ° Kendrick argued
that his conviction for securities law violations and perjury should be
reversed because during the delay period, documents were lost and one
witness may have forgotten certain details. The Ninth Circuit first
790, 795 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971) (indictment upheld
despite finding of actual prejudice because government's reason for delay found valid)).
1743. In other words, there was not an intentional or negligent delay for improper pur-
poses. 687 F.2d at 317.
1744. Id Tornabene also claimed that the indictment should be dismissed because the
government failed to produce the informant as was requested by him in support of his en-
trapment defense. Id at 316 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 65, n.15 (1957)).
Tornabene argued that such failure was "tantamount to failure to identify the informant."
Id. The court disagreed, stating that the proper remedy for such failure is a new trial and
thus, reversed and remanded this issue to the district court. Id
1745. 701 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3123 (1983).
1746. 18 U.S.C. §§2, 1153 & 2111 (1976).
1747. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976).
1748. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976).
1749. 701 F.2d at 842. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977) (defend-
ant must show that the delay caused him actual prejudice). The court noted that the defend-
ant must also show that the "prosecution either intentionally delayed the indictment to gain
a tactical advantage or delayed it in reckless disregard of circumstances indicating an appre-
ciable risk of harm to the defense." 701 F.2d at 842 (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 & n.17,
796). See also United States v. Walker, 601 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1979) (pre-indictment
delay permissible unless it violates fundamental concepts of justice).
1750. 692 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983). For a more de-
tailed discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 1694-98 and accompanying text.
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noted that proof of prejudice is necessary to a claim of pre-indictment
delay. 1751 However, the court found that the defendant, in trying to
prove prejudice, only showed "speculation" as to what the witness may
have forgotten and what certain allegedly missing documents may have
revealed. The court did not find this sufficient.
1752
In United States v. Greene, 1753 the defendant was charged with
willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes, 175 4 and was con-
victed when the jury found that he had understated his taxable income
for the years 1973 and 1974. Included in his appeal was the contention
that the charge of evasion in 1973 was time barred. 755 However, the
government was able to show that because of the suspended time pe-
riod due to third party enforcement proceedings, the indictment was
brought within four days of the expiration of the limitation period.
756
The defendant countered this showing by contending that the suspen-
sion of the limitation period should not have been allowed after he
withdrew his objection to the third party summons, and in addition,
should not be applied where a taxpayer is not exercising his right to
stay compliance under Title 26, section 7609(b)(2), of the United States
Code. 17
5 7
The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress intended that a stay
under section 7609(b)(2) remain in effect until a written withdrawal of
objection is received by the Internal Revenue Service and the person
1751. 692 F.2d at 1267 (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).
1752. Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 902 (1981); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1977)).
1753. 698 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1983).
1754. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976).
1755. 698 F.2d at 1367-68. 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (1976) provides that an indictment for tax
evasion must be returned within six years after the commission of the offense. However, the
court noted that where third party enforcement proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 7609(e) are
necessary, it operates to suspend the limitations period. 698 F.2d at 1369 n.4.
1756. 698 F.2d at 1369. The indictment was not returned until over six years after the
alleged tax year offense.
1757. Id 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
[a]ny person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have
the right to stay compliance with the summons if...
(A) notice in writing is given to the person summoned not to comply with
the summons, and
(B) a copy of such notice. . . is mailed by registered or certified mail to such
person and to such office as the Secretary may direct in the notice.
Section 7609(e) provides in pertinent part:
If any person takes any action as provided in subsection (b) . . . then the
running of any period of limitations under section 6501 (relating to the assessment
and collection of tax) or under section 6531 (relating to criminal prosecutions) withrespect to such person shall be suspended for the period during which a proceeding
with respect to the enforcement of such summons is pending.
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summoned. 758 The court determined that since no written withdrawal
was ever received by the trustee in bankruptcy, the defendant was still
exercising his right to stay compliance. Thus, the court concluded that
since the limitation period was properly suspended, the indictment was
timely.
1759
5. Dismissal due to government misconduct
Prejudicial government misconduct which results in an intrusion
into the defendant's constitutional rights is another basis for dismissal
of the indictment. 1760 In United States v. Ramirez,1761 one defendant
contended that the indictment against him should be dismissed as a
result of police misconduct. 762 Defendant Reynolds was an informant
for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). However, because of
his prior suspicious actions, the LAPD considered him a double agent
and therefore untrustworthy. During the time of the criminal activities
in this case, the defendant contacted the LAPD and informed them of
impending meetings in which he was participating.
The court noted that there was some support to be found in Reyn-
olds' allegations that he was illegally bribed and coerced into working
as an informant and that the police intentionally misled him while still
intending to arrest him. However, the court was convinced by the gov-
ernment's argument that the LAPD's actions were permissible in light
of Reynolds' previous untrustworthy actions and the LAPD's suspicion
that he was a double agent. 1763 The court agreed with the government
that the police actions were within permissible limits.
7 64
The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to dismiss the indictment by not exercising its
1758. 698 F.2d at 1369-70. The court noted that Congress has not explicitly stated how a
defendant may withdraw or revoke his previously exercised objection under § 7609(b), but
has concluded that since written notice is required to stay compliance with a summons, it
was reasonable to infer that written notice is required to withdraw the objection. Id.
1759. Id at 1370.
1760. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
1761. 710 F.2d 535 (1983). For discussion of this case concerning "essential elements" of
the indictment, see supra notes 1681-82 and accompanying text.
1762. In a pretrial motion, the defendant contended that the LAPD's actions violated his
due process rights, or alternatively, that the misconduct justified the use of the supervisory
power of the district court to either dimiss the indictment or take other remedial action. The
outrageous police misconduct alleged by the defendant was that the police coerced Reynolds
into acting as an informer and into playing an active role in the resulting criminal enterprise,
and then prosecuted him for doing only what the police had instructed him to do. 710 F.2d
at 539.
1763. Id. at 540-41.
1764. Id at 541.
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supervisory powers in this case. 1765 The court first noted that a dismis-
sal should be granted only when there is a clear basis in fact and law
for doing so, 17 6 6 and that the power has been used only infrequently.
The court then concluded that since it had already found that the po-
lice conduct was within permissible limits, the use of the court's super-
visory power in this case would not further any of the purposes
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 17 6 7 Thus, it affirmed
the district court's decision not to dismiss the indictment.
768
In United States v. MfcCown, 17 6 9 the defendants claimed that their
indictment should be dismissed due to government misconduct during
the undercover investigation leading to their arrests. In response, the
court stated that an indictment should only be dismissed "when the
government's misconduct is 'so grossly shocking and so outrageous as
to violate the universal sense of justice.' "1770
The defendants claimed that undercover government agents, with-
out the permission of their superiors, distributed two samples of mari-
juana to the defendants without attempting to recover them and with
little concern as to what was to become of the contraband. 1771 After
noting that only two federal appellate cases have responded to the
"outrageous government misconduct" argument, the Ninth Circuit did
not find the conduct in this case to be either "grossly shocking" or "out-
rageous." 1772 Thus, the court found that the conduct of the government
1765. Id. Three listed purposes which may properly underlie use of the supervisory power
are: "(1) to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights; (2) to preserve judicial
integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the
jury; and (3) as a remedial measure designed to deter illegal conduct." Id (citing United
States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1978 (1983)).
1766. Id. (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977)).
1767. See supra note 1765.
1768. 710 F.2d at 549.
1769. 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983). For further discussion of the claims of defendants in
this case, see supra notes 1657-62 and accompanying text.
1770. 711 F.2d at 1449 (quoting United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir.
1981) (per curiam)).
1771. Id. The undercover agents distributed two samples of marijuana, one of which con-
tained six ounces and the other contained two to five ounces. The defendants claimed that
the agents did not have permission to distribute the second sample. Id.
1772. Id. at 1449-50. The two federal appellate cases upholding the government miscon-
duct argument are United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1978) and Greene
v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971). In both cases, it was found that the
defendant "'would have not had the capacity to commit the crimes with which they were
charged without the government's assistance.'" 711 F.2d at 1449-50 (quoting United States
v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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agents in this case did not warrant dismissal of the indictment.17 73
The defendants in United States v. Al Mudarris774 were indicted
for mail fraud against a medical insurance carrier. The grand jury
heard testimony, but before the indictment was returned, its term ex-
pired and a new grand jury heard a single summary witness 1775 before
returning the indictment. In addition to claiming that the evidence was
inadequate before the indicting grand jury, 17 76 the defendants claimed
that due to the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct before the
grand jury, the indictment should have been dismissed.
77 7
In response, the Ninth Circuit noted that the party challenging the
indictment has the difficult burden of showing that flagrant misconduct
of the prosecutor deceived the grand jury or significantly impaired its
ability to exercise independent judgment. 1778 The court concluded that
the prosecutor's actions did not meet the flagrant misconduct standard
and thus upheld the trial court's discretion in not dismissing the
indictment. 
779
In United States v. Everett,1780 the defendants were convicted of
conspiring to impair, impede and obstruct the collection of tax reve-
nue.' 78' On appeal, defendant Chira claimed the district court erred in
denying their motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of gov-
ernmental misconduct. Chira claimed several inaccuracies in the pre-
sentation of his case, including misinformation in the affidavit of
1773. 711 F.2d at 1450. The court found the Supreme Court's statement in Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion), particularly apt:
If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope
of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in
prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law.
711 F.2d at 1450.
1774. 695 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2097 (1983).
1775. The single summary witness was an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms. Id. at 1184.
1776. See supra notes 1705-25 and accompanying text for a general discussion of evidence
before the grand jury.
1777. The defendants claimed that "the prosecutor and summary witness needlessly in-
jected irrelevant subject matter that was highly prejudicial and sometimes misleading." 695
F.2d at 1186. They also claimed that the prosecutors "improperly influenced the grand jury
and usurped its role by resolving credibility issues." Id. at 1187.
1778. Id. at 1185 (citing United States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) (errone-
ous grand jury instructions do not automatically invalidate an otherwise proper grand jury
indictment)).
1779. The court noted that it may dismiss an indictment as an exercise of its inherent
supervisory power to protect a defendant's due process rights. Id.
1780. 692 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) and cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1502 (1983).
1781. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See supra note 1728 for text of § 371.
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probable cause submitted in support of the complaint, misidentification
of him as "Joseph" rather than "Richard" on both the arrest warrant
and complaint, and excessive and unnecessary use of hearsay testimony
before the grand jury. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the al-
leged inaccuracies did not approach the level of government miscon-
duct necessary to violate the due process clause or to justify an exercise
of the supervisory power of the court. 1782 The court stated that such
supervisory power, including the power to dismiss an indictment on the
basis of governmental or prosecutorial misconduct, will be used to dis-
miss an indictment only when the misconduct represents "a serious
threat to the integrity of the judicial process."' 1783 The court did not
find that Chira's claims of misconduct rose to that level.
6. Dismissal due to selective prosecution
In United States v. Butterworth,178 4 the Ninth Circuit found it nec-
essary to deny review based on its lack of jurisdiction over the appeal.
The appeal concerned the defendants' claims that because they were on
a government list of appropriate targets for prosecution, they were se-
lectively prosecuted. 7 8 5 Previously, the Ninth Circuit had allowed vin-
dictive prosecution claims to be appealed immediately under the
"collateral order exception to the final judgment rule," 178 6 and accord-
ingly had also allowed selective prosecution claims to be immediately
appealed because of the similarity of the two claims. 1787 However, the
court stated that the Supreme Court had recently reversed a decision of
the Ninth Circuit allowing an immediate appeal of a vindictive prose-
cution claim.' 788 Thus, the court, noting its previous recognition of the
1782. 692 F.2d at 601.
1783. Id (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 885 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1784. 693 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1982).
1785. Id. at 100. Appellants were air traffic controllers and were charged with knowingly
participating in a strike against the United States in 1981. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1918(3) and 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3). The court stated that, "[s]elective prosecution occurs
when the government, without prosecuting others for similar conduct, brings charges against
a person on the basis of race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights." 693 F.2d at
101.
1786. 693 F.2d at 101. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-
47 (1949).
1787. Vindictive prosecution claims arise when the government increases the severity of
charges against a defendant who has exercised a constitutional right. 693 F.2d at 101. The
Butterworth court stated that "'[t]he interests involved [in selective prosecution cases] are the
same as in vindictive prosecution cases: the defendant seeks protection from criminal prose-
cution initiated punitively, in response to the exercise of his constitutional rights.'" Id at
100-01 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1788. Id at 101 (citing United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 646 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.
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similarity between selective and vindictive prosecution claims, also dis-
allowed this immediate appeal, finding that it did not have jurisdiction.
In United States v. Christopher,789 defendant Herer appealed his
conviction claiming that the government selectively prosecuted him be-
cause he was a vocal leader of the organization whose goal was the
passage of the California Marijuana Initiative. 1790  Other defendants
also appealed claiming that they were impermissibly selected for prose-
cution due to their "petitioning activities" when other trespassers were
not cited.
179 1
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its earlier deci-
sion that although mere selectivity in prosecution does not create a con-
stitutional problem, 1792 if there is unconstitutional discrimination when
administering a criminal statute, a defendant cannot stand con-
victed. 1793 The impermissible selection must be shown to be based on
an unjustifiable standard such as the exercise of the first amendment
right of free speech.17 9  The court concluded that defendants failed to
meet their burden of proof to overcome the presumption that the prose-
cution was undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory fash-
ion.1795 The court in so finding noted that the government advanced
several plausible grounds for prosecution, including that those not
prosecuted were not camping on the grounds but simply passing
through, while those cited may have been responsible for leaving
human waste on the grounds and creating concern over noise and se-
1981) (vindictive prosecution established when government threatened defendants with en-
hanced charges if defendants requested change of venue), rev'a 458 U.S. 263 (1982), on
remand, 682 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1982)).
1789. 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1983). For further discussion of this case concerning essen-
tial elements, see supra notes 1634-42 and accompanying text.
1790. 700 F.2d at 1258. In 1981, the defendants set up an information table on federal
property in West Los Angeles, but refused to leave when asked to by Federal Protective
Service officers. Id. at 1256.
1791. Id. at 1258.
1792. Id. (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
1793. Id. (citing United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972) (government
may not purposefully discriminate against persons who exercise their first amendment
rights)).
1794. Id (citing United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir.) (indictment upheld
where defendant claimed he was prosecuted because he was suspected of committing an-
other offense), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); and United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188,
1195 (9th Cir. 1975) (indictment upheld where defendant failed to show that government
failed to prosecute others who were not vocal), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976)).
1795. Id (citing United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (burden
of proof switches to government when defendant alleges intentional, purposeful discrimina-
tion and facts supporting allegation raise reasonable doubt as to government's purpose for
prosecution)).
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curity t79 6  Thus, the Ninth Circuit could not find that the district
court's findings were clearly erroneous.
797
In United States v. Greene, 798 the defendant was convicted for
willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes for the years 1973
and 1974.1799 The Ninth Circuit easily dismissed the defendant's con-
tention that he was improperly selected for prosecution. 80 0 The court
concluded that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that
the allegedly discriminatory prosecution was founded in an impermis-
sible motive and that others in similar situations have not been prose-
cuted.' 10  The court found that the agent's report was only relevant as
to the impermissible motive. 80 2 In addition, the court concluded that
the recommendation to prosecute was reviewed by two government di-
visions, and that the defendant's showing was "insufficient to taint the
entire administrative process."1803
7. Dismissal due to vindictive prosecution
In United States v. Allen, 18 0 the defendant was convicted of pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon. 8 0 5 One of his contentions on
appeal was that the district court erred in not dismissing the indictment
for vindictive prosecution. 80 6 Allen contended that the government's
admission that the indictment was delayed because it was awaiting dis-
1796. Id
1797. Id The Ninth Circuit first developed the "clearly erroneous" standard in United
States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 198 1), when considering a motion to dismiss for
selective prosecution.
1798. 698 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1983).
1799. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976). For discussion of this case concerning time limitations see
supra notes 1753-59 and accompanying text.
1800. The defendant claimed he was selectively prosecuted since he was actively giving
classes in "tax avoidance" and the revenue agent's report stated that his prosecution "may
act as a deterrent to further attempts by other individuals to evade income taxes." 698 F.2d
at 1368.
1801. Id (citing United States v. Ness, 652 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S,
1126 (1981)). In Ness, the Ninth Circuit determined that a defendant has the burden of
showing "that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted and that the prosecution
was based on an impermissible motive." United States v. Ness, 652 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).
1802. 698 F.2d at 1368. Greene claimed that the agent's report was inconsistent with the
agent's declaration in which the agent stated that his recommendation to prosecute was
based solely on his investigation showing that Greene had willfully failed to report a large
amount of taxable income.
1803. Id (citing United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1978) (the ultimate
decision to prosecute is several steps removed from the revenue officer)).
1804. 699 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1982).
1805. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1976).
1806. For a definition of "vindictive prosecution," see supra note 1787.
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position of an unrelated criminal case in Oregon was an improper and
vindictive justification for the delay and that he was, in effect, penal-
ized for "seeking and obtaining favorable treatment" in the Oregon
case.18
07
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court recently limited
the application of the presumption of vindictiveness to cases where "'a
reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists.' ",188 It then concluded
that the question before the court was whether the presumption of vin-
dictiveness should be applied if the government bases its decision to
prosecute on the severity of the sentence received by a defendant in an
earlier unrelated prosecution. 0 9
In reaching its decision, the court noted its earlier decision in
United States v. DeMarco,18 10 where the court dismissed an indictment
after the defendant exercised his right to change venue and the govern-
ment sought an additional indictment.' 811 The court distinguished
DeMarco, in that in the present case they could not see an increased
burden on the prosecutor by Allen's exercise of procedural rights dur-
ing sentencing in Oregon. z12 The court concluded that since it is ex-
pected that every defendant will seek favorable treatment at the time of
sentencing, the corresponding burden on the government will also arise
in every case. Accordingly, it would be unrealistic to assume that every
time a defendant filed a routine motion, the prosecutor's response
would be to penalize and to deter the defendant.' 8' 3 Thus, the court
1807. 699 F.2d at 460. There was more than one year between the execution of the search
warrant and the return of the indictment.
1808. Id. (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 & n.2 (1982)). The Ninth
Circuit noted further that a conviction in a case "'may be reversed only if a presumption of
vindictiveness-applicable in all cases-is warranted."' Id. (quoting United States v. Good-
win, 457 U.S. at 381 (emphasis in original)). The Supreme Court in Goodwin, however,
made a cautionary note when it stated that, "[g]iven the severity of such a presumption,
however,-which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus
may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct-the Court has [presumed vindictive-
ness] only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists." United States
v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982).
1809. 699 F.2d at 460.
1810. 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
1811. The court dismissed the indictment due to "the apprehension of vindictiveness." Id.
at 1227. In Portillo, the court noted that the prosecutor in DeMarco had "'considerable
stake in discouraging' defendants from exercising their venue rights when the effect 'will
clearly require increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources' because the prosecutor
loses the advantage of trying alleged conspirators together and must also conduct two trials
in different parts of the country." 699 F.2d at 461 (quoting United States v. DeMarco, 550
F.2d at 1227 (citations omitted)).
1812. 699 F.2d at 461.
1813. Id.
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found that there was neither direct evidence nor a presumption of vin-
dictiveness in this case. It concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in not dismissing the indictment.1
8 1 4
In United States v. Brooklier, 1115 five defendants had been charged
with racketeering in violation of the RICO Act,18 1 6 violation of the
Hobbs Act or extortion, 81 7 obstruction of justice, 818 and aiding and
abetting. 1 19 Two of the defendants, Brooklier and Sciortino, made a
number of arguments for the dismissal of the indictment. 8 20 One of
their contentions was that in light of the 1975 charges and resulting
plea agreement, the current indictment violated the Petite doctrine
against multiple prosecutions for the same transaction.' 8 2' The Ninth
Circuit rejected this contention because the doctrine is an internal pol-
icy of the Justice Department and thus not justiciable.1822
Brooklier and Sciortino also contended that the inclusion in the
current indictment of the extortion count represented vindictive prose-
cution. This particular extortion count had not previously been in-
cluded in the 1978 indictment, 823 but was added in the subsequent
1814. Id.
1815. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1194 (1983).
1816. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). For text of§ 1962, see supra note 1678.
1817. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.
1818. 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery. . . to obstruct, delay,
or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any crimi-
nal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be
fined ... or imprisoned... or both.
1819. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a princi-
pal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
1820. See supra notes 1677-80 and accompanying text.
1821. 685 F.2d at 1215. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). "The Petite
doctrine relates to the Justice Department's internal position that successive indictments will
not ordinarily be based on the same conduct in order to avoid unnecessary multiple prosecu-
tions." 685 F.2d at 1215. Generally, it is a nonjusticiable doctrine. Id. (citing United States
v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v.
Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978)).
1822. See supra note 1821.
1823. The 1978 indictment was dismissed because of voting irregularities in the grand jury.
685 F.2d at 1215.
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indictments. The court concluded that since the 1980 indictment con-
tained fewer charges and lighter penalties than the 1978 indictment, the
vindictiveness doctrine did not apply. 824 The court reasoned that if the
circumstances are such that it is realistic or reasonable to assume that
the government conduct would not have occurred but for the hostility
or a punitive animus towards the defendant because he has exercised
his legal rights, the doctrine will be applied. 825 Thus, the court con-




The Ninth Circuit applies the test articulated in Simmons v. United
States1827 when considering a defendant's claim that identification pro-
cedures deprived him of due process. Convictions resulting from iden-
tifications will be set aside if the pretrial identification was "so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of
1824. Id. (citing United States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1980) (vin-
dictiveness not found where charges in second indictment exposed defendant to no greater
risk of punishment then those in first indictment)).
1825. Id. (citing United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (vin-
dictive prosecution exists only when prosecutorial actions arise from an animus toward the
exercise of defendant's rights)). The court also noted that vindictiveness could not be pre-
sumed in this case as the government having to obtain a new indictment would "'necessarily
have to review the evidence and reconsider what charges to present to the grand jury.'" Id
at 1216 (quoting United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 755 (1983) (emphasis in original)). Because the prosecutor "'may uncover additional
information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he simply may come to realize
that information possessed by the State has a broader significance,' " there is '"no reasonable
likelihood" that vindictiveness is present when the government increases the charges before
trial. Id. at 1215 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982)).
1826. Id. at 1216.
1827. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons, eyewitnesses identified defendant Simmons from
a photographic display the day after a bank robbery. The photographs had been obtained
from a relative of the defendant and all featured him in the presence of others. Id at 382.
Simmons contended that the pretrial photographic identification procedure was so unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification as to deny him due process of law, or, at
the very least, to require reversal of his conviction. Id. at 381.
The United States Supreme Court, recognizing the need for law enforcement officials to
employ photographic displays in order to quickly apprehend criminals, was unwilling to
prohibit their use. Id at 384. Instead, the Court held that convictions based on pretrial
photographic identifications may be reversed only when the identification procedures are
"so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." Id The Court then stated that there was little chance the photographic
display had led to the misidentification of Simmons. The bank was well lit during the rob-
bery, the robbers did not wear masks, the witnesses had an opportunity to view the robbers
for as much as five minutes, and the witnesses were shown the photographs the day after the
robbery while their memories of the event were still fresh. Id. at 385.
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irreparable misidentification."' 18 28
In United States v. Crenshaw, 1829 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether certain pretrial comments by the prosecutor to eyewitnesses
impermissibly tainted the reliability of subsequent in-court identifica-
tions.18 30 Defendants Gordon and Crenshaw were indicted on charges
of armed bank robbery. 1 3 1 On the morning of the trial, the prosecutor
informed two bank employees, who had witnessed the robbery, that the
men they had previously identified in photographic lineups would be in
court seated at the defendants' table.'8 32 The trial judge made a pre-
trial ruling that the prosecutor's comments tainted the reliability of any
subsequent identification by the bank employees and refused to allow
any in-court identification. Nevertheless, the court allowed the bank
employees to indicate which pictures they had previously selected in
the photo lineups.
8 33
On appeal, the defendants contended that the photographic identi-
fication at trial violated their due process rights because it was tanta-
mount to an in-court identification.18 34 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendants' argument, stating that the prosecutor's comments did not
affect the reliability of the prior photo identifications.'8 35 Thus, the
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it per-
mitted the photographic identification at trial.
8 36
In United States v. Barrett,837 the Ninth Circuit addressed the is-
sue of whether a pretrial photographic spread was so impermissibly
suggestive that it tainted a bank teller's subsequent in-court identifica-
1828. Id. at 384.
1829. 698 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983).
1830. Id at 1063.
1831. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing
of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession
of, any. . . savings and loan association.. . shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in
subsection (a). . . assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person
by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
1832. 698 F.2d at 1063. The two bank employees previously identified Gordon and Cren-
shaw from a photograph lineup consisting of one dozen pictures, once shortly after the rob-





1837. 703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
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tion of the defendant. 838 Approximately two weeks after the robbery
of a savings and loan by a lone, bearded gunman, the teller who was
the victim of the crime identified Barrett from a photographic spread
prepared by the FBI. The spread consisted of nine photographs of
clean-shaven, white men of similar ages with similar features. 18 39 The
day before trial, the teller was shown the same photographic spread,
together with surveillance photos taken during the robbery and two
photographs of Barrett wearing a beard and mustache. 1840 The teller
once again identified Barrett as the robber. Although she was uncer-
tain of her initial photographic identification, the teller made a positive
in-court identification,' 84' and the defendant was subsequently con-
victed of bank robbery.
842
The Ninth Circuit held that the photographic spread was not so
impermissibly suggestive that it tainted the teller's in-court identifica-
tion. 1843 The court remarked that all the men in the photo lineup were
very similar in appearance, the only perceptible difference being that
Barrett was the only suspect wearing dark glasses. The court con-
cluded, however, that this difference was insignificant. 1844
The court further held that, even if the photographic spread was
somewhat suggestive, the teller's in-court identification was sufficiently
trustworthy to justify its admission. 1845 The court observed that the
1838. Id at 1084.
1839. Id. at 1084-85. The defendant asserted that:
(1) he was the only person in the photographic display wearing dark glasses (the
robber had been described as wearing dark glasses); (2) his photograph was one of
five in which height lines typical of a booking facility appeared in the background;
(3) all the men in the photographic spread were clean-shaven, implicitly indicating
that the robber had shaved; and (4) he was the largest person in the photographic
spread.
Id.
1840. Id. at 1084. The defendant argued that the teller's in-court identification was further
tainted when she again viewed the photo lineup and surveillance photographs prior to iden-
tifying him in court. This argument was not raised by Barrett at trial; thus, the Ninth Circuit
would not consider it on appeal. The court noted, however, that had it considered this
argument, it would not have affected its decision with regard to the reliability of the teller's
in-court identification. Id at 1084 n.15.
1841. Id at 1084. In addition, the defendant's live-in girlfriend testified that Barrett was
the man in the surveillance photo taken during the robbery, and that Barrett had shaved off
his beard and mustache on the afternoon of the robbery. Id at 1079-80.
1842. Id at 1079. Barrett was convicted of robbing a federally insured savings and loan
association in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). See supra note 1831.
1843. Id at 1085.
1844. Id
1845. Id (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). In Neil v. Biggers, the Court identified five factors that must be consid-
ered when assessing the reliability of in-court identifications. They are:
1985]
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teller had ample time to view the defendant during the robbery and
that handing the robber two clips of bait bills clearly demonstrated her
high degree of attention. Moreover, her description of the robber was
remarkably accurate and she correctly selected Barrett from nine other
similar photos at the pretrial photographic lineup. Finally, only two
weeks had passed between the time of the robbery and the teller's pre-
trial photographic identification. 846  Consequently, the court con-
cluded that the reliability of the in-court identification outweighed any
suggestiveness in the pretrial identification procedures. 1
847
In United States v. Kessler, 848 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a showup at the scene of a bank robbery was so impermissibly
suggestive that the eyewitness identification testimony of bank tellers
should have been suppressed. 849 Within an hour after the commission
of a bank robbery, defendant Booth was apprehended on the basis of
descriptions of the robber given by the tellers in response to identifica-
tion questionnaires. The post-showup questionnaires yielded more
precise and accurate descriptions of the robber than those given prior
to the showup. 850 At trial, Booth contended the showup was imper-
missibly suggestive, and the district court suppressed the eyewitness
identification testimony.
185'
On appeal, Booth advanced three principal arguments in support
of his contention that the trial court's suppression order should be up-
held.18 52 First, he asserted that the police officers' use of the word "sus-
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Nell v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
1846. 703 F.2d at 1085.
1847. Id.
1848. 692 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1982).
1849. Id. at 585.
1850. Id at 585-86.
1851. Id at 585.
1852. Id at 586. This case was before the Ninth Circuit on one other occasion. Id at 585.
See United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981). There, the trial court had sup-
pressed the eyewitness identification testimony of the bank tellers, holding the showup was
improper because no exigent circumstances existed to justify handcuffing the defendant and
returning him to the bank. Id The Ninth Circuit held the propriety of a showup identifica-
tion does not depend upon a showing of exigent circumstances. Id Consequently, the court
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to determine whether the showup
procedure was "'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification.'" Id (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968)). See supra note 1827 for a discussion of Simmons.
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pect" in reference to him was in itself suggestive. 1853 The defendant
further argued that his display in handcuffs surrounded by a large
number of police officers was impermissibly suggestive. 854 Finally,
Booth contended that the disparity in the answers to the pre- and post-
showup identification questionnaires demonstrated that the showup
was impermissibly suggestive.11
55
Prior to considering Booth's contentions, the Ninth Circuit noted
that it is almost impossible to avoid some degree of suggestiveness in a
showup at the scene of a crime. 1856 The court further stated, however,
that showups are not objectionable unless "the 'procedure is so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.' "'ll
The Ninth Circuit held that the procedure used for the showup in
this situation did not justify suppression of the subsequent identifica-
tion testimony. 8 58 The court stated that the mere reference to Booth as
a "suspect" was not an impermissible suggestion, 859 but cautioned that
use of this term should be avoided in order to eliminate the possibility
that witnesses will draw adverse inferences from its use. 1860 The court
also noted that the use of handcuffs and other indicia of custody do not
invalidate a showup where they are "necessary for the prompt and or-
derly presentation of the suspect consistent with protection of the of-
ficers and witnesses."' 8 6' In support of its conclusion, the court of
appeals observed that the eyewitnesses had been instructed to draw no
inferences from the fact that Booth was in handcuffs, that Booth was
only displayed for a short period of time, and that the presence of a
large number of officers at the showup was justified, given the type of
crime which had just occurred. 1862 The Ninth Circuit further held the
fact that differences existed between the pre- and post-identification
questionnaires could not be used to show impermissible suggestive-
ness 1 63 because one of the principal functions of a showup is to elicit a




1857. Id (citing United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968))). See supra note 1827 for a discussion of
Simmons.
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more precise description of the suspect.1 "'
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered Booth's assertion that the in-
itial descriptions of the robber were insufficient to justify the use of a
showup procedure. 1865 The court found this argument unpersuasive,
observing that victims are likely to be in shock shortly after a crime
occurs and, therefore, precise recollections cannot be expected.1866 In
addition, the court noted that the witnesses were questioned by FBI
agents after filling out the initial questionnaires and prior to the
showup.1867 These interviews yielded more detailed descriptions which
led to the arrest of the defendant. 8 68 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that, under the circumstances, use of the showup procedure was
proper.
8 69
In United States v. Burnette,18 7 1 the Ninth Circuit again confronted
the issue of whether a pretrial showup, at which the defendant was
identified, was conducted in such an impermissibly suggestive manner
that the admission of the witness' subsequent in-court identification tes-
timony denied the defendant due process of law.'8 7' A lone black gun-
man wearing a ski mask robbed a savings and loan. The robber then
removed the mask and fled on foot. A bank customer, chasing the rob-
ber, enlisted the aid of a passing truck driver who responded by block-
ing the robber's path with his truck. The robber was forced to pass in
front of the truck, enabling the driver to see his face for a brief period
of time. The driver then pursued the robber on foot. When they were
approximately four feet apart, the robber turned and fired a shot at the
truck driver. The driver was not hit, but was able to view the gunman's
face for approximately four seconds. The bank customer continued to
chase the robber and saw him enter a waiting automobile. A pedes-
trian heard the customer's shouts and noted the license plate number of
the vehicle.
8 72
The automobile was located by the police an hour later at a local
1864. Id. (citing Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (level of certainty demon-
strated at the confrontation is an indicia of reliability to be weighed against the corrupting
effect of suggestive pretrial identification procedures)). See infra note 1881 for a discussion
of Manson. See also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), discussed supra at note
1845.





1870. 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2106 (1983).
1871. Id at 1045.
1872. Id at 1042-43.
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motel. After a short surveillance, the suspect was located and taken
into custody. An FBI agent then contacted the truck driver and asked
if he would accompany the agent to the motel to identify the man who
had fired at him. When he arrived at the motel, the truck driver saw a
black man in handcuffs, but was not asked to identify him. He then
accompanied the agent to the police station where he saw a different
black male in handcuffs sitting in the back seat of a patrol car. Without
any questioning or prompting by the police, the truck driver immedi-
ately identified the man as the gunman he had chased following the
robbery, 873 and Burnette was subsequently charged with armed bank
robbery.
1874
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the truck driver's in-
court identification testimony on the ground that the pretrial showup
was so unnecessarily suggestive that it denied him due process of
law. 875 The trial court denied the defendant's suppression motion and
Burnette was subsequently convicted.
1876
The Ninth Circuit assumed arguendo that the pretrial showup was
unnecessarily suggestive,1877 but further noted that due process does
not require the suppression of all in-court identifications following sug-
gestive pretrial identifications. 878 The court of appeals stated that the
applicable test is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances,
the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive as to result in a
substantial likelihood of misidentification.8 79 "'It is the likelihood of
misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due pro-
cess,' " 1880 and, therefore, if the identification possesses sufficient as-
pects of reliability, due process is not violated by suggestive pretrial
1873. Id. at 1043-44.
1874. Id. at 1042. Burnette was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(d). See supra note 1831.
1875. 698 F.2d at 1045. The defendant also challenged the manner in which the prosecu-
tion solicited the in-court identification. The truck driver was asked by the prosecutor if he
could identify the black male he had pursued. Burette was the only black man present in
the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit stated that the prosecutor's question was not improper
because there was never any dispute that the man chased by the truck driver was black and,
therefore, Burnette was not prejudiced by the question. Id at 1045 n.10.
1876. Id. at 1044.
1877. Id. at 1045.
1878. Id. (citing United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1980) (due process is
not violated by suggestive identification procedures if the identification possesses sufficient
aspects of reliability)).
1879. Id. (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). See supra note 1827
for a discussion of Simmons.
1880. 698 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)).
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identification procedures.' 88'
The court concluded that the testimony of the truck driver was
sufficiently reliable to warrant its admission. 8 82 The court based its
conclusion on the witness' clear and unobstructed view of the defend-
ant, his attentiveness given the seriousness of the situation, his accurate
description of both the defendant and the gun prior to the showup, the
witness' high degree of certainty that the defendant was the man who
had shot at him, and the passage of less than two hours between the
crime and the showup.'883
D. Bail
Persons charged with non-capital offenses must be released from
custody pending trial if it has been determined by a judicial officer that
the bailee will appear on the appointed trial date.18 8 4 This release will
1881. Id. (citing Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977)). In Manson, an under-
cover narcotics agent purchased drugs on an informant's tip and then returned to the police
station. The agent described the suspect to a fellow officer who recognized the description as
being similar to that of an individual he had seen in the area of the narcotics sale on numer-
ous occasions. The officer showed a photograph of the man to the agent, who identified the
person in the photograph as the man who had sold him the narcotics. Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99-101 (1977).
In a state criminal trial, the agent made an in-court identification and testified he had
identified a photograph of the defendant. The defendant was subsequently convicted on
narcotics charges. Id at 102. The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal district court alleging that admission of the identification testimony had deprived
him of due process. The district court dismissed the petition; however, the Second Circuit
reversed on the ground that evidence of the photograph should have been excluded because
the examination of the single photograph was unnecessary and suggestive. Id. at 103-04.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit.
Id. at 117. The Court stated that, even though the photographic identification procedure
was suggestive because only one photograph was used and unnecessary because there were
no exigent circumstances preventing the use of multiple photographs, suppression of evi-
dence is justified only if a "substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" exists. Id.
at 109-10. The Court concluded that no such possibility of misidentification existed based
on the undercover agent's opportunity to view the defendant for a significant length of time,
the agent's special training as an observer, the accuracy of the agent's description of the
defendant, the agent's level of certainty, and the relatively short period of time between the
crime and the photographic identification. Id at 114-16.
1882. 698 F.2d at 1045-46. The court further stated the suggestive pretrial identification
procedure did not influence the truck driver's identification of the defendant, noting that the
truck driver had seen another black male in handcuffs at the motel and was immediately
aware that the man was not the robber he had pursued earlier that day. In addition, the
driver identified the defendant at the showup prior to any prompting or questioning by the
police. Id. at 1046.
1883. Id
1884. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976) states in pertinent part:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death,
shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial
1985] CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
continue throughout the trial unless it is determined that the bailee's
continued freedom will disrupt the judicial process.
1885
In United States v. Rhodes,1886 the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision to increase the defendant's bond and remand him to
custody following a determination that his conduct threatened to dis-
rupt the ongoing judicial proceedings. 1887 Dudley and a co-defendant
were charged with conspiracy in connection with the possession and
distribution of stolen mail. 888 During trial, following a noon recess,
Dudley approached the prosecution table and proceeded to make men-
acing statements to the prosecutor, a witness, and several inspectors
from the Postal Service. 889 The court had also received information
that prior to trial Dudley had made threats to the prosecutor, and that
threatening telephone calls had been received by witnesses and one
postal inspector. 890 Based on this information, the Ninth Circuit held
that the trial court acted within its authority to prevent further interfer-
ence by Dudley.'8 91
on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines
• . . that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required.
1885. FED. R. CuM. P. 46(b) provides in pertinent part: "A person released before trial
shall continue on release during trial under the same terms and conditions as were previ-
ously imposed unless the court determines that other terms and conditions. . . are necessary
.. . to assure that his conduct will not obstruct the orderly and expeditious progress of the
trial."
1886. 713 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 535 (1983).
1887. Id. at 468. See Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1961) (bail may
be revoked if "there is reason to believe that a trial actually in progress may be disrupted
. . . by [defendant's] activities").
1888. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) states in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or
any agency thereof. . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both."
1889. 713 F.2d at 468. Dudley's statements included, "I am going to clean this up when
this [sic] all over." Id.
1890. Id At one point, Dudley told the prosecutor "'that [the prosecutor] should watch
[his] family.'" Id.
1891. Id See, e.g., United States v. Meinster, 481 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D. Fla. 1979), where
the district court listed the following factors to be considered by the trial courts in a revoca-
tion determination:
(1) The trial court should determine whether a defendant has a motive to disrupt
the trial;
(2) The trial court should weigh the evidence carefully to determine if a defend-
ant truly intends to disrupt the proceedings;
(3) The trial court should determine whether defendant's behavior fits into a
known pattern; and
(4) The trial court should weigh the prejudicial effect the disruption would have
on the proceedings.
Id at 1123-24.
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Dudley contended that the trial court acted improperly when it
revoked his bond without a hearing. 18 92 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
claim, relying upon its ruling in a previous case that no full hearing is
required when the trial judge has stated his reasons for revocation, and
defense counsel has been given an opportunity to rebut the charges.1
893
In Rhodes, following the prosecution's presentation of evidence of
Dudley's conduct toward the court, defense counsel was allowed to an-
swer the charges. The Ninth Circuit found that all pertinent facts were
before the trial court when it made its revocation determination.
1894
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that sufficient evidence existed to
support the trial court's finding that Dudley's conduct threatened the
orderly progress of the trial.
18 95
E. Defendant's Right to be Present at Pretrial Proceedings
Under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a de-
fendant's presence is generally required at every stage of the proceed-
ings against him. 1896 This rule affords a broader protection than that
guaranteed under the sixth amendment right to confrontation or under
the fifth amendment right to due process.
1897
In United States v. Christopher,1898 the Ninth Circuit vacated a de-
1892. 713 F.2d at 468.
1893. Id (citing United States v. Stroud, 474 F.2d 737, 738 (9th Cir.) ("At the least, the
judge should have stated his reasons and given Stroud's counsel a chance to rebut them."),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 930 (1973)).
1894. Id. at 469.
1895. Id
1896. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 states:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment,
at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the
jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as
otherwise provided by this rule.
(c) Presence Not Required. A defendant need not be present in the follow-
ing situations:
(2) In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for
not more than one year or both, the court, with the written consent of the defend-
ant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial, and imposition of sentence in the defend-
ant's absence.
1897. [D]efendants have an explicit, unqualified right under Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to be present at their jury impaneling, as well as at all
other stages of the trial. . . . Rule 43 embodies the right to be present derived
from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence.
United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949
(1981).
1898. 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983).
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fendant's conviction because he had been arraigned in his absence. 1899
Defendant Michel and others were cited after refusing to leave federal
property while promoting passage of the California Marijuana Initia-
tive.' 900 When Michel was unaccountably absent at his misdemeanor
arraignment, 190 the court suggested that it was appropriate to proceed
without him pursuant to Rule 43.1902 No objection was made at that
time by Michel's attorney. 903 On appeal, Michel contended that he
was improperly arraigned in his absence.' 9 4
The Ninth Circuit stated that Rule 43 made no provision for the
arraignment of a defendant without either his presence or his written
consent to proceed in his absence, 190 5 and that only the defendant's
presence could adequately assure the court that he had been apprised
of the proceedings against him.
90 6
F. Defendant's Right to Discovery
There is no general constitutional right to pretrial discovery in
criminal cases.' 90 7 Pretrial discovery is required, however, if the ac-
cused specifically requests prosecutorial evidence favorable to his de-
fense. 908 Failure to comply with such a request is a violation of due
1899. Id. at 1262.
1900. Id. at 1256. Defendant and several associates set up a table on federal building
property in Los Angeles. The group sought to distribute information, solicit petition signa-
tures, and register voters. Members of the group announced their intention to stay on the
premises for seventeen days. Id Michel was cited for being present on federal property
after hours in violation of 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.302 (1981), which states in pertinent part:
"Property shall be closed to the public during other than normal working hours," and 41
C.F.R. § 101-20.315 (1981), which provides that "[w]hoever shall be found guilty of violat-
ing any rule or regulation in this Subpart ... while on any property under the ... control
of GSA is subject to a fine of not more than $50 or imprisonment of not more than 30 days,
or both."
1901. 700 F.2d at 1256. The court questioned Michel's attorney about Michel's wherea-
bouts, but no one could account for his absence. Id
1902. Id See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(2), supra note 1896.
1903. 700 F.2d at 1256.
1904. Id.
1905. Id. at 1262. The court cited United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), in which the court stated that "no defendant can be tried until
after he personally has entered a plea to the charge." Id at 1209. The defendant in Tortora,
however, had previously made court appearances in the case. The court held that the de-
fendant had been adequately notified and had thereby waived his right to be present at his
trial. Id at 1209-10.
1906. 700 F.2d at 1262.
1907. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (due process clause silent on
amount of discovery that must be afforded defendant in criminal case).
1908. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
In Brady, defendant Brady and an accomplice, Boblit, were arrested for murder corn-
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process. 19 09
In United States v. Bennett,191° the Ninth Circuit considered
whether an accused is entitled to discover grand jury transcripts. 91'
Defendant Bennett was convicted of fraud, 91 2 conspiracy,19 13 tax eva-
sion, 91 4 theft and embezzlement. 91 5 On appeal, Bennett sought to ob-
tain grand jury transcripts, asserting he could not ascertain whether
prosecutorial misconduct had occurred without them.
916
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had properly denied
mitted in the course of a robbery, and tried separately in state proceedings. Brady's accom-
plice made an extrajudicial confession admitting the homicide. Boblit's confession was
suppressed by the prosecution, despite Brady's request to examine Boblit's extrajudicial
statements. Brady did not learn of Boblit's confession until after Brady was convicted of
first degree murder. Id. at 84-85.
The trial court denied Brady's petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, however,
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the prosecution's suppression of the exculpatory
evidence denied Brady due process of law. Id. at 85. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Maryland high court's ruling, id. at 90-91, holding that the government's suppression of
evidence favorable to the accused, after it has been requested by the defendant, violates due
process when the evidence is material to the establishment of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. Id at 87.
1909. Id It is immaterial that the evidence is suppressed in good faith.
1910. 702 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1983).
1911. Id at 836.
1912. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
1913. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof. . . , and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
1914. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1976) provides:
Any person who. . . [w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement,
or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that is
made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and
correct as to every material matter. . . shall be guilty of a felony and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
1915. 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or employee of. . . any agency
receiving financial assistance under the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act of 1973 embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud any of the
moneys, funds, assets, or property which are the subject of a grant or contract of
assistance. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than two years, or both.
1916. 702 F.2d at 836.
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the defendant's discovery request. 1917 The court stated that Bennett
had not met his burden of showing a "particularized need" for the tran-
scripts which outweighed the need for grand jury secrecy. 1918
In Baumann v. United States,1919 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the government had unconstitutionally failed to disclose mate-
rial, exculpatory evidence to the defendant. 192 0  Defendant Baumann
was indicted on four counts of mail fraud 192 ' and aiding and abet-
ting 922 arising out of the fraudulent sale of "fenceposted" land sale
contracts. 923 He was found guilty on all counts, 92 4 and his conviction
was affirmed on appeal. 925  The defendant's subsequent petition in




1918. Id (citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (no
"particularized need" for disclosure of grand jury transcript because it dealt with subject
matter generally covered at trial)).
1919. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
1920. Id at 572.
1921. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direc-
tion thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
1922. 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, for the purpose of conducting, promoting, or carrying on by means
of the Post Office Department, any scheme or device ... or any other unlawful
business, uses or assumes, or requests to be addressed by, any fictitious, false, or
assumed title, name, or address or name other than his own proper name, or takes
or receives from any post office or authorized depository of mail matter, any letter,
postal card, package, or other mail matter addressed to such fictitious, false or
assumed title, name, or address, or name other than his own proper name, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
1923. 692 F.2d at 569. A "fenceposted" contract is a contract for the sale of land made out
to a person who is not expected to make payments on it. The contract is then sold to an
investor or pledged as security for a loan. Id
1924. Id Baumann was fined $1,000 and sentenced to a five year prison term on each of
the four counts, two of which were to run consecutively. However, the district court reduced
his sentence to five years by ordering that all sentences run concurrently. Id
1925. Id
1926. Id The district court judge consulted with a magistrate regarding Baumann's peti-
tion for post-conviction relief. The magistrate recommended the defendant's petition be
dismissed on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 "does not permit a party to relitigate issues
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Appealing the dismissal of his petition, Baumann contended that
the district court had erred in failing to order an evidentiary hearing on
his claim that the prosecution had suppressed exculpatory evidence
1927
in violation of his due process rights. 1928 The defendant alleged that
the prosecutor knew investors testifying against Baumann had received
legitimate periodic contract payments, rather than fraudulent payments
resulting from the "fenceposted" land sale scheme, and that the prose-
cutor failed to disclose this information to the jury.1929 The defendant
did not allege, however, that the prosecution relied on perjured testi-
mony or that the government failed to respond to a specific pretrial
discovery request.
1930
The Ninth Circuit stated that failure to disclose the exculpatory
material would be a due process violation only if the "omitted evidence
would have created a reasonable doubt that otherwise did not ex-
ist."'193 Pointing out that the prosecution's case against Baumann de-
pended upon circumstantial evidence that Baumann brokered the
"fenceposted" contracts, the court concluded that evidence showing
that the contracts were legitimate and not "fenceposted" would have
created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 932 The record did not con-
clusively demonstrate that Baumann's claim lacked merit justifying
summary dismissal. 933 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of Baumann's petition and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.
934
that were or could have been raised on direct appeal." Id The district court then dismissed
the petition. Id.
1927. Id. at 568.
1928. Id. at 572 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). See supra note 1908 and
accompanying text.
1929. 692 F.2d at 572. In his brief on appeal, Baumann included letters which he claimed
demonstrated that the contract underlying one of the counts of which he was convicted was
legitimate. Baumann further alleged the prosecution had possession of both of these letters
at the time of trial. The court of appeals refused to rule on Baumann's argument because it
had not been raised initially in the trial court. However, the court stated that the issue of
whether the prosecution had the letters in its possession before trial and failed to disclose
them to the defense should be considered on remand. Id at 573.
1930. Id. at 572.
1931. Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (failure to disclose excul-
patory evidence requires the verdict be set aside only if error influenced the jury)).
1932. Id The Ninth Circuit noted Baumann had not demonstrated that any Brady mate-
rial had been suppressed, but recognized that he had identified specific exculpatory evidence
which he claimed the prosecutor had knowledge of and failed to disclose. Therefore, his
claim was not "so patently frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal." Id at
573.
1933. Id at 572.
1934. Id. at 573.
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In United States v. Gee,'93 5 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the government's failure to provide Gee with a transcript of two tape-
recorded conversations involving Gee, his co-defendants, and an un-
dercover agent constituted a violation of the defendant's due process
rights, as well as Rule 16(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. 9 36 The taped conversations were played for defense counsel in
advance of trial and the prosecution provided Gee with a copy of the
tapes. Pursuant to Rule 16, the defendant subsequently requested a
transcript of his tape-recorded statements, 1937 but was informed by the
government that he not only had access to all the tapes, but had already
been given a copy of all transcripts in existence at that time. 9 38
At trial, the prosecution produced a transcript of the tape-recorded
conversations. Gee objected to the jury's use of the transcript, claiming
he had not been supplied with a copy although he had made a timely
request.' 939 Ruling the government was not required to prepare or pro-
duce the transcript prior to trial, the trial court denied Gee's motion for
a new trial.
1940
1935. 695 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1983). Gee was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982), which provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter [on drug abuse prevention] is
punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punish-
ment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy."
1936. 695 F.2d at 1167-69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) provides:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made
by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the
government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral
statement which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by
the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any
person then known to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testi-
mony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) further provides:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of his defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in
chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
1937. 695 F.2d at 1166. Both the originals and copies of the tapes were of poor quality.
Gee, therefore, requested that the government transcribe the tapes and provide him with a
copy of the transcript. Id. at 1166-67.
1938. Id. at 1166. A question arose concerning whether the transcript existed at the time
Gee made his discovery request. The trial court, however, made no clear finding as to when
the transcript was prepared. Id at 1167.
1939. Id. at 1166-67.
1940. Id. at 1167.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the failure to provide the
defendant with a transcript of his tape-recorded statements was not a
violation of Rule 16 because Gee had been given an opportunity to
listen to the original tapes and had been provided with copies of
them.194 1 The court also found that, even if a violation of Rule 16 had
occurred, Gee had not demonstrated that the failure to provide him
with a transcript had prejudiced his rights.
1942
The Ninth Circuit further held that, even if the prosecution had
violated Rule 16 and caused some prejudice to the defendant, it did not
constitute reversible error because the district judge had not abused his
discretion by allowing use of the transcripts. 1943 Gee was given ample
opportunity to review the transcript before it was given to the jury.
Moreover, the jury was removed from the courtroom while the tape
and transcript were compared for accuracy. In addition, the transcript
was retrieved from the jury immediately after the tape was played, and
the trial judge instructed the jury that they could only consider the tape
as evidence. 1944 The court limited its holding, however, by concluding
that "wrongful behavior by the Government in failing to fully comply
with Rule 16 might well compel reversal [in] only slightly different fac-
tual situations.'
1945
In a concurring opinion, Judge Fletcher concluded that the gov-
ernment's failure to produce the transcript violated Rule 16.1946 The
judge reasoned that the evidence tag attached to the transcript, as well
as the government's own statements, clearly established that the tran-
script was prepared prior to Gee's discovery request. 9 47 In addition,
the transcript represented information concerning the government's
1941. Id The court found no reason why Gee could not have produced his own transcript,
just as the prosecution had done. Id.
1942. Id. at 1168. The court noted: (1) neither the judge nor the jury expressed any diffi-
culty in understanding the tape; (2) the jury did not rely on the transcript when listening to
the tape a second time; and (3) the trial court had found that the tape had been available to
the defendant. Id
1943. Id The Ninth Circuit stated: "The trial court, when faced with a violation of Rule
16, may 'order such [offending] party to permit the discovery,. . . grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such order as it
deems just under the circumstances."' Id (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)).
1944. Id. at 1167-68. The court stated that the only relief to which the defendant might
have been entitled was a continuance. None was requested by the defendant, however, nor
did defense counsel ever suggest to the court that additional time was necessary to prepare
an adequate defense. Id. at 1169.
1945. Id
1946. Id at 1170-71 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A), (C)).
See supra note 1935.
1947. 695 F.2d at 1170-71 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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version of the tapes, which was relevant and significant to Gee's de-
fense. 1948 Judge Fletcher concurred in the judgment, however, because
Gee had failed to demonstrate that prejudice to his defense had re-
sulted from the government's failure to produce the document.
1949
1948. Id. at 1170 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
1949. Id. at 1171 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
1985]

